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This thesis examines the „public sphere‟ of state reconstruction and political conflict across the Somali 
territories through comparative discursive and contextual analysis of media production and consumption on the 
ground in Somalia. Using Somali-language media sources - including political cartoons, editorials, radio 
broadcasts and audio-visual propaganda - the chapters cumulatively present a dual conceptualisation of the 
public sphere in the Somali context. Here, local media production centred in individual capitals of various 
political projects (The Somali Federal Government, Somaliland and Puntland) coexists and overlaps with a 
transnational arena of Somali-language broadcasting and debate from various externally-based media 
producers. These range from the British Broadcasting Corporation‟s Somali Service and popular diaspora-
based satellite television stations, to sophisticated „jihadi‟ propagandists, or individual geographically-
detached cartoonists. Internationalised dynamics of economic and political change across the territories render 
distinctions between „diasporic‟ and „local‟ media production analytically unhelpful. At the same, ongoing 
popular rhetorical contestation over „foreign‟ influence ensures an ostensibly paradoxical (and politically 
salient) discursive resilience of a culturally and religiously-defined „Somali Ummah‟ across and beyond 
political boundaries. Although significant academic attention has been directed towards the role of 
decentralized „new‟ or „social‟ media and possibilities for civic agency vis-á-vis coherent, authoritarian state 
structures, the thesis argues that the Somali case highlights the significance of such public sphere technologies 
in altering discursive, political and security conditions for state (re)construction in socially fragmented and 




This thesis examines the relationship between local news media and conflict or political reconfiguration in 
Somalia. Examining the development of new forms of electronic news broadcasting and space for political 
debate, the thesis argues that the emergence of new ‗public sphere‘ technologies has important ramifications for 
future political development and contestation over state structures. The chapters explore the different linkages 
which exist between localised news production and global circuits of Somali-language media. It argues that this 
distinct broadcasting environment helps account for the continued salience of ideas of cultural, religious or 
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A note on language and orthography 
An important strand of analysis in this this thesis interrogates the political and cultural status of the Somali 
language. As such, the following chapters employ the ‗standard‘ Somali orthography of Af Maxaa Tiri for 
names of individuals or places. Nevertheless, as I endeavour to spell people‘s names in the manner in which 
they write them either in print publications or in personal communication with me, in some cases the ‗English‘ 
transliteration may be used. For non-Somali speaking readers the orthography should be fairly straightforward 
for basic pronunciation, bearing in mind that the ‗X‘ is similar to the Arabic letter ‗Hhaa‘, and ‗C‘ resembles the 
Arabic ‗Ain‘. Therefore, for example, the Somali name Xasan is usually written and pronounced in English as 
‗Hassan‘, whereas ‗Cabdilaahi/Cabdulaahi‘ would usually be pronouced ‗Abdilahi‘ by a non-Somali speaker. 
All quoted Somali text is given in italics, and my English translations or paraphrasing appear in the text.  
 
Acronyms 
Again, given my focus on the politics of language, I strive to use the ‗official‘ names of all organisations 
discussed in the thesis. Acronyms may derive from English or Somali (or even transliterated Arabic) and I use 
the most common forms in the following chapters. An indicative list is provided below: 
 
AMISOM: The African Union Mission in Somalia  
AS:  Harakaat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin  
ENDF:  Ethiopian National Defence Force 
KDF:  Kenyan Defence Force 
NISA:  The National Intelligence and Security Agency 
SFG:  The Somali Federal Government 
SNM:  The Somali National Movement 
SSDF:  The Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
UCID:  Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka (The Justice and Welfare Party). 
UDUB:   Ururka Dimuqraadiga Ummadda Bahawday (The United People‘s Democratic Party) 
UPDF:  Ugandan People‘s Defence Force 




















Map 2: Historical depiction of clan distribution 
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Somalia ‗ethnic group‘ Map 










Map 3: Modern conflict and political control 
 




















1. Introduction: Imagining the Somali lands 
 
1.1. The public sphere and the paradox of ‘Somali’ identity 
Popular political discourse across Somalia presents an intriguing paradox to observers of what is 
characteristically described as the world‘s archetypal ‗failed state‘. Narratives of relative ethnic, 
linguistic, religious and cultural homogeneity exist in the ‗public sphere‘ of Somali-language news 
media alongside the continued reality of extreme political fragmentation and ongoing armed conflict. 
Much scholarship on Somali state collapse and persistent conflict has focused on the relationship 
between (contested) ideas of a homogenous Somali ‗nation‘ and the practical challenges of state 
reconstruction amongst multiple diverse stakeholders. Instead of conceptualising this tension solely as 
a primary cause of continued state failure, this thesis interrogates the extent to which political 
fragmentation - combined with a decentralized, transnational and vibrant public sphere - influences 
the emergence of new political, cultural and religious articulations of explicitly ‗Somali‘ identities, 
and the opportunities and dilemmas that these present for a range of power holders, militants, 
activists, and political entrepreneurs.  
The very fact that a public sphere of media production, dissemination and reproduction 
actually exists in such a dynamic form in a conflict environment is in itself of significance, and calls 
into question popular assumptions about the capacities, internal logics and normative orientations of 
media in such settings (Stremlau, Fantini, Osman 2015). This study attempts to expand on these types 
of political economy-based analyses of the region‘s ‗media ecology‘ through an exploration of the 
relationship between the Somali public sphere‘s inherent trans-nationalism, commercial logics and 
orientation towards power or resistance, and the development of particular political discourses and 
trajectories of ideological contestation over Somali statehood, nationalism and identity.  
The distinctive Somali media ecology is the product of a political history of state-collapse, 
conflict and reconstructions of political authority. Active across Somali public sphere(s) are supra-
national communities (whether in the Horn of Africa itself or in the wider global diaspora) of 
producers and consumers of media products who create or identify with elements of ‗Soomaalinimo‘ - 
that explicitly or implicitly referenced notion of ‗Somali-ness‘ frequently invoked in the media 
analysed below. The thesis addresses the following questions:  
 
- Why do discourses of ethno-religious nationalism remain important in the public spheres of an 
intensely fragmented Somalia, and how is such rhetoric deployed by various actors across three 
distinct political centres?  




- To what extent does the particular context of media development, technology and current 
production influence the way in which these discourses are reproduced and disseminated, and 
how does this affect state-making?  
- What does the political language of media (in the contexts of statelessness or state 
reconstruction) tell us about the potential ideological and socio-cultural underpinnings of a 
reconfigured Somali nation state or states? 
 
The thesis undertakes critical discourse analysis of different types of Somali-language texts 
that circulate in a wider news media environment and transnational public sphere. These derive both 
from the amorphous and globalised context of online commentary or propaganda, as well as material 
which emerges from (and/or speaks to) specific political centres in Somalia in which I conducted 
fieldwork. These include Muqdisho (Mogadishu), capital of the Federal Republic of Somalia and base 
of the internationally recognised Federal Government of Somalia; Garoowe, political capital of the 
Puntland State of Somalia, an autonomous but non-secessionist administration in existence since 1998 
with stated aspirations to integrate into the federal structure of a reconfigured Somali state; and  
Hargeysa, seat of government of the independent, secessionist but as yet unrecognized Republic of 
Somaliland.  
The news media market across Somalia is as fragmented as the political sphere. Private online 
news websites have proliferated across and beyond the territories while different political authorities 
have varying capacities to either communicate as states or to control private broadcasting, whether in 
the form of locally or externally produced radio or television. This thesis engages with a broad range 
of Somali language media ‗texts‘ produced from or engaging with these different political centres. 
These include radio broadcasts; print and online news stories, editorials, or political cartoons; as well 
as propaganda material employed in radical opposition to existing power holders. The purpose of a 
comparative analysis of a wide range of media products is to explore the diversity of the Somali-
language news media market and at the same time present elements of commonality and contrast 
across what appears to be a highly polarised or fragmented geographical and ideological spectrum of 
production.   
In critically analysing various types of media text associated with these different political 
centres, I identify and compare the ways in which tropes of ‗Somali‘ identity employ various elements 
of the ‗paradox‘ introduced above, as well as the ways in which notions of appropriate or legitimate 
political authority are combined with the cultural vocabularies of Soomaalinimo for various political 
projects. Aside from discursive analysis, an appreciation of the technological context of media 
production, dissemination, reproduction and utilisation helps contribute to a broader understanding of 
the role of political argumentation, rhetoric, and the status of the Somali language itself across the 
different administrations. This analysis draws from the recognition in media ecology theory that 
information ‗forms‘ such as an alphabet, the printed word or television images are not mere 




instruments to facilitate communication but rather that they are, like language, symbolic environments 
in themselves in which humanity is discovered, fashioned, and expressed in particular ways (Postman 
1979, 41).  
In a fluid context of political experimentation and contestation where sovereignty is divided 
and debated - within the ‗official‘ borders of ‗Somalia‘ and beyond - the eponymous Somali lands are 
being actively imagined and created. This is occurring within a rapidly changing media-technology 
environment that serves as both a facilitator for such processes as well as an important arena of 
popular and elite conflict. The thesis argues that the distinctive development and conditions of media 
technology in a fragmented Somalia have created an inherently fluid and transnational information 
environment where discourses of Soomaalinimo can be deployed across a wide spectrum of political 
or ideological intent. Political fragmentation, a lack of a national (Somalia) post-conflict 
reconciliation process, prolonged statelessness, the global dispersion of Somali populations and 
development of decentralized, transnational media have all created an environment in which certain 
tropes of ‗Somali‘ identity can be reproduced and can become, at times, relevant for political 
mobilisation and experimentation. Furthermore, the language of politics is dynamic and important for 
understanding political change through prolonged statelessness and/or contemporary reconfigurations 
of authority: both in terms of vocabularies of politics and status of the written language itself. 
Although ‗clan-based‘ hate speech or radical religious or political propaganda may often be 
identified as part of the ‗problem‘ of continuing political violence in Somalia, the types of Somali-
language media texts that this thesis analyses are rarely studied any in critical discursive depth. This 
thesis explores the technological and discursive structure of the transnational Somali language public 
sphere in an attempt to understand the ways in which certain types of texts are created, circulated and 
appropriated or challenged. The discourses of producers deserve attention for the ways in which they 
reflect and infleunce fluid popular ‗nationalist imaginaries‘ and subjectivities (Askew 2002). Somalia 
may be fragmented, and may be characterised by seemingly endemic conflict. Nevertheless, 
development of political thought continues through multiple channels of debate and contestation in 
the public sphere. These range from new expressions of independent civic nationalism in Somaliland, 
to radical Islamist designs for a modern Somali social order, or the claim-making of multiple interest 
groups and emergent ‗federal‘ states redefining their relationship with the centre of a newly 
configured state of Somalia. 
It is important to clarify the political-geographical focus of my analysis of these particular 
texts, not merely to serve as a disclaimer, but rather for its relevance to my wider argument. Although 
the use of the term ‗Somalia‘ refers, in the broadest sense, to the internationally-recognised borders of 
that nation-state, the analysis attempts to situate different state administrations within a local and 
transnational media environment. Many people I know in the Republic of Somaliland would object 
out of hand to the discussion of their independent state in such a comparative analysis, in that its very 
inclusion might suggest that Somaliland was but another ‗region‘ of the ‗Somalia‘ that so many 




people in the northwest want so desperately to detach themselves from. This in itself is an identifiable 
discursive strategy that, conversely, makes me more inclined to draw comparisons which have no 
bearing on the ‗legitimacy‘ of Somaliland‘s claim to independence. Media in Hargeysa discuss and 
comment on ‗Somalia‘ in particular ways (or omit mention of it), and these constructions of the 
‗other‘ play a significant role in the foundational discourses of Somaliland‘s distinct history, identity, 
development and current status.  
Furthermore, Somaliland is not entirely detached from what I describe as the broader or 
transnational Somali public sphere, and here constitutes a subject in itself for political debate. This 
public sphere involves media producers who are active and whose products are consumed inside 
Somaliland, while simultaneously broadcasting to Somali audiences beyond these political borders. 
Here I refer to prominent private diaspora-based TV networks such as Universal TV, the Somali 
language sections of international broadcasters such as the British Broadcasting Corporation or Voice 
of America, as well as particular individual commentators such as cartoonists or religious figures 
whose material is consumed across the Somali territories.  
 In Muqdisho and Garoowe – political centres in what most people would agree is ‗Somalia‘ –
media and political commentators use different modes of expression for their discussions of 
Somaliland, each other, and other locations of political influence. This is of relevance to this study not 
out of some interest to ‗fairness‘ in presenting alternative narratives, but instead for what this 
language tells us about the discursive or rhetorical possibilities of political communication across the 
wider Somali Ummah (Ummadda Soomaaliyeed). This religiously defined transnational ethno-polity 
is of importance to many commentators and opinion-makers in each of the locations studied. In 
comparing these political centres with Somaliland, the thesis does not assert that ethno-religious 
nationalism is deployed in the same ways. For example, Somalilanders specifically reject narratives of 
‗Greater‘ or ‗Pan-Somali‘ nationalism that continue to hold some rhetorical weight in public discourse 
elsewhere in Somalia. Instead, I argue that each of these political entities (Somaliland included) make 
their cases for political legitimacy to a regional and global ‗Somali‘-defined audience within a 
transnational public sphere of Somali media production. This ‗imagined community‘ of the Somali 
ethno-religious nation can be seen (by different actors) to both correspond and misalign with present 
or desired political boundaries in the Somali Horn of Africa.         
This introductory chapter traces the history of state collapse and reconfiguration in modern 
Somalia and then places the research questions in the context of current political developments in 
three specific research sites. This historical narrative is punctuated with reference to existing 
scholarship on Somali literary production – forms of cultural expression which have both reflected 
and influenced articulations of Somali nationalism through anti-colonial, post colonial, and post-state 
collapse periods. A definition and problematisation of two of the theoretical concepts - ethnic and 
religiously defined ‗nationalism‘, and the ‗public sphere‘ - operationalised in subsequent chapters is 




then provided. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis‘ overall structure, integrating this 
theoretical discussion with the particular regional and typological media cases studied.  
  
1.2.  A history of Somali statehood: the making and breaking of a ‘nation’ 
Unresolved legacies of political collapse render popular historical interpretations of Somali statehood 
live, dynamic and an integral feature of many of the political arguments explored in subsequent 
chapters. Different historical experiences of a single, unitary, post-colonial Somali state, combined 
with an appreciation of external perceptions of Somalia‘s apparent distinctiveness, colour various 
modern vocabularies of political rhetoric, justifying multiple forms of political experimentation, 
shaping parameters of „Soomaalinimo‟, and foregrounding ideas of normative renewal. As such, a 
historical overview of Somali nationalism is required, leading up to the particular post 2012 political 
environment which my media texts deal with.   
The roots of Somali nationalism lie in the distinctive and pervasive idea that a large part of 
the eastern Horn of Africa has long been populated by a group of people who speak dialects of 
‗Somali‘; practice Islam; share pastoral or agro-pastoral modes of livelihood; are organised by the 
sub-divisions and customary law of a ‗total‘ genealogical system of segmentary lineage and – 
crucially – identify in some way as ‗Somalis‘. Maxamed Daahir Afrax would go so far as to suggest 
that ‗Somali nationalism existed long before the modern concept was given its political interpretation‘ 
(1994, 241). Nonetheless, the history (and direction) of the origin and advance of ‗Somali‘ speaking 
peoples into the eastern Horn is highly contested. This is due the lack of any comprehensive pre 20
th
 
Century written historical documentation, the existence and historical importance of various groups 
who do not fall comfortably within the framework of the ‗Somali‘ clan genealogy (Cassanelli 2010; 
Kusow 1995), and the modern political significance of the myths and tropes of Somali identity 
(Ahmed 1995) that will be explored in subsequent chapters.  
The powerful notion that the eastern Horn of Africa was populated by a group characterised 
by a relatively high level of ethno-linguistic homoegeneity would be both threatened and intensified 
by the colonial intrusion in the region from the late 19
th
 Century. British, French, Italian and Ethiopian 
interventions in the Horn have long been popularly understood as dividing the Somali peoples across 
various administrative and artificial boundaries. In response, anti-colonial mobilisation – epitomised 
by the influential Somali Youth League – took on a distinctly pan-Somali and anti-regionalist tone in 
its efforts to liberate the territories immortalised by the five points of the star adorning the later 
independent state‘s flag. These territories included the British Somaliland protectorate and the former 
Italian territory of the south and northeast which united in 1960 to form the independent Republic of 
Somalia; the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, essentially ceded by the British to Ethiopia‘s Menelik II in 
the late 19
th
 Century; the territory which would become the North Eastern Province of Kenya given by 
the British  to Kenyan nationalists in 1960 (ignoring a plebiscite demonstrating the population‘s desire 




to join the Somali Republic); and the former French Somaliland which became the independent state 
of Djibouti in 1977.    
 Literary culture (and its mediated dissemination) has historically played a vital role in both 
expressing an anti-colonial pan-Somali consciousness, as well as contributing to the ideas and 
imageries of the Somali nation itself. Somali literary culture has long been characterised by oral 
poetry and the importance of poetic expression in politics, conflict and society is explored in 
subsequent chapters with regard to ‗prestigiuous‘ and ‗non-prestigious‘ text and the impact of 
changing technologies and forms of (written) media. Afrax describes the period between the 1940s 
and 1960s as the era of the ‗great awakening‘ of Somali nationalist identity (1994, 240) and Johnson‘s 
(1974) analysis of the development of the new genre of the Heello in modern Somali poetry ties 
artistic innovation and changing media of recording and dissemination to the development of 
nationalist consciousness and anti-imperialist struggles for the creation of a independent state. At the 
most basic level, the Heello was distinct from the classical pastoral poetic form of the Gabay (see 
Orwin and Riiraash 1997) in terms of its shorter length, its emerging engagement with ‗modern‘ 
themes of patriotism and social issues, and the influence of increasingly urbanised elite of poets and 
performers drawing on the pastrolist cultural idiom. Although Johnson highlights the ‗northern‘ 
emergence of the Heello and its antecedent forms, his analysis is characteristic of much scholarship of 
the post-independence era in emphasising parallel developments in the ‗south‘ and a basic language 
shared across the territory by pastoralists, agriculturalists, town dwellers, and coastal merchants 
(1974, 3).  
Poetic opposition to the 1954/55 transfer by the British of the Hawd Reserved Areas in the 
north to the Ethiopian state is examined by Johnson as an important episode both for the development 
of the genre and for the quickening pace of the independence movement (Ibid, 88). Johnson also 
highlights the importance of the increasing incorporation of the Heello genre within theatrical plays 
and the subsequent popularisation of nationalist themes. He cites Walaalo Hargeysa‘s production of 
Soomaalidii Hore iyo Soomaalidii Dambe (‗The Somalis of Yesterday and the Somalis of Today‘) as 
an important example drawing on the theme of colonially imposed border restructions and the 
division of the Hawd territory at ‗our heart‘ (Xuseen Aw Faarax, cited in Ibid, 98).  
The territorial unification alluded to in such poems as Cabdullaahi Qarshe‘s popular 
Dhulkayaga (‗Our country‘) was partially achieved in 1960 with the independence and unification of 
the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Somalia 
under Italian Administration. This moment of emancipation was nonetheless tempered by an 
undercurrent of doubt, itself indicative of the paradox of ethno-linguistic commonality and clan 
division across the territories. As Johnson puts it ‗one would be very hard pressed indeed to find a 
Somali who opposed the coming independence to any part of this country. The unity of the two 
territories, however, is another question entirely‘ (Ibid, 106). Cali Sugulle‘s metaphorical allusion to 
the forced marriage was kept off the air by the newly independent state radio broadcaster (Radio 




Mogadishu) and is replete with pastoralist imagery warning against hasty political unification: ‗Adoo 
guri barwaaqo ah, geel dhalay ku haysta; Geeddii lama lallaboo, abaar looma guuree‟ (While you 
keep camels which have just given birth in a prosperous camp; [You should] not arranage a move and 
travel into drought) (cited in Ibid, 108). Despite early rumblings of discontent from the North that 
Somalilanders had sacrificed significant autonomy in their ‗marriage‘ with a Mogadishu-centred 
south, the mood of state-builders and much of the population remained distinctly optimistic, 
reminiscent of the experience of post-colonial liberation across much of Africa in the 1960s.  
Ostensibly, Somali political leaders were not presented with the same task faced by most 
other newly independent African states, namely the need to incorporate multiple and diverse ethno-
linguistic communities into a single state- based national identity and political system. Levels of 
relative ethno-linguistic homogeneity across the Somali Horn of Africa instead meant that many of 
the peoples imagined to be compatriots were split across the colonial-era boundaries of the region. 
Nonetheless, leaders in Mogadishu still had to overcome significant obstacles just to tie together the 
populations and political systems of the former Italian and British Somalilands. In fact, language was 
an issue here. Without a formalized Somali orthography, institutions (both government and 
educational) were operating on two different colonially-inherited tongues. The post-independence 
governments of the 1960s did not achieve the standardisation of a national Somali language, and in 
general, despite a peaceful transition of executive power in 1967 (the first in Africa, see Samatar 
2016), the wider nationalist project was undermined by elite corruption and the malign influence of 
political ‗tribalism‘ in the newly independent state. This itself was a legacy of divide and rule 
strategies of the earlier colonial administrations, and Kapteijns notes that the independence era 
nationalists ‗had to hitch their project of inclusion, unity and modernization to deeply tribalized 
administrative habits and institutions‘ (2009, 104). 
The assassination of President Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmaarke shortly preceded the military 
coup in 1969 led by General Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Asserting itself against a post-independence 
civilian parliamentary democratic model perceived to be mired in corruption and inefficiency, Barre‘s 
state professed ‗scientific socialism‘ and an agenda of secular ‗modernisation‘ (Samatar 1992). 
Propaganda of the era blended Marxist imagery with Qu‘ranic scripture and emotive appeals to the 
pastoral heritage of a Somali ethno-nation. Modernity was conceived of in terms of anti-tribalism 
(clanism) and an antipathy to elements of Islam deemed impediments to social progress. Literature 
and media in the post-independence era were also characterised by an emphasis on ‗modernity‘, 
embodied by a population shaking off the shackles of tradition and embracing a nationalism of 
economic and educational development. The eventual formalisation of a Somali orthography in 1972 
(discussed in more detail in later chapters) facilitated a mass literacy campaign by the military regime 
and is one of the few initiatives it is remembered with any fondness for today.  
Maxamed Daahir Afrax‘s contemporary literary and theatrical criticism highlights the 
predominant themes of the era and associates ‗modernity‘ with an embrace of Somali nationalism and 




the abandonment of tribal (or ‗clan‘) identities (Afrax 1987; Kapteijns 1995).  This was the era of the 
ilbaxnimo (civilisational) discourse where literary production, preservation, collection and 
performance were seen to be integral to the development of a modern society. Afrax‘s work 
(including numerous pieces published in the state Xiddigta Oktoobar [October Star] newspaper) 
highlighted the difficulties faced by researchers and critics in a context where a written culture had 
not been entrenched and where state institutions for the storing and development of literary culture 
remained underdeveloped. Afrax‘s pioneering of new forms of written culture (e.g. literary criticism) 
was in itself linked to this project of modernity and this theme will be returned to in subsequent 
chapters with regards to the changing ways in which Somali language texts are mediated, consumed 
and engaged with.      
Pan-Somali nationalist fervour reached its peak with the Barre regime‘s 1977 invasion of 
Ethiopia for control of the Ogaden region. Whilst the Somali military successfully overran the 
territory, the invasion was condemned internationally as an act of aggression intended to alter colonial 
boundaries by force. The invasion indirectly helped propel Colonel Mengistu to power in Ethiopia and 
precipitated a wholesale reversal of Cold War alliances in the Horn. Somali forces were driven out of 
Ethiopia in March 1978 after a massive intervention of Soviet and Cuban troops. After the war, a huge 
exodus of Ethiopian Somali refugees into Somalia became a destabilizing factor. There was no peace 
agreement with Ethiopia, the activity of the Muqdisho-supported Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF) persisted, and Ethiopian reciprocated by backing predominantly Majeerteen (SSDF) and 
Isaaq (SNM) opponents of Siyaad Barre. A rapprochement only came in 1987 in the final embattled 
years of both regimes.  
The failure of Barre‘s move against Ethiopia to begin the process of uniting the remaining 
Somali territories had a significant impact not only on the regime‘s stability but also on the wider 
cause of nationalism towards ‗Greater Somalia‘ (Barnes 2007), a historical theme which recurs in 
many texts addressed in subsequent chapters. One of the regime‘s immediate responses was the 
facilitation of the 1979-1980 Deelley poetic debates which featured numerous (but predominantly 
‗northern‘) poets (Ahad 2015). The event was designed to engage oral literary tradition in the pursuit 
of modernist political aspirations (critiques of anti-nationalist tribalism) but became a space where 
coded anti-regime discourses could take poetic shape. Ahad‘s analysis of the language of this poetic 
‗polytext‘ highlights the continued ‗hegemony‘ of pastoralist cultural heritage (‗Samaale‘/‘Sumaal‘) 
at the centre of the Somali national myth (Ibid, 39-40), at the expense other groups (particularly, in his 
terms, southern agirculturalists) who make up a large but historically marginalised segment of the 
‗national‘ population. The tension apparent here in the state‘s engagement of ‗tradition‘ for ‗modern‘ 
political goals also finds expression in Kapteijn‘s examination of ‗discourses of moral womanhood‘ in 
popular songs of the era. The desire for modernity (embodied in progressive nationalist statehood) 
also required an appreciation of ‗tradition‘ in the construction an anti-tribal embrace of Soomaalinimo 
(2009, 103). However, the state‘s (at times) violent antipathy towards Islam, for instance in its 




promotion of female emancipation and rewriting of family law also generated significant popular 
dissent with long term implications for discourses of public morality (Abdullahi 2010). Such moves 
were perceived to represent a secular assault on traditional and religious values by a hypocritical 
regime which was itself built around a tribal clique of certain Daarood clan-family sub-clans.  
The roots of the clan-based fracturing and extreme violence of the civil war era were set by 
the Barre regime which was adept at manipulating ‗clan‘ grievances and arming different groups 
against its opponents or potential opponents (Compagnon 1998, 76; Kapteiijns 2012, 14). The 
militarisation of clan identity, the influence of external sponors, the profusion of Cold War era small 
arms, and significant urban/rural tensions all set the scene for the 1980s emergence of armed jabhad 
(guerrilla or ‗freedom fighter‘) resistance movements in the north against Barre‘s state, including the 
aforementioned Somali National Movement (SNM) in the northwest and the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front in the northeast (Doornbos & Markakis 1994, Luling 1997, Lewis 2008). The 
former was a largely Isaaq clan-family dominated organisation which would eventually lead 
Somaliland to independence, while the latter, dominated by the Majeerteen sub-clans of the Daarood 
clan-family, would later play an important role in the establishment of the Puntland regional state in 
1998. Both campaigns drew counter-insurgency responses from the military regime, and the 
communities from which the resistance movements drew support (or were perceived to have drawn 
support) suffered greatly from the indiscriminate violence of Barre‘s forces (Bradbury 2008, 
Kapteijns 2012, 81).  Ultimately, it would be the Hawiye clan-family dominated United Somali 
Congress (USC), sweeping down upon Muqdisho from the south-central hinterlands, which would 
oust Barre from power in 1991. A failure to reach a comprehensive political settlement between the 
aforementioned insurgent forces and various other resistance groups prolonged the civil war. This 
entailed fierce contestation over Muqdisho and violent clan ‗cleansing‘ in the capital. In the southern 
regions the conflict facilitated the extensive expropriation of valuable agricultural land, often at the 
expense of the agro-pastoralist and so-called ‗minority‘ populations who had long been marginalised 
in the development of the colonial and post-independence state
1
  (Omaar and De Waal 1993; 
Besteman 1996 & 1998, Besteman & Cassanelli et al. 2000; Eno, Eno & Lehman 2010; Menkhaus 
2010; Ahad 2015). The violence and associated humanitarian catastrophe of famine eventually 
prompted the 1992 intervention of United States‘ and United Nations‘ forces (Clarke & Herbst 1996). 
Meanwhile in the north-west, a self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland emerged, a territory 
that retains its secessionist claim up to the present day. 
 In Muqdisho, violence from mainly Hawiye insurgent fighters specifically targeted those 
from Daarood sub-clans associated with the ousted dictator. Kapteijns documents this targeting and 
the inability (or unwillingness) of observers to accurately portray the specific nature of violence. Men 
were ‗armed and militarily prepared to kill in the name of clan‘ and the more they did so ‗the more the 
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hostile clan identities they performed became indisputably and irreversibly ―real‖‘ (Kapteijns 2004, 
13). Class also played an important role here, with poorly educated fighters hailing from rural and 
pastoral backgrounds exacting a form of revenge on the modern Somali state, embodied by the 
comparatively wealthy city dwellers who were felt to have benefited the most from its development 
and repressive tendencies (Ahmed 1995, ix). The clan targeting of violence in Muqdisho had a 
profound impact on the demographics of a once cosmopolitan capital previously inhabited by all of 
the major Somali lineage groups. The flight of a large proportion of the non-Hawiye inhabitants of the 
city has left a lasting legacy, both in terms of the politics of land control and reclamation in modern 
Muqdisho (Rift Valley/Heritage Institute 2017) and the wider ‗territorialisation‘ of clan identity 
across Somalia. Hoehne analyses the ‗shift from borderless, non-terriorially defined Somali space, to 
a bordered, intensively territorialised Somali space that took place during this extended period of 
rupture [post 1990]‘ (2016, 1381), and the impact of the violence in the city that displaced residents to 
their far flung clan ‗homelands‘ (degaan) can be felt in the modern context of political reconstruction 
and contestation across these territories.  
Summarising the history of the civil war and state collapse, Compagnon usefully defines three 
‗generations‘ of militant organisation whose experiences, membership and agendas have overlapped 
through this period (1998). First he cites the early post-colonial emergence of irredentist movements 
in neighbouring countries (such as the WSLF in Ethiopia) acting as Cold War international and 
regional proxy forces; second he charts the 1980s rise of anti-regime guerilla movements organised 
largely (but not exclusively) along clan lines but possessing some kind of transformative political 
program (e.g. the SNM, SSDF and USC); and third he describes the mushrooming of post-state 
collapse armed clan factions with no clear political agenda or broader constituency (Compagnon 
1998, 76). Whilst Chapter six engages in detail with the analytical utility of ‗clan‘ in understanding 
modern conflict in Somalia, it is important to highlight from the outset that scholarship on state 
collapse has persuasively challenged the reductive tendency to emphasise the intersection of ancient 
feuds with modern technologies of violence (Ibid, 74; Kapteijns 2004, 12) and Compagnon 
emphasises the role of political entrepreneurs utilising kinship as a ‗ready-made ideology‘ (1998, 83) 
for fighters most easily mobilised through existing clan structures. 
The descent into clan-based civil war and regional/clanic fragmentation this period brought 
tremendous suffering for huge swathes of the Somali population. It remains both a highly contested 
history (Kapteijns 2012; Ingiriis 2013; Bakonyi 2009), as well as constituting a pivotal temporal point 
of reference for multiple competing narratives and political arguments. Today, a quarter of a century 
after the burburkii (destruction) of the state, a generational juncture - between those with memories 
and experiences of the unitary Somali state and those who do not - makes itself frequently apparent in 
public spheres across Somalia or Somaliland through deployments of history by those who lay claim 
to modern state structures and those who contest them.  




The apparent ‗anarchy‘ of this two-decade period from 1991 was not simply destructive but 
also facilitated new forms of political and economic organisation (Little 2003; Hagmann and Hoehne 
2009; Bakonyi 2013). Local and even pseudo-‗national‘ structures emerged, ranging from the state-
like experiment of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland (Bryden 2003) to the judicially-orientated 
Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga (Union of Islamic Courts) and subsequent territorial 
administrations of the Islamist governors-cum-insurgents of Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin (aka 
‗Al Shabaab‘, hereafter AS) (Hansen 2013). The two decades of statelessness cannot be adequately 
conceptualised in terms of political or economic stagnation. Instead, this period witnessed the playing 
out of processes of political and economic contestation that had compromised the viability of the 
nation state of Somalia from its inception, and saw the redefinition of the political space in which the 
nation‘s centres of power and influence would come to be reconfigured.  
On the more prosaic level – and judged by the standards of ‗national‘ political reconciliation 
or reconstruction of a unitary state – the two decades following 1991 could only be described in terms 
of ‗failure‘, progressing through multiple peace conferences and abortive attempts at stable 
government in Muqdisho. Experiments such as the Union of Islamic Courts - broadly characterised as 
an alliance over different periods in Muqdisho and wider south-central Somalia between Islamist 
activists often linked to longstanding networks such as Al Itixaad Al Islaam, local religious-judicial 
authorities and certain clan groups within the business class - were enacted largely in reaction to the 
perceived failures of the political class. They remain an understudied phenomenon (Barnes & Hassan 
2007; Mwangi 2010; Sharif 2015) and are often understood by many outside observers as merely the 
precursor to AS‘s militancy.  
The emergence of Islamist-inspired forms of governance in Somalia coincided with a 
refocusing of Western strategic priorities for the region, newly redefined by the logics of the ‗Global 
War on Terror‘. Ethiopia‘s US-backed invasion of Somalia in 2006 to oust the Courts‘ administration  
- another pivotal historical juncture very much alive in the political imagination of current actors and 
commentators - served to empower the most ‗radical‘ offshoot of the broader experiment, AS. The 
organisation gained both power and a veneer of nationalist legitimacy in the resistance it put up 
against the historical Xabashi Christian foe, remembered primarily for the high number of civilian 
casualties caused during their heavy handed intervention in Somalia (Human Rights Watch 2008). 
The Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Cabdullahi Yuusuf Axmed was 
established in Muqdisho from 2007. It achieved control over only parts of the capital and was kept 
afloat almost solely by the presence of African Union ‗peacekeepers‘. Power was subsequently 
handed to an administration led by Sheekh Sharif Sheekh Axmed, a one time member of the Courts‘ 
administration and representative of the ‗moderate‘ Islamist faction the Alliance for the Re-liberation 
of Somalia which participated in the Djibouti-held talks in 2008. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces 
negotiated at this conference primarily benefited AS as opposed to the beleaguered and Muqdisho-




confined TFG, and between 2009 and 2010 the militants rapidly expanded their structures of 
administrative governance across a large swathe of south-central Somalia.  
This status quo of TFG ineffectiveness and AS expansion of governance persisted in south 
central Somalia until 2012, when the selection of the new Somali Federal Government (SFG) 
followed a shift in the military dynamics between these competing power holders and their 
international backers. The media texts analysed in subsequent chapters date from this period onwards, 
and my contextual historical discussion will provide an overview of the three separate political 
environments of Muqdisho, Garoowe and Hargeysa in which I conducted fieldwork. This comparative 
political introduction focuses on dominant or contesting narratives of change or status quo produced 
from or about these power centres.  
 
1.2.1. Muqdisho/south-central Somalia: Phoenix from the fire?  
Muqdisho holds intense symbolic value as an icon of Somali nationalism. Long a 
cosmopolitan city of trade and contact with the outside world (Alpers 1983), Muqdisho became the 
capital of a post-independence nation state that was supposed to represent all Somalis. Considering its 
glamorous and dynamic embodiment of Somali‘s post-independence modernity, the extreme and 
targeted violence unleashed in the city in the wake of the ousting of Barre‘s regime, and the physical 
destruction wrought on its architecture, Kapteijns points out that no-where in Somalia has the contrast 
between pre and post state-collapse realities been so stark (2010, 34). Her discussion of ‗making 
memories of Mogadishu‘ traces poetic engagement with the city both from inside Somalia and in the 
diaspora through a changing ‗architecture of Somali public space‘ precipitated by political breakdown 
and the development of new forms of electronic mass media. In this account different poetic voices 
from different periods of the city‘s post-indepdence development endow it with intense political, 
cultural and religious significance. Maxamed Daahir Afrax‘s 1981 novel Maanafaay – about the 
eponymous schoolgirl falling in love – epitomises the changing and contested social mores of a 
cosmopolitan city at the centre of a dynamic nationalist project of modernity (Ibid, 39; Afrax 1981). 
Conversely, the fact that renowned poet (and northerner) Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame ‗Hadraawi‘ 
composed Xamareey, ma nabad ba? (Muqdisho, how are you?) from Barre‘s jail demonstrates both 
the repression of the era and an evocation of the city as a touchstone for the struggle for 
independence: the ‗umbilical cord‘ of the country and ‗nerve centre‘ of the people. In the post state-
collapse period, Cumar Cabdinuur Nuux ‗Nabaddoon‘ laments from the diaspora what has befallen 
the city (Muqdishooy maxaa dhacay). His work references the emergence of increasingly muscular 
Islamist discourses of renewal and the clannic manipulations of the Barre regime, whilst remaining 
opaque about the specific perpetrators of targeted violence in the period that Kapteijns chronicles 
elsewhere (Kapteijns 2010, 50; Kapteijns 2012). Stepping into more recent history, Maxamed Cali 
Cibaar‘s Muqdishaay, mawlaad leedahay, samir ha moogaanin (Mogadishu, you have a Lord, do not 
forget to be patient), is a gabay poem that expresses explicit opposition to the TFG and support for the 




Union of Islamic Courts ousted by the 2006 invasion. The Islamist character of certain articulations of 
modern Somali nationalism – explored in detail in Chapter five – is evident here. In all of these poetic 
engagements with the history of the capital, Muqdisho is evoked as symbolic and gendered (often 
female) embodiment of the nationalist project. The changing ways in which these type of texts have 
been produced and circulated within a Somali ‗public‘ will be reflected on in subsequent chapters 
with commonalities and contrasts drawn between the poetic canon and the media products focused on 
by this thesis.  
All of the texts engaged with in subsequent chapters date from 2012 onwards and the 
installation of a ‗recognised‘ Somali Federal Government in Muqdisho. Given the long series of 
repeatedly failed negotiations for political settlement and the procession of ineffectual, practically 
invisible, or ‗transitional‘ administrations which characterised politics in Muqdisho from 1991 
onwards, it would be easy to dismiss the formation of the SFG as a mere changing of faces: composed 
of individuals ready, once again, to make the most of international patronage whilst doing little to 
seriously extend governance capacity or reconfigure the structures of the Somali state. Such a 
characterisation, however, would be unfair, and the post-2012 trajectory of the SFG has represented a 
genuine shift in the political landscape of the Somali state.  
The SFG has succeeded – albeit with the essential military backing of African Union Mission 
for Somalia forces (hereafter AMISOM) – in establishing a modicum of security and political control 
over all of the districts of the capital. ‗Formal‘ or at least daylight AS control of neighbourhoods in 
Muqdisho ended with their expulsion in 2011, and security across the capital is maintained by an 
amorphous mix of forces which (in theory) are part of or are aligned with the SFG. These include the 
Somali Police Force, National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) units, the Somali National 
Army, and AMISOM Troops and Police, as well as (in practice) militias of local powers such as 
District Commissioners who fall under the Regional Benaadir administration. Although this 
combination of security actors is not without its internal tensions (occasionally resulting in violent 
confrontation) the very fact that the state has at least nominal authority over all districts marks a 
change from the pre-2011 reality of AS control and the division of the city into separate 
neighbourhood fiefdoms controlled by militias largely unaligned to any central government.  
On the political front too, post 2012 progress has represented a departure from previous 
legislative or diplomatic stagnation. The Somali Parliament - selected for the first time through a 
process based inside Somalia - has succeeded in passing legislation and has voted for the ratification 
of international conventions. The executive branch has garnered an unprecedented level of 
international recognition, epitomised by the official reestablishment of diplomatic ties with the United 
States for the first time since 1991. More important than foreign plaudits has been the SFG‘s genuine 
movement towards the reconfiguration of the Somali state along ‗federal‘ lines as outlined in the 
Provisional Constitution, adopted in August 2012. While this often fraught process has been at times 
led from Muqdisho (as was the case with the Galmudug federal state) and at other times spurred by 




developments in the regions largely outside of the control of power-holders in the capital (as was the 
case with the emergence of the Interim Jubaland Administration), a clear federalisation trajectory has 
been set. As Mosley notes, ‗for all its fragility and flaws... federalism in Somalia remains the 
dominant political process with which to engage. Even those opposed to the leadership or framing of 
the federal government continue (in the main) to contest their case within its framework‘ (2015, 5). 
The framing of the federal project as the only game in town (at least in the minds of elite actors) is a 
significant achievement of the SFG. Nonetheless, the reconfiguration of the Somali state along 
‗federal‘ lines has been very much driven by traditional (Western) donors and the United Nations. The 
Provisional Constitution in which this is set out remains contested by actors such as AS who argue 
that it is an externally imposed and thus illegitimate document.  
The establishment of regional administrations across the south-central regions was completed 
with the creation of Hir-Shabelle state, just in time for the 2016/17 selection process to facilitate the 
replacement of Xasan Sheekh‘s administration. Targeted Al Shabaab violence and general insecurity 
across south-central Somalia prevented one-person-one vote elections being held.  Nonetheless, a 
United Nations process engaged around 14,000 individuals (clan elders and electoral college 
delegates) in the selection of Members of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Somali Parliament, who 
then elected President Maxamed Cabdulaahi Maxamed ‗Farmaajo‘
2
 in February 2017. Popular 
interpretations or perceptions of the build-up to this ‗Vision 2016‘ process, and oppositional 
narratives against the federal project, resonate through the public sphere and are a key theme 
addressed in the textual analyses of subsequent chapters.  
In terms of economic development, change has also been in the sea air of the capital since 
2012. With the promise of greater security and political cohesion, local business sectors and the real-
estate market have gone through a visible period of growth driven in no small part to ‗returnee‘ 
diaspora investors as well infrastructure projects led by foreign donors such as Turkey. Nowhere is 
such growth more evident than on certain important arteries of the city such as the Makka Al 
Mukarama thoroughfare running from the KM4 junction all the way up to the Parliament building and 
the Villa Somalia Presidential compound. Newly tarmac-ed roads, lined with the colourful hoardings 
of recently opened shops, restaurants, hotels, and – tellingly – the outdoor tea stands, speak to an 
increased sense of consumer and investor security and optimism. This is not to imply that the pre 
2012 Muqdisho economy was somehow stagnant – the labyrinthine Bakaara market buzzed with 
commerce then as it does today - but rather that the market has opened up for outside investors 
looking to take advantage of increasing stability and the potential to purchase or reclaim increasingly 
valuable land and property.  
Richly symbolic of Muqdisho‘s ‗rebirth‘ and constituting a stage for economic or security 
improvements to be enjoyed (or performed) are the city‘s beaches, often full of young people and 
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diaspora trend-setters enjoying the white sand, turquoise waters and the various restaurants and cafes 
that have sprung up on the now much sought after seafront real estate. This view of natural beauty - a 
resource ready to be tapped by a ‗new‘ Somalia - and scenes of leisure activity are emblematic of the 
‗Somalia rising‘ narrative. This dib-u-dhis (reconstruction) discourse is a powerful phenomenon in 
imaginations both of and about the nation, and concrete developments on the ground are rightly 
highlighted in academic and journalistic accounts of Muqdisho (Hammond 2013). Viewed through the 
lenses of international ‗mainstream‘ media and a powerful social media environment in which many 
politically engaged Somalis are active, the battle-lines of this discursive contest are clear: between 
portrayals of Muqdisho and Somalia emphasising ongoing conflict, terrorism, piracy, humanitarian 
suffering, and those showcasing the achievements of the changing nation, with glimmers of hope on 
the horizon.  
This narrative contest for the ‗real‘ or ‗new‘ Somalia has intensified, with multiple voices 
clamouring to show the city or country for what it really ‗is‘ and to dispel outsiders‘ misconceptions  
and prejudices. A foreign journalist‘s account of British diplomacy conducted in an airport ‗green-
zone‘, with forays into the mean streets of the city in armoured vehicles, shocked me as a reader. 
Although I recognized the general accuracy of the images reported, they jarred with my usual 
emotional reactions to them. I understood the descriptions of the execution sites, the militarisation of 
the airport zone and the accounts of violence, and yet I was amazed at the extent to which it was 
possible for me to normalise these features of the city as parts of a wider reality which is more 
diverse, dynamic and often much less grim
3
. A counterpoint may be seen in the social media 
‗stardom‘ of Ugaaso Abukar Boocow, the young Somali woman who ‗Instagrams‟ pictures of her 
daily life in Muqdisho, in an attempt to dispel stereotypes of the city and show a ‗different side‘ to 
Somalia
4
. In a similar vein, documentaries produced by Integration TV (‗the first English TV network 
for Somalis globally‘) portray for a diaspora audience a Mogadishu which is developing economically 
and gaining greater security, and serves as a call for Somalis to ‗return‘ to the city with their families 
to live and do business
5
.  
If Muqdisho is ‗rising‘ like the proverbial phoenix, then it is doing so from the fire rather than 
the ashes: political and economic reconstruction is taking place concurrently with ongoing conflict. In 
this context, the influence of media narratives framing this complicated and non-linear process is 
heightened and the conventions of discourse can both illuminate and obfuscate the realities of the 
environment for various groups‘ interests.  These may be commercial - for instance the international 
‗mainstream‘ media‘s preference for dramatic or violent content, or in regards those who have an 
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economic motivation in portraying Muqdisho as being open for business. They may also be political, 
for instance manifested in critiques of negative news as an affront to nationalist pride, or in regards to 
Muqdisho‘s portrayal in contrast to other political centres in Somalia. This thesis does not take as its 
focus this largely internationalised mainstream/social media discursive battleground but instead 
engages with certain types of Somali-language texts made for local consumption. Nevertheless, the 
outline of these debates serves to introduce the multifaceted security, political and economic 
considerations faced and managed by news producers and political communicators in Muqdisho, as 
well as highlighting the power of contrasting narratives in the peculiar context of Somalia‘s capital 
city
6
.      
 
1.2.2. Garoowe/Puntland: autonomy sans secession and the reconfiguration of the Somali 
state 
Situated on the windswept plain of Nugaal region, Garoowe is the political capital of the Puntland 
State of Somalia, a quasi-autonomous administration formed on August 1, 1998 with the stated 
intention of integrating into a reconfigured and federal Somali state when the conditions to do so are 
deemed appropriate. Puntland currently represents the most fully formed, coherent and functional 
example of a Somali federal (regional) state without aspirations itself to sovereignty (Mosley 2015, 
2). It enjoys a level of capacity to which other embryonic regional entities such as Jubaland, the 
Southwest State, the HirShabelle State or Galmudug currently aspire.  
Garoowe is located at an important junction of the main north-south road artery that links 
Muqdisho and the south with Puntland‘s economic capital, the port city of Bosaaso. Here the road 
also branches off towards Laas Caanood and the regions of Sool and Sanaag, control over which 
Puntland disputes with Somaliland. Were conditions for road travel better – considering poor 
infrastructure, instability along the Shabelle River where the road turns south towards Muqdisho, and 
the hindrance of various checkpoints going into eastern Somaliland - then Garoowe would be at the 
centre of a busy overland transport network linking the north and south of Somalia. Even with these 
limitations, road transit along this axis does take place, particularly between Hiiraan and Galmudug 
linking these regions with markets, export opportunities and commodities in or from Bosaaso. 
Garoowe exhibits a more sleepy economic air than either the booming Hargeysa or the dynamic 
Muqdisho, but nonetheless remains an important point on this route, and is significant as the political 
capital of the under-studied Puntland governance project. 
Since 1998 and its establishment as a political settlement between the mainly Majeerteen 
(Daarood) sub-clans who inhabit the northeast, the Puntland State of Somalia (Dowladda Puntland ee 
Soomaaliya) has developed many of the structures and institutions of statehood: a presidency, a 
unicameral legislature, judiciary, ministries of government, security forces. The latter include police 
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forces, intelligence agencies, custodial corps, and the ambiguously defined militia (not army, as that 
would imply a ‗national‘ force), the Darawiish. Handovers of political power have been facilitated 
peacefully (i.e. the narrow defeat of incumbent President Cabdiraxmaan Maxamuud Faroole by the 
current President Cabdiweli Maxamed Cali Gaas in 2014) albeit indirectly through the votes of the 
legislature (the Golaha Wakiilada) as opposed to the popular suffrage put into practice in the Republic 
of Somaliland‘s elections. 
 The administrative lexicon of Puntland‘s ‗statehood‘ is both significant and ambiguous. 
Indeed, it reflects many of the tensions which exist in the wider political climate over federal 
statehood and expressions of autonomy. In an introductory interview I conducted with Puntland‘s 
Minister of Information, Communication, Culture and Heritage (Wasiirka Warfaafinta, Isgaarsiinta, 
Dhaqanka iyo Hiddaha) in his Garoowe office, I stumbled over this territorial-political vocabulary
7
. 
Trying to frame a question on the scope of media coverage in Puntland in a geographical rather than 
political context I made reference to ‗Gobolka Puntland‟ (the Puntland Region). I realised my 
mistake, on one level, as soon as the words left my mouth and before the Minister‘s ears almost 
visibly pricked up: if I was going to aim for a spatial definition of the territory I should, of course, 
have pluralised region (Goboladda) to more accurately account for the fact that the Puntland territory 
is officially composed of 8 regions. This is complicated by the fact that these regions - partly an 
administrative legacy of the colonial era and the post-independence state, as well as being adapted by 
Puntland post 1998 – include parts of Sanaag, Sool and Cayn which are disputed with Somaliland. 
Consider also the status of Mudug region, half of which is controlled by Puntland (the dividing line –
based on clan demographics – runs through the city of Gaalkacyo) but which is also a bone of serious 
contention in the creation of the federal state of ‗Galmudug‘. This amalgamation of Galgaduud and 
Mudug regions, is being facilitated by the (ambiguous) Provisional Constitution which mandates that 
only whole regions can come together to form a new federal state.  
Although this is indicative of the complexities and fluidities of the wider Somali state 
reconfiguration process, this wasn‘t what prompted the Minister to interject. He was instead more 
concerned to clarify that the political entity we were going to talk about should be referred to as the 
Government of Puntland (or ‗state‘, depending on how one reads the ambiguous, Arabic derived-term 
Dowlad). Given his role and our location in an office of governance, it is understandable that his 
conception of Puntland was that of a political entity, more so than a geographical one. Perhaps this is 
inevitable in a reality where state power blurs at the edges, between formal administrative boundaries 
which predate current arrangements of political influence. Most news media in Muqdisho or Hargeysa 
would instead refer to ‗Maamuulka Puntland‟ (the Puntland ‗administration‘) implying a regional 
structure of less autonomy than Puntland actually enjoys in practice, and supposedly subordinate to a 
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central power. For commentators identifying with Somaliland, the central power would be part of that 
‗other country‘, Somalia.  
This anecdote not only gives some introductory context on the peculiar political status of 
Puntland, but alsohighlights the centrality of political vocabulary to the argument advanced by this 
thesis: namely that the particular political and technological circumstances of information transition 
across the Somali territories has created a discursive environment in which multiple bases of 
statehood and political authority can overlap and coexist, as well as shape the emerging form of (a) 
reconfigured Somali state(s). As the focus of much scholarship on the state in Africa shifts towards 
borderlands (Coplan 2010; Zeller 2013; Hoehne 2015) it should not be forgotten that there remain 
certain contexts where the tensions, ambiguities and objectives of political discourse are active in 
centres of power and continue to play a role in the articulation and reformation of political 
imaginaries of statehood.  
Comparing the contrasting orientations of Puntland and Somaliland towards the Somali state 
in the post-1991 period requires an examination of certain historical factors which find expression and 
reinterpretation in the various news or commentary texts analysed in subsequent chapters. Colonial 
legacies are important, and can be understood in terms of the precedent for independence that was set 
for Somaliland by British decolonisation, its separate institutional context of statehood (Contini, 
1969), as well as in the light of the centralising and southern-centric dynamic that was set in motion 
by the process of union between the two separate post-colonial entities in 1960. Perceptions of clan-
based political agency during the period of Siyaad Barre‘s military dictatorship also play a role in 
understanding Puntland‘s current orientation to the Somali state. Standard conceptions both in the 
academic and popular literature of the power base of the Barre regime emphasise the importance of 
the so-called ‗MOD‘ alliance between the Marexaan, Ogaadeen and Dulbahante sub-clans of the 
Daarood clan family. If the actuality of ‗MOD‘ cohesion during the period can itself be questioned 
(Compagnon 1995), then it is also a mistake to conceive of the former regime as a specifically 
‗Daarood‘ entity, especially considering the militancy of certain Daarood sub-clans (notably the 
northeastern Majeerteen and ‗their‘ SSDF movement) against the regime. The Majeerteen activists 
who mobilized against Barre – and who would eventually go on to form the nucleus of the Puntland 
state – provoked the regime in the 1980s into a level of counter-insurgency brutality (often against 
civilians) that echoed its better-documented campaign of repression in the northwest against the SNM 
and the predominantly Isaaq population there (Kapteijns 2012, 81).  
The killing and displacement of a large proportion of Muqdisho‘s Daarood population as a 
result of targeted clan violence in the aftermath of state collapse must also be appreciated as a 
foundational moment for the later state of Puntland‘s political identity and position of ambiguous 
autonomy from developments in the southern capital.  Nonetheless - and given the lack of a national 
truth and reconciliation process - how can one explain the northeast‘s post-1991 ostensible 
commitment of fidelity to a Somali state whose capital would remain Muqdisho, in contrast to the 




SNM‘s declaration of independence for Somaliland in the northwest? One narrative that manifests 
itself in political commentary or prescriptive policy documents (Kirk 2011, 7) is the notion that the 
geographical dispersal of the various sub-clans of the Daarood (over a wider territory than the more 
territorially concentrated heartlands of the other major clan families) predisposes the Daarood to a 
greater commitment to Somali nationalism or even - given the Daarood populations spread out over 
Kenya and Ethiopia - pan-Somali irredentism and the ‗Greater Somalia‘ dream. Such broad-brush 
conceptions of an over-arching ideological orientation of one clan family are seldom analytically 
helpful. Nevertheless, it is popularly perceived that political actors in Puntland are able and inclined to 
utilise relationships with other actors engaged in the wider federalisation process (particularly the 
Interim Jubaland Administration) which may, in part, be based upon a broad conception of Daarood 
solidarity. Along with a healthy dose of real-politick in the rough and tumble of the reconfiguration of 
the Somali state, such an alignment is often understood in terms of its opposition to the perceived 
‗Hawiye‘ control of Muqdisho (post 1991) and ‗their‘ dominance in the central regions. Popular 
discursive mapping of clan-political dynamics is explored and problematised in detail in Chapter six 
with reference to alleged agendas of different group constructs in the context of the ‗federal‘ 
reconfiguration of Somalia. 
Also crucial to conceptions of Puntland‘s political identity (both in terms of self-presentation 
and external perception) is the status of its foreign relations with external powers seeking to influence 
the Somali political or security environment. The fact that the Puntland administration has positioned 
itself (or has been positioned) on a key front line in the conflicts against both AS as well as maritime 
piracy, has undoubtedly had a major impact upon its ability to garner international support, 
particularly in security related sectors. Not only have state security organs such as the Puntland 
Intelligence Services (PIS) or the Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) received training and 
support from international ‗partners‘, but Puntland forcesconduct (little reported) joint operations with 
US Forces on the ground in the Galgala hills. This mountainous area is adjacent to Puntland‘s 
economic capital, the port city of Bosaaso, and has provided a haven for AS or AS-affiliated elements 
particularly in the wake of the group‘s loss of territory further south.  
Beyond the security sector, it has become clear that the Puntland administration has 
established itself as an authority which beesha caalamka (the ‗international community‘) is willing to 
deal with directly. A relevant example of this is the Italian Government‘s recent direct support and 
funding of Puntland TV, the ‗state‘ broadcaster based in Garoowe
8
. The external empowerment of 
regional political structures through communication technology support will be discussed below in 
relation to the wider Somalia media context, but suffice to say that this serves as an example for the 
truly ‗international‘ relations of what is a (juridically speaking) a non-state entity. These 
‗international‘ relations – often epitomised by the President of Puntland‘s jet-setting around the region 
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for talks with external powers – often pique the political sensitivities of commentators (in Muqdisho, 
for example) who decry the proliferation of regional ‗presidents‘ drawing power away from the 
centre. They argue that such political agency compromises the sovereign integrity of the Somali state 
and plays into certain regional powers‘ intention to divide and rule Somalia as a ‗federated‘ collection 
of proxy states. This discursive construction around authorities such as Puntland (and the counter-
narrative they provide) will be a major topic in subsequent discussions of expressions of nationalism. 
Once again, the vocabularies of these debates – the political lexicon of statelessness, ambiguous 
authority, state reconfiguration – are of importance to imaginations of power and legitimate authority 
across Somalia, and facilitate a huge range of arguments appealing to multiple ‗Somali‘ audiences.  
 
1.2.3. Hargeysa/The Republic of Somaliland: development, recognition and the ‘other 
Somalia’ narrative.  
While twenty years of de facto independence may not have brought international diplomatic 
recognition for the Republic of Somaliland, they have facilitated the development of new forms of 
political organisation and nationhood in the northwestern part of what is (still) demarcated as 
‗Somalia‘ on maps of the Horn of Africa. Cartographic fictions aside, Somaliland has emerged as a 
polity which passes what Bryden refers to as the ‗banana test‘ of sovereignty (2003) – if it looks, taste 
and smells like a state, then it probably is one – and political development in the territory has 
produced distinctive institutional frameworks for governance (Renders 2007) and relatively 
democratic and peaceful transitions of executive power. The emergence of Somaliland as an 
independent actor nonetheless remains a highly controversial project both within the region and in 
certain parts of the territory itself. It is not the purpose of this introductory overview to make 
comment on the ‗legitimacy‘ of Somaliland‘s independence claim. Instead, this discussion sets the 
scene for the subsequent exploration of the ways in which narratives and counter-narratives of 
nationalism, self-determination and the geopolitics of the region are deployed and how they influence 
popular conceptualisations of nationhood in the Somali Horn. The very fact that certain discourses 
may be marginalised or excluded from the public sphere in Hargeysa is in itself part of this process 
and needs to be kept in mind throughout the commentary on events taking place in this capital city. 
Somaliland provides an example of a ‗post-post‘-independence political project in that a significant 
reconfiguration of sovereignty has taken place after the earlier experiment of broader Somali 
statehood. This rupture, or ‗re-independence‘, has occurred in an international context very different 
from that which fostered the creation of a sovereign and unified Somalia in the 1960s.  
What makes Somaliland‘s case for secession distinct from many other independence 
movements is the fact that the territory enjoyed a brief spell of internationally-recognised sovereignty 
in 1960, between the exit of British power from the protectorate and its subsequent union with the ex-
Italian territory of southern Somalia (Bryden 2003, 342). Whilst this independence lasted a mere five 
days, it followed an experience of British influence (and boundary definition) which left a distinct 




northern political identity, conditioned in part, by one of the most indirect of indirect rules in the 
British Empire. Today, Somalilanders are often eager to point out to the otherwise ill-informed that 
their nation was never ‗colonised‘ - the distinct notion of ‗protectorate‘ being a feature of newly 
energised nationalist history.  
The relatively hands-off approach of the British to the Somaliland protectorate does not imply 
that imperial power did not have profound and far-reaching effects on the territory. It was from the 
north that the most organised and fierce resistance to foreign rule in the Somali Horn emerged in the 
form of the so-called ‗Mad Mullah‘ Maxamed Cabdullah Xassan‘s Darawiish army, which took on 
the British and their Ethiopian and local allies for two decades from 1900 (Sheik Abdi 1993). Said 
Sheikh Samatar (1982) highlights the poetic component of the Sayyid‘s proto-nationalist anti-colonial 
mobilisation and combat, illustrating the almost visceral impact of the war of words between the 
Darawiish and those clans seen as collaborators with the British.  
Although Abdi Ismail Samatar (1989) details how British colonialism had a significant 
impact upon processes of rural sedentarization and the incorporation of ‗traditional‘ elders into the 
political matrix of imperial-protectorate administration, it is nonetheless true that in terms of societal 
penetration British rule differed from the strategies of the Italians in the south. Settler colonialism and 
the development of export-orientated cash-crop industries brought about dramatic changes in land 
tenure in parts of south-central Somalia and set the context for expropriations by Siyaad Barre‘s 
regime and ongoing conflict over valuable land-based assets in the post-state collapse period (Marchal 
1997, Webersik 2005). Although Somaliland‘s post 1991 development has not remained entirely free 
of violent contestation, especially during its early phases (Balthasar 2013), the predominance of the 
pastoral livestock trade and the remittance economy (as opposed to large scale agriculture or state-rent 
seeking) has created a setting in which certain segments of the merchant class have been able to gain 
control of or create state institutions which would ensure a certain degree of security for these sectors 
to develop (De Waal 2007, 1).  
Somaliland‘s nationalist narrative draws heavily from the story of the SNM‘s increasingly 
audacious resistance to the Barre regime in the 1980s and the counter-insurgency that this 
provoked.This culminated in 1988 with extensive aerial bombardment which razed most of Hargeysa 
to the ground and expelled the vast majority of residents as refugees from the carnage (Adam 1995, 
74). With the collapse of the regime in Muqdisho, the SNM in the north formed the political nucleus 
of the unilateral declaration of Somaliland‘s independence. Articulated another way, this was a 
renouncement of the union between the former colonial territories of northern and southern Somalia 
signed in 1960. The history of northern clan negotiations, the declaration of independence and 
subsequent conflict and reconciliation is dealt with by Bradbury (2008). State formation since the mid 
1990s in Somaliland has taken place simultaneously with the systematic and extensive reconstruction 
and expansion of its ‗national‘ capital, Hargeysa. Lacking international recognition, this process has 
largely been driven through the returning of refugees and finance sourced from the global Somali 




diaspora, and the remittance economy (Ahmed 2000). Although Somaliland has not had access to (or 
been spared from) the external finance and political interference that have characterised the 
‗international community‘s‘ engagement with the internationally recognised government in 
Muqdisho, it has been a recipient of significant amounts of aid - albeit often channelled through civil 
society organisations and UN agencies (Phillips 2013, 29). Nevertheless, the primary impetus for 
reconstruction and development has come from free-market entrepreneurship in Hargeysa and the re-
development of the international livestock trade. As such, narratives of Somaliland‘s self-sufficient 
state building are often vocalised in the Hargeysa public sphere. 
The city today, whilst still physically and psychologically bearing some of the scars of its past 
destruction, is a dynamic regional hub of commerce, trade and communications. The remittance 
economy remains an important source of income and capital, and ties Hargeysa into various 
international markets and communities. Hargeysa (like much of the rest of urban Somalia/Somaliland) 
boasts a relatively advanced commercial telecommunications sector, and higher education institutions, 
often financed by diaspora returnees, are growing rapidly. At the same time, Hargeysa struggles from 
infrastructural deficiencies (roads, public services and healthcare delivery) and high rates of youth 
unemployment. The institutions and ministries of the Somaliland state project are physically based in 
Hargeysa, and local law enforcement and judicial mechanisms function. Politically too, Hargeysa is 
the centre of gravity for the Republic of Somaliland and is home to the various branches of 
government including the Presidency, the Lower and Upper Houses of the legislature as well as the 
National Electoral Commission which oversees the tri-partite electoral system.   
The functioning of democratic elections in Somaliland is a key facet of the unrecognized 
Republic‘s narrative of legitimacy: not only do elections allocate power within Somaliland but they 
play a role in defining the polity vis-á-vis the ‗other Somalia‘ which remains mired in ongoing 
conflict. This ‗nationalist‘ function of Somaliland‘s elections was on display in the Republic‘s last 
Presidential contest, which I witnessed in 2010 while living in Hargeysa. June 26 is an auspicious date 
for Somalilanders and constitutes one of the territory‘s two days of ‗independence‘, the other being 
May 18
th
, the date in 1991 on which Somaliland declared its secession from Somalia. June 26
th
 2010 
marked 50 years of independence from British rule over the Somaliland Protectorate and was 
deliberately chosen as the date for Somaliland‘s second presidential election - originally scheduled in 
2008 but repeatedly delayed due to political infighting and serious irregularities in voter registration. 
This constituted an important day for Somaliland, and came loaded with meaning for a territory 
asserting its nationalism in a context of democratic stability.  
Somaliland‘s constitution mandates a tri-partite competitive electoral system and is designed 
this way to prevent unlimited party fragmentation along clan/sub-clan lines. In popular political 
discourse it is widely feared that this is what would happen without strict limits placed on the number 
of parties allowed to compete. The 2010 campaign was fought out between the UDUB party (Ururka 
Dimuqraadiga Ummadda Bahawday The United People‘s Democratic Party) of the then incumbent 




President Dahir Rayaale Kaahin, the KULMIYE (Unity) Party of the eventual winner Axmed 
Maxamed Maxamood Silaanyo, and Faysal Cali Waraabe‘s Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka 
(UCID, The Justice and Welfare Party). In the weeks leading up to the election, the three parties 
mobilised their supporters for campaigning around Somaliland, a process characterised in Hargeysa 
by numerous rallies and motorised processions blasting through the streets. The parties were allocated 
alternate days for campaigning in order to minimise risks of confrontation between opposing groups, 
and the run-up to the election was characterised by a carnival-like atmosphere of marches and 
motorcades.  
In contrast to the movement and vibrancy of the preceding weeks, election day itself was 
governed in such a way as to facilitate orderly conduct and calm on the streets of Hargeysa. A private 
vehicle ban prevented large scale inner or inter-city movement of voters to multiple polling stations 
and restrict any kind of partisan campaigning on the day itself. Successful in this regard, the 
restrictions gave the city an uncharacteristic atmosphere of quiet tension. Queuing at polling stations 
was largely well-managed with people appearing genuinely enthusiastic and positive during the 
process, often eager to be photographed with their registration cards and indelibly marked fingers 
indicating they had cast their vote. The election constituted a major security operation for the state 
authorities and the spectre of violent disruption to the process loomed large. Hargeysa had suffered 
suicide-bombing attacks in 2008 by alleged AS-linked militants who ostensibly oppose Somaliland 
independence and retain elements of underground support in the northern territories. The state was 
required to perform its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence in order to facilitate a process on 
which it had staked much of its credibility as a viable and, indeed, legitimate secessionist political 
entity. The external ramifications of the electoral democratic process were not lost in the localised 
popular contestation over partisan politics. Public discourses of the legitimacy of the election 
reflecting the ‗readiness‘ of Somaliland to join the international community as an independent 
member were frequently expressed to foreign observers. The performance of this election was 
conceptualised for many people not only in terms of local power struggles but also in relation to 
sovereignty articulated not through juridical right but normative (democratic) legitimacy. Here, ‗post 
post-independence‘ political aspirations were tied to globalised norms and regimes of governance and 
democratic preference. Across Somaliland the election proceeded in a predominantly free and peace 
manner and produced a result deemed fair by international observers (Walls & Kibble/Progressio 
2011). The election resulted in the peaceful transition of power to President Silaanyo who had gained 
49.95% of the vote, with a national turnout at around 50% (Ibid, 35). 
This vignette of democratic performance in Somaliland serves to illustrate the centrality of 
partisan competition in Hargeysa in the public spheres of political commentary, in contrast to the 
political contexts of Muqdisho and Garoowe where no comparable established party system operates. 
Understanding the role of elections in Somaliland, not only for the political stability of the territory, 
but also its nationalist self-image allows for appreciation of controversy that was generated in 2015 




around disputes regarding the extension of President Silaanyo‘s mandate and the role of opposition 
parties, the upper house of the legislature (the Guurti), the National Electoral Commission, and 
Constitutional Court in this process. Officially taking into consideration technical limitations 
preventing a scheduled 2015 election, the Guurti, following a tri-partite agreement, has set the date 




1.3. Ethno-religious nationalism? 
Given the markedly different political contexts of these three cities and the level of fragmentation of 
political authority across Somalia, in what sense is a focus on ‗ethno-religious nationalism‘ an 
appropriate lens through which to comparatively study political identity and communication across 
the Somali territories? The following chapters draw from Benedict Anderson‘s oft-referenced 
conceptualisation of nationalism as the production of ‗imagined communities‘ of citizens able to 
presuppose the existence of - and identify horizontally with - their unmet (and un-meetable) 
compatriots. Anderson emphasises the importance of the development of print-capitalism in the 
European historical experience, as well as the popular emergence of temporal conceptions of 
simultaneity in allowing for this process of ‗imagining‘ the nation to take place (2006, 22). 
Anderson‘s nation is conjured up by its participants as being (1) ‗limited‘ with ‗finite, if elastic, 
boundaries beyond which lie other nations‘; (2)a ‗community‘ characterised by ‗deep horizontal 
comradeship‘; and (3)‗sovereign‘ with aspirations towards the normative values of freedom and 
independence (Ibid, 7).  
The former two characteristics are explored implicitly in this thesis‘ analyses of different 
types of media texts, and I argue that examples of rhetorical appeals to solidarity amongst an 
ethnically, linguistically and religiously (if not geographically) bounded community are common 
tropes of political discourse and appeals to legitimacy. The political question of sovereignty, on the 
other hand, is far more difficult to discern amongst the myriad claims to authority which contest, 
interact and overlap across the Somali territories of the Horn. One of the cumulative conclusions of 
the subsequent chapters is that not only can an ethno-religious national community be imagined 
across political boundaries of sovereignty, but also that these notions of trans-nationalism and 
political fragmentation can become constitutive of the idea of that nation itself. A notion of divided 
sovereignty becomes popularly understood as an inescapable fact of Somali political identity and must 
be articulated and utilised by a wide range of actors. These actors imagine the eponymous ‗Somali 
lands‘ in a variety of ways, each employing different conceptualisations of what it means to be a 
‗Somali‘. This abstract ‗ethnic‘ categorisation – which also engages a variety of religious, linguistic 
and ‗cultural‘ signifiers - holds great political significance in its ability to include or exclude different 
groups across multiple settings.   
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Fundamental to this argument is the idea that fragmentation is popularly conceptualised from 
an all-encompassing local to global scale - whether amongst groups within the territory of 
‗Somalia/Somaliland‘, amongst the wider ethnically Somali territories of Ethiopia, Kenya or Djibouti, 
or in the global diaspora. The blurred distinctions here render a local/diasporic dichotomy analytically 
problematic and demonstrate how an ethno-religious identity can transcend state boundaries. This, I 
contend, represents in itself a popular response to extreme political fragmentation and here the media 
ecology of the Somali territories plays a crucial role. The public sphere (introduced theoretically 
below) is conceptualised in terms of what I describe as its dual character. On one level, public spheres 
of political commentary and debate exist around (and help create) localised political projects, such as 
those found in Muqdisho, Garoowe or Hargeysa. At the same time, thesecentres of production overlap 
and interact with a wider public sphere of externally produced media speaking to regional and global 
Somali-speaking audiences. It is this interaction, I argue, that shapes different opportunities for the 
deployment of ethno-religious political argumentation and imagination.  
If, then, the basis of such identification is centred around ethnic, religious, linguistic and 
‗cultural‘ discourses, then what is the utility of the political concept of ‗nationalism‘ for a study of this 
type?  Nationalism remains a key component of the rhetoric of political actors themselves across 
Somalia, employing different combinations of these ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic tropes to 
respond to the particular circumstances and contradictions of Somali political statehoods. The 
reconstruction of the Somali state from the capital Muqdisho (and participated in by regional political 
actors such as Puntland, Jubaland et al) is framed in the historical context of remedying fragmented 
Somali political sovereignty, whether originally fractured by colonialism, post-independence 
exclusionary dictatorship, or the violence of the civil war. The concept of Somali ethnic, religious and 
linguistic homogeneity has been embedded in this project from its origins in anti-colonial 
mobilisation, a history which continues resonate across the modern public sphere in expressions of 
both support for state reconstruction and radical critiques of this process.  
Post-colonial Somali state-building has been analysed in terms of this apparent relative 
homogeneity, at least when viewed in continental comparison. For Laitin and Samatar, for instance, 
there pre-existed a Somali ‗nation in search of a state‘ (1987). Post-state collapse scholarship, on the 
other hand, has highlighted the disjuncture between such presentations of the nationalist ideal and 
complex realities of diversity amongst the regions and peoples of the Somali Horn. This, it is argued, 
has played a significant role in the deployment of colonial power, was exploited by the military state, 
and influenced trajectories civil-war violence (Ahmed 1995; Besteman & Cassanelli 2000; Kusow et 
al. 2004;  Eno, Eno & Lehman 2010). As the subsequent chapters will elaborate, the notion of Somali 
ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic homogeneity is in itself a construct, deployed in different 
contexts to unite or exclude from power certain groups at certain political junctures. The fact that it is 
an imaginative construct is precisely what makes it politically important, and discursively identifiable 
in various forms of political, literary or religious commentary.  




Conversely, imaginations of a ‗Somali‘ nation remain crucial for the secessionist polity of 
Somaliland, as its very naming suggests. This constitutes a political project which rejects the classical 
pan-Somali nationalist discourse of regional unity, but requires the development of its own rhetorical 
repertoire of national symbols and mythology. These discourses of Somaliland nationalism generally 
avoid the explicit presentation of a particular or distinctive ‗northern‘ identity as this could be seized 
upon by its opponents who decry the project as illegitimate in its alleged single clan-family focused 
composition. A civic nationalism based on a shared history of violence and struggle coexists in the 
Somaliland public sphere alongside discourses of wider Somali ethno-religious or cultural solidarity: 
the epitome of an imagined community that is divided (legitimately, in the Somalilander perspective) 
into multiple polities. This maintenance of a discourse emphasising both the ethnically-defined 
character of a ‗Somali‘ polity alongside a secessionist claim to independence provides political actors 
with both novel opportunities and dilemmas, and these are explored in the subsequent chapters with 
reference to the cultural politics of wider Somali state contestation and media production.  
While I utilise Anderson‘s focus on the technological basis of imaginative nationalism, I also 
draw upon expansions and critiques of his account. Wedeen‘s exploration of nationalism in Yemen 
(2008) has been instructive for attempts here to conceptualise Somali case studies. Yemen and the 
Somali Horn, physically separated by the Gulf of Aden, share numerous historical and cultural 
features: a history of colonial administration; territorial divisions and unifications; extremely limited 
state capacity; the development of Islamist ‗youth‘ insurgencies; and the dubious honour of 
constituting another theatre in the United States‘ ‗Global War on Terror‘. Wedeen builds on 
Anderson‘s notion of the imaginative content of nationalism and the technologies associated with the 
production of novel forms of horizontal territorial identifications, whilst problematising a basis of this 
theory - the idea that nationalism and secularization necessitate each other. For Wedeen this feature of 
Anderson‘s argument demonstrates a lingering indebtedness to modernization theory (Wedeen 2008, 
5) and she argues that what was contingent on a particular European history of developments of 
imagined national communities cannot be taken as a basis for generalizations about non-linear 
processes of identification and power politics in the post-colonial world.  
Wedeen‘s analysis of Yemeni case studies highlights the existence non-secular nationalisms 
which fuse discourses of piety with vocabularies of territorially designated sovereignty. In order to 
develop this theory Wedeen engages with a multiplicity of ‗mini-publics‘‘(including the media, the 
Mosque, the qaat chewing social settings – all of which relevant for Somali cases) which she 
characterises as the ‗substance of participatory politics‘ in a context of semi-authoritarianism and a 
lack of formal mechanisms of suffrage.  This focus then ‗explores how public sphere practices 
occasion the performance of an explicitly democratic ‗subjectivity‘ (or presentation of the self) – one 
that relishes deliberation – without producing specifically liberal debates or forms of personhood‘ 
(Ibid, 20). The development of the public sphere in Somaliland, for instance, demonstrates similar 




processes, albeit with the additional contextual factor of functioning procedural democracy and the 
pressures of international non-recognition.  
 
1.4. Habermas in the Horn? The Somali public sphere 
Jürgen Habermas‘ foundational account of the ‗public sphere‘ refers to the European development of 
a space of expression and debate which came to exist in urban bourgeois society, coinciding with the 
decline of the ‗representational‘ culture of feudalism and the emergence of capitalist enterprise. This 
new „Öffentlichkeit‟ culture which emerged in different contexts in Europe from the end of the 18th 
Century was characterised by the development of print media and the expansion of public, non-state 
controlled spaces for exchange and discussion in which views and knowledge could be shared and 
reproduced, with ‗rational-critical‘ dialogue creating new contexts and imaginations for political 
agency and ideology (Habermas 1991, 29). This classical conception of the public sphere is thus 
highly normative and – usually viewed contemporaneously with the emergence of ‗civil society‘ – 
emphasises the importance of space for popular debate as a prerequisite for the eventual rise of 
democratic modes of governance. For Habermas, this highly important (and idealised) period would 
ultimately last only for a short time before its decay was brought on by the growth of commercial 
mass media and the transformation of individuals in later stages of capitalism from citizens into 
consumers or clients of state services. Habermas‘ work has been subject to numerous critiques and 
reformulations but regardless of the limitations of his class-specific (bourgeois) and gendered (male) 
conceptualization of this epoch (Siltanen & Stanworth 1984), the value of his original formulation on 
the influence of this space of discourse and agency has often been built upon rather than jettisoned by 
his critics (Crossley & Roberts 2004, 10; Meyer & Moors 2006; Salvatore & Schmidtke 2013).  
The physical and political conditions of the public sphere in the three research sites of 
Muqdisho, Garoowe and Hargeysa vary greatly in terms of security concerns constraining free 
association and public expression, and in regards to the prevalence of print media. While these 
environments of media production, dissemination and reproduction are fully outlined in Chapter three, 
I note here that in each political centre a level of economic development, access to communications 
technology, media activity and (elite) public discourse exists for the realm of the public sphere to 
facilitate substantive debate around political norms. The invocation of Habermas‘s public sphere 
terminology in these differing contexts is not to testify to some process of bourgeois capitalist 
revolution analogous to European social or economic change between the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Instead it asserts the importance of networks and forums of media within a rapidly changing political, 
social and economic environment in which discourses of morality, imaginations of the political, and 
highly important definitions and distinctions between the ‗public‘ and the ‗private‘ are being 
constantly remade and redeployed. The content that is transmitted through these networks is clearly 
important, but so are the conventions followed, the innovations made, and the forms of media or 
artistic expression energised. 




Consideration of ‗Africanist‘ or ‗Southern‘ critiques (De Sousa Santos, 2013) of public sphere 
theories helps to clarify the particular way in which the concept is applied in this thesis. Willems 
(2013) points out that the public sphere is often inextricably linked to the notion of civil society, but 
has tended to escape the type of critical scrutiny that has been levelled against the latter in the field of 
African studies for its apparent Euro-centric historical/normative bias. She asserts that the relatively 
limited critical scholarship on the public sphere has tended to blur categorisations, and cites Ekeh‘s 
(1975) contention that the Western experience of a unified public sphere (which the state and civil 
society both occupy) is not reflective of African social spaces where distinction between ‗primordial‘ 
and ‗civic‘ publics is evident. She argues that this, whilst an important attempt to theorise a public 
sphere in an African context, is also an example of a tendency towards conceptual conflation 
(Willems, 2013, 7).  
Calhoun (1993) outlines the different connotations of civil society and the public sphere 
where the latter refers to a discursive space of public deliberation and the former implies some form 
of political organisation. Often civil society is identified by virtue of existing outside the state whereas 
the public sphere is defined in opposition to a private sphere. For Calhoun (and Willems) the public 
sphere partially overlaps with the state and civil society, constituting a sphere where both the state and 
civil society articulate their interests (Ibid, 267; Willems 2013, 6). Calhoun identifies one of the most 
significant obstacles to the application of public sphere theory in non-Western contexts with regard to 
Habermas‘ treatment of ‗identity politics‘ as falling outside of the arena of ‗rational critical‘ debate. 
For Calhoun, ‗Identity formation needs thus to be approached as part of the process of public life, not 
something that can be fully settled prior to it in a private sphere‘ (1993, 279).  He argues that the 
liberal model of the public sphere needs re-examination and notes how ‗even the very identity of the 
political community is a product, not simply a precondition, of the activity of the public sphere of 
civil society‘ (Ibid, 280). This critique recognises the unanticipated resilience of modern forms of 
nationalism in the post-Cold War era, flourishing alongside (not in spite of) expanding processes of 
globalisation. Here the privileged notion of actors entering into a public sphere with pre-defined 
identities, equipped to engage in dialogue whose outcome depends solely on the rational merits of 
argumentation, appears either as an abstraction derived from a highly specific historical context of 
European capitalist development, or as an unrealistic assessment of the actual dynamics of the classic 
‗coffee-house‘ model itself.  
There are different ways to respond to this apparent theoretical blind-spot, one of which has 
been highlighted above in Wedeen‘s conceptualisation of ‗mini-publics‘ in Yemen. These, she argues, 
facilitate the emergence of what she describes as non-liberal democratic subjectivities through 
deliberative spaces. Another response seen more clearly in the Africanist literature involves 
jettisoning the public-sphere label altogether, and replacing it with the concept of ‗popular culture‘, 
which, for Barber, is characterised by the arts as a channel for public communications (1997, 2). This 
approach is applauded by Willems who notes that ‗an advantage of conceptualising sites of popular 




culture as publics is that it avoids Habermas‘ elitist connotation of his concept of the public sphere – 
popular culture often engages, interacts and responds to official debates‘ (2013, 7). The problem with 
this conceptualisation of popular culture as a site of discourse for the subsequent Somali case studies 
is that it appears to emphasise a dichotomy between ‗official‘ (state) and ‗unofficial‘ (popular) 
debates - a distinction in the context of Somali media that is highly blurred and seldom clearly 
identifiable. Chapter three outlines the networks and individuals behind news media production and 
highlights the diversity of producers, the dominance of the private sector and the dynamic contestation 
between multiple actors attempting to establish themselves as ‗official‘ spokespeople for various 
political, social or religious projects.  
Also drawing from Anderson, Barber defines a ‗public‘ as an ‗audience whose members are 
not known to the speaker/composer of the text, and not necessarily present, but still addressed 
simultaneously, and imagined as a collectivity‘ (2007, 139). Here she emphaises that new forms and 
tools of public textual meaning making also depend on conventions of earlier genres, and highlights 
the collaboration between textual producers and audiences: ‗what we see… is not an appeal to shared 
cultural knowledge as a given, fixed characteristic of an ethnic population – but rather an active and 
collaborative project of constructing shared knowledge in the very act of alluding to it as if it were 
already in place‘ (Ibid, 167). Given the historical and modern tensions around the definition and 
boundary-setting of the Somali ‗nation‘, my subsequent textual analyses attempt to address the ways 
in which a transnational media ecology helps facilitate this very process, and the implications of 
changing technologies and forms of ‗entextualisation‘ of discourse.   
Hunter‘s (2015) exploration of the public sphere through newspaper culture in pre and post-
colonial Tanzania also illustrates a blurring of these boundaries between official and popular 
discourse. Here the ideological dynamism of the period, whereby fundamental terminologies of 
political change (freedom, rights, equality) were all up for debate, was mediated through the particular 
conventions of public letter-writing to various Swahili-language newspapers. These circuits of 
political communication were themselves products of the development of the capitalist economy and 
had their own built-in barriers to participation or access (class, gender, urban bias). Similarly, the 
importance of the technological mediation of discourses of politics is summarised by Barber in her 
analysis of Frederiksen‘s discussion of the Kikuyu press in contemporaneous Kenya: 
 
 ‗What [Frederiksen‘s account] suggests is that the local press‘s mode of constituting an imagined 
community depended not so much on its simultaneity and uniformity [Anderson], as on its hybrid, 
porous and responsive character‘ (2006, 15).  
 
The above critiques and developments of public sphere theory in non-European contexts all illustrate 
the difficulties that arise from the normative connotations of the terminology, particularly the notion 
that public-sphere/civil society interaction are a starting block from which liberal-democratisation 
processes can advance. Appadurai and Breckenridge have thus suggested:  





‗[a loosening of] the link between the word public and the history of civil society in Europe... [and 
argue] that it be used to refer to a set of arenas that have emerged in a variety of historical 
conditions and that articulate the space between domestic life and the projects of the nation-state – 
where different social groups (classes, ethnic groups, genders) constitute their identities by their 
experience of mass-mediated forms in relation to the practices of everyday life‘ (1995, 4).  
 
For Appadurai and Breckenridge this usage severs any predetermined relationship to ‗formal‘ politics 
or ‗rational communicative action‘ and instead helps describe ‗an arena of cultural contestation in 
which modernity can become a diversely appropriated experience‘ (Ibid).  
From another perspective, it could be argued that whatever ephemera are produced in the 
ether of the ‗public sphere‘ (however eloquently conceptualised), this actually has very little influence 
on the actual workings of political power exercised in political arena defined by money and the means 
of violence. Alex De Waal‘s recent intervention on the ‗real politics‘ of the Horn of Africa (2015) can 
be read to both downplay the significance of the public sphere, but also open up new perspectives on 
the position of popular discourse and political communications. De Waal visualises the politics of the 
Horn as a ‗forest of trees‘, each one representative of a political centre of patronage; spread out to 
varying degrees and often crossing borders. He highlights the material logics of bargaining for rents in 
a dynamic political marketplace and shows how the changing technological or communicative basis 
of its operation increase competition and drive up the price of loyalty, therefore facilitating and 
incentivising more entrants into rent-seeking rebellion cycles. Pervasive low-intensity violence is not 
the indication of the failure of this system, but rather a central component of it, serving as a means of 
bargaining and indicating actors‘ intentions and capabilities within the marketplace. Mineral and 
hydrocarbon revenues are important sites of conflict and constitute spoils to be distributed, while 
illicit transnational finance, the global arms trade and ‗Global War on Terror‘ security patronage from 
the West all play crucial roles for transactions in the marketplace and maintaining the all important 
‗political-budgets‘ of power holders. 
This pointedly materialistic account of the ‗real‘ workings of elite power does attempt to 
engage with the identities, ideas and imaginations of politics in the contemporary Horn. De Waal 
considers the technological and ideological context of the public sphere in the region and notes the 
increased detachment between this arena of popular debate and the circuitry of communication 
amongst the elites who operate within the marketplaces of patronage. De Waal emphasises the point 
that advances in communications technology have made a huge impact on processes of political 
bargaining (connectivity increases the number of potential entrants, makes closed-door negotiations 
impossible), while popular access to diversified media and the networks of new transnational elites 
raise possibilities for nascent localized public spheres of debate and dissent. However, such optimism 
is tempered by the fact that national concentrations of intellectual energy in centralized higher 
education institutions is a thing of the past, and the politics of ‗ideas‘ only becomes viable for those 
niche nodes of populist religious dissent. Nationalism and political ideology barely factor into the 




equation and these, I argue, are areas which require further reflection. To what extent are radical 
challenges to existing power holders able to call on past narratives of nationhood in the Horn context 
to broaden their appeal? To what extent do new avenues for decentralized politico-religious 
communication facilitate resilient insurgencies that have the capacity to derail the political 
‗stabilization‘ efforts perceived by so many to be externally driven? The development of AS‘s broad 
and cross-clan militant network, its continued ability to soak up intense foreign and domestic military 
pressure, and the regionalisation - or even internationalisation - of its ‗Jihad‘ is an instructive case in 
point. In a different context, one might productively enquire as to the circumstances and implications 
of national identity creation within a ‗well-regulated‘ political marketplace such as Somaliland (an 
example given by De Waal)? In this case, the development of such a mythology has been a 
component of the process he has described, and may well play a role in the maintenance of this order, 
particularly if the current circumstances of Somaliland‘s unrecognised international sovereignty were 
to change.  
 
1.5. Thesis structure 
Chapter two continues this discussion with a problematisation of ‗cultural‘ interpretations of 
nationalist contestation. The chapter reflects on the methodological choices that have been made in 
the subsequent selection of different ‗types‘ of modern Somali-language media texts for analysis. 
Their apparent novelty and importance are contxtualised and linked to the wider argument advanced 
on the relationship between the technological development of media production and the varying 
deployments of ethno-religious nationalist rhetoric. This chapter also engages in a discussion of the 
recent #Cadaanstudies controversy, an academic-activist movement challenging the ‗whiteness‘ of 
knowledge production on Somalia. Using this to foreground my own reflexivity, the chapter argues 
that aspects of this campaign are themselves indicative of (and overlap with) other contemporary 
struggles over the narrative politics of Somali nation statehoods, playing out in the contemporary 
public sphere. 
Chapter three provides a detailed comparative analysis of the technological, socio-political 
and security contexts of media across Somalia and Somaliland. The chapter gives an overview of 
media production in terms of content, networks of producers and audience consumption. Explored 
here are the role of journalists and different forms of media production in processes of state 
reconstruction or political reconfiguration of a federal Somalia. Communications by ‗state‘ entities 
(and their capacity to control information flows) are comparatively analysed in relation to the 
producers of the texts that are presented in the following chapters. This chapter argues that the 
transnational orientation of the Somali news media, as well as its commercial context, influence the 
production and reception of content. 
  The following three chapters each analyse particular types of modern media texts which are 
produced in and circulate through the wider Somali public sphere. The multiple producers of each of 




these types of media often consider themselves to be ‗nationalists‘. Nevertheless, their work 
constructs this Somali nation in varying cultural, religious, political or genealogical terms, hinting at 
the inclusion or exclusion of different groups, and the influence of the ‗external‘ forces. Analysis of 
these texts highlights certain continuities with the broader history of discursive post-colonial nation-
state building introduced above, whilst also demonstrating the impact of a dramatically altered 
modern media ecology in facilitating new ways of imagining a nation and ‗Somali‘ states. As such, 
Chapter four engages with many of the discursive tropes presented in this introduction (political 
reconfiguration, ethno-religious nationalism, clan) through an extended analysis of the work of Amin 
Amir, a diaspora-based cartoonist whose work is widely circulated through online and print news 
media in Somalia. Whilst it may seem counterintuitive to begin textual analysis with material 
produced outside of Somalia, the chapter argues that it is the artist‘s very detachment from the 
physical context which allows him to make comments which engage receptive audiences across the 
different political environments introduced above. This analysis is also punctuated with ‗local‘ texts 
which illustrate the salience of his renderings of politics to opinion-makers who may be physically 
present in the environments. This chapter proposes a lens of analysis of Somali media which 
emphasises the transnational, or, more precisely, collapses distinctions between ‗local‘ and ‗diasporic‘ 
nodes of production for discourses of Somali ethno-religious nationalism. This chapter considers the 
theoretical contributions of literature on popular geopolitics and transnational public spheres, 
problematising emphasis on ‗resistance‘ in recent work on African ‗civic agency‘.  
Chapter five explores a second type of modern media text: pro-AS online propaganda text and 
videos. This serves as a vehicle to examine the role of Islam (or Islamism) in nationalist political 
argumentation in contemporary Somalia. The chapter does not conflate these ‗radical‘, oppositional 
narratives with broader histories of Islamist activism, organisation or socio-religious change in 
Somalia (indeed, it argues that a dichotomous conception of religious/secular contestation in Somalia 
is fundamentally misleading), but rather interrogates the ways in this material discursively overlaps 
with other features of political debate across Somali publics spheres. This propaganda works 
explicitly through the language of non-liberal, anti-imperialist resistance to local and international 
power-holders, but is itself positioned within global frameworks of religio-political mobilisation and 
ideological conflict. This type of media production is representative of emerging imaginations of 
normative Somali statehood appealing to certain segments of the population within Somalia and 
beyond. This discussion also draws on recent theorisations of the relationship between mass religious 
communication and the technologies of the public sphere, and evaluates the relevance of the Somali 
case for such debates.   
Chapter six focuses on a third type of media text that circulates in the wider Somali public 
sphere: print or online opinion pieces. Texts analysed in this chapter either emanate from or directly 
comment on the three political centres of Muqdisho, Garoowe and Hargeysa. They are all written in 
the post 2012 period and explicitly engage – in different ways – with the division of Somalia along 




federal, regional and ‗clan‘ lines. This type of ‗non-prestigious‘ polemic writing is contextualised with 
reference to the historical development of the wider modern media environment, and the literary 
canon of ‗prestigious‘ composition. Following Barber, the analysis looks at what these texts say, do 
and are (2007, 200) in this specific transnational media ecology. In exploring the different ways in 
which commentary on ‗division‘ is performed in the public sphere the chapter attempts to illustrate 
some of the ‗the contexts in which clanship gains specific meanings and show what is ―rolled into‖ 
clan at any specific moment‘ (Kapteijns 2004, 4). Given the ubiquity of discourses and critiques of 
‗clanism‘ in this type of commentary, the chapter argues that - almost paradoxically - narratives of 
this division may themselves contribute to the maintenance of the idea of the Somali ethno-nation.  
The concluding chapter ties together the arguments put forward by the preceding media case 
studies: namely, an emphasis on the value of a transnational conceptualisation of a global Somali 
public sphere; and the notion that the enduring discursive importance of ethno-religious nationalist 
argumentation is created in the technological media environment of political fragmentation, as 
opposed to running contrary to it. The conclusion argues that the emergence of a supra-national public 
sphere influences imaginations of what the ‗Somali lands‘ have been, what they are, and what they 
can be. This constitutes a dialectical process whereby narratives of conflict perpetuate political 
fragmentation, while simultaneously reinforcing particular conceptions of shared ethno-cultural-
religious identity. Even if Somali ethno-nationalism is inherently contested (Kusow et al. 2004), an 
‗invention‘ (Ahmed et al. 1995), a ‗myth‘ (Hesse 2010), or has been ‗elusive‘ from the outset 
(Balthasar 2014), its contemporary manifestations in the public sphere should not be overlooked as 
they represent extremely malleable and adaptive discursive tools which are and can be used in the 
politics of resistance, authority construction and exclusion across the Somali territories.  If previous 
accounts have framed a contested or fictive nationalism as an explanation for state ‗failure‘, then this 
analysis attempts to flip the lens to interrogate how political fragmentation and the modern trajectories 
of conflict have affected the tenor of nationalist discourses in Somalia and the multiple political 





























































‗Can the Somali speak?‘ was the question was posed by young Somali-identifying academic activists 
in the context of the #Cadaanstudies movement that engulfed the field of Somali scholarship in 20151. 
Echoing Spivak‘s famous discussion of the ‗subaltern‘ voice (1988), and inverting the focus from the 
study of the ‗Somali‘ to critical analysis of the ‗whiteness‘ of structures of knowledge production, the 
‗hash-tag‘ encapsulated the numerous legitimate grievances of those who feel that this particular field 
of area studies is dominated by external narratives, an agenda of securitisation, and shoddy, detached 
scholarship. The campaign, driven largely through social media commentary and debate, has 
penetrated into both popular and academic discourse on post-colonialism and scholarly power 
imbalances. It also coincided with my period of fieldwork in Somalia.  
As a western, white, male scholar producing knowledge on Somalia, #Cadaanstudies 
provides a timely intervention around which I structure this methodological chapter of my thesis, and 
I foreground here important questions surrounding reflexivity, power dynamics of research, and the 
mediation of Somali voices. I argue that #Cadaanstudies – as a debate and as a form of narrative 
politics itself – reflects wider discourses within the transnational ‗Somali‘ public sphere addressing 
nationalism, political fragmentation, external intervention and the ‗cultural‘ identity of authority in 
contexts of state reconstruction or reconfiguration.  
This chapter discusses the apparent ‗exceptionalism‘ of Somali case studies with specific 
reference to the research methods that have been employed, adjusted and reflected upon in the 
development of this project. These include comparative critical discourse analysis of certain types of 
Somali language media texts from across the Somali territories, semi-structured interviews with media 
professionals, ethnographic observation in public sphere sites, and survey and focus group data 
collection with a young generation of news media consumers. I unpack this methodology in the 
context of #Cadaanstudies in order to address the potentials and pitfalls of attempting to balance an 
appreciation of the particularities of the research environment in the Somali Horn of Africa with a 
desire to make broader theoretical claims about ideas of nationalism and the 21
st
 Century parameters 
of public sphere communication.  
The thesis has posed three central questions. The first of which asks as to why discourses of 
ethno-nationalism remain important in the public spheres of an intensely fragmented Somalia. The 
second addresses the extent to which the particular environment of media development, technology 
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and current production influences the way in which these discourses are reproduced and disseminated. 
The third enquires as to the relationship between the political language of news media (in the contexts 
of statelessness or state reconstruction) and the potential ideological and socio-cultural underpinnings 
of a reconfigured Somali nation state/states. In putting forward answers to these questions my analysis 
looks not to the embedded features of some externally conceived idea of ‗Somali culture‘ or a reified 
and monolithic ‗Somali identity‘, but instead takes into consideration – and, crucially, takes seriously 
– the utilisation of these notions in the conventions and rhetoric of media texts and political 
commentary in different public spheres across Somalia.  
To give an initial example of this approach let me introduce here one of the perennial tropes 
of Somali studies – the influence of ‗clan‘ in politics.  The clan or ‗tribal‘ division of both the political 
territory of Somalia and the ethnic group in the Horn of Africa that identifies as ‗Somali‘, is as 
ubiquitous in the academic literature of Somali society and politics as it is contested - on, broadly, a 
‗primordialist‘ versus modernist or materialist axis. If the language of ‗clan‘ is visible in scholarly 
debate then what does it actually look like written on the pages of Somali public sphere news media 
and political commentary? As each of my subsequent analyses of types of media text illustrate (from 
political cartoons to Islamist propaganda to prose opinion pieces) it most certainly features: as a 
‗thing‘ in popular discourse, discussed as an explanatory factor of Somali politics, or critiqued as the 
malign influence of ‗tribalism‘.  What words are used? Which are not? Where do the acceptable 
boundaries of designation, definition or argumentation lie? How does this language create something 
which in one sense can be seen as a unifying ‗cultural‘ marker (the notion that Somali society is 
divided by ‗clan‘), but at the same time is decried as the ultimate barrier to political unity of an ethnic, 
religious or geographically ‗imagined‘ community? This chapter proceeds with a discussion of the 
pitfalls of essentialism inherent in a ‗cultural‘ approach to the study of political communication and 
ethno-religious nationalism across Somalia. This is followed by a reflection on my personal, 
professional and academic experiences in Somaliland/Somalia since 2009 and their influence on the 
specific methodology employed throughout the thesis. The different methods are then elaborated on: 
critical discourse analysis of particular types of media texts; elite interviews; and data collection 
through focus groups and surveys with university students. The practical and ethical considerations, 
constraints and opportunities of this research methodology are discussed, and the chapter concludes 
with comment on the relationship noted above between critiques of external knowledge production on 
Somalia and the narrative-politics of the Somali public sphere itself.  
 
2.2. Essentialism, exceptionalism and the ‘culture’ question 
It would perhaps have made sense to introduce this thesis by making reference to some inherent 
importance of news transmission within Somali society. This could have served as a historical link to 
the value of information dissemination across a nomadic pastoralist society, characterised by mobility 
and fluidity of people‘s orientation towards productive resources such as pasture or watering points 




for livestock; or in terms of shifting patterns of alliance or contestation in a system defined by 
patrilineal descent networks of clan. To succinctly illustrate this cultural continuity – a progression 
from ‗tradition‘ to ‗modernity‘, it may have been appropriate to have noted that a common greeting 
(the ‗how are you today?‘ of both the quintessential nomad and contemporary Somali urbanite) takes 
the form of ‗iska warran?‟ translating literally to ‗give news [of yourself]‘. One could have 
extrapolated from the prevalence of this linguistic construction in everyday discourse (Maxamed ka 
warran?/How is Maxamed? or Ka warrama sidaan ugu dadaalnay nabadda Soomaaliya?
2
 What do 
you think about how we have struggled for peace in Somalia?) the notion that war (news or 
information) and the act of giving it transcends the simple idea of reporting events but instead 
encompasses a wider sense of being or a condition in society. It could even have made sense to make 
some fatuous pun on the resemblance of that Somali word for news or information with its English 
homonym for armed conflict, and thus engage the reader through a witty engagement of a common 
trope in the portrayal of the contemporary Somali predicament: violence. 
Conveniently snappy as each of those opening gambits might have been, each would have 
been both unsatisfactory and ultimately misleading for the direction that this thesis endeavours to 
take. Should I, from the start of this project, have grounded my perspective in an essentialisation of 
Somali ‗culture‘? Would every subsequent and carefully worded disclaimer, definition or appeal to 
nuance be enough to avoid the pitfalls of reductive reasoning, or the presentation of Somali 
exceptionalism that colours so many breathless popular accounts of the ‗problem‘ of Somalia, the 
violence of the Horn, the intractability of political contestation? Is the ‗Somali‘ - depicted as ancestor 
of Richard Burton‘s timeless ‗fierce and turbulent republican‘ (1856/2014, 76) – orientated towards 
news in a different way to other peoples: to me, for instance? What is it about my ‗culture‘ that makes 
me feel and act the way I do towards the transmission of information? Is this a question I have ever 
even considered before? If not, why not? 
For other disciplines such automatic reflexivity is well established. There is some truth in the 
claim raised by the #Cadaanstudies movement that Somali studies has continued on somewhat 
oblivious to the critical contributions of the subaltern studies debates on South Asia (and the wider 
world) from the early 1980s (Spivak 2003). One can argue that as a field it remains compromised by 
colonial paradigms and mechanisms of knowledge production now sitting comfortably within a nexus 
of academic, policy and security-studies research, whose fundamental aim is the management or 
containment of the risk that the world‘s most prolonged state ‗failure‘ brings to powerful global 
interests. Somalia‘s particular trajectory since civil war in the 1980s does present unique challenges to 
the analyst, and the apparent distinctiveness of Somalia‘s prolonged absence of unitary state structures 
and ongoing conflict has created the conditions (alongside other factors and power imbalances) where 
scholarship can overlap clumsily with humanitarian or strategic policy.  
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Although the tags of Somalia‘s ‗statelessness‘ or ‗anarchy‘ are often served up with such 
hyperbole and a lack of discriminating nuance that they lack any meaningful analytical value, it is 
nonetheless important to recognize the distinctiveness of Somalia‘s contemporary political 
experience, particularly if an effort is made to push any research findings into a wider theoretical 
arena – in this case, analysis of the relationship between ethno-religious political identification, media 
technologies, and fragmenting states. Somalia is different from other comparable national case 
studies, primarily in that state-collapse was total and protracted to a point not experienced elsewhere 
in the modern post-colonial world. In the global context, there is no other nation-state of comparable 
size in which a wider array of sub-state or secessionist administrations have made effective claims to 
political authority for so long, and where the internationally-recognized national Government is so 
weak by comparison. From a different point of comparison, relative ethnic, linguistic and religious 
homogeneity stretching within and beyond the borders of the Somali state is highly distinctive in an 
African political context where a characteristic of state-building has often been the management 
heterogeneity within ‗artificial‘ political boundaries (Herbst 1989). Even Somalia‘s status as an 
‗African‘ case study is challenged by orientations of many of those who identify as ‗Somalis‘, away 
from the continent, and towards the Islamic or Arab world. This process is now intensified by cultural 
flows from the Arab world and reinvigorated discourses of political Islam, but has its deep roots in the 
mythology of Arab lineage descent, and colonial categorisations of race within which many Somalis 
sought to position themselves more favourably (Kusow 1995, 83; Ahmed 1995, 141; Besteman 1995, 
50).  
Sensitive to critiques of ‗methodological nationalism‘ or the naturalization of the nation-state 
as the taken-for-granted unit of analysis in political science (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002), this thesis 
problematises the very idea of the Somali nation in the context of transnational circuits of political 
communication. It argues that ideas (and critiques or rejections) of this nation-state are conditioned by 
the particular technological and political contours of a dynamic and contested Somali-language public 
sphere. Considered here is Somalia‘s ‗place‘ within regional, continental and global systems of 
politics and conflict. In many ways, the contemporary Somali experience is spatially understood to be 
largely peripheral in that its long-term exceptionalism and chronic condition  - whether in terms of 
political malaise or humanitarian need – renders it a special case that receives fairly limited attention; 
a sideshow of the ‗Global War on Terror‘ or African Union and United Nations‘ ‗stabilisation‘ efforts. 
Nonetheless, instability, conflict and state ‗failure‘ in this periphery periodically manifest 
themselves in ways which have tangible impacts on world systems and security. Armed young men in 
skiffs who threaten global shipping lanes necessitate almost unprecedented multilateral naval 
coordination; terrorists gun down shoppers at Nairobi‘s Westgate, and threaten others half a world 
away in malls in Minnesota; refugees and economic migrants (prolonged crisis having inescapably 
blurred these categories) make up one inflow into the maelstrom of population movement facing 
Europe and the Middle East today. Situating Somalia – between exceptionalism and relevance to 




theory, peripheral instability and threats to global ‗centres‘ – is one goal of the wider thesis. This is 
necessary for both for the proper framing of the research questions and subsequent arguments, but it 
also has a direct bearing on the material analysed as evidence. The way in which producers in the 
Somali media environment understand Somalia‘s place in the world influences the very imaginaries of 
political identity and communication that I explore in subsequent chapters.  
Navigating between the genuine particularity of the Somali context and a desire to make a 
broader contribution to the existing literature on political identities and the public sphere, the thesis 
engages with presentations of Somali ‗culture‘ and their role within the reconfiguration of Somali 
statehood(s). To avoid reproducing a narrative of Somali exceptionalism or the essentialisation of the 
‗cultural‘ component of this analysis, it is necessary to define the specific ways in which culture is 
conceptualised and deployed.  I draw heavily from Wedeen‘s designation of culture as ‗semiotic 
practices‘, the ‗process of meaning-making in which agents‘ practices (e.g. their work habits, self-
policing strategies, and leisure patterns) interact with their language and other symbolic systems‘ 
(2002, 713). ‗Culture‘ for political science is transformed from an abstract theoretical category of 
‗common knowledge‘, or a Geertzian system of coherent pre-configured symbols, into a repertoire of 
discourses which produce observable outcomes (Ibid). Chabal & Daloz focus on ‗meanings‘ and the 
‗attempt to reveal the language in which people, who may disagree about values, or political ends, can 
do so within a shared perspective‘ (2006, 22). While this builds on Geertz‘s notion of culture as a 
context in which events or actions can be intelligibly (or ‗thickly‘) described (Geertz, 1973, 14), 
Chabal & Daloz push this emphasis on interpretation of meaning into a critique of commonly held 
distinctions in socio-political analysis that equate ethnicity with identity (unchangeable, inherent) and 
religion with belief (taught). As they point out, such a distinction is a product of the Western 
experience and may not hold true in other parts of the world where ethnicity can be conceived of as 
being fluid, and religion innate or God-given (Chabal & Daloz, 2006, 117).  
Barber‘s approach to ‗texts‘ has proved helpful here in grappling with the notion of culture in 
media production. For Barber a ‗text‘ is an oral or written utterance that attempts to attract attention 
and to outlast the moment (2007, 2). Instead of being viewed as a ‗window‘ to the producer‘s 
individual subjectivity (or culture), Barber argus that analysis of texts must foreground genre and the 
‗conceptual materials‘ available to that producer to gain an understanding of what it is attempting to 
do in a particular social, historical and technological context: ‗if a verbal text is to ―tell us‖ anything 
about a society, social experience or cultural values, this can only be through its specific textuality, its 
specific way of being a text‘ (2007,13 emphasis in orginal). Texts, for Barber say things, do things 
and are things; they are ‗social and historical facts whose forms, transformation and dispersal can be 
studied empirically (Ibid, 200). The subsequent chapters attempt to place changing and emerging 
forms of political communication (such as cartoons, audio-visual propaganda, online/print news and 
opinion pieces) within a wider frame of Somali literary and cultural production and highlight the ways 
in which the technological context of their production and dissemination affects their 




‗entextualisation‘: the ‗process of rendering a given instance of discourse as text, detachable from its 
local context‘ (Ibid, 22; Silverstein and Urban 1996, 21). 
The subsequent analysis simultaneously attempts an interpretation of meaning or 
identification of the ‗work‘ of symbols, whilst also considering the explicit use of ‗cultural‘ arguments 
and forms within the media texts that are explored. Central to the thesis‘s argument is that political 
reconfiguration in the Somali context is taking place alongside contestation over ‗authentic‘ Somali 
‗culture‘, and that the form and content of communication in the public sphere is influenced by actors‘ 
perceptions of ethnically-defined practices and norms. This is elaborated on in Chapter four with 
regard to cultural contestation across and between generational and diaspora/local political arenas; in 
Chapter five with regard to the ethno-nationalist components of Somali Islamist discourses; and in 
Chapter six with regard to the way in which debates over what is presented as the quintessentially 
‗Somali‘ political-culture of clan division feedback into wider imaginations of shared identity and 
‗federal‘ power-politics. In each of these settings culture is specifically invoked in debates over 
political authority and thus overlaps with the different presentations of political ethno-religious 
nationalism. In taking the texts of these actors and commentators seriously, the chapters attempt to 
explain the fact of political and religious contestation alongside the persistence (and thus importance) 
of the ‗myth‘ (Hesse 2010) of Somali ethno-nationalist imagination.  
 
2.3.  My background  
My interest in the political situation of the Somali Horn of Africa was sparked initially through 
interactions with members of the British Somali diaspora community in my home town of Newport, 
South Wales. I was an undergraduate student in London, but did summer work at the Newport 
YMCA, an important community centre located in the Pillgwenlly neighbourhood where many of the 
town‘s Somali community reside. Having had the opportunity to briefly visit Somaliland in this 
capacity (‗fact-finding‘ for possible collaborations between the YMCA, the diaspora and communities 
in Somaliland), I returned to the School of Oriental and African Studies keen to take advantage of the 
(rare) possibility to take Somali language classes. Continuing this language tuition alongside my MSc. 
in the politics department, I graduated with a desire to get back to the Horn of Africa to develop my 
language skills. Through contacts of my Somali teachers at SOAS, I was put in touch with the 
University of Hargeysa who were interested in employing me as an English language teacher for their 
undergraduates.  
What I had anticipated would be a few months of volunteer teaching, became two years of 
full-time employment between 2009 and 2011, where I worked for the University establishing and 
running a new English Language Department. Developing course materials, hiring local and foreign 
teachers, and managing academic records and progress for the nearly 2000 students on our books 
proved to be a challenging and fascinating experience, affording me great insight into the booming 
tertiary education sector in Somaliland. Being employed directly by the university (and not by an 




international organisation) brought with it its own challenges and opportunities. My experience with 
UoH gave me useful insight into the social and cultural dynamics of coordinating an educational 
program inserting a group of (mostly) non-Muslim, white, western foreigners directly into both the 
university and the local community where the sight of white people on the streets (outside of their 
NGO Landcruisers) was rare or even unheard of.  Lacking restrictive security regulations I was able to 
move relatively freely around Hargeysa; to ride the public buses, shop in the central market, and 
‗hang-out‘ in the cafes, tea-stands, restaurants and hotels where ‗ordinary‘ Somalilanders gather to 
read newspapers, watch TV, listen to the radio and discuss. Experiencing Hargeysan cafe culture was 
important for me in developing my language skills outside of my more formal weekly classes with a 
local teacher, and I spent large amounts of highly-caffeinated time reading newspapers and chatting 
with my fellow customers.    
Through interactions with students at the University I developed an interest in the political 
worldviews of young people - a ‗Somaliland Generation‘ with no prior experience of the unitary 
Somali state. I was particularly fascinated with what I perceived at the time to be apparent tensions 
between political expressions of Islam (Islamism) and Somaliland nationalism. Students would often 
express to me the argument that Somaliland should be recognised by the international community 
because it was a functioning democracy, then almost in the same breath, point out that democracy (as 
a cultural norm) was incompatible with Islam and was thus not appropriate for Somaliland. These 
discussions highlighted a range of vocabularies of identity and nationalism (both coherent and 
contradictory) and epitomised for me the dynamism of the Somaliland project, at least in the city of 
Hargeysa. 
With this in mind, I left Hargeysa in 2011 intending to start a PhD exploring discourses of 
Somaliland nationalism in the public sphere, with particular reference to the relationship between 
Islamism and state legitimacy.  After my first year of study I was approached by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross which was recruiting Somali language interpreters for their expanding 
‗protection‘ activities across Somalia. Realising that this could afford me unique opportunities to 
travel and work across south-central and northeastern Somalia, I interrupted my studies at Edinburgh 
and took the job. Between 2012 and 2014 I worked for the ICRC in places of detention and with 
various ‗arms-carriers‘ and political authorities. The objectives of the ICRC‘s ‗protection‘ activities 
are to work with authorities to improve conditions of detention for people detained as a result of 
armed conflict, and promote respect for and compliance with international humanitarian law.  
Considerations of ICRC neutrality and confidentiality (of paramount importance for the 
organisation‘s ability to access highly sensitive places of detention) have prevented me from directly 
using any data gathered from my interactions with arms carriers, political authorities or detainees in 
Somalia. Nevertheless, part of my work for the organisation involved monitoring, translating and 
analysing Somali language news media material, primarily related to developments in the ongoing 
conflict and various actors‘ perceptions of or orientations towards international humanitarian actors. 




Undertaking this alongside specialist ICRC media field officers in Somalia increased my familiarity 
with the topography of the media environment across Somalia, and I was initially exposed to many of 
the open-source texts used in my different regional or ideological samples here during my work with 
the organisation. 
My joining of the ICRC coincided with the fall of Kismaayo in 2012. The Kenyan Defence 
Forces‘ Operation Linda Nchi succeeded in capturing the southern port city from AS, and my work 
with ICRC continued through to the execution of AMISOM‘s 2014 operation Badweynta Hindiya 
which led to further territorial gains against the militant Islamist group (Williams 2016). Working in 
Somalia allowed me to witness first-hand the reconstruction and reconfiguration of the Somali state in 
what was a unique period of great optimism for political stabilisation. This was tempered by a 
continued insurgency and the difficulties inherent in rebuilding a political apparatus in Somalia with 
any potential to unify or govern effectively. I was able to witness the paradox of foreign military 
occupation and foreign political intervention in what was supposed to be a context of nation-building 
or reconstruction and I began to consider the different ways in which these processes were being 
understood and expressed by multiple Somali political actors. I had the opportunity to work with 
individuals in nascent government institutions (whether relics of the past or newly emerging power 
structures) which, despite not constituting the direct subject of this research, helped me gain an initial 
understanding of some of the power dynamics underlying this process. I was able to travel extensively 
around Somalia and witness the popular expression of (or reactions against) the tangible state-building 
that was happening around people: the flags, ceremonies, songs, stories, rumours, jokes, slogans, 
cartoons that exist and are reproduced in public spheres of media and popular discourse.  
Being exposed to multiple narratives of Somali politics threw new light on my previous 
experiences of Somaliland, and broadened my understanding of a wider political-discursive reality in 
the Somali Horn. The relative ease of access to Somaliland has made it something of a haven for 
foreign researchers wanting to experience a Somali political environment. This, arguably, has led 
either to an over-representation of the Somaliland case, or the tendency to extend arguments derived 
from that context over the wider Somali region. Whilst themes such as state formation, the role of 
elders, political tradition/modernity/hybridity have been explored in depth, often with fascinating 
results, this has led to Somaliland (with its own nationalist narrative and presentation of itself to 
outsiders) becoming the point of comparison for the rest of Somalia vis-á-vis state-building and 
peace-building. 
While I retained my interest in the themes of nationalism and Islamism encountered during 
my time in Somaliland, I made the decision to attempt a comparative analysis of the question of 
political/religious discourse in the public spheres of news media and political commentary across 
different Somali contexts. In undertaking fieldwork in the political capitals of ‗Somalia‘, ‗Puntland‘ 
and ‗Somaliland‘ - and examining local and transnational media texts in reference to these centres - 
the analysis reproduces a three-way division of the territories that is familiar from journalistic and 




policy-orientated writing, as well as practical international engagement. This discursive division of 
the territories belies the actual complexity of configurations political and military power on the 
ground, particularly, but not exclusively, with regard to who controls what in southern Somalia. 
Nonetheless, constraints on where I could undertake fieldwork (outlined below), combined with my 
desire to present a legible comparative frame for analysis of political commentary, has meant that the 
thesis inevitably relies on these territorial divisions. Recognising the limitations of the framing, each 
chapter attempts to demonstrate the complexity of the Somali public sphere with regard to the overlap 
of voices and the often transnational orientation of commentators. Whilst certain voices are inevitably 
left out, I argue that there remains value in attempting to understand media production and political 
argumentation in this comparative three-way framing. For example, I address how other power 
centres of Somalia view, understand or critique the Somaliland ‗project‘ and, in turn, this analysis 
engages with the discursive or rhetorical conventions and strategies of different writers in Hargeysa in 
their discussions of the wider politics of the Somali Horn of Africa. This type of comparative critical 
discourse analysis across different political contexts in Somalia/Somaliland has not been undertaken 
elsewhere and scholarly focus on the discursive workings of the types of media text I address in 
subsequent chapters is limited. Much more attention has been given to the corpus of poetic Somali 
argumentation – as political communication or social history - and below I situate this work in 
relation to my own while justifying the alternative focus. 
My emphasis on public spheres of media production is in itself partly a product of my 
personal and professional experiences in the Somali territories. Simply put, I have had much greater 
exposure to public sphere sites of media production and dissemination than I have had to ‗private‘ 
realms of social interaction and discussion. In two years of living in Hargeysa I was rarely invited into 
people‘s homes. This, I believe, was a function of both my residence with other foreign teachers and 
the cultural distance that existed or was perceived to exist between me (particularly as a non-Muslim) 
and ‗ordinary‘ Somalilanders. This is not to suggest that my interactions with people were 
characterised by unfriendliness (far from it, I remain in close contact with many of the good friends I 
made in Hargeysa), but rather our professional and social interactions would largely take place in 
‗public‘ settings. Working for the ICRC in the entirely different security contexts of south-central 
Somalia and Puntland afforded even less opportunity for access to the ‗private‘ than might have been 
open to me in Hargeysa had I been more socially proactive.  
My greater familiarity with the ‗public‘ has fuelled my interest in the ways in which political 
communication and debate – however localised – can be framed in the context of a broader (even 
global) audience defined and understood as ‗Somali‘, and this observation has formed the nucleus of 
the methodology and analysis. I myself have also been a media producer on Somalia, albeit in an 
English-language setting. While living in Hargeysa between 2009 and 2011, I also worked as a 
freelance photographer documenting subjects ranging from Somaliland‘s independence day 
celebrations to the refugee Somali Olympian athlete Samia Yusuf (before her tragic death in the 




Mediterranean en route to Europe) for outlets such as the BBC, Die Zeit and AFP
3
. As a producer and 
consumer of visual material on Somalia and Somaliland I have developed an interest in the 
relationships between ‗Somali‘ identity expression, discussions of external narratives around the 
Somali Horn and the types of debates I note above in the Somali-language public sphere itself. This 
chapter has already hinted at this particular discursive nexus in relation to the #Cadaanstudies 
movement and presentations of the ‗Somali‘ subject. This is a theme I reflect on in the conclusion 
below.  
 
2.4.  Methodology overview 
The research employs a mixed-methods and primarily qualitative approach in order to explore the 
relationships between media production, state reconfiguration and popular political imaginations of 
nationalism across Somalia and Somaliland. The first component of this methodology is critical 
discourse analysis of Somali-language media texts. Specific case studies of important ‗types‘ of 
Somali-language media texts have been chosen and are defined by particularly prevalent producers or 
subject matter: cartoons produced and reproduced online and in print, militant Islamist audio-visual 
propaganda, and written online/print opinion pieces. The form and content of these texts (along with 
supplementary news media writings and broadcasts) are analysed with comparative reference to the 
three political centres of Hargeysa, Garoowe and Muqdisho in which I undertook fieldwork, the 
broader transnational Somali media ecology, and a longer history of Somali literary/cultural 
production. This is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with media producers and elites 
linked to media-production; ethnographic observation of public sphere sites/events; and focus groups 
and survey data collection on media consumption amongst a younger generation of university 
students. The following sections contextualise and justify these methodological choices while also 
reflecting on their use in the ‗field‘.  
      
2.4.1. Texts, sampling and critical discourse analysis 
 Chapters four, five and six each highlight the context and importance of the three types of 
media texts chosen for discursive and content analysis. Nonetheless, it is important to summarise the 
reasons for this focus here. With regards to Chapter four, I argue that the cartoons of Amin Amir are 
unique as they represent a form of individual writtern and visual ‗nationalist‘ political commentary 
that is consumed and reproduced across all of the political territories I conducted fieldwork in. His 
location in the diaspora is significant, although in building on previous studies of external influence 
(and considering the increasing prevalence of internet access in urban Somali itself) this chapter 
problematises a restrictive local/diasporic analytical binary in its analysis of these materials as part of 
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the media ecology ‗on the ground‘ in the Horn of Africa. Chapter five acknowledges that the militant 
Harakaat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin group wage an effective media war against internationally 
‗recognised‘ state actors, alongside a brutal campaign of insurgency and terrorism. Their media 
production is varied and sophisticated, and analaysis of a particular form of ‗positive‘ propaganda 
video targeted specifically at Somali-speaking audiences provides a useful lens through which to 
explore the parameters of Islamist and ethno-nationalist visions of Somali political conflict and 
change. Chapter six‘s exploration of the genre of the written political opinion piece focuses on 
examples that date from the post-2012 SFG era, explicitly engage with the questions of the federal 
reconfiguration of the state, and employ clan-specific language or critiques. Analysis of this form of 
prose gives insight into the ways in which diverse and changing vocabularies of ‗division‘ themselves 
contribute to ethno-nationalist imaginations of the ‗Somali lands‘. While the following chapter will 
give a detailed overview of the media ecology in which all of these texts are produced, this section 
proceeds to situate this selection of these three types of text in relation to the broader scholarship on 
Somali literary and and cultural production. As such, it also elaborates further on the specific rationale 
behind this selection of samples of particular types of media text.  
 Cultural ‗texts‘ in the transnational Somali public sphere encompass a wide array of material 
and formats, many of which have been explored in Somali studies scholarship to trace changing 
technological, social and political contexts of production. Introduced in the previous chapter‘s 
discussion of the development of the Somali nation-state, there exists a wide literature on shifting 
conventions of poetic composition, song and theatre (Johnson 1974; Samatar 1982, 2009; Afrax 1987, 
1994; Kapteijns 1995, 2009, 2010; Barnes 2006; Ducaale 2006; Sheikh Cabdillaahi 2009; 
Andrzejewski 2011). I return to this below in order to position the particular types of text this thesis 
engages with. Moving beyond the literary, scholarship has also looked – through micro and macro 
perspectives –at other forms of artistic and material culture to identify processes of social change and 
contestation. Declich‘s (1995) study of dance forms amongst southern ‗Bantu origin‘ populations 
demonstrates the tension and fusion between traditional forms of expression and sociality and the 
parameters of correct religious conduct,  while Akou (2011) ties her analysis of changing clothing 
styles to the nationalist state-building project, ideas of female emancipation, and later emphases on 
public piety accompanying increasingly assertive Islamist doctrines. This wider Somali cultural 
studies literature is also of relevance to discourses I identify in analysis of certain types of modern 
media text.   
The prominence of oral modes of social and political communication have long been 
emphasised in research on cultural production in the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa. The classic 
image of information being passed by word of mouth through a dispersed and mobile nomadic 
pastoralist population continues to colour both scholarly and popular imaginations of quintessentially 
‗Somali‘ communication networks. Poetry has often been examined as the form of oral aesthetic-
didactic communication par excellence, a highly structured medium through which arguments are 




made between and within clan groupings. The parameters and settings of poetic communication vary:  
from their prosaic utility in the passing of messages or stories from group to group; their role during 
inter or intra clan meetings or peace negotiations; their deployment as a weapon of war; and their 
potential for various types of mass mobilisation – such as during 20
th
 Century anti-colonial struggles 
or the post-colonial era of state-building and nationalist propaganda (Samatar 1982; Barnes 2006; 
Andrzejewski 2011). Amidst these various possible functions, a poet, by means of the particular form 
chosen and his particular skill of composition and oratory, can become a highly influential individual 
with the capacity to swing debates, mobilise support and deal substantive blows to adversaries. 
Politics is intimately bound up in the practice of poetic oratory, and as Samatar puts it: ‗poetry is not 
the craft of an esoteric group of beauty minded men whose role in society is at best marginal. On the 
contrary, his craft place the Somali poet in the mainstream of society and his energies and imagination 
are constantly drawn upon for social purposes‘ (1982: 56-56). 
 In post state-collapse Somalia, Kapteijns has explored poetic texts in the changing context of 
conflict across the territories, emphasising important distinctions made by audiences between 
‗prestigious‘ poetry speaking to a national audience and ‗non-prestigious‘ clan-specific hate-speech 
(2012, 59; Samatar 1982). Although this work primarily focuses on the build-up to, and immediate 
aftermath of, state-collapse, she engages with expressions of social and religious change in Somalia in 
the post-1991 period through analysis of various examples of poetry and song (see also her 2009 
account of post-colonial nationalist-era music). Highlighting generational shifts, Kapteijns describes 
one particular text as ‗typical of much of the poetry and song texts of the nationalist era (1955-1991) 
in which Islam was present as an organic, self-evident, and integral part of the Somali cultural legacy 
that did not need separate mention‘ (2012, 43). This is contrasted with examples she gives from early 
2000s‘ poetic discourse of more frequent and explicit references to Islam in the context of conflict or 
peace-making. Such an approach demonstrates the value of engagement with cultural-political texts 
that reflect (and possibly condition) changing ideological orientations and perspectives in the fluid 
environment of stateless contestation for power.  
Kapteijns also highlights the increasing importance of electronic media and online 
connectivity, not simply as another means of communication, but rather in terms of its role as a 
‗junction of all these media flows‘ and the development of Somali cyberspace as ‗the single most 
comprehensive and continuously expanding depository of Somali cultural production in existence‘ 
(Ibid, 23; 2009, 122; Isse Salwe 2008). The material and analysis presented in this thesis takes its cue 
from Kapteijn‘s observations, but attempts to expand on and update the analysis of the 
communications context in which different media operate. In doing so, the analysis shifts to the 
broader category of news media and political commentary in the Somali language public sphere: 
material characterised by various formats including radio broadcasting, video and television 
production and print news media and political commentary. Poetic discourse, as the textual analysis of 




subsequent chapters will show, continues to play a role in terms of its specific content and the popular 
legitimacy of the form within and across this multi-media environment.  
Considering the global context of communications technology, distinctions between ‗old‘ and 
‗new‘ or ‗mass‘ and ‗social‘ media are growing increasingly irrelevant. This is particularly true for 
younger generations of consumers and producers who have grown up in public sphere environments 
where online connectivity and instant electronic dissemination of media is simply taken for granted. 
This observation also holds true for the media landscape in Somalia and, in one sense, the blurring of 
these media boundaries may be even more pronounced here. Expansions of internet and mobile phone 
connectivity have taken place contemporaneously with periods of statelessness and political or 
economic reconstruction, and so the media market is not characterised (as in much of the rest of the 
world) by large established mass or state-media orientated entities having to adjust programming and 
content to new technological realities. Instead, these changes to the technological communications 
environment have themselves often precipitated the emergence of the highly fragmented and 
privatised media producers that are now influential across Somalia. Regardless of attempts by power 
holders to exert control over local media as part of processes of state reconstruction, such agendas of 
regulation will remain compromised by the existence of producers and networks which have emerged 
in the context of unhindered connectivity and an unregulated media market.  
Somali cyberspace has been explored by several other scholars, although the analyses have 
largely focused on the phenomenon from a diasporic perspective – in terms of expression or identity 
formation in the diaspora vis-á-vis connectivity with the Somali territories (cf. Olden 1999, 
Brinkerhoff 2006; Horst 2006, Issa-Salwa 2008). For instance, Osman‘s recent thesis (2015) on 
diasporic ‗conflict recreation‘ through deterritorialised media, illustrates the potential for transnational 
populations to employ such communicative technologies for potentially destabilising purposes. This 
focus is understandable given the fact that up until recently online access has been far more prevalent 
in the diaspora. With expansions of internet intrastructure and mobile technology in the Horn this 
situation (at least for urban areas) is rapidly changing. As such, there has hitherto been relatively little 
substantial academic engagement with the modern news media environment as it operates on the 
ground in Somalia - taking into account this dynamic and transnational public sphere, and the ways in 
which producers and consumers interact across and beyond the political territories of the Somali 
Horn.  
Analyses of ‗old‘ media remain useful for this type of endeavour. For instance, Hoehne‘s 
introduction to the burgeoning newspaper scene in Hargeysa (2008) emphasises the impact of stability 
and economic growth on the publishing industry, while Stremlau‘s discussion of the politics of radio 
liberalization in the same city (2013) portrays a broadcasting environment constrained by policy-
makers‘ perceptions of the fragility of a hard won peace.  Stremlau, Fantini and Osman‘s (2015)  
recent analysis of radio stations in southern Somalia makes an important contribution to 
understandings of the modern political economy of media production in a localised setting, and 




highlights similar commercial and conflict dynamics to those I encountered during my own fieldwork 
(reflected on in the following chapter). Stremlau et al. convincingly explain why the Somali media 
industry has been able to continue to expand in a conflict environment and argue that the sector 
operates by its own logic, aside from the normative claims of journalists themselves or those who seek 
to support or influence them (2015, 2).  
The three particular types of text I explore in chapters four, five and six all circulate in this 
wider news media environment, primarily in print and online formats. The fact that a vibrant economy 
exists for political discussion in media - some of which may be paid for by interested parties for self-
promotion or the slander of competitors - indicates that such content is perceived by such actors to be 
important. This thesis seeks to build on this political-economy approach in exploring how the material 
logics of the media industry – alongside the fragmentation of political power – influence the ways in 
which political identity are popularly expressed and imagined in media content. Here, an explicitly 
comparative methodology engages the concept of a multilayered Somali public sphere and reflects on 
how interaction on local and transnational levels influences wider political discourses on ethno-
nationalism and expectations of Somali statehood(s).  
 Another factor that has prompted the broadening of the textual scope of this study to include 
more written (and often digitalised) media is the status of the Somali language itself. The 
formalisation of the Somali orthography in 1972 was a significant (though not uncontroversial) 
achievement of Siad Barre‘s military regime, and the apparent degradation of the Somali language in 
the post state-collapse era is a problem much lamented by public intellectuals. The reconstruction of 
the Somali state thus also entails a linguistic component whereby political authorities assume 
responsibility – as part of a nationalist agenda – to promote and advance the linguistic status of 
Somali. Questions of which ‗Somali‘, whose ‗Somali‘, and where exactly this responsibility lies are 
part of the discourse around this issue, and the nationalist component of such linguistic and 
educational agendas are clear to political actors involved
4
. Laitin‘s 1977 study of the ‗politics, 
language and thought‘ of the process of earlier script formalisation gives an insight into the 
contemporary contestation of that fraught process. Heated debates during that period over the possible 
utilisation of Arabic script, new ‗Somali‘ alphabets or a Latin based system (the eventual choice) 
engaged questions of ‗cultural‘ and religious as well as linguistic identity of a Somali nation state. The 
question of what exactly was ‗formalized‘ by the adoption of the Somali orthography in 1972 is itself 
disputed and is of relevance for both the modern media environment and the cultural identity of re-
emerging state structures. Lamberti (1983, 31) states that ‗Daarood‘ dialects from the Mudug region 
and the Ethiopian Ogaden became the benchmark for education and broadcasting. Orwin, on the other 
hand, notes that there has never been a single official standard and that modern language use has been 
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 Indicative of this is the coincidental fact that in early January 2015 (as I was writing the first draft of this 
chapter) I was approached by the Ministry of Education in Muqdisho to record a short (Somali language) 
statement for celebrations marking the 43
rd
 anniversary of the formalisation of the Somali script. 




characterised by multiple dialects and interpretations, as well as continued debates over the nature of 
‗pure‘ Somali (cited in Landinfo 2011, 9).  
Nevertheless, regardless of whether one defines Af Maxaa Tiri as a ‗northern‘ dialect 
(complicated as this is by the physical presence of clan-defined speakers of this tongue in southern 
areas
5
) it is evident that the adoption of official orthography did have the inevitable impact of 
marginalising the Af Maay spoken predominantly in the inter-riverine areas of southern Somalia. This 
process corresponded with the broader positioning (introduced in the previous chapter) of markers of 
pastoral ‗northern‘ cultural heritage at the heart of the Somali identity promoted by post-colonial 
power holders. Debates around language are being re-invoked in processes of state (re)construction 
across the Somali territories. As such, the following chapters engage with the history of script 
formalisation and its legacy in numerous ways, paying particular attention to the self (and externally) 
perceived role of modern media producers in promoting the written language, and the impact of the 
adoption of new communications technologies. The chapters also highlight how the status of the 
written language (vis-à-vis external linguistic and religious influences) is itself indicative of the wider 
contours of conflict over the ‗cultural identity‘ and boundaries of Somali nationalist imaginations.      
With the above approach mind, it is necessary to describe my exposure to Somali media and 
further outline the rationale (introduced above) behind the selection of the types of texts that make up 
the bulk of the data for Chapters four, five and six of the thesis. My own personal and professional 
background in Somalia/Somaliland has had a significant effect on my engagement with media and, 
inevitably, on my selection of sources and texts. Working for the University of Hargeysa I had 
numerous opportunities to work and interact with students and staff. My discussions with young 
people on topics ranging from the independence movement, Islamism and democratic institutions, 
‗good‘ Islamic social conduct were what spurred my initial interest in the discursive environment of 
state-building, and I was also able to discuss and observe colleagues‘ and students‘ media 
consumption and preferences. Indeed, I spent large amounts of time ‗hanging out‘ in the cafes of the 
city, gradually improving my spoken and written Somali through conversations with my compatriots 
and endless reading of Hargeysa‘s vibrant print media.  
My work for the International Committee of the Red Cross afforded me opportunities to 
spend time in Puntland and south-central Somalia. Interactions with colleagues, government officials, 
and civilians as well as exposure to new media networks prompted me to broaden my research focus 
into a comparative study of the wider Somali language public sphere. I was lucky enough to work 
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 Technically, in Lamberti’s division of dialects ‘Northern Somali’ refers only to the clan-defined dialects spoken 
in Waqooyi Galbeed (Northwestern), Togdheer, Sanaag and western Nugaal regions. This is separate from the 
‘Daarood’ dialects that are spoken across most of the north-east (today’s Puntland), the Ethiopian Ogaden, 
and along the Ethopian border in the central and southern regions of Galgaduud, Bakool and Gedo. 
Nonetheless, these two sets of dialects are very similar and together can be taken as the basis of “standard” 
Somali and Af Maxaa Tiri (Lamberti 1986, Kapchits 2015). This historical amalgamation of dialects in the 
context of state broadcasting and education, combined with limitations on modern scholarship explain 
continued popular deabtes over which (sub)dialect did constitute or still constitutes ‘pure’ Somali.    




alongside Somali colleagues focused on media monitoring across the Somali regions. Interactions 
with these staff members as well as those within the wider delegation allowed me to gain perspective 
on the types and sources of media consumed. Although most of my former colleagues would be 
considered elites in the wider social-economic context (a status that employment with an international 
organisation bestows), in other respects (gender, generation, geographic location, clan, links with or 
experience in the diaspora) they were a diverse group. Engagement with many different individuals 
regarding their media consumption habits, preferences and political perspectives has informed the 
type of textual sample that I have built up.  
Following Chapter three‘s ethnography of media production in Somalia, Chapter four 
explores the work of cartoonist Amin Amir, a media producer and commentator who enjoys a 
remarkable (and essentially unique) position of individual influence and popularity across the Somali 
territories. The irony here is that the artist behind this oft-referenced and reproduced material dealing 
with the daily developments and intrigues of Somali politics is, in fact, based in the diaspora. The use 
of his material, I argue, is valuable in the broader analysis of the Somali public sphere for two 
reasons. Firstly, it provides a vehicle through which to explore many of the discursive tropes of 
nationalism and cultural nostalgia that are common in contestation over, and legitimisation of, state 
reconstruction. Secondly, it is indicative of the inherent trans-nationalism of communication circuits 
that characterise the public sphere and contribute to ‗de-territorialised‘ imaginations of the global 
Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. The relationship (or disconnect) between this apparent de-territorialisation 
of nationalist identity in the public sphere, and the apparently increasing territorialisation of localised 
conflict dynamics on the ground in Somalia is returned to in the concluding chapter.  
Furthermore, Chapter four elaborates on methodological calls in the fields of critical or 
popular geopolitics for closer attention to audience reception of media products. It does this by 
highlighting certain areas (particularly around the linguistic and cultural context of individual media 
ecologies) which, I argue, are often left inadequately interrogated in recent scholarship on African and 
Middle Eastern public sphere satire or ‗resistance‘-based civic agency. My discussion of diasporic 
cartoons as they are consumed and reproduced in Somalia is grounded in a contextualisation of the 
very form which media products may take within a distinctive public sphere environment. This then 
emphasises the political or cultural significance of certain visual or linguistic features of media 
products which may be taken for granted in other contexts. The chapter examines how the identity and 
technological/geographic reach of the producer (as well as the discursive tenor of his work) can help 
contribute to our understanding of the parameters of the wider Somali public sphere and the nature of 
civic agency.  
This ‗grounded‘ approach is maintained through the following two text-based chapters, with 
chapter 5 exploring a particular set of ethno-nationalist/Jihadist-orientated propaganda videos as a 
vector through which to explore the wider discursive field of Islamism (political or militant Islam) in 
the Somali public sphere. The chapter does not argue that these particular Al Furqaan Media videos 




are representative of the broader field of Islamist activism Somalia, but instead that they sit at one end 
of a broad spectrum of religiously-orientated nationalist expressions of Somali statehood. Indeed, in 
comparing these narratives with other types of media commentary and rhetoric which engage Islam, 
the chapter argues that the frequent dichotomising of ‗radical‘ or ‗extremist‘ and ‗moderate‘ or 
‗traditional‘ Islam in the Somali discursive political context is fraught with analytical pitfalls and 
overlooks the broad socio-religious changes which impact expressions and expectations of emerging 
Somali statehood(s).   
The analysis of cartoons and audio vidual propaganda in Chapters four and five draw on 
supplementary media texts from, or aimed at, the three political centres in which I carried out 
fieldwork. Chapter six, however, exploring written commentary on the ‗federal‘ reconfiguration of 
Somalia, analyses in the most explicitly comparative manner the ways in which different political 
actors conceptualise and present each other in context of state fragmentation and reconstruction. Here 
the sample of texts is made up of written opinion peices, editorial-type articles and more prosaic (and 
ostensibly more objective) pieces of news reportage. These texts date from 2012 onwards (the 
installation of the SFG in Mogadishu and a shift in the military campaign against AS), debate the 
federal project promoted by the ‗international community‘ and power holders in Mogadishu, and 
explicitly employ tropes of clan ‗division‘ in their analysis or condemnation of political 
fragmentation.  The analysis considers the identities and role of both the writers and the particular 
format they are using to ‗entextualise‘ discourse (Barber 2007, 22). The chapter to identifies various 
ways in which ‗division‘ and ‗clanism‘, as dynamic concepts, are utilised, discussed and critiqued by 
local actors and commentators across the wider Somali political context. This examination of a 
particular type of rhetoric (clan-based claims to or attacks on political legitimacy) does not suggest 
that this is the only discursive strategy used by actors and groups in the Somali political context, or 
that it is static. Instead, Chapter six argues that a critical analysis of the popularly conceived and 
expressed trope of ‗clanism‘ is a useful lens through which to examine many of the themes and 
debates raised in preceding chapters such as the identity of the Somali ‗nation‘ in terms of Islam and 
‗culture‘, and the deployment of various historical narratives in support of different political projects. 
Here, the chapter contends that changing narratives of ‗division‘ can themselves contribute to the idea 
of a Somali nation – one that is caught up in processes of extraversion and a supposed ‗cultural‘ 
predisposition to fragmentation.  
These different types of media text are explored in the chapters through the use of critical 
discourse analysis. Wodak highlights some of the core principles of this ‗heterogeneous school‘ which 
include leanings toward inter-disciplinarity; a problem orientated approach (i.e. a starting focus on 
identity or social change); an emphasis on textual data combined with ethnographic fieldwork in the 
sites of production and reception of such texts; the abductive process of constantly moving back and 
forth between data and theory; and persistent recognition of the importance of the historical context of 
the text under analysis (2004, 186). Critical discourse analysis treats language as a social practice in 




itself and emphasises the dialectical relationship between a context and a ‗discursive event‘ - i.e. the 
fact they mutually condition and are conditioned by each other. In other words, ‗discourse analysis 
identifies the rules that make a text... in the same way that grammar characterizes the structure of 
sentences, discourse rules characterize utterances/texts that are acceptable within a certain practice‘ 
(Ibid, 191). The analyses of my case studies identify various discourses which are expressed in the 
Somali public sphere and the ways in which they structure and are structured by the context (or 
‗practice‘) of conflict and state reconfiguration or reconstruction.  
I was initially hesitant to label my approach explicitly in terms of critical discourse analysis 
due to linguistic insecurity on my part: I can read and understand a Somali newspaper but would that 
mean (I asked myself) that I would be able to perform discourse analysis on that text, given that this is 
a challenging undertaking even in one‘s native language? With more immersion in the literature I 
became more confident in incorporating many of the different strategies of this methodology - for 
instance, specific focus on concrete textual features of news media such as passive voice constructions 
and the obscuring of agency (Blommaert 2000). This focus dovetails with an approach that is 
sensitive to forms of news reporting in the local media and the extent to which externally-derived 
journalistic patterns of language contrast with the everyday discourses of politics; or, the potential 
disconnect between ‗official‘ print or radio news-speak and the manner of discussing politics which 
takes place literally on the street as this news is received, reproduced, disseminated and challenged.  
A theoretical concern considered in regards to the application of critical discourse analysis for 
this project relates to implicit assumptions of relations of domination/subordination which are 
contained within the practice. Wodak describes the method as a strategy of ‗demystifying ideologies 
of power through the systematic investigation of semiotic data...‘ (2007, 186), pointing towards a 
focus on the conscious and instrumental application of discourse by power holders over subordinate 
actors. Such an emphasis may be open to Mahmood‘s Foucaultian critique (2005) of liberal ontologies 
of agency which reify binaries of domination and resistance at the expense of broader 
conceptualisations of the multi-directional channels of power which structure a social context. A 
similar concern is highlighted in my discussion in Chapter four of recent Africanist analyses of the 
public sphere or ‗civic‘ agency‘ and its apparent focus on ‗resistance‘.   
The use of critical discourse analysis as a ‗demystifying‘ tool thus implies that ‗mystification‘ 
is an already executed strategy of power-holders. This is an assumption which privileges the 
concreteness of boundaries between different groups of actors and may overlook what Wedeen would 
describe as processes of shared-meaning reproduction (2008). This is not to suggest that disparities of 
power do not exist or that ideologies of instrumental mystification are not employed, but it does 
emphasise the fact that ‗elite‘/‘ordinary‘ actor boundaries are often blurred in a variety of ways in the 
Somali public sphere(s) and that it is often the interplay between the production and reception of 
discourses of power (as opposed to their direct obfuscating effect) which serve to reproduce existing 
power relations.  




These issues arise from the origins of critical discourse analysis in engagement with the mass-
media technologies of industrialised economies (Fairclough 2001), and this must be appreciated when 
applying similar techniques to a non-Western setting. The context of media production in my research 
sites is markedly different in terms of the social penetration of technologies and state capacity for 
regulation, though it is important to recognize that sources of media are potentially no less globalised 
or diverse than those consumed, say, by the Somali diaspora in industrialised economies of Europe or 
North America. What is required is a ‗critical‘ engagement with the connections between this 
patchwork of both locally produced and globally influential forms of media and sources of cultural 
orientation and political identification. 
Another approach to critical discourse analysis - which remains sensitive to these 
problematically dominant liberal ontologies or reifications of resistance – is developed by Alshaer 
(2008) in his  ‗Culture of Communications‘ theory, employed in his analysis of media/literary 
products of Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2009). This is particularly relevant for my 
chapter on Islamism in the public sphere as Alshaer‘s focus is on a movement whose communication 
strategy employs tropes of nationalist-historical struggle as well as themes of divinely sanctioned 
politico-religious governance. Building on Said‘s notions of the inseparability of language and culture 
and a Saussurian conception of language as sign (acoustic ‗image‘ as arbitrary signifier and the 
signified ‗concept‘), this ‗culture of communications...allows the recipients of communicative 
practices (referred to as audiences in media and communication studies) to recognize socio-political 
plurality and positionality within societies as well as the shared linguistic and cultural characteristics 
that a socio-linguistic community shares and reacts to‘ (Alshaer 2008, 102; cf. Bouissac 2010; Said 
1994). This approach has proved helpful for my analysis of the relationship between discursive 
structuring and rhetorical intent found in the particular sample of ethno-nationalist Jihadi propaganda 
videos forming the starting point for Chapter five‘s discussion of Islamism within the public sphere. 
Here, I argue, that the ‗socio-linguistic community‘ is both utilised and constructed with appeal to a 
number of discursive tropes which are not limited to this particular ‗counter-public‘ but find 
expression across the wider Somali public sphere. 
Evaluating the cultural, ideological or political ‗representativeness‘ of media texts produced 
by numerous individuals in a diverse and fragmented public sphere, is a challenging endeavour. 
Chapter three reflects on the profiles of the cultural producers‘ whose work I analyse, as well as the 
technological context of their production. Nevertheless, from a methodological perspective, I note 
here my use of certain critical literary and cultural studies theories, namely notions of ‗intertextuality‘, 
which have enabled me to conceptualise the relationships between the mass of data which has made 
up my sample, and which could be added to daily with innumerable new texts that enter into the arena 
of the Somali public sphere. Again building on Saussure and his notion of the arbitrary linguistic sign, 
as well as Bakhtin‘s notion of meaning as existing only within linguistic interaction between 
individuals of groups within specific social contexts (Medvedev & Bakhtin 1985, 120), theories of 




intertextuality emphasise the inherent and inevitable relationship which exists between all 
communicative practices and the genres, structures, plots, modes of narrating, grammars and 
vocabularies of all previous works of literary production:  
 
‗No longer the product of an author‘s original thoughts, and no longer perceived as 
referential in function, the literary work is viewed not as the container of meaning but as a 
space in which a potentially vast number of relations coalesce. A site of words and 
sentences shadowed by multiple potentialities of meaning, the literary work can now only 
be understood in a comparative way, the reader moving outwards from the work‘s apparent 
structure into the relations it possesses with other works and linguistic structures‘. (Allen 
2000, 12) 
 
Limitations in my knowledge of the wider Somali literary canon no doubt prevent me from engaging 
with the full intertextual potential of the pieces I critically analyse. Nonetheless, I have found this 
wider approach to textual analysis helpful in its emphasis on the comparative: while individuals and 
their technological communicative contexts remain important to understand, my focus in subsequent 
chapters is more on the ways in which texts emerge from and interrelate with a wider public sphere 
of public discourse. My broader exposure to public discourse in Somali media and politics has given 
me a certain perspective on how texts correspond with such debates, and also where they may 
diverge from more ‗standard‘ modes of address or argumentation.  
On a practical level, I initially considered the use of different software packages (such as 
NVivo) to help organise my electronic text data sample (webpages, digital images, audio and video 
recordings) alongside field-notes and transcripts of interviews or focus groups (discussed below). 
Whilst there is scope for mass textual analysis within corpus linguistics (Schmied & Hudson-Ettle 
1996, 166; Hardt-Mautner 1995) - i.e. the scanning of a large corpus for particular words, phrases, 
grammatical constructions –software currently doesn‘t exist for this type of processing of Somali-
language texts
6
. As such, my electronic archive has been built up of Windows folders/files 
corresponding to particular types of text. Each item within has been assigned a corresponding Word 
document which includes all background data (hyperlink, last date of access, date of creation, number 
of ‗hits‘ or views etc.), a full English translation, and annotation in the form of comments alongside 
the text. Each Word file is then given multiple thematic or regional tags (‗Puntland‘; ‗Islamism‘; 
‗Federalism‘ etc.) to allow for easy access and organisation where necessary. This system for my text 
archive was later expanded to include field-notes from the ethnographic and interview/focus group 
stages of my data collection, a process I will outline below.  
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 Nevertheless, Jama Muse Jama’s recent work on the Redsea Cultural Foundation’s Somali Corpus 
program (http://www.somalicorpus.com/) is indicative of efforts underway to develop electronic resources for 
statistical and morphological analysis of the Somali language, and raises the possibility for future quantitive 
research in this direction (Jama 2016).  




2.4.2. Ethnography in the ‘field’: conversations and observation  
My textual analyses have been supplemented by the results of different types of data-collection 
undertaken during fieldwork across Somalia in 2015. While experiences from Hargeysa and from my 
work across south-central Somalia and Puntland with the ICRC since 2009 have no doubt coloured 
my perspectives, the field data I employ in the subsequent chapters is drawn almost entirely from a 
six-month period of dedicated research across Hargeysa, Garoowe and Muqdisho in the first half of 
2015. During this period and across these research sites (and also in Nairobi and London, and via 
Skype and email correspondence) I conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with media 
professionals, writers, government figures, and representatives of civil society and educational 
organisations (see subsequent footnotes and interview list in the appendix [3]). These interviews were 
facilitated through existing contacts of mine in NGO and higher educational circles in the three 
Somali research sites, as well as via direct contact through email with online and print news media 
content producers. The objectives of these interviews were to gain insight into the background and 
professional experiences of these journalists and their self-perceptions of the role of media in political 
processes across the different contexts. State representatives were interviewed on the basis of their 
official duties in regard to media (Ministers of Information, for example) or based on their particular 
utilisation of or relationship with media organisations or technologies. Civil society and educational 
professionals were interviewed on the basis of their media-related activities (for instance in journalism 
trade unions, or ‗capacity-building‘ organisations) and I was interested in their perspectives on the 
wider media climate of the political centres studied.  
The interviews were held in Somali in a variety of settings – hotels, offices, Government 
premises, cafes, universities – and after initial experimentation with audio recordings, I decided to 
dispense with the dictaphone and rely on shorthand notes which I would type up fully and with my 
own annotations immediately after each interview. Conversations (which, over tea, could last for 
hours) flowed more easily, and with more revealing data, when they were not being audio-recorded 
(Rubin & Rubin 2011). It was, of course, crucial in every case to make clear my position as a 
researcher and ascertain transmissibility of information. In the vast majority of cases the informants 
did not take up my offer of anonymity, although in a few instances I have concealed names on 
purpose where I have felt that there is even a small chance that sensitive information has been 
exposed. The reality of the ongoing conflict, particularly in Muqdisho, and dangers faced daily by 
journalists (discussed in the subsequent chapter) necessitated a perhaps overly cautious approach to 
the nominal transmission of information and the extensive anonymising of sources.  
In addition to these interviews and during the same period of fieldwork in the first half of 
2015, I also conducted 9 focus groups (each with between 6-14 student participants) in Puntland State 
University (Garoowe), Gollis University (Hargeysa) and the University of Muqdisho. In these higher 
education institutions I also distributed Somali language questionnaires (of my own design) and 
received 325 responses. The purpose of these focus groups and questionnaires was to gather data from 




a younger generation (with no prior experience of the pre-1991 Somali state) on their media-
consumption habits and their perceptions of media capacity, influence and neutrality. I was interested 
in the range of media technologies and sources that young people in the different contexts used, 
reasons behind these preferences and their opinions regarding different types of media production and 
potential (or actual) state regulation. Data here also came from interaction amongst peers and possible 
divergences of opinion around some of the weightier questions (Kitzinger 1994). All of the 
participants appeared to take the focus groups very seriously and were keen to articulate their views 
clearly.   
Three of the focus groups were conducted with students in journalism faculties and thus 
included individuals who had been or were working in the industry. The remaining groups were 
composed of male and female undergraduate students selected at random - the Universities‘ 
administrations helped me with this selection and the distribution of questionnaires. In all interactions 
with students (in person and in writing) I was careful to emphasise my role as a researcher, to explain 
my research questions and give respondents an opportunity to contact me and later receive feedback 
on the outcome of my project. All of the focus groups were held in Somali, recorded and transcribed, 
and participants did not state their names. Observations derived from these focus groups and 
questionnaire data are included across the different chapters to add context to the media environment 
or technologies described. The sample questionnaire (Somali with an English translation) and 
aggregated data is included in the appendix (4 & 5).  
Conducting field research in Somalia is a challenging and potentially dangerous undertaking 
and I am grateful to my numerous informants, friends and former colleagues for their support and 
assistance (see acknowledgments). Hargeysa is fairly easy place to insert oneself as an independent 
researcher, and my prior contacts and experience in the city allowed me to stay in a range of different 
hotels, and move freely around the city to meet different informants. Garoowe and Muqdisho are 
more sensitive environments and my periods of fieldwork there depended on advice and assistance 
from professional contacts based there. 
 Garoowe is generally considered to be a stable and relatively secure city, although its modest 
size and its role as centre of the Puntland administration mean that a foreign outsider requires good 
local contacts to help secure a visa, to gain permission from the authorities to undertake research, and 
to avoid suspicion from intelligence and security agencies located there. In Garoowe I conducted most 
interviews in the hotel I was staying at, but was able to spend most working afternoons at the 
University interacting with staff and students, and travel to different government and NGO offices to 
meet informants. I was also able to attend different events and functions held at the University 
(Puntland Government affiliated) and observe political news media in action in those settings.  
Muqdisho provided another distinct set of challenges due to the continued occurrence of 
militant attacks and assassinations, as well as the perennial risk of kidnapping. This is not a city in 
which a white, foreign researcher can simply jump in a taxi, cruise around and meet with informants. 




Again, based on my previous experience in Muqdisho and my existing contacts, I was able to identify 
a particular hotel in which I could base myself. I knew (and was known to) the local security company 
responsible for the hotel, and I was confident that it was not a potential primary target of militants 
(unlike many other hotels which have been attacked). The hotel was in close proximity to my former 
workplace and, importantly, was located inside the city. Accommodation usually used by foreigners at 
the secure airport ‗Green Zone‘ would have been problematic in that informants would have been 
much less likely to be able to visit me there. I emphasise the importance of the hotel milieu in the 
context of the Somali public sphere in the following chapter, and suffice to say that whilst most of my 
time in Muqdisho was spent in this fairly restricted environment, this location itself provided 
interesting opportunities to meet a wide range of individuals as both solicited and unsolicited 
informants.  
Each of my research trips from Nairobi required a great deal of forward planning and careful 
consideration of security restraints. Despite the occurrence - in the parlance of the INGO world - of 
certain unanticipated ‗security incidents‘ (contextualised themselves below and in the following 
chapter for their own value to my data collection), I was nonetheless able to meet my fieldwork 
objectives. The importance of properly articulating one‘s identity as an academic researcher in the 
context was brought home to me not only by the tangibility of political violence but also the 
prevalence of narratives of foreign intrigue and conspiracy in the public sphere – a propensity that is 
in itself a subject of my research. In this regard, I recall the novel experience of having an account of 
my interview with the (then) Governor or Mudug region (Puntland) posted, by him, on his Facebook 
page for his ‗friends‘ to discuss. This was illuminating for me in regards to popular perceptions of a 
foreign researcher. Several of those who left comments on the post suggested that I might be a spy, 
with one individual countering by pointing that if I was actually an intelligence agent I would have 
likely concealed my Somali linguistic competence. 
In other ways, and throughout the data-collection process, I have considered questions of 
reflexivity and the impact that the researcher‘s physical presence in the fieldwork site (or prior 
prejudices and proclivities) has on the quality of the data collected (Fine 1993; Jenkins 1994). In one 
sense, the prominence of textual sources within my data set is a response to these types of concerns: 
the fear that informants‘ discussions with me around socio-cultural or religious politics would be 
coloured by our differing identities and positionalities. This was a feeling I often had when I 
interacted (as a teacher, in a particular position of power) with students during my time working at the 
University of Hargeysa. I would frequently ask myself how my students‘ expressions of their attitudes 
on issues ranging from Somaliland‘s independence efforts to the role of religion in democratic politics 
were influenced by my identity as a foreign, non-Somali, non-Muslim interlocutor, and the extent to 
which these opinions might be articulated in different ways within entirely Somali contexts of debate 
or activism.  




A related consideration, particularly relevant in the field of media studies, is the tendency for 
researcher/researched roles to be switched – when one interviews people who make their living 
interviewing others it is not uncommon for the researcher to begin to start answering more questions 
than s/he is asking. As such, I often became the subject of separate interviews almost as a quid pro 
quo for my access to media offices and studios
7
. Wolfe describes this as the tendency for ‗the contexts 
of discussion and analysis to travel across discursive boundaries of academia, popular culture, 
scientific discourse and cultural encounter‘ (1997, 55). 
Focusing on texts would thus largely allow for me to remove myself from the equation and 
enable me to interpret material explicitly designed for an audience in which I was not included. 
Taking the step back to identify the parameters of this producer/audience relationship (i.e. the very 
nature of the public sphere) has therefore become an important objective of the project. The other 
practical reason for relying on a sample of media texts was the fear that a change in the security 
situation might severely limit my ability to conduct fieldwork and so this data set would be something 
I could fall back to if that proved to be the case. With the above considerations in mind I often 
designed my interview and focus group questioning along seemingly more neutral, non-ideological, 
prosaic or practical themes regarding media production or consumption. Whilst conversations would 
often veer into normative ground, I would continue to emphasise the practical and technological 
aspects of my research project, whilst making clear to participants that I was also analysing specific 
media texts (on which they might express opinions or offer suggestions). 
A textual focus does not in itself, of course, preclude the influence of the biases or prejudices 
of the researcher who undertakes discursive analysis. My primary concern here has been the potential 
influence on text selection of subjective emotional engagement with the research context and 
experiences derived from fieldwork itself. Being a potential target of, and actual witness to, the types 
of political violence discussed in the thesis has had an unavoidable emotional impact on me, as a 
researcher. I have had to consider carefully the extent to which these experiences either add valuable 
first-hand perspective and reflection to the analysis or, problematically, contribute to a 
sensationalisation of the narrative and a shift of the research focus away from a more representative 
picture of political life in the context. Whilst it is impossible to say with certainty to which of these 
poles my account has swung, the very recognition of the possibility of the negative implications of the 
latter helps mitigate its influence in the writing.  
Experiencing the violence that affects a large number of the producers of news media in 
Somalia (and the wider population, particularly somewhere like Muqdisho) allows the researcher both 
to share something with his respondents, but it can also underscore how differently these experiences 
can be interpreted, handled and lived with, by those who are socially embedded in this environment in 
the way that he/she is not. I remember, vividly, entering my former workplace compound in 
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Muqdisho as an AS attack was underway against the Ministry of Higher Education, meters away 
across the street. With bullets literally whistling overhead I came across a group of ladies - the 
domestic staff of the compound who I knew well - sitting outside the kitchen drinking tea. As I 
flinched with every round passing through the air above, they greeted me with big, relaxed smiles, 
asking me how I was, and how my family were back in the UK. A week later I was in Garoowe, 
sitting in the hotel garden restaurant the evening after a suicide bomber had blown himself up and 
(bits of him, at least) into the compound. Drinking tea with the other guests we discussed a picture on 
one of their phones of the bomber‘s head which we had seen being collected along with other body 
parts in a plastic bucket from the cafeteria that morning – ‗just look at his nose‘, one of my 
companions pointed out to me, ‗he‘s not from around here, definitely a Kenyan Somali‘.  
These anecdotes may have limited analytical value for any argument I make in the following 
chapters, however they serve here to underscore the multiple and unexpected (from my perspective) 
ways that people experience, process and reflect on violence.  I cannot pretend to have provided in 
subsequent analyses any kind of systematic sociology of these responses and I merely point out here 
that ‗audience‘ reactions to directly experienced violence and its mediated transmission are 
unpredictable and varied. It has been valuable for me to experience first-hand an event (like a militant 
group‘s attack) and then subsequently ‗consume‘ it through the media and within the public sphere 
that I am studying (Fordred 1997).  As I argue in subsequent chapters, the public sphere does not 
merely serve as the vehicle by which events are disseminated but instead can plays a role itself in 
shaping the communications preferences of actors (from their verbal or written statements to acts of 
performative violence) who understand its technological and discursive parameters and the rhetorical 
opportunities it facilitates. It must also be recognised that media the world over may ‗sensationalise‘ 
violence (or direct focus towards it and away from other types of event), and an analysis of media 
production may inevitably do likewise to that political context. Once again, these concerns have 
remained in the background to the subsequent case studies, and I have endeavoured to elaborate on 
them at different points where appropriate and of analytical value.    
 
2.5. Conclusion: reflexivity, knowledge production and narrative politics 
This methodology has attempted to justify the specific rationale behind text sampling and to 
demonstrate the relevance of analysis of certain types of media product amongst the clamour of the 
public sphere: a media environment both created and utilised by innumerable individuals identifying 
as ‗Somalis‘ in a wide variety of political contexts. Ultimately, the greatest challenge for this 
discussion of reflexivity is to justify how I, as a foreign, non-Somali researcher, am in an appropriate 
position to mediate a sample of these voices and present accurately a variety of different political 
arguments. To the credit of its proponents, the #Cadaanstudies movement has distanced itself from 
the type of critique that focuses on a one-dimensional appreciation of researcher identity. The 
‗whiteness‘ of scholarship in this discourse refers not to the identity of individual actors, but rather the 




complex web of power relations (from structural impediments to entry into academia, to the highest 
levels of security policy making) that influence the production of knowledge on a ‗Somali‘ subject. I 
have presented above my own experience in the Somali Horn of Africa which in various contexts has 
overlapped with this particular nexus of power and information politics.  
I do not argue that I sit in some particular position of neutral objectivity, allowing me to 
advance comparative theoretical arguments beyond the reach of other more ‗culturally‘ or politically 
embedded (Somali) commentators. Whilst I have reflected above on the potential influence of my 
own experiences on my scholarship, the reality of this impact may be beyond my own subjective 
perception. I present here my background to the reader and allow him/her to judge accordingly. 
Nevertheless, I have been privileged with experiences of working and living in various locations 
across the Somali territories which are rarely afforded to foreigners. I have been exposed to multiple 
perspectives on the political identity of Somali statehoods and, at the same time, I hold no particular 
connection or affiliation to any political actor or agenda.  
 This is a necessary observation to make. The combined reality of extreme political 
fragmentation and the persistence of foreign interference in Somali affairs, has produced a public 
sphere of debate which is highly sensitive to the ulterior motives of commentators
8
. Even the 
#Cadaanstudies movement itself became a subject of suspicion and was drawn into the realm of 
narrative contestation between political actors in Somalia. Originating as it did in a discussion of the 
‗Somaliland Journal of African Studies‘ (which had no Somali representation on its editorial or 
advisory board), some (Somali) commentators perceived the campaign to be conspiring in its critique 
against the Republic of Somaliland and its independent political agenda
9
.  
In a different vein, the development of #Cadaanstudies commentary itself advances particular 
conceptualisations of ‗Somali‘ identity in its idioms of activism, themselves influential in debates 
over the cultural homogeneity/heterogeneity of the Somali ‗nation‘. Some of these arguments require 
the presentation of a relatively concrete ‗Somali‘ identity. They can also be seen to appropriate many 
of the tropes of the anti-colonial nationalism which itself emphasised the type of reductive 
homogeneity critiqued by a more recent generation of scholars. An example here is the utilisation of 
the Maandeeq motif to name an affiliated podcast, that mythical she-camel of the post-colonial 
nationalist poetic discourse. Maandeeq, however, as Ahmed points out, was an idiom with far greater 
resonance for the largely pastoral north than those Somalis (primarily in the inter-riverine south) who 
did not derive their wealth from camels (1996, 13). The adoption of the motif into nationalist 
mythology thus played a role within processes which promoted pastoral cultural hegemony as a 
signifier of Somali nation state identity.  
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In fairness to the creators of the podcast, mention was (briefly) made of this potentially 
contested idiom, and the #Cadaanstudies movement remains in its early stages of engagement with 
the wider field Somali studies. What is of note, however, is that tensions inherent in constructing a 
‗Somali‘ identity as a vehicle to critique external power structures can also be seen in the application 
of Somali nationalist rhetoric in the context of political reconfiguration in Somalia itself. This is a 
theme I move onto in my analysis of news media texts in the chapters below.  As above, the 
discursive parameters of the online and academic debate come to overlap with areas of contestation 
over ‗Somali‘ identity, re-engaged in contemporary expressions of statehood and political authority. 
These observations are not meant as criticisms of the movement (and the former charge of anti-
Somaliland intent is a misrepresentation of the aims of the campaign), but are simply intended to 
highlight the inevitability of such narrative contestation within the particular political environment of 
the modern Somali public sphere. 
In reflexively considering my own motivations for knowledge production on Somalia, I also 
come to an appreciation of what might be termed a ‗thin constructivist‘ ontological interpretation 
(Wendt 1999; Shotter 1993) of the relationship between ideological and material determinants of 
agency, relevant for both the ‗objects‘ of my study and myself. I write this thesis with the genuine 
intent of contributing something of analytical value on the dynamics of identity across the Somali 
territories, providing context and nuance to understandings of how and why people across this region 
perceive, experience and comment on their political reality in different ways related to the 
reimagining or reconstruction of Somali statehoods. At the same time, the preparation and writing of 
the thesis represents a professional stepping stone, important for me to develop a potential career in 
academia. These are material, mercenary considerations which are, I contend, hardwired into the 
mindset of most young scholars working in the Western academy. Similarly, working for the ICRC 
across the Somali territories I was genuinely motivated and inspired by the humanitarian impulse to 
provide tangible help to people in dire need. I was willing to accept and manage the risk of working in 
a conflict environment because I believed (and still believe) in the value of the Red Cross‘s genuine 
commitment to neutrality and impartial action; something that cannot simply be taken for granted in a 
context where political, security and humanitarian agendas frequently overlap. At the same time, the 
ICRC paid me a (good) salary, and I can hardly claim that this was something of no importance to me.  
How different am I from the young AS recruit who accepts risk, potential (or certain, 
planned) death because he believes in an ideology and worldview, but also because this organisation 
pays him to fight with a regularity not matched by other political-military actors? Here the constant 
interaction of the ideological and the material renders meaningless any attempted extrapolation of a 
‗pure‘ conceptualisation of motivation to agency. As the Somali President has argued, AS may fight 






 (a 2015 ‗market rate‘ of $20 paid to youngsters per grenade thrown at an AMISOM 
checkpoint, according to world on the street in Muqdisho), but this does not preclude genuine belief 
and particular forms of ideological or cultural identification. This, for some individuals, is enough to 
drive them to a willing military suicide.  
The purpose of this observation is to foreground reflexivity through full disclosure.  I do not 
sit outside of power structures critiqued by the #Cadaanstudies movement, nor can I fully escape the 
battlefield of narrative politics that characterises contestation over the state in the Somali public 
sphere. I can, however, embed recognition of these contexts into my subsequent chapters, further 
‗grounding‘ my critical discourse analysis and other mixed qualitative methods. The very fact that 
these two arenas of discussion around Somali ‗knowledge production‘ overlap further testifies to the 
dynamism, fluidity and inherent transnationalism of the public sphere itself - a subject of research I 
have been drawn to by personal experience, happenstance, as well as various structures and relations 
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On November 1, 2015, the day before I first put pen to paper for this chapter, Harakat Al Shabaab Al 
Mujahideen (AS) launched a ‗complex attack‘ on the Saxafi Hotel in the heart of Muqdisho, near the 
KM4 junction and opposite the Somali Police Force‘s Criminal Investigation Directorate. In grimly 
familiar fashion a AS suicide squad initiated the attack with a car bomb at the hotel‘s fortified gate, 
opening an access point through which the fighters entered. In the hours of chaos that followed the 
gunmen moved through the hotel killing their targets: politicians, members of state security or 
military forces, ‗infidels, apostates and spies‘, and other ‗ordinary‘ bystanders, before eventually 
being overwhelmed by National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) special forces - the elite 
and US-trained Gaashaan (‗Shield‘) unit for whom hotel siege-breaking has become something of an 
operational speciality. Four other hotels in Muqdisho have been attacked in a similar manner since 
2014.     
 Saxafi means ‗journalist‘ in Somali and whilst media workers were not the direct targets here 
(and they often are the direct targets of violence in Somalia) members of the profession were directly 
affected. Shabelle Media photographer Mustafe Cabdinuur Shafaaa – friend and colleague to 
informants of mine in Muqdisho – was killed as the car he hid next to while covering the events 
exploded: a second bomb detonated remotely targeting security forces rushing to the scene. As events 
unfolded a AS spokesman made direct contact with BBC Journalist Mary Harper to confirm their 
responsibility for the assault
1
  and as the battle was raging pro-AS Radio Al Andalus recorded an 
interview with the fighters inside the hotel shortly before their apparent ‗martyrdom.‘
 2
   
The location, space, symbolic significance and general milieu of hotels in Somalia and 
Somaliland have been central to both the practical and theoretical development of this thesis and my 
conceptualisation of the ‗public sphere‘ in these contexts. Each location of my fieldwork, whether 
Muqdisho, Garoowe or Hargeysa, brought different considerations, and constraints for research, and 
yet what was consistently confirmed was the significance of ‗hotel culture‘ for the production and 
consumption of media products, as well as the often blurred boundaries between the state and civil 
society that were visible in these settings. This account of the Saxafi Hotel attack presents an extreme 
but not uncharacteristic example of the importance of such locations in the particular security and 
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state-reconstruction context of Muqdisho, and hints at the role of journalists and media technologies 
on the dynamic battlefield of Somali politics. These locations hold intense political, social and moral 
significance for different actors in the city and are multifaceted sites of media production and 
consumption – both in the sense of the workings and recordings of elite politics, as well as their 
manifestation as spectacular theatres of performative violence and contestation for the state itself.  
This chapter provides a comparative ethnography of media production and consumption 
across the three different political centres in which I conducted fieldwork. If the subsequent three 
chapters discursively analyse media texts then the work of this chapter is to ground this material in 
particular environments of media production and consumption. The chapter gives an overview of 
Somali public spheres first in terms of media technologies and the networks that utilise this 
communicative infrastructure. This is followed by a discussion of ‗individuals‘: elite and non-elite 
producers of media across the different political contexts. Before shifting the focus to media 
consumers and sites of public sphere activity, the account interrogates aspects of a ‗cultural‘ politics 
of journalistic form and language. The chapter comes to its conclusion by way of reflection on the 
(often fraught) relationships between media production and political authorities in the context of state 
reconstruction or reconfiguration.  
This chapter argues that Somali media technologies have developed in the context of extreme 
political fragmentation, privatisation and inherent trans-nationalism, and have created an environment 
in which multiple discourses of contested Somali ethno-religious nationalist identity can be 
operationalised by various actors. This analysis relies on a two-sided conceptualisation of the public 
sphere. Here, one ‗level‘ of the public sphere operates within these political centres serving as 
‗capitals‘ of separate, if interlinked, political projects. Local media constructs a political environment 
around these administrative centres, discursively relating and defining themselves vis-á-vis the wider 
‗Somali‘ political context.  
At the same time, there exists a wider trans-national ‗Somali‘ media environment, 
characterised by ‗international‘ Somali language broadcasters, whether Somali-branches of foreign 
media organisations such as the BBC or VOA, or private diaspora-run broadcasters such as Universal 
TV. The fact that such networks have both the technical capacity and audience appeal across all of the 
territories in question is highly significant for state actors attempting to discursively legitimise their 
different political projects or identities.  It is the interplay between these spheres which allows a 
broadly homogenising conception of Somali ethno-religious or cultural identity to coexist with 
multiple presentations of normatively defined political community. Somali ‗nationalism‘ - far from 
being irrelevant in this context of fragmentation – is of crucial importance in this dynamic 
marketplace of cultural, ideological and political entrepreneurs.   
There is much scholarship which focuses on identity and ideology in the diaspora (McGown 
1999, Collet 2007, Kusow & Bjork 2007, Issa-Salwe 2008, Osman 2015, Abdi 2015). This chapter 
adjusts the analytical lens to explore how the transnational existence of a popularly defined Ummadda 




Soomaaliyeed (the Somali Ummah, a globally-conceived ethno-religious community) feeds into the 
public sphere of media production and consumption in Somalia itself, and the implications this has for 
political reconfiguration and new emergences of ‗Somali‘ sovereignty or statehood.  
 
3.2.1.  Producers: technologies and networks 
The news media market across the contemporary Somali Horn is characterised by great diversity and 
fragmentation – an environment which mirrors the socio-political splintering of the territories which, 
prior to 1991, made up the unitary nation-state of Somalia. Radio, television, print and online news 
are the primary means of information transmission, though their relative prevalence or importance 
varies across the different political or economic centres explored here.  
Radio broadcasting – and external media influence - has great historical pedigree in Somalia. 
The British powers in the Somaliland Protectorate first introduced military radio broadcasting from 
Hargeysa, which from 1942 morphed into Radio Kudu featuring BBC news bulletins in Somali, 
English and Arabic. The BBC Somali Service started broadcasting in 1957 and was established, in 
part, to compete with Nasser-led Egypt‘s anti-colonial messaging carried on Radio Cairo to the 
territories. Consumption of material through this medium has long been popular across the far-flung 
territories predominantly inhabited (at a low population density) by nomadic pastoralists. The 
importance of news transmission for those engaged in such livelihoods so susceptible to climatic or 
environmental shocks, or the restrictions on movement that conflict can bring, has long been noted in 
the literature to explain the social importance of radio broadcasting in Somalia (Adam 2001). While 
the younger urban generation might regard radio as the medium of their parents or grandparents – 
becoming obsolete in the internet age – radio technology and broadcasting continues to be the most 
accessible means of receiving information for a majority of the population in both urban and rural 
settings. Indeed, even surveying this younger generation (a sample of university students in 
Muqdisho, Garoowe and - to a lesser extent - Hargeysa) confirmed their perception that radio 
remained a prevalent form of media in ‗their neighbourhoods‘
3
.  
The perception that radio remains the primary media of the masses also explains how political 
authorities across the territories relate to producers in this sector and, as we shall see below, it is often 
radio broadcasters who are affected most frequently and most acutely by states‘ sporadic or persistent 
attempts at control or censorship. This is most notable, in a formalised sense, in Somaliland where 
private FM radio broadcasting is prohibited, the state fearing the proliferation of broadcasters 
representing highly sectional clan constituencies (Stremlau 2013). By comparison, in Muqdisho there 
are (as of mid 2015) around 30 FM stations broadcasting daily, though these networks face their own 
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constraints and are liable to appear and disappear in the market due to extremely fluid financing. It is 
important to emphasise that the profusion of FM stations in Muqdisho, whilst hinting at the societal 
diversity in the city, does not simply represent the emergence of a multitude of clan-specific radio 
mouthpieces. Certain stations may be based and have primary audiences in certain neighbourhoods 
(themselves made up of particular configurations of clan power relations), or they may be the result of 
business initiatives based around particular clan networks. However, the open affiliation of any 
broadcaster with a particular clan interest would be seen as illegitimate either by the wider public (to 
whom all the stations attempt to broadcast to) or by the state which remains highly sensitive to the 
capacity of radio to incite social unrest.  
Across urban centres television is becoming a medium to rival radio in terms of prevalence 
and popularity. Satellite-connected TVs are standard features in practically all moderately affluent 
homes. They are not entirely absent even from some Internally Displaced Persons‘ (IDP) camps and 
their ubiquity in cheap cafes, restaurants or mafrish (qaat-chewing hangouts) means that they are an 
increasingly common means of receiving news and entertainment in private and public contexts. 
Often connected via receivers of content from the Arab world (Nilesat is particularly popular) the 
hundreds of receivable channels are predominantly in Arabic with religious broadcasts from Mecca or 
historical documentaries being popular. Films and drama may be of Hollywood-esque origin, filtered 
through Gulf-based networks, and Indian and Turkish dramas are also widely watched. International 
news channels - from the traditional ‗western‘ BBC or CNN to the popular Al Jazeera English or 
Arabic and Russian or Iranian television news and comment (RTV, Press TV, respectively) – are 
frequently viewed, especially by more affluent audiences who have the requisite linguistic 
competencies and, perhaps, life experience in the diaspora.  
Somali-language broadcasting only makes up a small proportion of the total number of (the 
hundreds of) channels available and is dominated by several big and usually diaspora-based networks 
such as Universal TV, Somali Channel, and Horn Cable. The output of these channels is often 
dominated by rolling news coverage of events in Somalia, issues affecting the global Somali 
community and major world news. Also common are topical or political debates and ‗cultural‘ 
programming frequently composed of interviews with poets and singers, and recordings (often from 
the pre-1991 era) or music videos of their work. Punctuating all this, the globalised market that is the 
Ummadda Soomaaliyeed is continuously invoked in the seemingly endless stream of advertisements 
for everything from Somali doctors in St. Paul, to mattresses in Muqdisho or nappies in Nairobi.  
Somali cyberspace is a vast and predominantly unregulated cultural space of information and 
entertainment production and dissemination. The rapid expansion of mobile telecommunications 
across the territories in the post state-collapse period is a topic that has been emphasised by numerous 
commentators, often those with an enthusiastic interest in the anarcho-capitalist development of 
private, cheap, efficient and widespread mobile connectivity (Feldman 2007, Nurhussein 2008). The 
high level of social penetration of mobile phones across society (crucially in urban and rural settings) 




and the bypassing or effective jettisoning of older statist institutions of public communication (post 
and landline technologies) has brought with it an impressive infrastructure of internet connectivity in 
terms of cable, satellite and mobile points of access. Whilst internet cafes are still important centres 
for the (young) masses to get online and plug into these worlds of news-media, propaganda or social 
networking, the rapid expansion of mobile internet technology (in some places, like Hargeysa, 
operating at ‗4G‘ level) has meant that online activity is an increasingly private and personalised 
experience. The online realm, which encompasses and re-broadcasts the established mediums of radio 
and TV, is accessible through the ubiquitous smart phone, itself a primary status symbol and marker 
of communicative modernity. The development of the technology in this direction has implications 
for the ways in which news media is consumed and disseminated in the public sphere and also has the 
effect of gradually expanding levels of internet connectivity out of urban centres and into the 
hinterland. 
 The advertisement from Hargeysa below (Figure 3.1) illustrates this in its expressive 
presentation of a modern cultural archetype: the connected camel-herder; the urbanite who still 
maintains his connection with sources of wealth in the pastoral economy: 
 
Fig. 3.1. Advertisement, Hargeysa, 2010. Author’s photograph. 
 
The online news media market is made up of hundreds or even thousands of localised news 
websites all competing for ‗hits.‘ In the survey I conducted amongst my 325 university student 
respondents in Muqdisho, Garoowe and Hargeysa, when I asked the participants which Somali-
language news website they used most often, I received 64 different answers. Whilst there are clearly 
certain news websites which are more popular in these different areas amongst this particular 
generation, the sheer number of possible news sources reflects what some interviewees described as 
‗hebel.com‘: the perceived phenomenon where hebel hebel (which I translate into the British-English 
vernacular as ‗every so and so‘) has a personal ‗news‘ website to propagate their views and/or 
generate revenue from advertising. Despite the multiplicity of competing online platforms and the 




presence of a large number which represent very specific sectional views or constituencies, a 
significant proportion are updated consistently and regularly with breaking news and the uploading of 
various opinion pieces or analysis. This is indicative of the large numbers of people who are involved 
in these processes both in the diaspora – where many, but not all, websites are ‗hosted‘ and where the 
website ‗owner‘ may reside – and in Somalia where the site will employ a small number of journalists 
who may write exclusively for that site or act in a more freelance or ‗stringer‘ capacity
4
.  
A fairly relaxed attitude towards intellectual copyright allows for content to spread click and 
paste-style and multiply across different online platforms. Although some sites configure their pages 
to prevent the straightforward lifting of their copy, this practice is widely tolerated and rarely becomes 
a point of serious contention amongst the journalistic fraternity who often accept this as just ‗the way 
things are done‘
 
to generate content and thus the hits important to the advertisers who provide a 
significant amount of the financing for such operations
5
. 
Amongst this online milieu of news production there operate various internationally 
predominant social media platforms (Facebook and Youtube, for example). These sites intersect with 
private Somali news media production and provide multiple routes of access for individuals into the 
online environment. The way in which Somali media networks directly share their content on these 
platforms or the manner in which prominent politicians, intellectuals or activists use Facebook as a 
primary means of circulating opinion pieces, serves to blur the distinction in the Somali media 
environment between ‗social‘ and ‗traditional‘ or ‗professional‘ media – a context which is already 
characterised by extreme fragmentation, privatisation and a lack of commercial or state media 
monopolies
6
. It is in the online world of Somali media production that the inherent trans-
nationalisation of content and discourse is most obvious, and where the lines of ideological 
contestation for state and society are most stark.  
The online realm is an important and dynamic battlefield on which multiple actors tap into 
globalised sources of information to provide comment and justification for action in regard to the 
reconfiguration of the Somali state. It is not uncommon, for instance, for pro-Jihadi media to cite 
online publications from major Western civil society groups, media organisations or think-tanks 
(Human Rights Watch, The Economist and International Crisis Group, for example) in order to make 
points either about the weakness or venality of the ‗apostate‘ SFG or the continued resilience of AS 
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. At the other end of the spectrum, even the US Military has been in the business of running a 
Somali News website (not that one would know that from a cursory glance of its main page) where 
particular perspectives (‗moderate voices‘) on the ongoing conflict and cultural-religious contestation 
are propagated
8
. In this manner the Somali public sphere must be conceptualised as a fundamentally 
transnational space, where the parameters for nationalist discourse are internationalised and make 
situate the ‗Somalis‘ as an ethno-religious ‗cultural‘ group in the global context. 
There is a great deal of overlap between the style and content of online news production and 
the print media industry. In the post-colonial, pre-state collapse era, newspapers never enjoyed the 
status or coverage of radio due to the logistical difficulties inherent in their national distribution and 
the low levels of literacy in the written Somali script, itself only formalised (with great controversy) in 
1972. During this period newspapers remained an elite, urban and state-controlled enterprise, 
epitomised by the nationalist mouthpiece of Barre‘s revolutionary regime, the Xiddigta Oktoobar (The 
October Star), published in Muqdisho.  
State collapse was followed by a profusion of newspaper publishing in the capital. Stateless 
press freedom ran in parallel to the conflict that engulfed southern Somalia and the daily, weekly and 
monthly papers that emerged at this time often served as the mouthpieces of the various clan-based 
factions vying for control of the capital. For those young journalists who attempted to remain 
unaligned and provide objective news, the security situation was far from favourable. A journalist 
active at that time recalled that he and his colleagues were unable to print the clan-alignment of those 
militia that perpetrated acts of violence or kidnapping in the city for fear of retaliation and the looting 
of offices by bandits. The profusion of newspaper writing that corresponded with urban conflict in 
Muqdisho was not sustained through the subsequent period characterised, from the late 1990s, by a 
stateless status-quo of factional power-sharing and the initially ad hoc development of neighbourhood 
Islamic courts structures. By the time this evolved Islamic Courts Union administration had been 
overthrown by the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, virtually no newspapers were being printed, distributed 
or read in the city, wracked once again by intense urban warfare, this time between those foreign 
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occupying forces and the emergent AS
9
. In Muqdisho today at least 3 daily papers are published and 
other more substantial bi-weekly publications such as the Xaqiiqa Times have emerged. Publications 
such as the latter have been born out of the generally improved security situation that has 
accompanied the gradual consolidation of power of the Somali Federal Government in Muqdisho, and 
the increased investment that has flowed into the city as a result.  
In Somaliland, namely Hargeysa, the fall of the acutely oppressive Barre regime, also 
precipitated a profusion of private newspaper printing. Unlike Muqdisho, however, the relatively 
peaceful development of new state authority allowed for this wave to be sustained. While virtually all 
of the very early post-1991 papers disappeared or were superseded by new titles, the newspaper 
market has nonetheless gone through continuous growth. In Hargeysa today, despite tighter profit 
margins and competition from online news, around 13 papers are published daily or weekly
10
.  
Garoowe‘s newspaper market is significantly less active than either Hargeysa‘s or 
Muqdisho‘s. Despite being the political centre of the Puntland administration, Garoowe lacks the aura 
of economic dynamism that either of those cities enjoy. Puntland‘s economic capital is the port city of 
Bosaaso, and the relatively few papers (such as Kaaha Bari) that make it to Garoowe are printed 
there.  
In categorising the media networks that operate across the different technological formats and 
commercial markets outlined above, it is possible to distinguish between four main types of Somali 
producers. Firstly, there are private local media companies whose range of broadcast is limited to 
specific urban centres and regional territories (websites that fall into this category are, of course, 
accessible anywhere but tend to have geographically focused readerships). Whilst this type of network 
may have financing or even staff or management in the diaspora, it is important to distinguish such 
operations from the second category in this typology which refers to the big diaspora-headquartered 
television stations. These, crucially, have ‗national‘ coverage and a broad viewership - the archetype 
here is the London-based Universal TV which is popular across the territories in question. Similar to 
the latter in terms of scope and broad appeal - but distinct in their management structures and 
relationship with ‗international‘ media - are the Somali services of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Voice of America, primarily accessed online and via radio, broadcast through 
dedicated shortwave frequencies or on the numerous private FM networks. Finally a fourth category 
could be labelled as ‗state‘ media, referring to the television or radio broadcasting of the Somali 
Federal Government (Somali National Television/Radio Mogadishu), the Puntland State of Somalia 
(Puntland Television) and the Republic of Somaliland (Somaliland National Television/Radio 
Hargeysa). These stations consider themselves distinct from private media, carry the government line 
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3.2.2. Producers: individuals 
Local, private news media is a commercial enterprise and many broadcasters in different formats have 
been established by businessmen as sideline projects with capital derived from other sources. This 
type of entrepreneur often has links with the state, either in its current form or through a position held 
in a previous government – and frequently the commercial/governmental distinction is highly 
blurred
12
. An older generation of journalists (often with professional experience in the diaspora or 
with international media organisations) is often linked with the establishment of new private media 
enterprises in Somalia
13
. Civil society ‗activists‘ are another group prominent in managing stations, 
especially those which receive funding for international humanitarian agencies or syndicated content 
from dedicated humanitarian broadcasters such as Radio Ergo
14
.  
Cabdishakuur Mire Aadan was one particular individual media producer, whose life and work 
intersected on numerous - almost uncanny - levels with my research into the Somali public sphere and 
politics. I initially came across Mire Aadan through reading a serialisation of his book Kobocii 
Islaamiyiinta Soomaaliya 1952-2002 (‗The rise of the Somali Islamists 1952-2002‘) in the Xaqiiqa 
Times newspaper in Muqdisho. Whilst the academic referencing left something to be desired, the 
book represented a detailed Somali-language account of a highly contested history and I was 
interested to see how Islamist mobilisation was discursively presented to a Somali audience.  
Mire Aadan was born in Muqdisho where he graduated from the Maritime High School and 
went on to work with the Ministry of Fisheries during the Barre era. After the civil war erupted he, 
like many who traced their lineage within the Daarood clan-family, moved north to what would 
become Puntland where he established the Ilays newspaper and Radio Midnimo in Bosaaso. From the 
early 2000s Mire Aadan took various positions within the Puntland Government including deputy 
Minister of Information and during this period he produced Kobocii Islaamiyiinta whose second 
edition would be published in 2013.  
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Aside from this work, Mire Aadan was a regular writer in his own publications and in the 
broader public sphere. The last piece of his I read was a self-published Facebook post entitled Ibiyihii 
Wargaysyada Muqdisho (‗The newspaper seller of Muqdisho‘
15
). In the piece he describes an 
encounter with a boy selling newspapers at the cafe in which he is drinking coffee with other men. 
Despite the scorn of his companions the writer engages the boy in conversation and buys him a cup of 
tea that he would never have been able to afford on his own ($1!). The writer laments at the poverty 
and lack of opportunities of the boy (‗who was decreed by Allah to have been born Somali‘) and 
comments on the attitude of the elites (MPs, businessmen whose children live in diaspora) with whom 
he is sitting. ‗What shocked me the most‘ he notes ‗is that little Cabdiraxman was met not with 
compassion but suspicion: much of the talk was about whether he had been sent [to the hotel] by ‗the 
children‘ [The Shabaab]‘
16
. The piece is accompanied by a picture of a young newspaper vendor. The 
writer comments at the bottom that the picture was not taken in Muqdisho, as he would fear for the 
safety of the boy. Muqdisho, he says, is characterised by fear („Muqdisho waa la isaga garaabaa 
cabsida‟).  
On February 20, 2015, Cabdishakuur Mire Aadan was killed in an AS attack on the city‘s 
Central Hotel, along with up to 24 others. I had intended to meet him in Muqdisho the following 
month but was left instead with his last piece of public writing, a poetic and portentous tweet: „waa la 
guuray... waxaa loo guurayaa dooga iyo meesha daruurta roobku ka hilaacday ee indhaha u roon‟ 
(‗One is on the move, to the place of greenery and where the rainclouds give lighting which is a 
delight to the eyes‘). It is a scene of pastoral idyll, where the thunder clouds are a sign of Jaano 
(Paradise) rather than something to be feared. Aside from this grimly prophetic reading, this social 
media statement says much about this type of public intellectual, businessman, politician and Somali 
nationalist: at once highly conversant in the different media technologies of modern Somalia and 
adept in the poetic idiom of ‗traditional‘ and prestigious communication. The bitter irony of his death 
notwithstanding (killed by political descendents of the Islamist activism and militancy he himself had 
documented), Mire Aadam‘s career, work and demise is – based on my experience and meetings in 
the context –representative of many other elite media actors and the circumstances, possibilities and 
constraints of the public sphere.  
 
Before the settings of that public sphere are elaborated on, it is necessary to introduce media 
workers at the other end of that professional spectrum: individuals whose profiles are not so 
prestigious, but who may also be victims of (different kinds) of violence. Providing content on the 
ground for the multiple media networks described above are the local journalists operating in the 
various distinct urban political contexts. Journalism is, by and large, a young man‘s game and 
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although female journalists are active – including on dedicated stations committed to female rights 
and empowerment such as Kasmo FM in Muqdisho – the majority of correspondents in the field are 
male. Women are often visible (or audible) as presenters on local TV or radio whereas men tend to be 
overrepresented in ‗front-line‘ news collection, due to a combination of factors including potentially 
challenging security situations, the male dominance of the political field (the most common topic of 
reportage), as well as socio-cultural or religiously-articulated norms which restrict women‘s wider 
role in different forms of employment, including journalism
17
.  
A dominant perception that I encountered time and again from consumers of media across the 
territories in question was that the vast majority of young men entering the journalistic profession 
lacked a suitable, basic educational background and the skills to do the job properly. Many 
respondents in the focus groups I held in universities in Hargeysa, Garoowe and Muqdisho (including 
some who had been or were part-time journalists themselves) believed that journalism was a field 
often entered by un/under-qualified young men with few other prospects in the local job market. 
Perceiving the prerequisites for entry into a career in journalism to be possession of a mobile phone 
(on which to make contacts and record interviews) and an internet connection, many young journalists 
were said to be ill-equipped to deal with the different situations that they might encounter in complex 
political, commercial and security environments. Whilst it is difficult to quantify the accuracy of such 
perceptions, I do document and analyse examples of journalistic malpractice later in this Chapter. 
What was striking, however, was the link drawn by media consumers or other media professionals 
between young journalists‘ skills (or their propensity to ‗make mistakes‘) and the potential for them to 
be targeted or caught up in violence. 
Somalia is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist. The National 
Union of Somali Journalists (Ururka Qaranka Suxufiyiinta Soomaaliyeed/NUSOJ) documents various 
forms of violence perpetrated against journalists across the territories covered by this thesis. 
Somaliland, of course, has its own Journalists‘ organisations (as does Puntland). However, NUSOJ‘s 
publications attempt to maintain the notion of a ‗national‘ (i.e. Somali) group of media workers and 
their reportage covers all territories regardless of the organisation‘s general lack of official physical 
presence in the secessionist northwest. Even more notable than the attempted recreation of the 
juridical fiction of a unified ‗Somalia‘, the 2014 NUSOJ annual report also includes alleged violations 
against ethnic Somali journalists inside Ethiopia. Here the ‗national‘ encompasses an ethnic solidarity 
amongst a journalistic fraternity, a practical example of the trans-border sensibility of the popular 
ethno-political imagination that is the subject of the wider thesis.    
This chapter has already made mention of the killings of two media professionals in 2015, 
and NUSOJ‘s aforementioned 2014 report details the killings of 5 journalists in that year, as well as 
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the wounding of 7 and the arrest or detention of 47 others
18
. Whilst the focus of this thesis is not press 
freedom itself, I have examined the ways in which journalists and violence or restrictions against 
them are perceived within the public sphere of media production and consumption. This, I argue, has 
an impact upon the reception of the material discursively analysed in subsequent chapters.  
In the interviews I conducted with journalists themselves, and in the focus groups I held with 
my samples of media consumers in roughly the same generational cohort as most front-line journalists 
(university undergraduate students), the factors said to influence violence or restrictions placed 
against media workers fell into three broad but interlinked categories: deficiencies in the professional 
skills of young journalists; ‗corruption‘; and the security prerogatives of different state structures in 
the various contexts. Time and again, my respondents would emphasise a lack of training for 
journalists which was said to contribute to the phenomenon of false news being spread or partiality or 
bias of journalists for or against certain powerful interests. The lack of training corresponded with 
deficiencies of what were conceived as professional ethics and the predominance of ‗corruption‘ – 
exacerbated by the tiny profit margins of online news production – whereby positive news coverage 
would be sold to interested parties or practices of character-assassination blackmail would beused by 
unscrupulous media networks or individuals to generate revenue. Respondents frequently referred to 
these types of inaccurate reporting or highly partisan or even malign coverage as ‗mistakes‘ which 
would generate conflict and put the journalists at risk – either from those affected individuals or 
groups or through arrest, detention or censorship from the state itself
19
.  
While I return to the question of popular perceptions of truth claims or neutrality in the media 
below, it bears emphasising here the role of communications technology in drawing large numbers of 
individuals with widely varying skill-sets or qualifications into the journalistic profession - in a wider 
economic context where, by and large, youth unemployment is a perennial issue. The low technical 
barrier of entry to the profession is particularly relevant for online media. The potential anonymity of 
news production was emphasised by many of my respondents or interviewees (in comparison to the 
TV and Radio Broadcasters) as a potentially negative factor affecting the quality of material 
produced. When I asked interviewees about their view on the sheer number of news sites accessible 
and used by individuals in society, many emphasised concerns surrounding bias and 
unprofessionalism. Others, however, emphasised a more positive opinion about the effect of online 
media for popular literacy rates and engagement in political affairs. This observation leads us to the 
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next section which reflects on the role of news-media on wider processes of state-building and socio-
political ‗reconstruction‘ in the Somali territories.  
 
3.3. Journalistic form and language: the ‘cultural’ politics of the Somali public sphere 
News media - political commentary online and in newsprint - is one of the primary (or, in some cases, 
only) mediums by which most people in urban Somali contexts engage with the written Somali 
language in any substantial form. The apparent ‗destruction‘ or ‗degradation‘ of the Somali language 
is a process characteristically traced back to the fall of the Barre state (which had only formalised the 
script and carried out mass literacy programs from 1972 onwards) and is a great lament of 
contemporary intellectuals. The lack of state institutions in the post-1991 era to preserve, promote and 
innovate with the still young written form of the language, as well as the long absence of any state 
bureaucracies interfacing with the general population through the script, has produced a modern 
situation where Somali-language instruction is barely promoted in the basic educational system 
(Cassanelli & Abdikadir 2008, 107), and where foreign imports, mainly of Arabic and English, have 
made substantial inroads into the basic vocabularies of daily life for many people
20
. The resulting 
linguistic mishmash or degradation of ‗pure‘ Somali (a controversial question in itself when it comes 
to ‗minority‘ dialects, as subsequent chapters will discuss) is frequently decried by local intellectuals 
who recall the nobility, pedigree and grace of oral poetic culture, and promote contemporary state 
efforts to preserve the language.  
Commentators in the public sphere often critique the manner in which the state or 
international NGOs communicate with the wider society, for example the use of English in job 
advertisements or calls for tender. As competence in English is often a prerequisite for state or INGO 
employment, the writing of such advertisements in that language is often designed as a first step 
towards screening applicants. However, this strategy may rarely be particularly effective (many 
people, may be quite familiar with humanitarian, governmental or recruitment jargon without 
necessarily having a level of functional conversational English), and often breeds resentment or 
distrust from locals (as opposed to diaspora candidates) competing in the job market for positions 
within a state perceived as closeted, out of touch with daily cultural realities or norms, and riddled 
with ‗returnee‘ nepotism. An editorial piece ‗Af Soomaali iyo far qalaad‘ (‗The Somali tongue and 
foreign script‘) in the Xog Ogaal newspaper (March 2,2015) points out that although the Somali 
language is lauded by politicians in public as being spoken all over the world, in Muqdisho it is hard 
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to find a state office which actually uses it as an administrative language. The writer argues that many 
(language) teachers‘ salaries could be paid with what it costs to accommodate MPs in hotels every 
night. This touches on the perceived spatial divide between power holders and the population - 
encapsulated again in conceptions of the ‗hotel‘ political elite.   Considering that AS employs the 
rhetoric of populist religio-cultural contestation in both their propaganda and militancy, it should be 
clear that these linguistic divides between states/agencies and the populace can take on deadly 
significance.  
By unpleasant coincidence I was personally witness to two separate AS attacks in the space of 
one week (during my fieldwork) against the Ministry of Higher Education in Muqdisho and against a 
United Nations bus carrying local and foreign educational experts in Garoowe. Both attacks took 
place immediately outside the hotels I was staying in and together resulted in the deaths of 17 people, 
including the attackers
21
. In both instances the AS communications explicitly referenced the targeting 
of educational facilitators allegedly spreading foreign and un-Islamic ideologies. Of course, the 
cultural politics of AS governance, insurgency and propaganda are hardly unambiguous in 
themselves. Their campaign must manage the inherent contradictions of its claims to legitimacy on 
the basis of both its place within a global salafi-takfiri ideological struggle and its distinct Somali 
nationalist flavour. This tension manifests itself linguistically, particularly in the communications of 
the group itself (or its supporters) which use Arabic, English and even Swahili. On one level AS 
communicates its ‗Jihad‘ in Qu‘ranic Arabic language and idiom - a mode of communication which 
large segments of the wider Somali population are increasingly conversant in as cultural orientation 
towards the Arabic and wider Islamic world intensifies. At the same time, the group‘s propagandists 
invoke a brand of Somali nationalism which decries foreign influence and employs a ‗Somali‘ cultural 
repertoire of poetic references and emphasis on pastoral society and elements of clan-based customary 
law.  
Such communicative patterns are explored at length in Chapter 5, arguing that these 
contradictions are employed productively to allow the group to project its appeal to multiple 
audiences both within and outside of Somalia. They are reflective, however, of wider tensions in 
Somali society around globalised cultural orientation and the disaffection or alienation of parts of the 
population from politics - which may take on a cultural-normative and linguistic aspect - can facilitate 
the discursive space for AS to attempt to legitimise its attacks on government or international 
organisations, particularly the UN.  Suffice to say, the stakes of cultural-linguistic education are high 
in contemporary Somalia.   
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State authorities in Hargeysa, Garoowe and Muqdisho have taken steps towards the 
promotion of Somali both as a language of state and as part of their symbolic commitment to the 
promotion of ‗national‘ culture and heritage. Government figures specifically address the decline of 
the Somali language, mandate the use of Somali in government documentation and establish or 
support cultural centres for the promotion of linguistic culture
22
.  However, despite such recent and 
sporadic efforts there is no single functioning and effective ‗national‘ body (which, of course, would 
be disputed by Somaliland) equivalent to an institution like the Barre-era Somali National Academy 
of Arts, Sciences and Literature to help standardise, re-promote and further develop the Somali 
language through erey-bixin (word creation for new terms). Considering the wider limitations and 
challenges around financing and state security faced by governments particularly in Muqdisho and 
Garoowe, it would appear that Hargeysa is currently best placed to for such initiatives to gain traction 
and yield significant results, albeit in the context of Somaliland-specific projects.  
The Red Sea Cultural Centre in Hargeysa (Xarunta Badda Cas) is an example of an active, if 
private, institution working to promote Somali language and culture within Somaliland society. I was 
able to sit-in and participate in several classes at the Centre, attended by young local professionals 
eager to learn more about ‗their‘ language, etymology and its dialects (covering all of the Somali 
territories). The teacher of the class, Cabdiraxmaan Faarax ‗Guri-barwaaqo‘ had been abroad in the 
diaspora since the 1970s (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Canada) where he had founded a Somali language 
newspaper before returning in 2012 to what had become the Republic of Somaliland. Guri-Barwaaqo 
epitomises a type of returnee intellectual who has found better conditions for preserving and 
developing the Somali language in the diaspora, than within the Somali territories themselves. As 
these individuals move back to the Somali Horn they bring with them certain conceptions and 
objectives of cultural ‗revival‘ often taking their points of reference from the pre state-collapse era. 
This is a theme I explore further in the subsequent Chapter on the relationship between diasporic and 
local media production and the case study of Amin Amir‘s cartoons. 
 In his manner of speaking, in our conversations and during the classes he taught, I picked up 
on the particular way in which he employed the phrase ‗the south‘ to refer to what, for his students‘ 
generation, is that ‗other country‘ of Somalia. For him ‗the south‘ was defined in cultural-linguistic 
terms as being different to ‗the north.‘ When discussing my selection of research sites, he noted how 
he conceived of Garoowe – geographically very clearly situated in northern Somalia – as being 
‗southern‘ in the sense that it, like Muqdisho and the other southern regions had less of a ‗written‘ 
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culture than the north (Somaliland), a fact for him epitomised by the more vibrant newspaper and 
print media scene in Hargeysa
23
. While some scholars have viewed legacies of the British colonial 
education and administrative system as influencing post-colonial patterns of literacy in the north 
(Abdi 1998; Samatar 1989), the point here is that linguistic culture itself has become a subtly crafted 
political marker in the sense that the roles of cultural development or preservation have importance 
within modern presentations of legitimate ‗Somali‘ sovereignties.  
An example of this could be seen in the Hargeysa International Book Fair, an event now in its 
10th year and run under the auspices of The Red Sea Centre. The book fair is ostensibly a showcase 
and promoter of written Somali cultural production. It also plays an important role in presenting to an 
interested international audience Hargeysa‘s (and Somaliland‘s) stability and its status a venue for 
cultural interaction. Here there exists an implicit assertion that the Somaliland Government is an 
independent entity playing a positive role in promoting Somali literature and cultural expression. 
Although the annual event is a civil society intitiave, the boundary with state actors is often blurred. 
For instance, the current co-organiser of the Book Fair, Ayaan Maxamuud Cashuur, also serves as 
Somaliland‘s representative to the United Kingdom.        
The role of ‗internationalised‘ local intellectuals, external institutions, funders and 
participants is not entirely uncontroversial in the HIBF context, and serves as a window into 
contemporary debates in and on ‗Somali‘ cultural production. In 2015, for example, great controversy 
was generated - particularly in the religious public sphere of Hargeysa‘s Mosques and through some 
of its more vocal Imams - when it was revealed that Jude Kelly, founder of Women of the World and 
known for her previous gay-rights advocacy, would be speaking on a panel at the event
24
. 
Contestation here over external values and ‗correct‘, ‗Somali‘ and Islamic norms illustrated how 
modern debates on public morality are structured with regard to print cultural and cultural promotion, 
and are arguably indicative of wider divides between these internationalised elites (often ‗returnees‘) 
and a more conservative local socio-religious culture which has developed in the post-1991 period.  
In August 2015, Muqdisho hosted its first ‗International Book Fair‘, a significant achievement 
given the security constraints on public events in the city and one which garnered significant local and 
international media attention. The holding of such an event shows a desire on the part of local and 
diaspora intellectuals to address similar concerns around the degradation of the Somali language and 
wider creative culture. Whilst it is not the case that the event was held simply to compete with 
Hargeysa‘s more established event, the political significance of the Fair should not be overlooked - 
branded, as it was, in a remarkably similar fashion, situated within the wider ‗Mogadishu rising‘ 
narrative and the reassertion of the city as a cultural as well as political capital of Somalia. The 
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significance of perceived control over this narrative became apparent in the controversy that 
accompanied international media coverage of the event. BBC Journalist Mary Harper‘s blog post 
about the event, whilst emphasising the event in the context of wider social or political reconstruction 
in Muqdisho
25
, was accompanied by an image (apparently chosen by a sub-editor) of the aftermath of 
an unrelated AS attack. The picture was, no doubt, selected to illustrate the intense security challenges 
faced by organisers of an event such as this, but the reaction online was reminiscent of the 
‗#Cadaanstudies‟ controversy discussed in Chapter 1, an element of which critiqued external 
presentations of Somalia and the control by outsiders of dominant narratives and discourses of 
modern Somali political history and development.  
Whilst not overshadowing the events themselves, these two controversies generated around 
both the Hargeysa and Muqdisho 2015 book fairs are neatly instructive in their apparent symmetry. 
They highlight at once the political significance of ‗Somali‘ cultural renaissance and guardianship 
associated with security and state building across Somalia, while at the same time constituting arenas 




Journalism itself is also seen to play a role linking written culture with processes of Somali 
political reconstruction (or reconfiguration). This is epitomised by externally funded efforts to raise 
professional capacity in the sector. Radio Ergo, a Somali-language humanitarian broadcaster funded 
by the UN and Western donors, has run training events for journalists in Muqdisho, Garoowe and 
Hargeysa which have focused both on basic literacy and writing skills (for the effective 
communication to audiences) as well as on journalistic ethics and correct conduct of media 
professionals. Once again, journalistic integrity and professionalism are linked to basic capabilities 
(e.g. in use of the written language). The normative societal function of journalists both within 
communities, as well as within the context of political reconstruction is implied by the types of 
training material used. Standardisation of spelling and the correct use of technical terminology is 
emphasised as a means by which to avoid misunderstandings and the generation of conflict
27
. 
Furthermore, good journalistic conduct is associated with respectful or ‗dignified‘ modes of address, 
for example – in a gendered context – the various appropriate terms of address for women 
(marwo/lady, as opposed to the less ‗polite‘ naag/woman), or highlighted in advice for male 
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journalists interviewing female victims of sexual violence - a highly charged political topic, as we 
shall see below.  
Journalistic accountability is a frequent focus of these types of training and I recall here an 
instructive example of the way in which unaccountable and highly dubious quality reporting can serve 
to heighten tensions around already existing political flashpoints. Whilst the following example is 
indicative of a phenomenon hardly unique to the Somali territories, it does shed light on the ways in 
which disparate, fragmented and often fairly anonymous ‗news‘ sources can influence and find their 
way into competing rhetorical narratives of political contestation, themselves drawing on dispersed 
and transnational sources of ideological legitimacy.  
In January 2015 a story broke in the media across Somalia about the confiscation by 
Somaliland authorities of alleged military hardware and vehicles discovered on board a Sudanese-
registered ship which had docked at Berbera port. Certain online media networks, notably 
Caasimadda.com (based in Muqdisho) subsequently posted pictures which it stated were taken during 
the Somaliland authorities‘ public display of this equipment. Whilst some of the images of armoured 
personnel carriers looked, at a cursory glance, like they could conceivably have been taken at Berbera 
port, others, including pictures of tanks bearing World War Two-era Wehrmacht insignia, appeared to 
me, somewhat out of place. Through some fairly basic internet military-history research I was able to 
track down and identify the website from which the image had been copied: a site advertising a 
private collection of replica WWII tanks usually displayed at English county fairs, and somewhat 
unlikely to have gone on out-of-season secondment to the Horn of Africa
28
.  
Whilst Somali online media often uses ‗stock‘ images to illustrate news stories, in this 
instance the headline was stating that these pictures were taken at the scene in Berbera and so 
represented a different category of journalistic malpractice. With the ease of replication of the online 
media form these image began appearing on numerous other sites. This, in turn, even prompted some 
breathless commentators to remark on the ‗Nazi‘ origins of the weaponry Somaliland was importing - 
as opposed to questioning the authenticity of the originally disseminated images themselves
29
.  
Given the continued enforcement and monitoring of the UN arms embargo against Somalia, 
allegations and misinformation of this kind is a serious business, and the rhetoric coming from 
Puntland over this incident also illustrated the stakes potentially involved in such a controversy: the 
Puntland administration frequently alleges a covert role of Somaliland in supporting AS‘s operations, 
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and statements by the Puntland Security Minister around this arms seizure (as reported in the 
Muqdisho media) highlighted the administration‘s fears that this materiel would end up in the hands 
of those militants
30
. This prompted a response from Somaliland‘s defence minister lambasting the 
Puntland claims, and, after discussions with the Sudanese government the ship was eventually 
released with the alleged military cargo reloaded. What this hardware actually consisted of, and its 
intended final destination, remained unclear in the flurry of dubious reporting and use of fake images 
by journalists and propagandists eager to make a political point
31
.  
There is, of course, often a sizeable distinction to be made between the rhetoric of such 
political actors and the actual incidence of conflict on the ground. Somaliland and Puntland do engage 
in sporadic skirmishes, although this particular incident (shouted out, as it were, from the distance of 
the various political centres) did not lead to a serious escalation in tension in the disputed areas of 
Sool and Sanaag, perhaps highlighting the primacy of local factors in this particular contexts (Hoehne 
2015). It is, nonetheless, instructive for the manner in which political claims and counter-claims are 
made through media channels in these different capitals. The combination of ubiquitous instantaneous 
and transnational online media, with increased discursive and physical political distance between 
power centres in Somalia creates a public sphere environment in which masses of information (or 
misinformation) can be selectively deployed and utilised by various, often anonymous actors. The 
widening disjuncture of political-territorial identity and the potential fertility of conspiracy theories in 
this public sphere context are combined processes which I reflect on in the conclusion and, with more 
discursive or rhetorical focus, in Chapter six, in regards to narratives of clan-political agencies.  
Many journalists in the Somali territories themselves lament such examples of malpractice, 
and in interviews with media professionals a desire was commonly articulated for the development of 
‗quality‘ journalism that could inform and educate the population whilst holding officials to account 
in an unbiased fashion. The launch of the Xaqiiqa Times newspaper in Muqdisho (in print and 
downloadable) represented an initiative in that direction. Founded in 2014 by the internationally 
experienced journalist Yuusuf Xasan, the fortnightly paper attempts to demonstrate the higher 
production values and ‗investigative‘ function of local media, self-consciously distinguishing itself 
from other local daily papers
32
. Structured and relatively probing interviews with Government 
officials are a novel feature of the Muqdisho media scene and represent a desire to present a more 
informed critique of power-holders, alongside more traditional comment and opinion pieces
33
.  
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The difficulties that this approach will face in the tense and opaque political context of 
Muqdisho may well become apparent and the sustainability of the venture is by no means assured. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that media entrepreneurs such as Xasan see increasing stabilisation as 
providing new openings in the newspaper market as well as new conceptions of the role that 
journalism is imagined to play in the process of political reconstruction itself. The fact that the paper 
was being distributed free on local flights coming in and out of Muqdisho was indicative of the 
‗national‘ ambitions of the paper in a changing commercial media market in the capital and it was 
illuminating to see the interest with which passengers picked up and read the colour-printed 
newspaper, a novel production in the local media context.     
 
3.4. Consumers: spaces of the Somali public sphere 
The ‗Telesom‘ junction in downtown Hargeysa lies at the heart of a dynamic and fast-changing urban 
environment. Officially the intersection of Road Number 1 and Ahmed Takhtuur Road (the 
signposting of street names has been a very recent and noticeable initiative of the local authorities) the 
crossroads is usually known by its most prominent architectural inhabitant – the squat green cube of 
the Telesom building, the Republic of Somaliland‘s predominant mobile phone service provider. The 
building is a customer service hub and throughout the mornings and late afternoons it is full of people 
there to manage their money and mobile accounts. 
Surrounding the building, and catering to this stream of customers and passersby, are the 
newspaper vendors. These boys and young men, who have collected their armfuls of the numerous 
different newspaper titles earlier in the morning from distribution points elsewhere in the downtown 
market, weave through the bustle selling their wares to passing customers coming from the adjacent 
central covered suuq or those seated in the large Cadaani cafe across the road at the junction. Whilst 
this trade in news is a common sight all over downtown Hargeysa – these vendors hawk their papers 
through most of the cafes, teashops, qaat shacks (mafrish), and more upmarket restaurants – it is at 
the Telesom junction where the convergence of the different strands of the Hargeysa public sphere 
can most clearly be seen coming together: mobile telecommunications, market commerce, print media 
and cafe culture all rolled into one.  
The most prominent public sites for media consumption in Hargeysa (and indeed Garoowe 
and Muqdisho) are largely male dominated. Restaurants and cafes may have smaller segregated 
women‘s areas, but the dynamics I discuss here with regard to the comparative conditions of public 
sphere association are primarily conceived in male terms. Cafe culture in Hargeysa is flourishing, and 
exists partly as a function of the booming local economy, itself driven by urban stability, light-touch 
government regulation or taxation, diaspora remittances and investment in human and material 
capital, and ever-expanding service, telecommunications and construction industries. In Hargeysa (as 
in Muqdisho and Garoowe) cafe culture remains the primary node around which most people socialise 
in public: alternative settings, such as cinemas or performance of live music or drama are largely 




absent in public environments where considerations around proper Islamic conduct are becoming 
more and more important and informally policed. One debate that I witnessed during my time 
working for the University of Hargeysa centred around the inclusion of ‗traditional‘ dance (involving 
men and women) in the institution‘s yearly ‗Cultural Week‘ events. A sizeable conservative faction of 
the student body largely succeeded in limiting the space for musical or dance-related performance 
within the context of legitimate ‗Somali‘ cultural performance. Poetry, however, is usually seen as 
being acceptable and is increasingly emphasised as the exemplar of ‗Somali‘ ethno-cultural 
production. 
 It is telling that cultural or artistic production is far more prevalent through television and 
online media channels than it is in any public setting in modern Somalia or Somaliland. This is 
particularly true for ‗traditional‘ music and dance with programming often nostalgic in tone and 
featuring pre state-collapse footage. This is due partly to security concerns (especially in Muqdisho 
where the National Theatre has been a past target of Islamist militants) as well as the fact that many of 
these centres of production are located in the diaspora. It should be noted, however that, diaspora 
communities themselves are certainly not unaffected by conservative cultural religious trends and 
subsequent chapters return to this complex question of trans-nationalism and ‗Somali‘ cultural 
orientation
34
. The prevalence of artistic material in amongst news media indicates that a market exists 
for such products which seem to be consumed vicariously and do not have many well-publicised or 
prominent outlets for live performance in Somalia/Somaliland itself.  
 Socio-economic stratification – ever more visible in the heady atmosphere of urban economic 
expansion – is reflected across various sites of the public sphere. As commercial development 
expands from the city‘s core into peripheral neighbourhoods, many of the old standbys of the lower-
class public sphere - the roadside plywood shacks of the qaat stalls, the mafrish where men buy the 
narcotic leaves, chew, smoke, drink soda, converse and listen to the radio – are displaced by new real 
estate. In some cases these new developments include new, more concrete (as it were) meeting spaces; 
modern cafes, restaurants or barber shops.  
Elsewhere, the established restaurants and hotels spread across the city still provide a draw for 
broad clienteles, whilst the big, self-defined ‗international hotels‘, like the Maansoor or Ambassador, 
maintain more rigorous security screening, house expatriate staff and serve as hubs for local and 
external elites. The bigger hotels invariably include facilities for meetings and different types of 
public and private events, and often the buzz of their cafes corresponds to the schedules of the various 
ceremonies, seminars or ‗workshops‘ taking place. Mid-mornings are always the busiest time at a 
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place like the Imperial Hotel, a kind of ‗mid-tier‘ establishment with a broad clientele, and located in 
the heart of the Government Ministries‘ district. At this point in the day, the civil society or 
‗stakeholder‘ great and good spills out of various ‗capacity-building‘ or ‗empowerment‘ workshops 
(almost invariably financed by foreign donor money), the women usually disappearing to their own 
more secluded zones, whilst the men take their seats around the garden. Ordering sweet tea and 
cappuccinos from the perpetually harried waiters they sip their beverages in shade, waiting for the 
newspaper and shoe-shine boys to come around.  
After 11am though, the espresso machines are switched off in preparation for the Duhur call 
to midday prayer and quiet (punctuated perhaps by some post-Mosque diners in for lunch) reigns until 
after Casar, the mid-afternoon prayer rousing people from their slumber through the midday heat. As 
businesses start to reopen after 4pm, the cafes of the city start to fill up again. The early evening radio 
news from the BBC Somali Service or the VOA is often listened to amongst the din of the 
reawakened streets, a ritual that persists even if it is considered by many smart-phone savvy 
youngsters to be very much an anachronism: something of their parents‘ generation when instant 
access to radio, print or visual journalism wasn‘t but a click away on a 3 or even 4G connection. 
 The increasing individualisation of media consumption accompanies new technological 
innovation. It is often notable in different social contexts how people are increasingly plugged into 
media through their mobiles and headphones, often sharing space with their fellows but consuming 
very different products, whether websites, local FM radio stations (particularly in Muqdisho where the 
market is so diverse), or Youtube videos
35
. Gone are the days when a much smaller range of 
authoritative news sources were relied upon by the majority of a national audience. Many of these old 
standbys such as the BBC are increasingly interacted with online by audiences where they are 
challenged or critiqued by consumers sensitive to perceived political or regional biases. Such 
consumers are also often attuned to the fact that such media is broadcast into Somalia from abroad, 
and online commentary or debate in the local press indicates popular concern that ‗correct‘ normative 
boundaries of media agency are followed. 
 I discussed at length the perceived neutrality of external Somali language media sources 
(particularly the BBC or VOA) with my university focus group participants in Hargeysa, Garoowe 
and Muqdisho. In each location arguments were made about a lack of neutrality - whether an over-
emphasis on negative stories, disproportionate number of people from certain groups in powerful 
positions in these media organisations, a lack of representation of journalists on the ground in certain 
places, or perceptions of foreign or western influence or propaganda. However, the fact that these 
critiques came from consumers from different locations and political orientations is an indication that 
a certain regional-political objectivity is at least strived for by networks like the BBC or VOA. 
Producers at such international Somali broadcasters are clearly aware that the perception of bias 
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towards or against any region in a politically fragmented Somalia will have serious consequences for 
their station‘s popularity and credibility. Many students also emphasised their respect for the technical 
journalistic capacity and professionalism of the staff of these organisations, indicative of their 
continued importance in the media environment despite a diversification of alternate news sources and 
means of access.    
If content in the public sphere is highly internationalised then so too are many of the spaces of 
the public sphere in these political centres. Here I refer to the presence of many diaspora returnees (as 
businessmen, politicians, or ‗consultants‘ in humanitarian or governance sectors) or transient elites 
who move back and forth between continents, sometimes alone, sometimes bringing their families to 
experience life back in the Somali Horn. The Hargeysa social scene of restaurants, hotels and cafes, 
for example, is particularly busy in the (European) summer season when diaspora children are on 
vacation from their schools and are brought by their parents to the Horn. Labels of dhaqan celis (for 
those experiencing ‗cultural rehabilitation or return‘) are prominent here and this diverse phenomenon 
ranges from family holidays where diaspora children are brought ‗back‘ to see the motherland and 
their extended family, to practices of sending wayward youths to Somalia from Europe or North 
America to be essentially detained by family members, mental health clinics (Tiilikainen 2011) or 
even (as I have observed) within the formal prison system. Accounts such as Hansen‘s (2007) and 
Hammond‘s (2015) capture both the complex and non-linear movements of ‗revolving returnees‘, as 
well as the controversy and contestation which is often generated by such mobility, particularly 
around cultural norms and competition generated in the local job market.  
The internationalised nature of urban public sphere settings is highlighted not only through 
the consumption of externally-produced media (Somali or non-Somali), but also in the content of so-
called ‗local‘ news. Newspapers in Hargeysa usually have an international section composed of 
stories of relevance to diaspora communities (or locals who may have family members abroad). Taken 
from foreign media and translated or commented on, this content frequently explores developments or 
controversies in Europe. For example, stories could cover ‗anti-radicalisation‘ policies in education 
rolled out by the British government, or there may be comment on inflammatory statements made in 
the European media about ‗swarms‘ of migrants at the continent‘s borders
36
. Where the focus is not 
Europe or North America a common theme is human-interest or religious-related stories from the 
wider Islamic world, particularly the Gulf states where many Somalis reside and which are often 
presented as potential exemplars of successful Muslim economic development and state-building. 
Such media themes are indicative of an internationalised ‗Somali‘ audience, on the ground in the 
Horn of Africa and these public sphere spaces serve as forums in which transnational socio-cultural 
identities of a global Somali population are reproduced.  
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Many of the features of public sphere space outlined above are characteristic in the differing 
political contexts of Garoowe and Muqdisho, and yet there are also significant differences. Garoowe 
lacks the type of boom-town economic atmosphere that can be felt in Hargeysa, and even parts of 
Muqdisho in the post-2012 SFG period. Cafe, hotel and restaurant-culture exist in the Puntland capital 
yet the newspaper market is considerably smaller. More private FM radio stations are available in 
Garoowe than Hargeysa – given the Puntland government‘s somewhat less firm regulatory role – 
although neither place compares with regard to Muqdisho‘s fragmented and crowded radio 
broadcasting marketplace.  
The conditions for public sphere media consumption in Muqdisho are set in no small part by 
the fluctuating security situation. During my time in Muqdisho people would often remark that the 
number of people out on the streets of the capital - congregating to drink tea, listen to the radio and 
read newspapers around hotels, big businesses, universities and government Ministries - was a clear 
barometer of the popularly perceived level of threat of violence. Whilst major AS attacks in central 
Muqdisho continue to occur on a sporadic basis, the general trend of increasing numbers of people 
coming out on the streets to do business and socialise (even at night) has been maintained. Arguably, 
AS has become slightly more sensitive to the negative publicity generated by attacks which are 
perceived to be indiscriminate with regard to civilian locations (here read non-government) and the 
group‘s communications often contain warnings to civilians to disassociate themselves from any 
location connected to the state. 
 The re-emergence of ‗ordinary‘ or ‗everyday‘ day urban life is a key component of the 
‗Muqdisho rising‘ narrative. Part of this, of course, concerns the ability of people to come together in 
public sphere locations and thus the status of such sites is highly political in nature. AS‘s 
asymmetrical mode of urban warfare has made social destabilization and a derailing of this narrative a 
key priority, whilst the targeting of restaurants or cafes being opened with diaspora finance or by 
diaspora returnees had been justified both on the grounds that these locations were haunts of members 
of the ‗apostate‘ government and the accusation that such places were hotbeds of vice and 
inappropriate or culturally unacceptable behaviour
37
.  
As the targeting has shifted in the last year or so towards bigger and more fortified targets 
such as hotels and ministries the discourse of AS legitimisation tries to take advantage of the social 
and cultural difference that is perceived to exist between elites and the wider population. The 
infrastructure of securitisation of these nodes of the elite public sphere are obvious all around 
Muqdisho and Cabdishakuur Mire‘s piece quoted above on the newspaper boy is telling in its 
portrayal of social barriers and intense mistrust within a public sphere that, nevertheless, manages to 
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continue operating in the context of wider economic development and reconstruction it the capital. 
This relationship between public sphere media production and the politics of counter-insurgency and 
state-building is elaborated on in the following section.  
 
3.5. Information control, insurgency and state-building 
Across the three political centres, control over media narratives within the different environments of 
the public spheres is of paramount importance for state authorities and challengers to power, all of 
whom are engaged at some level in contestation for - or reconfiguration and reconstruction of - new 
mechanisms of legitimate governance. Muqdisho represents the most volatile of these contexts, where 
violent contestation (and its mediated portrayal) is most common and acute. In representing a fairly 
decisive departure from previous transitional governance structures - but in the absence of popular 
elections - the SFG has been required to pay close attention to its propagation of legitimate authority 
and has attempted to gain control over a narrative of securitisation, re-establishment of governance 
structures and the fight against terrorism. 
 ‗State‘ media, notably Somali National Television and Radio Muqdisho, plays a role here, 
broadcasting documentaries such as „Barnaamij ku saabsan shabakado Al Shabaab ah oo la soo 
qabtay‟ (‗Program about apprehended Al Shabaab Networks‘) which presents the conspiratorial 
nature of AS militancy amongst and within Muqdisho communities
38
.  The film features dramatic 
shots of elite SFG forces in full battle-gear, engaging the enemy over a Hollywood Action Movie-
esque soundtrack. The ‗patriotism‘ of the SFG forces is emphasised along with the warning to the 
population that the state will seize property rented to AS, a practice justified with reference to Islamic 
law from Sheekh Bashiir Axmed Salaad (the Head of the Organisation of Somali Clerics). The film 
continues with detailed interviews from captured AS operatives who have been involved in different 
capacities in the planning or execution of assassination operations in the city.   
This television production serves as an example of the state‘s communication in a context 
where the armed opposition has the capacity to broadcast widely online and, arguably, produces 
material of a higher level of technical polish and slickness. Although detailed analysis of AS and pro-
Jihadi media is provided in Chapter 5, of note here is the fact that the SFG is in direct competition 
with the militants in terms of propagating their material in the public sphere. Also of relevance is the 
way in which ‗mainstream‘ Somali private media respond to the release of AS propaganda films. 
Often news producers (who may not directly identify with AS‘s Jihadi-Takfiiri ideology) can be seen 
to give coverage or reproduction to such high-profile media products, in that they are deemed 
newsworthy in themselves (and will thus generate internet traffic and hits)
39
. 
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The SFG frequently broadcasts footage of its battlefield or intelligence successes, including 
images or interviews with captured operatives and judicial processes (up to and including executions) 
of either alleged AS members or government forces themselves accused of killing civilians. The 
relationship between the media and state counter-insurgency in Muqdisho has been discussed by 
renowned journalist and former head of the BBC Somali Service, Yusuuf Garaad, who has criticised 
the amateurish nature of such joint productions
40
. Garaad has pointed out the negative effects on 
intelligence gathering and potential criminal prosecutions of allowing (even encouraging) journalists 
to interview suspects of attacks shortly after their capture. On this dynamic media battlefield it 
appears that the state is torn between attempting to present its forces‘ successes whilst actually 
prosecuting an effective and credible counter-intelligence operation against a foe which has infiltrated 
all levels of society and, indeed, state and security forces themselves.  
Regulating flows of information in this conflict-setting can often have direct significance for 
protagonists or those caught up in moments of violence themselves: in another comment piece Garaad 
lambasts rolling media coverage of ongoing attacks of the kind described earlier in this chapter 
(including the use of Twitter by eager journalists) as a factor potentially putting more lives at risk 
during such incidents and being capitalised on by attackers themselves who can use such updates to 




 Century technological context of the Muqdisho public 
sphere is highly dynamic and coverage itself has the potential to alter events as they unfold, a fact not 
lost on actors (such as AS militants and spokesmen) who prepare for operations with carefully 
planned strategies for media exposure.  
Occasionally the state attempts to take direct charge of the narrative politics of the ongoing 
conflict it is engaged in. In May 2015, the Head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency 
(NISA) made a public ‗request‘ to the media in Muqdisho to stop using the term ‗Al Shabaab‘ to refer 
to AS and instead use the acronym ‗UGUS‘ (Ururka Gumaadka Ummadda Soomaaliyeed – 
‗Organisation of the Destruction of the Somali Ummah‘)
42
. This somewhat clumsy directive 
illustrated the importance placed by the state on the media narratives as well as the limitations of its 
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sporadic control of the industry. The irony of its announcement on ‗World Press Freedom Day‘ 
notwithstanding, its ambiguity was troubling for many in the local media (a request or an order!? 
many wondered) given the SFG‘s past form with regard to prosecutions of journalists.  
 Since the establishment of the SFG there have been several high profile arrests, detentions, 
prosecutions and convictions of journalists in Muqdisho, ostensibly for reporting (or allegedly falsely 
reporting) information that has ‗incited‘ popular discontent directed against the state. These have 
included the prosecution of journalists for reporting rape allegations regarding Government forces, or 
against media networks such as Shabelle Radio, targeted for broadcasting AS statements, or vox-
populi-esque programming of uncensored public opinions which, the Government has claimed, is 
tantamount to incitement of clan violence in the city. The Shabelle incident occurred during a flurry of 
disarmament operations by the SFG against long-influential neighbourhood militia leaders (such as 
Axmed Daaci in Wadajir district), a process which led to armed confrontations and significant tension 
in parts of the city. In this situation media coverage was deemed by the SFG to have been socially 
destabilising. However, popular perceptions abounded in Muqdisho that Shabelle radio was receiving 
a high level of state scrutiny partly due to a particular dynamic of clan ownership and intra-Hawiye 
contestation going on in Government in Muqdisho
43
.  
In another notable recent example of an attack on press freedom, Universal TV East Africa 
director Cabdilaahi Xirsi Kulmiye and journalist Cawil Daahir Salaad were arrested and held for 6 
days by NISA after the broadcasting of a Doodwadaag debate featuring two members of Parliament, 
one of whom made provocative statements about Somalia‘s current status under the 
‗colonial/imperial‘ control of neighbouring powers. Both the debate and the subsequent arrests were 
picked up by pro-Jihadi media, spun to verify their frequent claims of external dominion over 
Somalis
44
. The SFG‘s limited communications around the detentions referred to the broadcasting of 
sensitive information pertaining to state security however the journalists were eventually released 
after an apparent intervention from the Leader of Parliament
45
. The importance of narratives of 
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external interference and ‗neo-colonialism‘ for wider discourses of ethno-nationalism are discussed at 
length in subsequent chapters, and the incident described here illustrates their potential sensitivity vis-
á-vis the state and within the technical context of information dissemination and regulation. Legal 
frameworks regulating journalistic conduct remain ambiguous despite the ratification in January 2016 
of the Somali Media Law. This vaguely worded document includes provisions that media content be 
‗based on respect for Islamic law and Somali culture‘ and that journalists should ‗avoid the 
dissemination or publication of videos and photos that are against the sound conduct of the society‘
46
. 
The definition of such terms (or the identity of arbitrating bodies) is left unelaborated, giving the state 
significant leeway to prosecute individuals where it sees fit. 
Although the security contexts of media in Garoowe or Hargeysa are somewhat less fraught 
than Muqdisho, regulation of media is a sporadically-used mechanism for the flexing of the muscles 
of state power (such as it is) in these environments. The young people with whom I discussed these 
issues in both Garoowe and Hargeysa were keen to emphasise the legal frameworks in operation to 
govern relations between private news media and the state. They made frequent reference to the 
concept of an appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities of journalists and offered 
different perceptions of how ‗free‘ media was in these administrations. In general they would argue 
that Puntland or Somaliland was a freer and safer environment for journalists than elsewhere in 
Somalia or the Horn, although some in Garoowe did note the greater risk of AS retaliation against 
journalists in some parts of Puntland, notably the town of Gaalkacyo
47
. Puntland‘s media law was 
ratified by its Parliament in mid 2014 after heated negotiations with the Media Association of 
Puntland, an independent journalists‘ union covering the territory. Compromise was eventually 
reached although some journalists continued to feel that the legislation gave too many powers to the 
state authorities, including the issuance by the Information Ministry of mandatory identity cards for 
journalists.  
The Puntland authorities have on several occasions suspended the operations of various 
external radio and television broadcasters (such as VOA, or Somali National TV from Muqdisho) 
usually under the pretext that they have disseminated false information, particularly in regard to 
internal Puntland politics or reporting of Puntland‘s relationship with Muqdisho and negotiations over 
the federalisation process
48
. The Puntland administration‘s close links with Golis telecommunications 
(the primary mobile phone and internet service provider for the territory) has also allowed for the 
temporary blocking of certain local websites such as Puntland Today and Puntland Now.  
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As in Garoowe, a diverse and privatised media market in Hargeysa operates within wider 
structures of social, legal and political contestation, negotiation and mediation. For this reason the 
concept of press ‗freedom‘ is of limited analytical use for this account which has focused more on 
how information-flows and public expression are perceived by media consumers themselves. 
Although press freedom is popularly cited as an element of Somaliland‘s democratic stability (itself a 
highly political narrative as the territory defines itself in contrast to the rest of ‗Somalia‘), 
considerations of social stability and the legitimacy of state power are also important for people in 
defining appropriate boundaries of media expression. For example, the Chairman of the Somaliland 
Journalists‘ Association (SOLJA) himself explained how he agreed with the State‘s restriction of 
private FM radio, for the reason that an expansion of specific clan-affiliated networks would promote 
social fragmentation.  
Also emphasised in our discussions was the perception that journalists operated within clan 
networks (overlapping and interacting with the formal legal system) that would advocate for them, 
represent them in disputes, and serve as mechanisms of protection. This was contrasted with how he 
saw the situation in the south (Somalia) whereby higher clan fragmentation produced the 
circumstances in which journalists were at much greater risk of violence
49
. This narrative does not 
preclude, however, the state‘s prosecution of journalists, usually under the legally defined charge of 
reporting false information, and several media professionals have been convicted for the publishing of 
derogatory stories about figures close to the highest levels of governmental power
50
. Once again, the 
state has some capacity to sporadically regulate media production through legal frameworks and its 
security services, justified in terms of societal stability.   
 
3.6. Conclusion: The dual Somali public sphere  
This chapter has comparatively outlined multiple points of overlap between public sphere media 
production/consumption and expressions of statehood across Somali political contexts. Stremlau, 
Fantini and Osman critique overly normative conceptualisations of media agency in conflict 
environments such as Somalia (2015). They argue that the political economy of Somali media is 
defined by internal commercial logics of political patronage, combined with a profusion of young 
journalists with few alternative employment opportunities. While such conclusions are corroborated 
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by my own fieldwork, my focus extends both to media content and the wider reception and influence 
of media production across a fragmented political environment. Materialist accounts such Stremlau, 
Fantini and Osman‘s rightly problematise notions of ‗corruption‘ in the Somali media market context 
and interrogate naive assumptions that media agency is necessarily objective and constitutive of a 
positive pillar of critical civil society. It is nonetheless important, however, not to overlook the 
genuine debates which are ongoing in (and on) the Somali public sphere which have a bearing on the 
‗cultural‘ or ethno-religious identity of emerging and competing political authorities.     
This comparative analysis of news media production and consumption across the political 
centres of southern Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland has illustrated how this information 
environment both reflects and influences political fragmentation and reconfiguration across these 
territories. The technological and political contexts of media production and consumption breed a 
profusion of different narrative voices and possibilities for more individualised and diversified 
consumption. These voices, nonetheless, all attempt to legitimise themselves through discourses of 
authentic ‗Somali‘ identity and sovereignty in a highly politicised socio-cultural arena of contestation. 
The contours of Somali ethno-religious nationalist political imagination, still vital in the context of the 
reconstruction of a shattered state and society, are shaped by these technological and political 
conditions, and the status of media production (down to the form of the Somali language itself) is 
understood by protagonists to be fundamental in defining the parameters political reconfiguration and 
new Somali sovereignties. The politics of ‗book fairs‘, discussed above, is one succinct example of 
this dynamic, where popular desires for cultural regeneration overlap with the narratives and agendas 
of different Somali state-makers. Competing ethno-nationalist discourses of Soomaalinimo are 
interrogated in greater depth in textual analyses in subsequent chapters.      
Emphasised in this chapter is the duality of the public sphere in the Somali context. There 
coexist multiple arenas of information production, consumption and reproduction centred around the 
political developments of individual nodes of a reconfigured state, as well as a single globally 
orientated and transnational ‗Somali‘ public sphere which reproduces and commoditises tropes of 
‗Somali‘ identity divorced from the individual political contexts of contestation in the former unitary 
state of Somalia, and indeed the wider Somali territories of the Horn. ‗Transnational‘ here does not 
simply mean ‗diasporic‘ as both levels of this public sphere involve internationally-mobile and 
locally-based participants. Furthermore, this duality is conceptualised in political rather than 
technological terms. Media producers at both the local and transnational levels of Somali political 
debate generate and reproduce content through multiple technological means. A vast array of audio-
visual and print media production (found in radio and television broadcasts, news articles and 
editorials) is regularly digitalised into an online Somali-language media environment accessible in the 
Somali territories and in the diaspora. Social media platforms such as Youtube and Facebook intersect 
and overlap with this content and these networks, further blurring traditional distinctions between 
‗new‘ and ‗traditional‘ media.  




It is the overlap of content across these public spheres, I argue, which helps structure the 
different focuses of ‗ethno-religious nationalist‘ debate and facilitates the apparent malleability of 
political articulations of Soomaalinimo. The existence of a prominent transnational Somali public 
sphere is itself significant for the various state authorities which have varying (and often limited) 
power to fully regulate the discursive environment in which they are attempting to assert themselves. 
The fact that it is so often this transnational face of the Somali public sphere that is the concern of 
would-be state regulators is indicative of its perceived significance: authorities in Garoowe, Hargeysa 
and Muqdisho have all made sporadic moves against broadcasters such as Universal TV for various 
alleged transgressions (the most recent instances of office closures or arrests occurring in these 
capitals were in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively).   
Previous scholarship has emphasised the influence of the external on the local in the Somali 
context – whether through the ‗recreation‘ of conflict via diaspora-based media or the material impact 
of financial flows such as remittances (Osman 2015, Ahmed 2000, Lindley 2008). This chapter has 
taken a somewhat different approach that has emphasised how the Somali media ecology is structured 
by a pervasive transnationalism: by the mobility of elite producers; by the cross-border broadcasting 
of important Somali-language media networks; or by the frequent ‗international‘ focus of ostensibly 
local media on issues affecting the global Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. This account thus allocates 
greater agency to individuals in the Somali territories as globalised producers and consumers in the 
urban public sphere(s). The next chapter attempts to further elaborate on these dynamics through a 
particular case study of this type of transnational media production, consumption and popular 













































4. Cartoons in conflict: Amin Arts and transnational geopolitical 
imagination in the Somali-language public sphere 
 
 
   
                            Fig. 4.1 
 
- Man in red: ‘The Somali politician [pictured in the chair] sees this as being in his interest. Oh Allah 
may you bestow on Somalia a patriotic politician’. 




Online and in print, Amin Amir‘s (‗Amin Arts‘) political cartoons are a distinctive and prevalent 
feature of news media and political commentary in Somalia. Unlike other prominent East African 
political cartoonists (such as Kenya‘s Godfrey Mwampembwa, AKA Gado) who produce work for a 
single major national newspaper and are syndicated in various international publications, Amin Arts‘ 
cartoons are produced and reproduced across the diverse and highly fragmented world of Somali news 
media. The cartoonist maintains a personal website (aminarts.com) and his images find their way – 
often ‗copy-and-paste‘ fashion - into the myriad Somali-language news websites, blogs, forums and 
print media across the patchwork of regional authorities or de facto independent states that make up 
what remains defined on the political map as the nation-state of Somalia. Amin Amir is undoubtedly 
the most popular cartoonist at work on the Somali political scene, and there are very few other 
producers of this particular type of visual commentary in the Somali-language ‗public sphere‘ of 
political commentary and popular debate.  
Insofar as a unitary Somali state ceased to exist a quarter of a century ago, and given the 
continued fragmentation of political power across the Somali territories, it is remarkable that any 
single political commentator has the type of widespread distribution and reproduction enjoyed by 
Amin Amir. His consistent lament at the predicament of Somalia and his critiques of the venal 
politicians and malign foreign influences at work at the heart of elite politics, clearly strike a chord 
with audiences both inside Somalia and in the global Somali-speaking diaspora. It is from this 




position of geographical detachment that the cartoonist – based in Canada – comments, both on the 
daily developments and intrigues of different contexts local or regional politics in Somalia or on the 
wider ‗national‘ concerns of the community addressed as the global Ummadda Soomaaliyeed, the 
Somali Ummah - a supranational projection of shared identity based on a common religion (Islam) 
and ethnic descent. 
This chapter situates its analysis of Amin Amir with reference to three interlinked bodies of 
scholarship on the modern public sphere: popular geopolitics, civic agency, and the role (or ‗cyber-
subjectivities‘) of ‗digital diasporas‘. I examine the role of Amin Amir‘s cartoons in reflecting and 
conditioning popular orientations towards geopolitical discourses and utilise recent literature on 
African civic agency in the public sphere, particularly with regard to the commonly invoked theme of 
‗resistance‘. The chapter engages with literature exploring the possibilities which transnational and 
diasporic-influenced public spheres afford for de-territorialized forms of political identification or 
nationhood. In responding to recent calls in the popular geopolitics literature for greater focus on 
audience reception and interpretation of media texts, the chapter analyses the cartoons in the context 
of their reproduction within the media ecology of Somalia. I argue that greater attention needs to be 
paid to the ways in which different forms of production (the political cartoon for instance) hold 
significance in particular media environments. The political, technological and cultural contours of 
the Somali public sphere mean that certain visual and linguistic characteristics of the political cartoon 
format (taken for granted in other contexts) are themselves of importance to ongoing contestations 
over Somali state reconfiguration and broader geopolitical discourses.  
The chapter surveys these three bodies of literature highlighting the ways in which this case 
study both aligns with and diverges from recent conceptualisations of popular geopolitics and 
(transnational) civic agency. The practicalities and constraints of media production in Somalia are 
then outlined, and the position of this particular producer and his form of commentary is 
contextualised. A selection of Amin Amir‘s cartoons is then critically analysed in terms of its 
discursive content and appeal to Somali nationalist sentiment. This sample is representative, I argue, 
of his much wider body of work and is divided into three thematic sections: a critique of foreign 
intervention and the ‗venal politician‘; critiques of ‗clanism‘; and a discussion of cultural or religio-
political ‗imports‘ in processes of state contestation. Bringing back into focus the transnational 
dynamics of the Somali public sphere, the chapter then considers the cartoonist‘s position as a 
diasporic cultural producer vis-á-vis the contestation ongoing within processes of reconstructing the 
state (or states) across the Somali territories. I conclude by arguing that Amin Amir‘s work epitomises 
the inherent trans-nationalism of Somali public spheres as introduced in the previous chapter. This 
globalised orientation is perceived and understood as such by local and external producers and 
consumers of Somali-language media, and has a profound influence on the parameters of discursive 
contestation taking place over the re-emergence of state structures. Instead of conceiving of these 
cartoons primarily as a product of the diaspora (and analysing them in terms of the ‗cyber-




subjectivity‘ of those external populations) this chapter conceptualises them as part of the media 
environment on the ground in Somalia.   
 
4.2. Cartoons, critical/popular geopolitics and public sphere ‘resistance’ 
The critical geopolitics literature has long been concerned with the relationship between hegemonic 
representations of geographically-framed political relations and ‗everyday‘ experiences of power and 
resistance (Ó Tuathail 1996, 2006; Dodds 1996; Hammett 2011). Dittmer and Dodds note that whilst 
analyses of geopolitical representation and discourse remain important, only recently have focuses 
begun to shift ‗towards audience interpretation, consumption and attachment‘ (2008, 437) of texts 
which reflect, condition or challenge popular perceptions of local or global power relations. The 
writers here cite Thrift‘s contention that overemphasis on geopolitical ‗representations‘ overlooks the 
‗little things‘ of how ‗(and therefore why) geo-power is actually practiced‘ (2000, 380). They go on to 
argue that ‗everyday practices such as the consumption of news media and serialised popular culture 
need to be connected to our interest in the representational qualities of maps and other geopolitical 
objects‘ (Dittmer and Dodds 2008, 445).  
This chapter takes up this approach by critically examining the ways in which Amin Amir‘s 
diasporic cartoons are disseminated, consumed, and reproduced inside Somalia itself. My fieldwork 
across different political centres in southern Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland brought me into 
contact with the cartoons as reproduced in various newspapers, websites and civil-society political 
engagements. Whilst this research did not focus on gathering a large sample of audience reactions to 
the cartoons specifically, my following theoretical discussion of the case study is underpinned by 
several observations derived from my study of this media environment ‗on the ground‘ in Somalia. 
Firstly, there is no other individual political commentator (using cartoons or other media) whose work 
is reproduced so widely across the different public spheres of a fragmented Somalia. Secondly, such 
widespread dissemination is, in part, a function of audiences‘ ability to selectively utilise different 
cartoons from the artist‘s prolific output speaking to particular regional events or in support of various 
political positions – this I conceptualise in terms of Hills‘ notion of ‗performative consumption‘ 
where consumers‘ agency is demonstrated in the strategic deployment of selected material (Hills 
2002; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Thirdly, the popularity of Amin Amir‘s cartoons was commonly 
related to me in terms of his perceived neutrality: detectable for audiences through his desire to 
critique multiple political elites and aided by his position of relative security in the diaspora, as well 
as his own (marginalised) clan background. Furthermore, I argue that the relative novelty of the 
political cartoon form (visually and linguistically) in the Somali media environment is a factor in the 
cartoonist‘s popular reception: it productively and provocatively utilises humour as well as 
highlighting dynamics of cultural contestation in which the cartoonist plays a particular ideological 
role.  




Each of these observations speak to the importance of situating popular geopolitical media 
production within local contexts of consumption. There is increasing literature on African, Middle 
Eastern and diasporic media production in the form of cartoons, satire and humour which illuminates 
the myriad devices by which power is challenged (or re-inscribed) in imaginative and important ways. 
Often, however, I find the contextual backdrops offered for such production raising further questions, 
particularly around language usage and class or ethnically-influenced patterns of consumption. What 
is the significance, for example, of cartoonist Zapiro‘s own cultural or class background and his use of 
English in the dissemination and reproduction of his work in South Africa (Hammett 2010; Zapiro 
2010; Mason 2010; Eko 2010; Dodds 2010)? Similarly, for whom is English-language anti-state 
propaganda in Zimbabwe aimed at? How does it circulate within the country (Hammett 2011)? Are 
jokes in Nigeria which critique the state (and form an auto-critique of national identity) delivered and 
re-interpreted in languages other than English? If so, where and how (Obadare 2009)? What are the 
ethnic or class politics of language choices – between English and Amharic – in Ethiopian or Eritrean 
diaspora media (Skjerdal 2011; Bernal 2014)? How does an (Arabic) lingua franca influence 
production in an Arab public sphere engaged in anti-imperialist political cartooning? Does the form of 
the political cartoon have the same history, status or popularity in each of the different national media 
contexts (Falah et al. 2006)? Does the alleged ‗liberal‘ potential of internet-based discursive 
connectivity, as analysed by Brinkerhoff (2006), have anything to do with the linguistic (English) 
basis of the particular (Somali) diaspora network studied? To what extent can this be representative of 
a far wider Somali-language sphere operating betwixt and between the diaspora and the Horn of 
Africa and engaging multiple (and not necessarily liberal) political-religious subjectivities?   
In teasing out important theoretical distinctions between, for example, discourse and 
narrative, or language and practice (Müller 2008) such ‗little‘ or seemingly self evident things as 
language, audience composition, place or media form, may prove to loom rather ‗large‘ in analysis. It 
is my own focus on the place and deployment of diasporic media in the Somali territories (as well as 
my professed ignorance of the ‗on the ground‘ media realities of the other contexts referenced above) 
which prompt my questions above on this range of public sphere geopolitical media. I recognise that 
the answers to many of these questions may be difficult to uncover ethnographically, particularly in 
‗closed‘ political contexts where subversive anti-state media production is highly sensitive. Whilst 
Somalia is - in many ways - a highly dangerous environment for journalists to work in, the 
decentralised and transnational nature of media production across multiple political territories - where 
political authorities have relatively limited capacity to systematically control media flows - affords 
various opportunities for a researcher to comparatively examine the ways in which different media 
products are popularly consumed and utilised. This chapter thus offers a semi-ethnographic account of 
media consumption in Somalia which examines the discursive output of a particular diasporic 
producer in the context of the wider Somali public sphere. It attempts to demonstrate how the very 




form of the media and the identity of the producer themselves can both reflect and condition debates 
ongoing on the ground over Somali state reconstruction and conflict. 
This approach engages with a recent trend in the scholarship on civic agency in Africa which 
has involved a shift in focus away from realms of organised civil society and onto the public sphere 
and popular culture in analyses of multiple forms of resistance – whether multi-directional, radical, 
mundane, vernacular, universalised, structured or spontaneous. Obadare and Willems emphasise the 
‗fractured sovereignty‘ of the African state and the ‗disruptive influence of the global economic 
system on the ordinary African‘ as contexts in which ‗parallel infrastructures [of resistance are] 
mobilised, plotted and enacted‘ (2014, 2). Their volume highlights the various nuanced ways in which 
resistance can be interpreted, and their conceptualisation of this notion transcends reductive 
formulations of a reified ‗unified and heroic subaltern subject‘ (Ibid, 7; Abu-Lughod 1989). In 
understanding civic agency, many of these debates centre around Mbembe‘s discussion of popular 
ridicule of elites and the extent to which such expressions in popular culture and local vernaculars 
constitute challenges to power relations or represent (as he would have it) the potential reinforcement 
of political hierarchies through ‗conviviality‘ (2001, 110; Obadare & Willems 2014, 7; Hammett 
2010, 8). Whilst resistance here is appropriately problematised - and binaries of 
subordination/domination are jettisoned - the nature of the case studies explored necessitates a 
continued focus on the relationship between ‗ordinary‘ Africans and the ‗official‘ in terms of state 
structures or power holders.  
This is the point from which my analysis of political cartoons in the Somali public sphere 
somewhat diverges. Given the prolonged conditions of flux and contestation that characterise Somali 
state-structures and state-society relations (where these can be clearly discerned), it is difficult to read 
public sphere agency primarily in terms of ‗resistance‘, nor in distinctions between ‗official‘ and 
‗informal‘ media and communication. Instead, political and thus media fragmentation across Somalia 
creates an environment where public sphere or ‗civic‘ agency can be conceived of as producing the 
discursive spaces in which political organisation is legitimised or struggled against. This is not to 
argue that resistance is absent from the discursive framing of Amin Amir‘s work; on the contrary, the 
analysis below highlights how his representation of the ‗poor‘ Somali ‗population‘ (‗shacabka 
masakiinta‟) is fundamental to his speaking of truth to power holders. Nevertheless, from an 
analytical standpoint I argue that a more productive framing of his ‗civic agency‘ involves a focus on 
the cartoonist‘s position - in terms of his cross-sectional influence, his generational ideological 
perspective, his location in the diaspora, and the technological means through which his material is 
disseminated. These factors are indicative of the transnational dynamics which characterise the 
Somali public sphere and, crucially, the debates which are ongoing in Somalia over the ideological, 
cultural and religious foundations of reconfigured Somali statehood(s).  
Amin Amir is as much an ‗African‘ cultural producer as Zapiro (Jonathon Shapiro), the white 
South African cartoonist who is a prominent subject of many of the contributions to Critical African 




Studies‟ Special Issue on political cartoons and satire in Africa in 2010. The focus on Zapiro‘s 
provocative output yields valuable insight into the discursive dynamics of the post-Apartheid media 
environment and parameters of political debate. However, I emphasise here the value of engaging 
with other contexts of African public sphere production which differ vastly from the South African 
experience. Unlike Zapiro, Amin Amir is not published in major national newspapers but instead 
disseminates his work (widely) through online media and reproductions in multiple local newspapers 
across the Somali territories, and his cartoons are written in colloquial Somali (not in a national 
English or French media lingua-franca as in the majority of political cartooning studied elsewhere in 
African public spheres - Wekesa 2012). Importantly, the reality of conflict in Somalia and the dangers 
faced by journalists or commentators has meant that the cartoonist has based himself outside of the 
region. This does not, however, limit - and may actually enhance - his ability to reach multiple 
audiences in a way that virtually no other individual political commentator does in this media 
environment.       
 
4.3. Diasporic cultural production and activism 
Amin Amir‘s work and its reception epitomise the wider blurring of geographical boundaries found in 
these transnational Somali public spheres, and represents a collapsing of firm distinctions between 
diasporic and ‗local‘ artistic production or political commentary. This is a theme grappled with by 
many recent discussions of globalised African ‗cultural production‘, and as Harrow and Ekotto argue: 
‗the new conditions of globalization have generated possibilities for subject positions that cannot be 
simply defined by terms such as ‗exile‘, ‗hybrid‘. ‗creole‘ or ‗diasporic‘‘ (2015, 3). Insofar as Amin 
Amir‘s popular cartoons are produced for a global audience identifying with a Somali political 
context regardless of their geographical location, his influence on what is an inherently transnational 
public sphere clearly transcends such reductive labels. 
The peculiar nature of the political cartoon itself (residing somewhere between ‗artistic‘ 
cultural production and direct political commentary or activism) shifts the focus for our critical 
engagement. If a recurring theme in African cultural studies is the stylistic or thematic gulf between 
material produced for ‗local‘ (read ‗African‘) and ‗international‘ (read ‗white/western‘) audiences – 
mediated through the ‗geodeterminism‘ of publishing opportunities and the market (Ibironke 2015, 
38) – then the transnational popularity of Amin Arts represents a very different setting for production 
and consumption. The paper collapses these firm distinctions between diasporic and local content 
firstly by discursively analysing the themes of the cartoons in the context of the media environment in 
Somalia, and secondly by interpreting the geographical detachment of this particular producer (from 
the messy political realities which are his subject matter) as an enabling factor in his presentations of 
nationalist identity, political critique and generational or cultural identity to multiple audiences across 
the Somali territories.  




Much scholarship on diaspora media or online engagement with countries of origin focuses 
attention on the influence that such media production has on diaspora communities themselves - the 
importance of cyber-subjectivities for identities in ‗host‘ countries, or recreations of conflict in new 
sites (Georgiou 2006; Horst 2006; Osman 2015). In some cases, the analytical distinction between a 
dispersed and diverse global ethnic community and a single distinct state-dominated ‗home‘ polity is 
both clear and logical. Victoria Bernal‘s work on Eritrea and ‗deterritorialised identities‘ focuses on 
particularly prominent diaspora-based websites and emphasises the role of an online public sphere as 
an ‗imaginatively constructed space‘ (2005, 661; 2014). Taking the starting point of Anderson‘s 
imagined community (2006), Bernal argues that ‗one should not see the imaginings of diasporic 
Eritreans simply as a feature of diaspora, reflecting the nostalgia of people far from home...one should 
understand them as part of the construction of Eritrean nationhood‘ (2005, 669). Her argument 
proceeds with a call for a re-theorizing not of cyberspace itself but the wider public sphere, where 
online infrastructure does not simply facilitate access to ‗information‘, but provides discursive arenas 
for new imaginations of nationhood to be constructed (Ibid, 672).The online Dehai platform, she 
argues, has served as an experimental space for alternative forms of knowledge or cultural production 
that de-territorialize emotive attachments to the nation-state. Other work (Skjerdal 2008) on Ethiopian 
diaspora journalists highlights both the possibilities that a detached transnational public sphere offers 
to political exiles critiquing the state, as well as the potential ideological blurring that occurs between 
‗journalists‘ and ‗activists‘ in this decentred media environment. 
There are several important differences between Eritrean (and Ethiopian) public sphere case 
studies and the Somali context which have an important bearing on my own analysis. Firstly, the 
political context in Eritrea around which Bernal‘s transnational public sphere operates is dominated 
by a single, functioning authoritarian state which has a high level of control over domestic media and 
even the capacity to extract resources from the diaspora community itself (De Waal 2015). In this 
sense it can be imagined that the state – dominated by the (omni)presence of President Afewerki – can 
serve as a focus of the intellectual, creative and/or rebellious activity of transnational platforms of 
debate. A contrast with Somalia could hardly be more striking: multiple state projects exist with a 
varied level of (comparatively minimal) control over media and political communication. It is difficult 
to assess the potential for online engagement in the forums discussed by Bernal by citizens inside 
Eritrea given levels of censorship and online media control, and whilst her account touches on the 
impact of these platforms on politics inside Eritrea (for example the rumours about political elites 
using pseudonyms to participate in these transnational debates) this element of the analysis seems 
secondary to a focus on imaginings of the Eritrean nation within the diaspora itself.   
This account of the Somali public sphere emphasises the blurring of the boundaries between 
local and diasporic intellectual discursive production and proposes a dual conceptualisation of Somali 
public spheres: there exist local public spheres which coalesce around particular political projects (the 
Somaliland print news media, for example: Hoehne 2008), alongside wider networks based both in 




the diaspora and in the region which attempt (and in some cases succeed) to speak to a broader 
transnational Somali audience, the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. It is into this latter arena that the work of 
Amin Amir operates, although, as my subsequent analysis shows, local actors may selectively 
appropriate this material for particular sectional agendas. Crucial here is the sense that participants in 
this media environment perceive themselves to be members of a global Somali community (often 
regardless of or alongside their political/regional affiliations in the Horn) and that this transnational 
subjectivity creates the space in which multiple discursive strategies (political Islam, pan-Somali 
ethno-nationalism, for example) can gain audiences and traction.  
It is important to clarify the political-geographical focus of my analysis of these particular 
texts, not merely as a disclaimer but rather for its relevance to my wider argument. Whilst the use of 
the term ‗Somalia‘ refers, in the broadest sense, to the internationally recognised borders of that 
nation-state, the analysis attempts to situate the various power structures and or state/administration 
constructions within the context of the visual rhetoric analysed. Given that Amin Arts‘ cartoons often 
focus on southern Somalia (i.e. events as seen from and in Muqdisho [Mogadishu]), my analysis will 
primarily focus on these images. However, it is significant that the cartoonist engages with other 
Somali political arenas such as that of the Republic of Somaliland. I make occasional reference to this 
material to demonstrate how subtle thematic or discursive differences in the portrayals of different 
political actors or environments are indicative of one particular (but influential and illuminating) 
external conception of political identity across the Somali Horn of Africa. Although Amin Amir has 
been making political cartoons since the 1990s, the individual images analysed here are taken from 
the period 2012-2015 and deal with the current presidency of Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud and issues 
related to the ongoing process of state reconstruction, federalisation and conflict against Harakat Al 
Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin (AS).    
 
4.4. Cartoons in context: the Somali media environment and visual cultural production  
Amin Amir‘s work is visible in various forms of Somali news media and political communication, 
and few other artists employ this medium of commentary and satire to reach such wide audiences 
across and beyond the Somali territories. Divisions of political authority across Somalia are mirrored 
in the fragmentary nature of the media environment. As discussed in the previous chapter, aside from 
several large and externally-based Somali-language broadcasters, the news-media market is 
characterised by multiple private FM radio-stations usually focused in and around specific areas or 
cities. These are supplemented by newspapers which are primarily consumed in the specific urban 
areas where they are printed. As for online news – the primary (but not exclusive) vector by which 
Amin Arts‘ cartoons are disseminated – the market is highly fragmented with hundreds or even 
thousands of localised news websites competing for ‗hits‘.   
In this online milieu the cartoons of Amin Amir are reproduced across the Somali regions 
through news sites and social media forums such as Facebook, itself an important conduit into news 




media. Given the range of regions and political contexts addressed by the cartoons, reproduction in 
various locations and forums is often highly selective: a cartoon critiquing this or that politician in this 
or that region/government will be picked up on by a local news broadcaster or commentator to make a 
specific political point. The fact that Amin Amir is generally seen to be critical of virtually all power-
holders across Somalia serves to popularise his work and allows it to be employed by multiple actors 
with different positions or agendas.   
While visual political commentary or communication may be apparent in the various urban 
centres of fragmented modern Somalia, when one considers the (varying but limited) role or power of 
state or administrative entities, it should not be surprising that commercial advertising is far more 
prevalent and visible in daily public life. Hargeysa is an urban centre where visual political 
communication is particularly obvious, often in the form of monuments and murals commemorating 
the nationalist struggle against the Siyaad Barre dictatorship and the eventual emergence of the state 
structures of the de facto independent Republic. In comparison, the internationally recognised Somali 
Federal Government (SFG) based in Muqdisho has much less capacity to communicate visually on 
the streets of the capital. Visual government communication is not, however, entirely absent and 
political artwork sometimes appears in the political centre of the city: murals contrasting the chaos of 
past conflict with the benefits of contemporary peace (however fragile or however often punctuated 
by sporadic AS violence) may be seen outside the Parliament complex, or posters at the important 
KM4 junction depict the role and benefits of taxation for the development of society and state 
services.  
Amin Arts‘ cartoons are themselves used in the performance of politics in Muqdisho and are 
shown below (Figures. 4.2 and 4.3) featured on the banners of a ‗youth‘ demonstration (organised by 
the regional Benaadir administration) against AS. One of the cartoons used on the banners - depicting 
a would-be AS suicide bomber being dragged to the execution ground by the regional security forces - 
can actually be read primarily as a critique of the police and national security forces who were 
allegedly ‗sleeping‘ while the Benadir regional administration carried out their own security 
operations. Here we see how multiple meanings can be ‗encoded‘ in and ‗decoded‘ from the images 
(Hall et al. 1980; Pillai 1992), as well as the different possibilities which exist for their reproduction 
and utilisation. Reflecting on why that image stood out to me as a subjective external observer, I must 
note that the whimsy of the cartoonish image jarred with the grim reality of the stakes and firing 
squad which are photographed and televised in action. Such executions are themselves highly political 
acts, choreographed by often beleaguered local state authorities as a demonstration of state power 
against those that contribute to instability in the city (whether government soldiers accused of killing 
civilians or AS itself).  
 









In the context of visual communication in contemporary urban Somalia, tensions exist 
between certain doctrinal interpretations of Islam and what may be considered appropriate artistic 
expression in this Muslim society. Highly orthodox Sunni schools of Salafi (or ‗Wahhabi‘ influenced) 
politico-religious thought play a role in the public sphere, and injunctions against the recreation of 
images of humans may, in part, explain the relative infrequency of the depiction of people, epitomised 
elsewhere by Amin Amir‘s cartoons. In Hargeysa, for instance, it is common to see paintings of 
people on the streets (for example, in posters or murals advertising NGO activities) which have been 
literally defaced - presumably by passers-by with religiously-inspired iconoclastic intent (cf. Noyes 
2013, 176). Whilst further research would be required to adequately conceptualise such acts in the 
wider context of visual culture in this media environment, it is noteworthy that the very form of the 
satirical cartoon itself cannot simply be taken for granted here as a ‗standard‘ or universally accepted 
mode of civic agency, and carries with it potentially contested meaning and significance in itself. 
Similarly, much can be read into the ‗cultural‘ iconography visible in the demonstration in 
Muqdisho by young people (and political authorities) referenced and pictured above. For example, the 
use of English as well as Somali in the banners is striking (an appeal to multiple audiences), and at the 
speakers‘ table are positioned items considered as quintessential ‗Somali‘ cultural paraphernalia (the 
traditional haan water container, here emblazoned with the national flag). Themes of nationalist and 
Islamic identity will be revisited below in the discursive analysis of a selection of Amin Amir‘s 
cartoons below, and also in a discussion of what I refer to as the artist/cartoonist‘s generational 
identity.  
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the history and status of the written Somali 
language takes on a certain political or nationalist relevance within processes of state or 
administration-building across Somalia. The linguistic role of journalists or political commentators is 
frequently recognised by those individuals themselves, or donors or political authorities seeking to 
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 News story originally published on Jowhar.com:‘Dhalinyarada 17-ka degmo ee gobolka Banaadir oo isu soo 
baxay uga soo horjeedaan Al Shabaab ka dhigay Muqdisho’ [Youth of 17 districts of Benaadir region 
demonstrate together against Al Shabaab in Muqdisho+ webpage no longer active, pictures in writer’s archive. 
August 26, 2014. 




build their professional capacities. The use of the vernacular - as is usually the case in Amin Amir‘s 
cartoons, where the discussants are often the ‗ordinary‘ people who watch politics or conflict unfold, 
or are victims of it - is also rare to see in written popular culture or news media. This is not to suggest 
that written print culture (e.g. novel writing) does not exist - the holding of book fairs in Hargeysa and 
Muqdisho demonstrates a desire to promote written Somali cultural production and these events hold 
political significance both in regard to processes of state-building and the role of literacy and 
‗cultural‘ expression for societal development. It is fair to say, however, that the novel is not a 
prevalent form of cultural expression consumed widely by people across the Somali territories.  
If news media constitutes one of the few formats in which most people across the Somali 
territories engage with formal written Somali, then Amin Amir‘s cartoons represent a rather unique 
popular usage and reproduction of colloquial written Somali. In analysing these cartoons in the 
modern Somali context it is thus necessary to recognise that the very visual or linguistic form of this 
type of communication cannot simply be taken for granted. In itself the cartoon form holds ‗cultural‘ 
significance across political environments where debates are ongoing as to the role of the state in the 
preservation or promotion of the Somali language and the parameters of religiously or culturally 
appropriate artistic expression.  
  
4.5. Amin Arts’ constant critique: humour and discourse analysis approach  
With the previous section exploring the status of the form of the political cartoon in regards to the 
particular political, cultural, visual and linguistic dynamics of the Somali public sphere, the chapter 
now proceeds with critical discourse analysis of a selection of specific Amin Arts‘ ‗texts‘. Based on 
my research and professional experience as a consumer of Somali-language media across Somaliland, 
Puntland and south-central Somalia since 2009, I argue that this sample is representative of several 
important discursive tropes employed in his wider work: namely, critiques of external interventions in 
Somali politics, the role of venal politicians, exhortations against ‗clanism‘; and frequent appeals to a 
somewhat nostalgic register of pan-Somali nationalism. Building on the conceptualisation of critical 
discourse analysis outlined in chapter 2, with specific consideration of the political cartoon form, the 
following analyses of cartoons as ‗texts‘ identify various discourses which are expressed in the 
Somali public sphere and the ways in which they structure and are structured by the context (or 
‗practice‘) of conflict and state reconfiguration or reconstruction.  
Amin Amir‘s cartoons consistently critique power holders across Somali politics and employ 
the ‗visual language‘ of signs, conventions and rhetorical devices familiar in political cartoons the 
world over (Werner, 2003, 83). As with any satirical image, the discursive tool-kit required by the 
viewer for an understanding of its ‗visual argument‘ (Birdsell & Groarke 1996, 1) includes 
recognition of its general purpose, and the shared beliefs, assumptions, conventions or practices which 
allow the image and the text to make sense in a particular environment (Werner 2003, 82).  




Caricature in Amin Amir‘s cartoons - the artistic rendering of a recognizable individual 
through the exaggeration of particular physical features - is less obvious or grotesque than in other 
examples and it is through a more realist portraiture-rendering of individuals that audience recognition 
is ensured. Identification of particular types of character (the venal politician or the ordinary or ‗poor‘ 
citizen) is achieved through the indexical signs of clothing, bodyweight, political emblems as well as 
text labels where the cartoonist deems them necessary.  
In presenting such characters the cartoons can also be seen to employ what Billig describes as 
the device of ‗unlaughter‘ (2005, 192), the rhetorical utilisation of the absence of laughter in a form or 
situation where it might otherwise be expected. The ‗firing squad‘ cartoon noted above is a good 
example of this meeting of a grim reality with the apparent whimsy or inherent humour of the 
medium. This device is often at work in the visual portrayal of similarly grotesque or violent scenes, 
particularly related to graphic bloodshed and the destruction of the ‗ordinary‘ Somali population. 
The most common reaction I noted to Amin Amir‘s cartoons (when discussing them with 
people in Somalia) was that of laughter on first sight of the image. Increasing attention in the popular 
geopolitics literature is being given to the role of humour in reflecting, challenging, subverting, 
redirecting or remaking power relations (Obadare 2009; Ridanpää 2009; Semati 2012; Dittmer 2013). 
An important distinction has been invoked here with laughter defined as a physical response [that] ‗is 
not always the response to a conscious reflective and controlled subject... at times laughter has no 
clear basis in humour – we may laugh and not know precisely why‘ (Macpherson, cited in Dodds and 
Kirby 2013, 51). As a subjective individual consumer of Amin Amir‘s cartoons I find some to be 
laugh-out-loud funny – particularly those that ridicule power holders with ingenious and absurd visual 
devices like the figurative political football match, or a ‗federalist‘ political vehicle trying to go four 
directions at once. Others, which directly portray visceral human suffering are, for me, more difficult 
to laugh at – they are not ‗funny‘; I fear that to laugh at them would imply a disrespect to those whose 
plight is depicted. The fact that people, in my experience, have laughed at all these different ‗types‘ of 
cartoon speaks to the above distinction as well as amorphous socialised orientations towards humour 
which are so difficult to define, particularly in a cross-cultural context. 
 I speculate, however, that responses of laughter have something to do with the novelty of the 
cartoon form in the context of political commentary in Somalia. The discussion above has briefly 
introduced the political-religious context of visual communication and it is the distinctiveness of 
Amin Amir‘s voice (or portraiture) that makes him such a visible part of the wider media 
environment, capable of deconstructing and ridiculing countless figures. Laughter may be one 
response to the unique positioning of this commentator and may reflect tensions around the 
parameters of culturally acceptable commentary or art which are manifest in the Somali public sphere. 
Although there are difficulties inherent in gauging the level of applicability of this assertion across 
different local audiences, it nonetheless highlights again the importance of sensitivity to the cultural 




context of particular forms of commentary (like the cartoon) whose meanings may take different 
forms for audiences in different places.   
 
 4.5.1. Discursive tropes: foreign intervention and the ‘venal politician’  
Amin Amir‘s cartoons frequently address a set of specific political themes, often combining them to 
present an overview of the problems he sees facing Somalia, or, occasionally, to depict a positive 
development or event. A primary target of the work – and a familiar focus of ire in political 
cartooning elsewhere – is the venal politician. This (invariably male) character, sells out the Somali 
nation to other corrupt power holders or external actors with malign intent. The cartoon featured at the 
beginning of the chapter (Figure 4.1) is a characteristic example of the visual rhetoric employed by 
the cartoonist in his presentation of a grand theme of modern Somali political discourse: the division 
of Somalia by neighbouring powers and the complicity of local political actors. In the image the 
cartographically defined shape of the Somali state (i.e. the borders recognised by the ‗international 
community‘) coloured in the sky-blue of the Somali flag, is being shattered by the jackboot of 
Ethiopian power, on top of which rides the diminutive ‗Somali politician‘ seated in his all important 
‗chair‘ of political power. Whilst it is the visual argument that does most of the work here – the 
fragility of Somalia embodied in the shattered glass metaphor, alongside the blunt impact of a 
(literally) big regional power – the speech bubbles and the identity of the speakers are not 
insignificant. There is a lament at the intentions of contemporary politicians and a call to the divine 
for aid for those who are ‗patriots‘.  
The dialogue here comes from the two older gentlemen pictured on the left, one dressed in a 
macawis (the male sarong-like garment worn often across Somalia, and considered a ‗traditional‘ or 
typically ‗Somali‘ item of clothing - although they are often imported) and holding a walking stick. 
The other sports a more ‗western‘ look - perhaps hinting at the diaspora or different fashions of male 
dress in Somalia. These two particular characters, offering sage comment over what they observe, are 
a common feature of the cartoons and are presented to demonstrate the wisdom of age and experience 
over a changed Somali political or social reality. Standing always in witness over proceedings (and 
never part of the action themselves), the two gentlemen could almost be seen as avatars of the 
cartoonist: himself somewhat detached from events and yet engaged in them, himself of an older 
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 While it is appropriate to treat with caution any potentially reductive discussion around the position of 
‘traditional elders’ in Somali politics (odayaal dhaqameed - the literal translation which is used commonly in 
the media and popular discourse) it is certainly true that in other forms of Somali print media the image of 
older male commentators is often used. The twin cartoon figures of the Maansha Allaah and Wager feature in 
Hargeysa’s Jamhuuriya newspaper offer two different perspectives on various issues of the day, while the 
image of Carraale Waddani, replete with macawis, stick and shawl, in Hargeysa’s Ogaal newspaper, also gives 
the reader the benefit of his critical wisdom. 






- Ethiopia stealing ‘the country’ from back pocket of Somali politician reaching for ‘seat’ (while standing 
on a ‘patriot’)  
- Man in hat: ‘Allah save us!’ 
- Woman: ‘As he searches for the seat the country is taken’ 
- Man on left:  ‘Is that what Vision 2016 is like?’  
 
Figure 4.4 again addresses the theme of foreign intervention, this time drawing comment (and 
explicit explanation of the unfolding action) from ordinary citizens who witness the interaction 
between the suit-wearing politicians and the downtrodden (and barefoot) ‗patriot‘. On this occasion, 
one of the observers makes more specific reference to political developments in Somalia by indicating 
his perception of ‗Vision 2016‘, the Muqdisho-based Federal Government‘s internationally-backed 
transitional framework for constitutional review and elections as the term of current President Xasan 
Sheekh Maxamuud expires. The cartoon reflects popular frustrations with the political machinations 
of international powers to divide Somalia in the carving of federal states out of the patchwork of 
regional power holders, with Ethiopia playing a primary role in this allegedly nefarious conspiracy. 
Elsewhere this is a prevalent theme particularly in media and political comment in Muqdisho
3
 and 
frequent reference is made to historical enmity with the Ethiopian ‗Xabashi‘ neighbour and its role 
following the collapse of the Somali state, notably, during its full-scale invasion in 2006 to oust the 
Midowga Maxaakiimta Islaamiga (The Union of Islamic Courts). This intervention paved the way for 
the installation of a transitional and then internationally recognised federal government more palatable 
to the ‗international community‘ and set in motion the dynamics which would empower AS as a 
significant political actor and insurgent force (Hansen 2013).  
                                                          
3 
   See Cabdullahi Ibrahim Cumar’s June 8, 2014 editorial: ‘Taageerayaasha SNM iyo SSDF oo fuliyey 
balanqaadyadii ay la galeen Xabashida’ [SNM and SSDF supporters fulfil the promise they made with the 
Xabash] Keyd Media: 
http://www.keydmedia.net/editorial/article/taageerayaasha_snm_ssdf_oo_fuliyey_balanqaadyadii_ay_la_gal
een_xabashida/ (accessed May 21, 2015). Article now available at: 
http://caasimadda.com/taageerayaasha-snm-ssdf-oo-fuliyey-balanqaadyadii-ay-la-galeen-
xabashida%E2%80%8F/  




The emergence of the northern breakaway or semi-autonomous states of Somaliland and 
Puntland is frequently discussed in southern-Somali political commentary in terms of their status as 
alleged proxies or clients of Ethiopia, and such accounts often reference the neighbouring state‘s 
historical relationship with movements fighting the Siyaad Barre dictatorship. Intriguingly, whilst 
Amin Amir‘s cartoons often focus on the role of Ethiopia (and Kenya) with regard to the southern or 
central regions of Somalia (the emergent Jubaland State, the Southwest state and the Galmudug 
region, all at various stages of administration formation), there are few portrayals of Somaliland as an 
Ethiopian ‗proxy‘, perhaps with the view to avoid alienating audiences in the northwest, or as 
indicative of the artist‘s conception of polity as a  distinctly separate political space.  
   
             Fig. 4.5 
 
AMSIOM solider (standing over bodies of the ‘poor population’: ‘So, how about our efforts for peace 
in Somalia?’ 
 
Whereas Ethiopian influence in Somalia is usually depicted in the form of political 
conspiracy, other contingents of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) are often 
critiqued for the direct impact of their on the wider population. Despite its labelling as a ‗peace-
support‘ mission, the AMISOM mandate extends to direct military engagement against AS and its 
contingents are involved alongside SFG forces in the capture of territory and counter-insurgency 
operations. Figure 4.5 was produced in response to the alleged killing of civilians in Merka, Lower 
Shabelle region by Ugandan forces on patrol in the town
4
. The spilling of the blood of the figurative 
body politic of Somalia is a common theme of the cartoons and often takes the graphic form of the 
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 Human Rights Watch statement August 18, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/13/somalia-au-
forces-linked-wedding-killings) 




              Fig. 4.6. 
 
 
There is often a gendered element to this embodiment of the nation, exemplified in Figure 4.6 
where the woman dressed in the blue and white of the Somali flag (also evocative of the young anti-
colonial martyr Xaawo Taako) is dragged away by AMISOM, while the Somali press remains 
restrained from reporting. Again, this image refers to a specific event or period: throughout 2014 
alleged sexual violence perpetrated by AMISOM and Government Forces was very much in the 
media and controversy followed the imprisonment of journalists accused of spreading ‗false‘ news
5
. 
At the same time, there are wider visual arguments that could be read into this image regarding its 
gendered nationalist rhetoric and the ‗rape‘ of Somalia by foreigners.  
The depiction of the Ugandan AMISOM troops typically emphasises racialized differences in 
appearance (in terms of skin tone, facial features), and whilst, on one hand, this can be interpreted 
simply as the cartoonist‘s device for audience character recognition, it does also hint at a perceived 
and expressed distinction between Somali and non-Somali (or ‗African‘) subjects. Tensions between 
‗African‘ and ‗Islamic‘ or ‗Arab‘ components of ‗Somali‘ identity is a complicated subject, 
particularly when one considers the relevance of tropes of relative religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
homogeneity in Somali popular culture, alongside realities of ethnic and linguistic diversity found 
across the Somali Horn. The point ventured here is simply that this particular cartoonist employs a 
visual style in his presentation of the Somali population which distinguishes it (ethnically) from those 
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 Radio Muqdisho, February 5, 2013, ‘Maxkamada G/Banaadir oo xukun ku riday Wariye Koronto iyo 
haweeney loo haystay faafinta kufsi been abuur ah’ [Benaadir Regional Court passes sentence on Journalist 
Koronto and woman held for spreading false news about rape]  
http://radiomuqdisho.net/archives/maxkamada-gbanaadir-oo-xukun-ku-riday-wariye-koronto-iyo-haweeney-
loo-haystay-faafinta-kufsi-been-abuur-ah/  




 4.5.2. Discursive tropes: clan and ‘clanism’ 
 Fig. 4.7                  Fig. 4.8   
  
 
Fig. 4.7 ‘Somalia’ chained to the fire and destruction of ‘clan’, held back from obtaining the prize of nationhood. 
 
Fig. 4.8 
- Reporter: ‘Mr Attorney General, if it is the case that many people have stolen government property, 
then why is it just this man who has been arrested?’ 
- Attorney General: ‘This man’s clan isn’t big so I know I can try out my power on him’ 
  
 
Subtle discourses of ethnicity also overlap with the identification by the cartoonist of ‗clan‘ or, more 
specifically, ‗clanism‘ (Qabiil/Qabyaalad) as an influential factor in the political situation of Somalia. 
This is highlighted by the two images translated above. That Somalis are divided through a 
genealogical system of patrilineal descent (abtirso – literally to count one‘s forefathers), and that this 
‗construct‘ (Kapteijns 2012, 11) of collective imagination is a fundamental feature of social 
organisation, is a tenet of seminal works in the field of Somali studies, many of which date back to 
colonial-era anthropology (Lewis 1957/1978; 1994). To recognise the continued salience of clan 
constructs in Somali politics (or in popular perceptions of politics) does not equate to an endorsement 
of a primordialist conception of clan as the monolithic and timeless determinant of all power and 
social relations in the Somali context, or a reductionist approach which interprets all conflict through 
the lens of clan competition. Debates in the literature, particularly post state-collapse, have 
highlighted the shortcomings of such approaches while emphasising the fluidity of clan-identification 
and the diversity of material determinants of political change or contestation across the Somali 
territories (see Barnes 2006;  Besteman 1998; Luling 2006; Samatar 1992, 2011).  
The concept of clan exists within Somali public spheres of news media, political commentary 
and activism. Arguments are voiced in a political arena (like in Muqdisho) where clan constructs are 
institutionalised as a basis for the distribution of political power through the (in)famous ‗4.5‘ system. 
Initially instituted by the previous Transitional Federal Government, the mechanism - which is still in 
effect - divides representation equally between the four major ‗clan-families‘ of the Darood, Digil & 
Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye, while retaining a half share for so-called ‗minority‘, or beesha shanaad – 
„fifth clan‘ - groups who fall outside of these major lineages.   




Figure 4.7 represents a broad conception of a (literally) monolithic malaise of ‗clan‘ (qabiil) 
and situates the problem in a nationalist context where the prize of unity (embodied in the flag) 
remains unobtainable due to the shackles of a destructive past. This broad-brush rendering of the 
spectre of clan politics is frequently reproduced online and in print. For example, its use for the front 
cover of Maxamed Cismaan Xaashi‘s book Aafada Qabyaaladda [‗The catastrophe of clannism‘], 
published in Hargeysa (2014), indicates the image‘s blunt resonance across the Somali territories, as 
well as the ubiquity of Amin Amir‘s work in the wider Somali public sphere. It is noteworthy that this 
image uses the word qabiil (clan) rather than qabyaalad (clanism), as political commentators or 
columnists often distinguish between the two: clan or tribe as a natural phenomenon and ordained by 
Allah so that the peoples of the world might know each other (Xaashi 2014, 14, quoting the Qu‘ran, 
Surat Al-Ĥujurāt), distinct from ‗clanism‘, the divisive prejudice often manipulated by outsiders (e.g. 
the European colonialists) to divide the Somali Ummah. Indeed, Amir himself has made this 
distinction when referring to his work (interview with Universal TV, 2011) and so this image can be 
read in terms of the individual who is chained to his own qabiil as much as he strives for nationalism, 
and it is this general predicament which can be conceived of as qabyaalad.   
Figure 4.8 paints a more detailed picture of the cartoonist‘s perception of clan and power 
politics on the ground in Muqdisho. Since 2012 and the formation of the Somali Federal Government, 
processes of state reconstruction have involved the reclaiming of government property from those 
groups or individuals who had been occupying it, often since periods of chaos in the city after 1991, 
and/or through the largely stateless (if not entirely anarchic) development of the city in the following 
decades. As the state struggles to demonstrate capacity there is frequent debate in the public sphere 
around which groups in society it is able or willing to act against.  
The cartoon here portrays the Attorney General – legal representative of the state, but pictured 
with pistol in hand – ‗trying out‘ his power against an individual whose clan is ‗not many‘ (in 
number). Returning to the theme of ethnicity or race, it is likely here that the cartoonist is depicting as 
his victim of state authority an individual from the so-called Bantu/Jareer ethnic group(s). Part of the 
Beesha Shanaad, or ‗fifth clan‘, this (internally diverse) group is usually considered to be outside of 
the main ‗Somali‘ lineage construct and various groups which fall under this label are believed to 
descend either from ‗indigenous‘ ethnic communities which pre-date ‗Somali‘ expansion or from 
slave populations brought from southeastern Africa during the 19
th
 Century (Eno, Eno & Van Lehman 
2010; Hill 2010).  
The designation of ‗minority‘ status (i.e. those diverse and multilingual groups which fall into 
the 0.5 of the 4.5 power equation) is problematic not only for the fact that accurate census data 
regarding population sizes is non-existent, but also in the terminology (in Somali) around these issues. 
The fact that the term ‗minority‘ does not translate easily or clearly into the Somali public sphere of 
political commentary (I have seen the English term transliterated into ‗maynoorati‘ or translated as 




„beelaha laga tira badan yahay‟ or ‗the communities that are less [than others], or outnumbered‘
6
) is 
indicative of the difficulties of defining what this phrase actually means in different contexts in 
Somalia. For example, is it conceived of as including other coastal populations such as the Benadiri 
groups believed to descend from Arab settlers, or those speaking Bajuni Swahili dialects on the 
southern-most coastline? What of the Digil and Mirifle, whose lineage group is considered to be one 
of the 4 major Somali clan families but is characterised by their use of the Maay language or ‗dialect‘, 
and predominantly agro-pastoral livelihoods, in contrast to the perceived pastoral heritage of the other 
3 historically dominant ‗samaale‟ clan families of the Darood, Dir and Hawiye?
7
 
   This list could go to consider those groups that are geographically detached from wider 
kinship networks and thus define themselves in a ‗minority‘ in a given territory. This could apply to 
the Biimaal subclan of the Dir clan family: the sub-clan being long-term residents of contested areas 
of Lower Shabelle region, whilst the majority of the Dir clan family reside the northwest in what is 
now Somaliland and Djibouti. Whether the Dir clan-family grouping includes the Isaaq or not, is 
another contentious and politically-loaded question (Elmi 2010, 29). Also to be considered is the 
caste-type occupational groups such as those usually referred to under the collective label of Gabooye, 
who may be affiliated or bonded to dominant pastoral clan groups?  
Although this discussion of the lexicon of the debate raises more questions than it answers, it 
is necessary to highlight these complexities of the ‗minorities‘ question as they are important for an 
understanding of the discursive grounding of the cartoon analysed above. Whilst the image hints at 
the ethnic dimension of clan or ‗minority‘ politics in Muqdisho (almost tantalisingly, as the victim‘s 
face is turned away from view), it simultaneously obscures the specific identity of the victim through 
its use of generalising language - someone who‘s ‗clan is not many‘. This device – whether 
consciously conceived of as such by the artist or not – locates the individual in the wider context of 
qabiil or qaybyaalad politics which are discussed across Somalia. This constitutes a conversation 
about the relationship between clan and national identity/ies (epitomised in the other ‗qabiil‟ cartoon), 
while also referencing the status of particular ‗minority‘ groups in the Muqdisho context. Some 
informants in Muqdisho indicated that the perception of Amin Amir as being from the Reer Benadiri 
– a label which includes several ‗minority‘ groups and long-time inhabitants of the southern coastal 
cities, believed to trace descent from Arab traders – contributed to his reputation as a ‗neutral‘ 
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 See Foore Newspaper, Hargeysa, April 30, 2015, ‘Qurbe joogta reer Awdal waxay 90% aaminsan yihiin 
Somalilandnimada: Madaxweyne Ku-Xigeenka’ [Vice President: 90% of the Awdal diaspora communities 
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Somalia’s first think-tank based in Muqdisho) December 2014 report on attitudes towards democracy in the 
city and the term in Somali (‘the people who are outnumbered, or are less *than others+’) is used in regards to 
public support for quotas of political representation. The question of which groups this designation should 
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http://www.heritageinstitute.org/attitudes-towards-democracy-mogadishu/   
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 This discussion is picked up again and elaborated on in Chapter six. 






. One informant, who self-identified into this group himself, described the 
way in which these communities were so marginalised in politics that they were perceived not to have 
such a stake in the dynamics of elite level power sharing and contestation.  
While this impression of neutrality in the political game may be a largely popular sentiment 
(derived not just from the cartoonist‘s perceived identity but also his constant critique of all manner of 
different political figures), it does not mitigate the controversy caused by the cartoons. Indeed, another 
informant told me that he was a close relative of Amir, but that he kept this a ‗secret‘ for fear of 
retaliation against him by way of family association
9
. Amir‘s work generates threats and insults on a 
regular basis, as he has himself stated on various occasions
10
. Violence against journalists (whether 
perpetrated by the state, AS or other interests) has been prevalent across many parts of Somalia and is 
a theme noted above in the depiction of the gagged reporter
11
. The cartoonist‘s physical detachment 
from this risk is an important aspect of his work and perhaps gives a certain freedom of expression 
and critique which would not be available to a similarly prominent commentator in Somalia itself.  
 
 4.5.3. Discursive tropes: cultural/religious imports and state contestation 
  Fig. 4.9        Fig. 4.10 
   
Fig. 4.9 
- Man on left: ‘Who are this lot? They all look the same’. 
- Man on right: ‘They’re members looking for positions, flooding into the Somali presidency’. 
Fig. 4.10 
- Passerby: ‘Mujaahid Abuu Mansuur, has the Jihad turned into farming?’ 
- Mukhtar Roobow (AS Commander): ‘Go to hell, get the lost Jihad away from me. I’m called Roobow, 
don’t use the Arab name’. 
 
Considering Amin Amir‘s position as a cultural producer and political commentator located outside of 
Somalia, it is instructive to explore his contributions to local debates (particularly in Muqdisho) 
surrounding cultural or religious ‗imports‘ and the role of ‗returnees‘ in state reconstruction. His 
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  Interview, businessman, Muqdisho, February 8, 2015. 
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 Interview, anonymous, Muqdisho, January 31, 2015. 
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 BBC Somali.com, May 7, 2010, ‘Amin Amir wuxuu BBC ku yiri ‘Facebook anigu ma lihi’’ [Amin Amir tells the 
BBC that he does not have a Facebook page]: 
http://www.bbc.com/somali/news/story/2010/05/100507_amiin_caamir.shtml  This has since changed and 
the cartoonist now links to his Facebook ‘opinions’ page via his website Aminarts.com.  
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 See National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) Annual Report 2014 ‘Press Freedom at Risk in Somalia: 
Murder, Imprisonment, Censorship and Bad Laws’: 
http://www.ifex.org/somalia/2015/01/13/somalia_annualreport_2014.pdf  




interventions, I argue, highlight the complexity of these local discussions relating to the cultural and 
religio-political identity of a reconfigured Somali state, as well as being indicative of the inherent 
transnationalism of the public sphere in which they take place.   
In Figure 4.9 our two wizened commentators are depicted watching a flow of political cadres 
arrive in Somalia - members of the so-called Dam al Jadiid (‗New Blood‘) clique that is popularly 
understood to have formed the backbone of President Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud‘s government. Itself 
a splinter of the political Islamist Al Islaax movement and ideologically orientated towards the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood‘s brand of activism in pursuit of state power, this faction has been 
characterised by strong ties with certain Gulf States, notably Qatar. The cartoon references the 
disembarking cadres who have all graduated from Egyptian or Sudanese universities. The importance 
of alumni networks (particularly from Sudanese institutions) has been noted in relation to their role 
within the establishment and development of different phases of the Islamic Courts‘ Union 
experiment in Muqdisho and beyond (Sharif 2015), and my experiences in Muqdisho confirm the 
continued prevalence of elites in various Ministries and security services with shared backgrounds in 
such Islamic educational institutions.  
The Dam al Jadiid cadres are presented here as (literally) faceless foreign imports, arriving to 
a red carpet reception from various Islamic institutions in Africa, the Middle East or Asia. They all 
dress the same way, and the short trousers cut above the ankle, make reference to their salafi Islamist 
political-ideological orientations. The clique is continually named by the cartoonist in his critique of 
President Xasan Sheekh, and is usually portrayed as pulling the strings of his government. The group 
may be embodied either by these same faceless operators; in the form of specific political elites such 
as former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and close confidant of the President, Faarax 
Sheekh Cabdulqaadir; or as the money men who buy off dissent from Parliament. The cartoonist also 
attacks what is often popularly perceived of as endemic corruption and vote-buying in the Parliament 




These cartoons speak to a wider discourse in local political commentary surrounding not only 
on the role of money in the business of government, but also in regard to the external influences on 
and identities of those who are perceived to have captured re-emerging state structures. The ‗return‘ 
of diaspora Somalis to Muqdisho and their role in government is an aspect of this discourse, though 
the phenomenon itself is multi-faceted and discussed in different ways in the public sphere. Often 
there is clear recognition of the value of the skills and expertise brought by ‗returnees‘ to the 
ministries or organisations which are attempting to rebuild themselves, whilst at the same time unease 
is expressed as to the actual effectiveness of schemes bringing back ‗professionals‘ into high level 
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positions, at the expense of a local work pool of talent. This dovetails with popular accounts of how 
such systems are open to discrimination and nepotism
13
.  
Some arguments focus on the moral or ‗cultural‘ impact of the diaspora on conduct and 
customs which are defined as local, appropriate, Islamic and ‗Somali‘. It is important to note that such 
critiques of ‗foreign values‘ do not only come from AS - which targets anyone associated with the 
Federal Government and threatens those who engage in ‗immoral‘ behaviour
14
 - but are also found in 
the wider online or print media. Such discourses are indicative of a wider tension that exists between 
those who remained in Muqdisho through the bad years and those who may be perceived as swooping 
in from the diaspora to reap the benefits of improved security, favourable business conditions and 
other fruits of state reconstruction
15
.   
Perhaps given his location in the diaspora, it is unsurprising that Amin Amir‘s cartoons do not 
often wade explicitly into this debate. However, the portrayal of Dam al Jadiid as an external 
influence and the faction‘s prevalence in his wider political critique is representative of a certain angle 
of the ‗foreign influences‘ discourse – one which hints at the alien nature of certain political or 
religious trends. One example could be the development of salafi orientated political-Islamist 
networks, or the takfiri-jihadi militancy epitomised by AS, and interpreted by many commentators as 
a foreign import alien to ‗Somali‘ Islam.   
Amin Amir takes on the discussion of the role of Islam in political society through a 
persistent critique of the brutality of AS and their preaching of a ‗false‘ Islam. Figure 4.10 satirises the 
apparent disappearance from the scene of Mukhtar Roobow, a formerly prominent AS commander. 
Likely due to internal tensions within in the organisation, Roobow is currently believed to have 
retreated to the Bakool region and territory of his clansmen (Bryden 2014, 5). In this cartoon Amir has 
him as a farmer having both relinquished his Kalashnikov and Arab name – a pointed reference to 
what the cartoonist may be portraying as externally orientated or inspired Jihad. As noted, the 
references to doctrinal religious debate or contestation are largely limited to a critique of AS, and 
Islam often becomes a trope used in the presentation of the good Somali (Muslim) patriot, with an 
appeal (common to many polemics on unity) to religion and nationalism in the fight against ‗clanism‘ 
or regional factionalism. Space for religious discussion has undoubtedly been constricted in the 
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 See Xog Doon newspaper, Muqdisho, April 13, 2015, „Maxaa laga dheefey mashruuca QUEST?‟ [What was 
gained from the Quest program?], a critique of UNDP and IOM program to bring ‗Qualified, Expatriate, Somali, 
Technical Support‘ to Government institutions.  
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Keyd Media, September 26, 2014, ‘Wasiirada DFS oo curyaaminaaya mustaqbalka hablaha soo kacaya – 
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Muqdisho context for several reasons including trends towards increased Sunni/Salafi orthodoxy; 
concerns surrounding public morality; the influence of Islamist political or judicial governance 
networks in the post state collapse period; the ‗sacralisation‘ (Vindino, Pantucci & Kohlmann 2010) 
of the current phase of conflict between AS, the SFG and its external backers; and the persistent threat 
of violence against those seen to criticise that takfiri-jihadi movement. Political assassinations of 
individuals either directly or indirectly associated or employed by the Somali Federal Government 
have been a frequent occurrence in Muqdisho with many being linked to AS as part of their campaign 
to make governance by these re-emergent structures impossible.   
Whilst the cartoonist may be removed from the latter threat by virtue of geographical 
distance, the wider socio-religious context of Muqdisho (changed as it likely is since the last time he 
was a resident there) no doubt impacts on the tone and emphasis of his work. This detachment can be 
viewed through the cartoonist‘s presentation of daily life in the city – one example might be that he 
never depicts women wearing the face-covering Niqab, now so common in the city – and may also be 
indicative of his generational identity as well as locus in the diaspora.  
 
 4.5.4. Discursive tropes: situating Somaliland 
                               Fig. 4.11 
 
- Radio: ‘This is Radio Hilaac, voice of the people of Somaliland’ 
- Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud Silaanyo (Republic of Somaliland President): ‘we kicked the Horyaal 
Radio Station of UDUB off the air, now the founders of Horyaal are opening Hilaac in order to destroy 
Kulmiye. Since you close the newspapers, why not shut down Radio Hilaac? It is dangerous to us’. 
- Xirsi Cali Xaji Xasan (Minister of the Presidency): ‘President, it was not possible to close Horyaal. It is 
very problematic to close a mobile radio. However, we requested the British and the Ethiopians to 
keep it off the Somaliland airwaves’. 
 
Amin Amir‘s cartoons deal with political and social issues relevant to a global ‗Somali‘ audience. 
They portray events occurring across the territories covered by this thesis, as well as Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Djibouti and locations important to the wider diaspora. The cartoons are uploaded daily to Amin 
Amir‘s website, corresponding with issues of the moment - regardless of their location. Viewed as a 
whole (along with the accompanying Somali advertising speaking to consumers in numerous 
locations) the website epitomises the trans-nationalism of a public sphere whose audience crosscuts 




multiple political boundaries. In this setting it is instructive to explore an external presentation of 
politics in Somaliland, juridically-speaking still part of ‗Somalia‘ but forceful in its consistent 
narrative of secessionist independence.  
Figure 4.11 comments on political developments in Somaliland, this time employing the 
characteristic device of critiques of the stifling of the press. Somaliland‘s official political identity is 
referenced by the flag and the title of the president, while the characters themselves are regular 
subjects of the cartoonist‘s lampooning. Unlike cartoons depicting politics in Muqdisho, the dialogue 
here makes specific reference to Somaliland‘s established and competing political parties, associated 
in the President‘s mind with media conspiracy against his administration.  
Pictured with club in hand, President Silaanyo is depicted as an enemy of a free press, and the 
past practices of his government are referenced in the dialogue. Violence against the press, and the 
stifling of journalists, is a common theme of the cartoonist‘s work, as highlighted above with regard 
to Muqdisho. Establishing this as an important issue across the political territories, the cartoonist also 
contributes to a perceived fraternal solidarity of Somali media workers – a phenomenon also alluded 
to in the previous chapter‘s discussion of the National Union of Somali Journalists‘ publications 
which catalogued violations against journalists in a ‗national‘ (i.e. Somalia) arena, but also, 
internationally, with regard to cases of abuse in Ethiopia. Although this sense of cross-border 
journalistic solidarity may be challenged by the existence of separate media trade unions in 
Somaliland and Puntland, it nonetheless illustrates how media in the Somali public sphere context can 
work in their reportage to discursively reproduce particular political structures, whilst also developing 
a transnational professional identity of their own.  
The reference to British and Ethiopian support for the Somaliland government‘s control of the 
media plays on similar tropes of external intervention common in the other cartoons explored here. 
While this is a subtle critique of Somaliland‘s alleged dependence on such external powers, the focus 
on media freedom deflects the rhetoric away from a direct challenge to Somaliland‘s political 
‗legitimacy‘. Comparing the cartoonist‘s treatment of the Somaliland polity to his frequent attacks of 
the profusion of flag-bearing ‗regional-states‘ in the south, it is clear that he regards the former as a 
far more established political project, worthy of a different level of satirical critique.   
Somaliland‘s inclusion in the cartoonist‘s commentary at once situates it as part of a wider 
Somali political-imaginary that is regional and global in scope. At the same time, aspects of this 
presentation establish the polity as a separate political space, notably through the depiction of internal 
dynamics of partisan electoral competition. As noted above, Amir‘s consistent critique of an 
externally-engineered fragmentation of Somalia via ‗federalism‘ rarely directly questions 
Somaliland‘s position in this narrative, and the cartoonist does not explicitly challenge or condemn 
Somaliland‘s secessionist claims - unlike many non-Somalilander commentators in the public sphere. 
If this can be seen of as a form of neutrality vis-á-vis the macro political narratives of the Somali 
Horn, then the cartoonist‘s critical energies are more often channelled into satire of Somaliland 




politics at the level of its individual political actors and electoral system. Somaliland here is imagined 
within the context of an ethnically defined regional public sphere, whilst simultaneously being 
defined through the critique (and thus reproduction, a la Mbembe) of its internal political structures.  
 
4.6. The digital diaspora and civic agency in a transnational public sphere  
This final section examines presentations of this particular generational identity and the cartoonist‘s 
geographical detachment from the environment on which he comments. This account reflects on the 
power dynamics inherent in these media production processes and considers the implications of the 
technological modes of dissemination of these texts for the argument advanced at the outset: namely, 
that the cartoonist epitomises the type of transnational and multidirectional digital engagement typical 
of Somali media, itself collapsing simple distinctions between ‗local‘ and ‗diasporic‘ in their 
productions of discourse on nationhood and political identity in the Somali Horn of Africa.   
In an interview given to Universal TV in 2012, Amin Amir discussed his personal history, 
motivations for work, and feelings about the political situation in Somalia
16
. It is clear that the female 
interviewer and interviewee (Amir) are of the same generation and had known each other working in 
the creative arts in Muqdisho prior to the collapse of the Somali state. The interviewer notes the 
changes in society back in Somalia (for example, in terms of dress) and in reply Amir acknowledges 
that the place he left is different to the country of today. Cultural or historical nostalgia permeates 
paintings by Amir which are displayed in the studio. He comments on their themes: the image of the 
young girl cradling the goat and the importance of livestock in ‗our culture‘, ‗traditional‘ dances and 
celebrations, images of boys learning the Holy Qu‘ran using traditional loox writing boards, and the 
beauty of historical sites in Mogadishu – such as the Cabdulaziz Mosque in Muqdisho, damaged 
during the conflict. Whilst the pair discuss politics at length, none of his cartoons are displayed 
(presumably to avoid potential controversies or allegations of bias) and the focus is on these paintings 
of a Somali cultural or historical idyll.  
Towards the end of the interview a film is shown which, with modern Somali pop music 
playing in the background, depicts the cartoonist/artist in his home in Canada and shows him 
mentoring a teenage boy (of Somali descent) through his art. The video portrays the young man 
making his way through the streets of the North American city to Amir‘s home and studio; contrasting 
the troubled youth‘s apparent alienation, with the warmth of Amir‘s family home and the satisfying 
endeavour of his artistic vocation. The home in question is filled with the type of paintings noted 
above in the interview, primarily women and children in a past Somali setting. Few hijab or niqab are 
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visible here; rather women are depicted in the ‗traditional‘ attire of the female guntino
17
. An image of 
domestic harmony is presented as the young man arrives to watch and learn from the artist at his 
easel. He is then pictured going home – past the distractions of the fireworks and liquor stores of 
downtown – and taking up the sketch pad himself, presumably inspired by his meeting with the artist.  
The focus then returns to Amir‘s home (now with a different background pop song calling on 
society to give charity, ‗zakada bixiyo‟) and concludes with a shot of the digital image that he has 
been working on: a depiction of Ethiopian forces killing civilians in Somalia; a woman exposed on 
the ground, literally impaled by an Ethiopian flag. Whilst the juxtaposition of this bloody scene and 
the domestic tranquillity of the artist‘s home is unsettlingly stark, this contrast could be read as an 
attempt to override apparent contradiction by presenting the artist as a detached but engaged observer. 
Here he is an exemplar of cultural guardianship (in a particular historical imagination of pre-state 
collapse Somalia), and an activist-commentator on the abuses against the body-politic of modern 
Somalia perpetrated by external forces. If a generational identity of the artist is highlighted in the 
work displayed in this piece of self-promotion (the visual references to Somalia before the destruction 
of the state, and the emphasis on the interplay between Islam and ‗traditional‘ Somali cultural 
practices) then his position in the diaspora and the legitimacy of his digital voice towards the 
homeland is also a theme pushed in the metaphor of tutelage and the power of art as solace.  
This video emphasises civic agency in a transnational public sphere in which there is a lot 
more going on than ‗resistance‘ - however richly that may be conceptualised. This cultural producer 
operates and exerts power within a specific transnational media context, itself conditioned by the 
particular political circumstances of Somalia. The previous section alluded to debates in the public 
sphere in Somalia over the different roles of diaspora returnees in the reconstruction of the Somali 
state, and here I emphasise the position of the transnational Somali public sphere in empowering 
media and cultural producers to speak to an audience of Somalis across the various political 
boundaries. Universal TV – on which this interview was broadcast – is in itself a good example of this 
phenomenon and is arguably the most popular television channel across political territories including 
Somaliland, Puntland and urban south-central Somalia.  
This observation speaks to the ‗dual‘ conceptualisation of the Somali public sphere noted in 
previous chapters, whereby media flows can be categorised in terms of their local orientation around 
specific political contexts, and broader networks that engage with a global Somali-speaking 
population. In a sense, Amin Amir‘s work straddles both - the absence of print or online newspapers 
with a single nation-state focus creates an environment where the images uploaded on the cartoonist‘s 
personal site are disseminated via copy-and-paste across the myriad news sites, forums, social media 
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 Akou’s (2012) discussion of the ‘politics’ of dress in Somali culture illustrates the significance of women’s 
(and men’s) fashion before, during and after the rule of the military regime and highlights the contestation 
played out through modes of dress over concepts of cultural tradition, anti-colonialism, Islam, secularism and 
the ‘scientific socialism’ of Barre’s state. 




spaces and print newspapers across Somalia. At the same time, the selective reproduction of the 
images often corresponds closely with the location of particular media content broadcasters and their 
political orientations. For example, it is rare in a Hargeysa newspaper or online news site to see an 
Amin Arts cartoon which addresses specific political developments in Muqdisho. Indeed, news media 
in Somaliland only very selectively reports events in that ‗other country‘, such as news linked to the 
relations between the governments in Hargeysa and Muqdisho, or those stories which illustrate the 
continued violence which continues to characterise the south. The role of Universal TV here in 
broadcasting this interview is also significant and the popularity of this particular channel across the 
territories in question has already been noted. The channel constitutes an important part of the 
transnational Somali public sphere in which the cartoonist himself plays a unique and influential role. 
Covering this range of political contexts and providing content of interest to numerous 
audiences is not only indicative of the cartoonist‘s perspective from the diaspora over the wider state 
of ‗Somali‘ politics, but may also represent a shrewd commercial strategy in a challenging media 
marketplace where notions of intellectual copyright are rarely respected. With media revenue being 
largely generated from advertisements and web-traffic, the development of an Amin Amir ‗brand‘ is 
important and the cartoonist has in the past produced (apparently) commissioned images promoting 
certain companies. This is indicative of the capacity of this unique producer to influence popular 
conceptualisations of state politics and political identity across the Somali territories, and should be 
viewed in the context of the wider development of private, diaspora-based media networks. Online 
advertising clearly accounts for a significant proportion of the cartoonist‘s income and he occasionally 
produces cartoons which act, in of themselves, as advertisements for large Somali companies, albeit in 
the context of social good or development: 
              Fig. 4.12 
 
- Man on right: ‘The Golis company has aided the people who have fled from Yemen and transported 
many of them to their home regions’. 
- Man on left: ‘Every time they are leading the way when it comes to aid, may God bless them’.  
 




Figure 4.12 praises the telecommunications company in question (based in Puntland) for what 
might be termed a demonstration of corporate social responsibility – its provision of aid for Somali 
refugees fleeing from Yemen. It is not clear whether this image was commissioned (and paid for) by 
the company or instead represented a spontaneous comment by the cartoonist on the situation. Once 
again, bound up in this pseudo-commercial is a call to solidarity for the wider Ummadda 
Soomaaliyeed, the fate of which (especially in terms of ‗refugee‘ communities around the world) is a 
common topic in the wider Somali public sphere. The commercial value of the Amin Amir brand, or 
his endorsement, is indicative of the capacity of this unique producer to influence popular 
conceptualisations of state politics and political identity across the Somali territories, and should be 
viewed in the context of the wider development of private, diaspora-based media networks. 
 
4.7. Conclusion  
Critically analysing the discourses and potential influence of Amin Amir‘s cartoons requires a careful 
contextualisation of Somalia‘s unique public sphere environment and perhaps it should come as no 
surprise here that amongst the fragmentation and conflict of modern Somali politics, it is a political 
cartoonist who is (arguably) the most prominent, prevalent and referenced visual commentator. The 
transnational relationship between the artist and his audience (production, selective application, 
reproduction) is analogous with other transnational flows of media, politics and finance which 
characterise so many aspects of life across the Somali territories. The prevalence of media based in 
the diaspora and beamed into Somalia has been explored above, but it is also important to recall the 
role of diasporic communities on political change across the different political contexts (Verjee et al 
2015, 40), and the importance of remittance finance to both national and household economies 
(Ahmed 2000). The point here  is not that all consumers across Somalia are all equally ‗globalised‘ or 
transnational in their cultural or material orientations (certain tensions regarding the role or influence 
of a specifically defined diaspora community have be highlighted in the chapter) but rather that the 
particular circuits of political commentary, news media and artistic expression most prevalent across 
Somalia are characterised by intrinsic elements of trans-nationalism which collapse the distinctions 
between ‗diasporic‘ and ‗local‘ production identified and critiqued in other contexts of African 
‗cultural production‘. 
 The generational and geographic detachment of Amir, which, combined with self-
presentation emphasising his critical neutrality, enables him to provide specific pointed commentary 
as well as grand ethno-nationalist statements which are acceptable to a wide range of audiences - 
often receiving the material through the selections and mediations of an anarchic digital news 
marketplace. The scope of the cartoonist‘s critical gaze across the Somali territories serves to address 
a single broadly ethnically-defined Somali ‗imagined community‘ (to borrow Anderson‘s conception 
of the emotive basis of nationalism), which is divided by multiple political boundaries and regimes of 
authority. Whether these exist in the form of sovereign states or the sub-state administrations of what 




is still officially considered to be ‗Somalia‘, is not of great importance to this conceptualisation of 
Soomaalinimo incorporating, as it does, the lingering echo of the ‗Greater Somalia‘ ideal (Barnes 
2007), and a fluidity of transnational identification.  
This is not to suggest that the various political boundaries are, in themselves, unimportant: a 
self-identifying ‗Somalilander‘ in Hargeysa will quickly clarify the discursive fixity of that particular 
political identity! However, Amir‘s form of digital cultural production (freed from some of the 
technical or political constraints of television or radio) employs physical or temporal detachment from 
the context to speak to Somali audiences across this political spectrum. That people actually listen is 
indicative both of the ways in which identity is constructed across and through ethnic and political 
lines in the Somali Horn, and of the influence of novel forms of transnational political commentary 
and communication on a diverse but self-defined and discursively reproduced ‗Somali‘ audience.  
Instead of conceiving of these cartoons primarily as a product of the diaspora (and analysing 
them in terms of the cyber-subjectivity of those external populations) this chapter has conceptualised 
them as part of the media environment on the ground in the Somali Horn of Africa that is itself 
permeated by cross-cutting transnational dynamics of information sharing and identity creation. In 
approaching the material from this angle, the chapter has presented the interplay between some of the 
cartoonist‘s favoured tropes, themselves portraying local, regional and global factors affecting state 
reconfiguration and contestation across Somalia. The complexity of this particular cartoonist‘s 
potential ‗civic agency‘ within the public sphere cannot be adequately conceptualised primarily in 
terms of the ‗resistance‘ of the ‗ordinary‘ against the ‗official‘. Whilst this is in no small part related 
to the particular conditions of political fragmentation in the Somali Horn, this framing of different 
types of public sphere agency may have relevance for other zones of conflict and contestation in 
Africa where transnational media technologies play a role in shaping political imaginations and 

























5. Spies, stonework, and the suuq: nationalism and narrative politics in an 
Islamist Somali public sphere 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin (‗Al Shabaab‘
1
, hereafter AS) operates as a primary belligerent at 
war with government and international forces in Somalia. In the terminology of one of these parties, 
the United Nations, it acts as a ‗spoiler‘ towards multilateral military and political efforts to 
reconfigure and reconstruct the Somali nation state
2
. This takfiri jihadi or militant salafi
3
 Islamist 
organisation is distinct from the numerous domestic armed actors in Somalia in that it has maintained 
a broader operational structure (both in terms of territorial presence and operation, as well as 
relatively diverse clan makeup of senior leadership and ideologues
4
) and has thus been in a position to 
espouse a distinctive radical narrative of the ongoing conflict in local, national and global terms.  
Since 2013, media affiliates of AS have been producing and disseminating online 
documentary-style videos presenting daily life in areas of south-central Somalia under the militant 
group‘s control. In the context of their wider armed struggle waged against foreign occupiers and an 
‗apostate‘ Federal Government, these videos feature narratives of nationalist economic self-
determination as alternatives to aid dependence and the allegedly nefarious interference of external 
powers in Somalia. This chapter uses such radical oppositional propaganda material as a vehicle to 
analyse the ‗narrative politics‘ of Islamism as a component of the wider Somali public sphere of 
debate over state reconstruction or reconfiguration.  
Although AS propaganda is not synonymous with the far broader spectrum of reformist 
political Islamist thought influential across the Somali territories, it nonetheless overlaps discursively 
with many popular critiques in the public sphere levelled against elite power-holders. The relevance 
of ethno-nationalist rhetoric and attacks on clan-ism have been addressed in the previous chapter with 
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I initially intended to use the acronym HSM for ‘Al Shabaab’ as it denotes the ‘official’ and full name of the 
group (the organisation or its supporters rarely use the moniker ‘Al Shabaab’ on its own but rather ‘The 
Mujaahidiin’ or Xarakaad Al Shabaab, the Al Shabaab Movement). Furthermore, the ‘ASAS’ tag has been used 
by the group in the past for public (English) communication, such as for Twitter feeds accounts associated with 
its spokesmen (@HSMpress). However, during the research period many commentators (particularly in English 
writings) took to using HSM to denote the former president Xasan Sheikh Maxamuud. For clarity I have felt it 
necessary to switch to the use of AS as shorthand for the militants.   
  
2  




For an overview of Salafi or Wahabi forms of ‘fundamentalist’ Sunni Islam and their different political or 
military manifestations see Wiktorowicz (2006).
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Halgan.net, April 9,2015: ‘Dowladda Federaalka Soomaaliya oo lacag dul dhigtay 11 hogaamiye oo ka tirsan 








regard to a transnational political imaginary of a particular cartoonist, and will be explored again in 
the context of explicitly clan/regional focused media texts in the following chapter. For a (Somali) 
population characterised by an almost total adherence to Sunni Islam – across the political territories 
in question – this chapter interrogates the narrative politics of a bitter and brutal Islamist insurgency, 
one which legitimises the killing of other Muslims in the name of a takfiri-jihad (Kepel 2006, 31). 
The chapter analyses the relationship in popular discourse between various tropes of supposed Somali 
ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity, and asks as to how political Islam 
operationalises Somali nationalism, manages the contradictions of religious struggle in an ethnically-
defined religious polity, and attempts to speak to multiple audiences across political boundaries via an 
inherently transnational public sphere.  
Somali-language propaganda of AS affiliates explicitly presents ‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist 
and religio-cultural discourses, relevant to wider popular local perceptions of the conflict and political 
reconfiguration across Somalia. While AS may have exhausted its popular political capital due to its 
battlefield tactics, elements of their conflict-narrative may continue to chime with popular critiques in 
the wider Somali public sphere against political elites beholden to foreign security agendas, finance 
and ideology, and the ultimate ‗neo-colonial‘ division of the Somali Ummah (Ummadda 
Soomaaliyeed). 
Most recent literature on AS communications has focused on its internationalist orientation 
and its status as regional affiliate of Al Qaeda, often emphasising the role of foreign fighters or the 
agency of Somali-diaspora recruits either in Somalia itself or in communities in the West (Anzalone 
2012; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher & Sheehan 2012). While such accounts yield important insight 
into the transnational dynamics of modern Islamist militancy, much less attention is given to the local 
narratives of conflict which propelled AS from being one radical splinter of the broader Islamic 
Courts Union (Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga) to the bureaucratic, relatively efficient and cross-
clan administration of large parts of southern Somalia between 2006 and 2010.    
  If AS has, at times, been characterised by a broad ideological divide between factions with 
an ‗internationalist jihadi‘ outlook and those with a more pragmatic ‗nationalist' worldview, then the 
discourses of this latter faction require detailed analysis not only for a clearer understanding of the 
internal dynamics of the AS insurgency but also in regards to the wider role of narratives of Somali 
ethno-nationalism in ongoing processes of state reconfiguration. While AS‘s early ‗nationalist‘ 
legitimacy – forged in their resistance against the (Western-backed) Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 
2006 - has been noted by the relatively few scholars who have critically examined the movement as 
an administrative entity (Hansen 2013, Marchal 2011), I argue that there remains considerable scope 
for interrogation of the actual forms of these Somali ethno-nationalist discourses in the wider context 
of statelessness, political reconfiguration and socio-religious change in Somalia.  
The chapter proceeds with a definition of ‗narrative politics‘ within the Somali conflict and 
then introduces particular channels of militant Islamist communication in relation to the wider Somali 




media ecology. An overview is given of the various conflict dynamics of state contestation across 
Somalia, into which jihadi actors or narratives assert themselves. The chapter then engages in critical 
discourse analysis of the specific audio-visual propaganda texts in question. This is followed by a 
condensed contextualisation of Islamist mobilisation in modern Somali political history and a 
discussion of wider socio-cultural shifts influencing public religious expression across the post state-
collapse environment. The final section reflects on the interplay of narratives of internationalised or 
regional militancy, with highly localised dynamics of political organisation and mobilisation.   
As textual critical discourse analysis is the primary mode of analysis deployed here, a 
clarification of some of the terminology used below is necessary. Problematic definitions and 
conceptualisations of cognitive or behavioural ‗radicalism‘ have plagued political science and security 
studies analyses of militant-religious mobilisation and violence (Borum 2011; Neuman 2013). With 
regard to Islam in particular, critical explorations of the politics of naming or labelling doctrines, sects 
or movements have highlighted the difficulties of employing terminology not deployed by particular 
groups themselves (Salafi/Wahhabi), or in implicitly endorsing descriptors of militant agency 
(jihad/jihadi) which are rejected by a Muslim mainstream who decry the use of such terminology to 
justify terrorism or other political violence (Wiktotowicz 2006; Hegghammer 2009). This is holds true 
for the Somali territories where a majority of the population would likely reject AS‘s insurgency (or at 
least the evolution of its ‗terrorist‘ tactics). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily preclude certain 
popular sympathies for elements of Islamist-inspired political agendas and the complexity of the 
politico-religious discursive playing field is emphasised through the contextualisation of this 
propaganda material within an explicitly Islamic public sphere. Terms such as ‗jihad‘ are included in 
the discursive analysis in the sense that they are deployed by AS propagandists themselves, while 
other labels (salafi, takfiri, wahhabi etc.) are discussed and problematised in the wider analysis of the 
contemporary spaces which exist for politico-religious debate.     
 
5.2. Narrative politics and militant Islamist media 
In south-central Somalia, where state structures have been absent for a quarter of a century, the re-
emergence of governance and the ongoing reconfiguration of the Somali state inevitably involves 
discursive contestation over political legitimacy and its ideological orientation. This propaganda war 
continues in a context of extreme political and social fragmentation where very little - in terms of the 
mechanisms or legitimacy of power - can be taken for granted. AS and affiliated propagandists 
operate on this battlefield to promote an all-encompassing lebenswelt/lifeworld narrative (Habermas 
1985) legitimating their armed struggle against the ‗infidels/unbelievers‘ (gaal) and their ‗apostate 
stooges‘ (murtad/dabadhilif). This operates both in terms of the global ‗jihad‘ of transnational 
Islamist militancy and also through vocabularies of Somali nationalism and anti-colonialism, drawing 
on assumptions of shared cultural, religious and political identity.  




The pro-AS narrative is just one of numerous different interpretations of processes of state 
reconfiguration active in the dynamic discursive arena that is the modern Somali public sphere. My 
focus on the narrative politics (Lucaites & Condit 1985) of insurgency and counter-insurgency 
emphasises the diverse circuits of political communication which feed into and help construct popular 
imaginations and understandings of conflict and political change. Demonstrations of strength and 
intent, and the winning ‗hearts and minds‘ are as much priorities for AS as they are for a host of local, 
regional and international actors including humanitarian organisations, United Nations agencies, 
African Union forces and domestic political actors. ‗Ordinary‘ Somalis, inside the country and in the 
diaspora engage this narrative politics via ‗social‘ and news media, and seek to foreground discourses 
of ‗Somalia Rising‘ or respond creatively
5
 to the violence of AS itself (Hammond 2013). As noted in 
Chapter 3, even the United States‘ Department of Defence has been, until recently, maintaining a 
Somali-language news website in order to promote certain perspectives (or ‗moderate‘ voices) on the 
reconstruction of the Somali state, clearly indicative of the perceived importance of electronic media 
in the context of ongoing conflict
6
.   
At one end of this ideological spectrum, this chapter engages in depth with three videos from 
the same media network (Al Furqaan Media), which, although of different lengths, all share numerous 
stylistic features.  The analysis moves between a fine-grained examination of particular elements of 
the discourses, and an attempt to situate the recurring themes of the material in the broader contexts of 
both the struggle for the reconfiguration of the Somali state and wider debates in the Somali-language 
public sphere.  
These videos are worthy of attention, I argue, for three reasons. Firstly, this type of material 
has received little prior scholarly attention in the Somali context in comparison to ‗official‘ AS media 
focusing on the battlefield itself. Secondly, this particular producer (Al Furqaan) continues to release 
slick propaganda material that directly relates to dynamic battlefield developments in southern 
Somalia – indeed, their most recent video was released in December 2015 and purported to show the 
town of Janaale ‗recovering‘ in the aftermath of its recapture by AS from African Union forces
7
. 
Finally - and while this lies beyond the scope of this chapter – there is significant analytical scope for 
the comparison of this material with other ‗positive‘ jihadi propaganda from other contexts, 
particularly the media savvy militants of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, whose huge 
output on the alleged social benefits of Islamist state-building goes far beyond the gruesome 
execution or battlefield themes they are most commonly associated with.      
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 Guardian newspaper, 22 January 2016,  ‘Defiant Somalis condemn Al Shabaab beach attack’: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/somalia-lido-beach-mogadishu-tweetlidopictures-alshabaab  
6 





 Al Furqaan Media, 22 December 2015 ‘Soo Kabashada Janaale’[The recovery of Janaale], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQt0hzU6Ku8  




Media products promoting the AS agenda can be divided into two broad and potentially 
overlapping categories: ‗official‘ AS communication epitomised by the organisation‘s Al Kataib 
media unit; and the material produced by various affiliated networks such as Al Furqaan 
Radio/Media, or websites such as Somalimemo.com or Calamada.com. Differentiating between 
affiliation and ownership with/by AS is rarely straightforward in the fluid battlefield and media 
environment, and Radio Al Furqaan‘s headquarters has since 2010 shifted from one AS-controlled 
location to the next as the group has lost control of various urban strongholds. While this is indicative 
of the fact that Al Furqaan is a ‗Shabaab station‘, it nevertheless bills itself as an ‗independent‘ media 
network, and this influences the type and tone of the propaganda it releases.    
  Al Kataib‘s ‗official‘ AS output is largely in Arabic or English and focuses mainly on the on 
the ongoing conflict itself, the role of fighters and the various operations carried out in the name of 
AS‘s campaign both in Somalia and in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. This material appears 
to primarily target audiences in the Arabic speaking world and in the West, and seeks to either 
promote AS as a credible and effective transnational jihadi actor (as Al Qaeda‘s affiliate in East 
Africa
8
) or as a vehicle to directly address Governments to both threaten attacks and attract potential 
foreign fighters (whether of Somali ethnic origin or not) to their struggle in East Africa
9
. Capable 
cameramen are evidently embedded in AS units for certain high-profile attacks and the (edited, 
captioned and often highly graphic) material they produce is picked up not only by pro-jihadi websites 




The media production of Al Furqaan, on the other hand, tends to be released exclusively in 
Somali and, whilst referencing the ongoing conflict, focuses more on the alleged economic, social, 
political and developmental benefits of AS rule through their implementation of strict Islamic Law 
(Shariah). The videos analysed in this paper are taken from a much wider Al Furqaan output, and have 
all been distributed electronically, primarily through the Youtube platform. As the videos only 
reference the conflict indirectly they have so far escaped Youtube censors who typically remove other 
more explicitly violent jihadi material. The four videos analysed in this paper had (as of January 
2016) a combined total of around 97,000 views. Whilst this figure – in terms of global ‗viral‘ online 
video – is hardly staggering, it does indicate that a Somali speaking audience exists for the material 
and these figures do not include direct viewing through other websites.  
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 Somalia Newsroom 3 December 2015: http://somalianewsroom.com/2015/03/12/will-al-shabaab-follow-
boko-haram-and-pledge-loyalty-to-isis/  
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 Caasimadda.com, 1 July 2015, ‘Daawo sawirada Al Shabaab oo soo bandhigay meydadka askarii Burundi ee 
lagu dilay Leego’ [See Al Shabaab published pictures of corpses of Burundian soliders killed at Leego] 
http://caasimadda.com/daawo-sawirada-alshabaab-oo-soo-bandhigay-meydadka-askarii-burundi-ee-lagu-
dilay-leego/ (Graphic images) 




Attempting to identify the target or actual audience of such material is a difficult task for the 
researcher. Obviously, this material is aimed at a Somali-speaking audience located in Somalia, in the 
Somali-speaking territories of the Horn, or in wider diaspora communities. This paper assumes that 
the audience in Somalia is primarily situated in urban areas where internet access is relatively fast and 
affordable, and is also relatively youthful, based on the tone of the material and the apparently young 
age of many of the journalists. Whilst it is clear that the content has been filmed on the ground in 
south-central Somalia it is possible that post-production may have been undertaken outside of 
Somalia, as in other contexts of jihadi media production
11
. Regardless of the potentially transnational 
character of this media production and consumption (true of online Somali news media in general), it 
is clear that the material is engaging with a particular narrative of life and conflict on the ground in 
Somalia. Important for this analysis is the way in which these ‗locally‘ produced and consumed texts 
present the interplay between meta-narratives of global or transnational militant Islamist struggle and 
micro-level religious or cultural politics of everyday life in south central Somalia. 
 
5.3. The strategic environment for AS militancy 
Although AS has seemed to have been on the back foot since 2010/11 with the loss of territory it 
controlled in Muqdisho (and then from 2012 with the progressive fall of towns from Kismaayo and 
Baraawe on the coast, through to inland urban footholds in Gedo and Bay regions in 2015) it still 
retains an amorphous presence in the south-central hinterlands, frequently demonstrating the capacity 
to move back into previously ‗liberated‘ areas as SFG and AMISOM forces move on. This fluidity 
means that maps of military/political control of south-central Somali - however up to date - invariably 
fail to capture the complexity of the reality on the ground and the situation is often better 
conceptualised as a shifting patchwork of force movement and nominal control from various actors. 
These include SFG or SFG-aligned military units; the forces of embryonic regional administrations 
(such as the Interim Jubaland Administration or the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaac forces); local clan-
based militias (where these are actually distinguishable from the previous two types of actors); 
AMISOM contingents who vary in terms of regional zones of operation, capacity and interests; and 
AS itself.  
The targeted killing by US drone strike of AS leader Axmed Cabdi Godane (nom de guerre 
Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr) in September 2014 was anticipated from some quarters to accelerate the further 
degradation of the organisation. The group had been beset by worsening internal divisions between 
various factions loosely representing nationalist versus ‗internationalist‘ strategic priorities, 
foreign/local fighter contestation, and groups or individuals disenchanted with the centralisation of 
control by Godane - itself bringing criticism from senior Al Qaeda figures to which the group had 
formally affiliated with from 2012 (Bryden 2014). Although these schisms culminated in the violent 
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 Vice News 1 July 2015 ‘My Journey Inside the Islamic State’ on the location of media producers in the 
Iraq/Syria context: https://news.vice.com/article/my-journey-inside-the-islamic-state
  




deaths of several high profile figures, from the young American jihadi Omar Shafik Hammami (nom 
de guerre Abu Mansur Al Amriki) to the veteran Somali Islamist and one-time close associate of 
Godane, Ibraahim Xaaji Jaamac Meecaad ‗Al Afghani‘, AS nonetheless retained a capacity for 
mounting ‗complex‘ attacks on a variety of governmental, military and civilian targets in Muqdisho. 
Recently, AS‘s military tactics have moved beyond asymmetrical harrying of AMISOM forces to 
direct engagement with selected outposts. Routs of Burundian and Kenyan bases in June 2015 and 
January 2016 provided a wealth of official propaganda material for the group. 
The momentum of AMISOM/SFG advances against AS and their ability to effectively hold 
captured territory are influenced by wider political turbulence (such as the turnover of three Prime 
Ministers in two years since 2012) and difficulties of reconfiguring regional control along federal 
lines (Mosley 2015). Here one must recognise the varying degrees of consolidation of administrations 
established for ‗Jubaland‘ centred around Kismaayo, the ‗Southwest State‘ around Baydhabo, and the 
more recent intrigues and conflict involved in getting a ‗Central State‘ in Galgaduud and Mudug off 
the ground. This overview of the political/military situation highlights the peculiar and messy reality 
of power on the ground in south-central Somalia, where political reconfiguration continues alongside 
both insurgency/counterinsurgency in areas nominally controlled by SFG/AMISOM forces, and the 
advances of these military assets into areas still under the black flag of AS.  
AS also maintains a territorial and operational structure in Puntland, waging war against the 
state authorities and their international backers - ranging from US Special Forces in the Galgala Hills 
to UN staff in Garoowe. AS‘s Puntland operations are conditioned by both highly localised and 
international dynamics. That its territorial centre of gravity lies in the mountains straddling the region 
of Sanaag and the port city of Bosaaso owes much to the marginalisation of the Warsangeli sub-clan; 
struggling for autonomy and advantage between the various political and clan-based structures of the 
Puntland and Somaliland states (Hoehne 2014). At the same time, a recent political-ideological split 
has occurred within the wider ‗national‘ AS organisation, with a particular Puntland-based ideologue 




In Somaliland, while AS maintains a covert presence, its operations against state interests 
have been minimal since 2008 when it attacked the Ethiopian Consulate, the UNDP headquarters and 
the Presidential residence. The relative lack of violent AS activity in Somaliland, combined with the 
fact that several high-profile AS leaders (including the late Emir Godane) hail from the region, fuels 
conspiracy theories, and (in Puntland) periodic official allegations that the administration in Hargeysa 
either directly supports or provides safe haven to AS operatives in order to destabilise southern or 
northeastern Somalia. An apparently bogus account of the ‗nexus between Somaliland and Al 
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 Jubbaland Media.com October 22, 2015 ‘Garabka kooxda Al Shabaab ee Galgala oo sheegay inay ku biireen 
ISIS’ [Al Shabaab faction in Galgala announces that they have joined ISIS]: 
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Shabaab‘ appeared in February 2016 on the Kenyamedia.net news blog (since taken down). This 
account by the (fictional) ‗Swedish investigative journalists Peter Wolfson & Greta Backstrom‘ was 
both reproduced and debunked across Somali cyberspace, and is indicative of the lengths to which 
parties will go to influence the narrative around Somaliland‘s relationship with AS and, by extension, 
the wider Somali territories
13
.  
While AS exists as one of multiple military-political actors active in the arena of state-
contestation in Somalia, it nevertheless occupies a distinctive position within the Somali political 
imaginary. AS sits, in popular media discourse, at once outside of state institutions while 
simultaneously playing an integral and covert role between the strategic manoeuvres of these various 
‗state‘ power holders. The spectre of its necessarily transnational, labyrinthine and clandestine 
operational networks lends itself to conspiracy theorisation in a public sphere characterised by intense 
mistrust
14
. The Puntland Minister of Security, Cabdi Xirsi Qarjab, recently accused the SFG in 
Muqdisho of facilitating an AS troop movement along the coast north into Puntland-controlled Mudug 
as a move designed to destabilise his territory. This, he alleged, was due to Puntland‘s opposition to 
the 4.5 (clan) system of MP selection being pushed by the Muqdisho-based government
15
. While AS 
retains its own distinctive narrative of the wider Somali conflict, it in itself constantly invoked, in 
almost spectralized form, by various state political actors to illustrate issues of insecurity (which can 
be blamed on competing administrations) or outlines of macro-political conspiracy.  
5.4. Spies, stonework and the suuq – AS documentary propaganda 
The videos uploaded by Al Furqaan onto their Youtube channel from late 2013 were focused 
primarily on daily life and ‗development‘ in areas still under the control of AS. The videos‘ locations 
(Ceel Buur in Galgaduud Region, Baraawe and Buulo Mareer in Lower Shabelle Region) were all 
captured by AMISOM/SFG forces in 2014, while Lower Juba remains largely under AS control at the 
time of writing. In each case, and characteristic of AS‘s battlefield tactics, the towns were ceded to the 
advancing forces without significant urban resistance. AS forces melted away into the hinterland to 
harry the occupying forces and disrupt supply lines both for the new occupiers and the remaining 
civilian populations. Foreseeing losses of territory that year may have spurred AS and affiliated media 
organisations to produce this wave of material to serve as propaganda for their period of 
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administration. This would invite comparisons between the economic or humanitarian conditions of 
these towns before and after the SFG takeovers; conditions which would be inevitably worsened by 
the ongoing conflict, AS‘s tactic of economic blockade, and the SFG‘s inability to extend the 
provision of basic services to local populations in the wake of its territorial advances. 
 On the surface, Al Furqaan‘s film „Qaabka loo sameeyo burjikada Ceelbuur‟ (‗How the stone 
stoves of Ceel Buur are made‘) is a mundane 11 minute documentary about traditional stone work and 
trade in this town in Galgaduud in central Somalia
16
. However, read in the context of AS narratives 
engaging tropes of Islamic and Somali ethno-nationalist identity, the video serves as a sophisticated 
piece of propaganda designed to frame the Somali state (and battles for it) in a way that glorifies and 
empowers AS militancy and governance. The video begins (like all of those analysed here) with 
Arabic script and a voiceover announcing ‗In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, Most Merciful‘. 
This is followed by the Somali (latin script) name of Al Furqaan Broadcasting, their website emerging 
in explosive graphics: sparks and flames evoking divine or supernatural power.  The film opens with 
panoramic shots of the town at sunrise and the male voiceover, strong-voiced but calm and measured 
in tone, speaking clearly to his audience, begins by describing the town‘s long history in the central 
regions of Somalia. He emphasises that it was previously invaded by Ethiopian Forces, although the 
population remained. The inclusion of a caption naming the journalist is important and characteristic 
of all these films in that it attempts to present an image to the viewer of an independent media 
organisation providing objective reportage from areas under the control of AS, and distinguishes such 
products from the official communications of AS itself.  
 The introduction continues with another description of Ceel Buur as an ancient town blessed 
with natural resources; famous in Somalia and abroad for the stone stoves (burjiko) that are produced 
there. Going in search of those with the skills to make these stoves, the journalist (never pictured in 
the film) then interviews a craftsman who discusses the security situation under the area control of the 
‗Mujaahidiin‟ (he gives a positive assessment, of course) and talks about his tools and process of 
work. This is followed by various shots of the excavation of the stone and a continuous description of 
the process and the various people involved is given. The journalist maintains the didactic tone of an 
educator, instructing viewers on a traditional handicraft.  
 Another interview with a different carver reveals perspectives on the geographic location and 
directions of the trade, themselves of political significance. Discussing the export of the stoves, the 
craftsman states that they are taken to places in ‗this land‘ (dhulkan) such as ‗Somaliland, Puntland, 
Djibouti, Zone 5, and then also Ethiopia and across the sea‘. Here the administrations inside what is 
formally recognised as ‗Somalia‘ - the secessionist Somaliland and the autonomous but non-
secessionist Puntland – are imagined as part of the Somali territory, but so too is the nation state of 
Djibouti and Zone 5 (the administrative name for Ethiopia‘s ethnically Somali-dominated territory, 
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sometimes known by the name deriving from the predominant clan there, the Ogaden). The carver‘s 
subsequent addition of ‗Ethiopia‘ and his manner of speaking then situates it as a different or separate 
place.  
 Regardless of whether or not the interviewee was coached or coerced into this manner of 
speech (perhaps unlikely given the relatively natural way goes about answering the rather mundane 
questions), this ordering of the geography of the Somali lands is significant in that it correlates with 
the historical notion of the ‗Greater Somalia‘ divided up by the colonialists and packaged of to hostile 
non-Somali neighbours such as Ethiopia (Barnes 2007; Kusow 2004). This idea, integral to the 
identity of the post-colonial Somali state – from the symbolic five points of the star on the Somali flag 
representing the five ‗Somali‘ territories of the Horn, to the war fought against Ethiopia in 1977 for 
control of one of those territories – has been rebooted in the rise of Islamist political and military 
agitation, emphasising the religious solidarity of the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed on top of ethnic, 
linguistic or cultural linkage between the territories. The words of this stone carver sitting under the 
tree in Ceel Buur constitute either a subtly crafted piece of political propaganda, or simply represent 
wider popular perceptions of the geographical status of Somali territories within a politically divided 
Horn. That the administrations of Somaliland or Puntland are discursively equated with the political 
arrangements of Djibouti or Zone 5 in Ethiopia, is of significance for the way in which Somali ‗states‘ 
are imagined and reproduced, and the types of rhetoric and agency which are fashioned around them.   
 
                   Fig. 5.1 
 
Screenshot from ‘How the stone stoves of Ceel Buur are made’ (Al Furqaan Media): the craftsman interviewee. 
 
 The video concludes with footage of the craftsmen and traders preparing and coming together 
for the Maqrib (sunset) prayer. The narrator intones that the people of Ceel Buur have found peace 
with implementation of the Shariah and that as producers and tradesmen they come together to pray in 
the same place. The imagery is that of a rural, productive and religious idyll situated firmly in a 
context of ‗traditional‘ and ‗Somali‘ economic activity.  




Al Furqaan‘s more substantial documentary „Bulsho horumartay hagar daamadii hey'adaha 
kadib‘ (‗Development of the society after the deception of the agencies‘)
17
 presents a critique of 
humanitarian actors in relation to Somali economic self-sufficiency and food security. Uploaded onto 
Youtube in December 2013, the film opens by introducing its location (Jamaame and Kamsuuma 
districts in Lower Juba region) and individuals (such as community spokesmen) who will be 
interviewed by the Al Furqaan journalist. That the journalist is presented as an outsider implies an 
objectivity in this reporting by an ‗independent‘ news agency. The ‗ease‘ of the journey is 
emphasised, a factor intended to resonate with people in different parts of south-central Somalia 
where movement between districts is hampered by the ubiquitous checkpoints of Government (SFG) 
forces, pro-SFG and/or clan-based local militias, and AS itself.   
The film situates its narrative of ‗development‘ in the Juba regions in the context of a wider 
conflict being fought over Somalia and its resources. The narrator (over footage of AMISOM troops 
arriving in Muqdisho) describes how the ‗invasion‘ of Somalia has been ongoing for a long time and 
is a ‗multifaceted‘ campaign. One of these ‗faces‘ relates to control of agricultural production and the 
impoverishment of Somalis, which itself leads to the dangerous emigration (tahriib) of Somalis to 
Europe or dependence on handouts from the forces which have taken control of the country. The 
‗colonial‘ campaign is described as involving ‗warfare of the mind‘; psychological tactics to promote 
the image of poverty in a country that is actually rich in natural resources.  
This sequence features footage of communications equipment and meetings chaired by white 
men in suits - actually the UN Special Representative for Somalia, although the imagery implies 
military intelligence and planning
18
. The visual linkage between communications technology and 
espionage is significant in the wider context of jihadi media in Somalia. Narratives referencing 
Western surveillance, Wikileaks‘ revelations, and the hacking of electronic communications are 
commonly deployed, particularly in discussions of drone strikes and the use by foreign intelligence 
agencies of locals as spies. This, along with moral injunctions against young peoples‘ time-wasting 
online (the irony of AS‘s electronic jihad notwithstanding) has served as justification for sporadic 
banning of mobile internet, and the public execution of alleged spies is a common and publicised 
occurrence in towns under the group‘s control.   
The narrator contextualises the film‘s subsequent content by declaring that although the ‗the 
white or black unbeliever‘ has succeeded in these objectives in the areas they have captured, there 
remain other parts of the country under the control of the Islamic administration of AS that are ‗free‘ 
and in which agricultural production can flourish. Administrative governance is equated with rule by 
Islamic law as a means to arbitrate impartially in clan-based disputes, the result of which – as 
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emphasised in this particular video – is the improvement of security in the region. The benefits of 
security (resolution of conflicts through the implementation of Islamic law and the removal of 
obstacles to movement such as checkpoints and extortion from pro-government or SFG militias) are 
frequently cited by subsequent interviewees in the film as the primary reason that agricultural 
production and trade has flourished under AS rule.  
The film progresses through different locations- from the fields to the market (suuq) where an 
idealised image of bountiful domestic production in conditions of peace, security and religious 
observance is presented. From early on, the position of international humanitarian ‗agencies‘ is 
implied and then linked with the wider narrative of foreign espionage and the invasion of Somalia. 
The title of the film plays on the ambiguity of the term ‗agencies‘ (which exists in both Somali and 
English) and blurs the distinctions between ‗humanitarian‘, ‗security‘ or ‗intelligence‘ to the point 
where the viewer is meant to believe these are one in the same. The implication here is that 
humanitarian agencies form a part of the grand neo-colonial structure of regional and Western 
military powers (the former such as historic Christian enemies such as Ethiopia and Kenya being 
utilised by the latter, dominated by the United States) who are backing an ‗apostate‘ or ‗stooge‘ 
government in Muqdisho in an effort to de-Islamise, depopulate and then exploit Somalia. Aid itself is 
portrayed as weapon which promotes dependence and a mindset of poverty which enslaves its victims 
or drives them out of Somalia.  
As the film progresses this narrative is reinforced with more specific charges levelled against 
these foreign agendas. Firstly, the actions of the AS administration to reinforce flood barriers on the 
Juba River to prevent flooding are compared to the lack of such measures in Government-controlled 
areas where, theoretically, international humanitarian actors are able to operate. Infrastructure 
development by the administration, such as road building/repair and irrigation, is emphasised with the 
implication that such work to benefit the potential self-sufficiency of Somali production is not a 
priority for the ‗agencies‘.  
The action then moves again to the suuq where the narrator describes his conversations with 
traders who tell him that local agricultural production has increased since the banning by AS of the 
World Food Program (the only agency specifically mentioned in the film) which was importing food 
aid. Here the emphasis is on the production of local foodstuffs such as sorghum, maize, sesame and 
beans, in contrast to imported staples of rice and pasta which are prevalent and popular across 
Somalia. One trader describes how food aid ‗broke‘ the market for local produce and once again the 
narrative of manufactured dependence on imports is reinforced. Footage of busy markets where men 
and women buy and sell fruit and vegetables exemplifies not only an idea of prosperity but of healthy-
living based on local produce. Here interviewees extol the virtues of local fruit juice over the imported 
soft drinks which are full of ‗chemicals‘. These are discourses of ‗local‘ or ‗organic‘ food production - 
familiar to bourgeois consumers in the west - but situated in a narrative pitting dependence against 
religiously-framed economic nationalism.  




                   Fig. 5.2 
 
Screenshot from ‘Development of society’ (Al Fuqaan Media): the juice-drinking interviewee.  
 
Humanitarian action (or the wider humanitarian situation of Somalia) is a recurring theme in 
other Al Furqaan videos where references are frequently made to the dignity and self-sufficiency of 
the Somali Ummah and contrasting indignities of aid dependence. The January 2014 Al Furqaan film 
„Mashruuca afurinta dadka sooman‟ (‗Project for the people breaking the fast‘) ostensibly portrays 
AS in the town of Baraawe providing rations to poor residents to enable them to break the fast during 
the holy month of Ramadan
19
. This video highlights discourses around the micro-politics of aid 
delivery relevant across Somalia, particularly in relation to vulnerable or disadvantaged communities. 
The humanitarian problems facing Somalia are presented in the introduction as a product of civil 
unrest and the ongoing conflict, while the Islamic administration undertakes ceaseless humanitarian 
activities in the areas it controls to mitigate the suffering caused. The video goes on to present a 
distribution of basic foodstuffs to men and women (queuing separately) in a courtyard, and the project 
itself is described as being a collaboration between the Islamic administration and wealthy locals.  
The narrator goes into detail about the setting of the distribution: the place is very ‗clean‘ and 
the people are ‗well organised‘; there is no violence or pointing of guns as would be found in the 
places (of aid distribution) controlled by the government or regional administration; men and women 
are separated, as is stipulated by religion, and everyone is sitting down ‗nicely‘. The narrator notes 
that before the distribution starts, it is common for the people to be addressed and the film then 
depicts the Wali (AS governor) of the Lower Juba region visiting and inspecting the site. This is 
followed by interviews with the recipients, male and female, who talk about the quality of the goods 
distributed (emphasis on the fresh meat) and the dignified manner in which it is conducted - one 
respondent compares it favourably with those distributions conducted by the ‗infidels‘. The film 
concludes with a description of the end of the distribution, clearly emphasising not only the calm 
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organisation of the event but also clear ideas of public piety and gender segregation: ‗After the 
distribution, the people begin to leave in an orderly fashion. The women go first, the men wait and are 
not intermingled with them‘. 
These portrayals of aid and nationalistic self-sufficiency ‗work‘ by reproducing the security 
narrative of AS control over territory in Somalia. Whilst AS has lost both urban territory and a 
significant degree of public support - in part due to its targeted killings of civilians associated with the 
SFG and collateral civilian casualties in its large scale attacks - it is nevertheless important to recall 
that initial territorial and administrative gains made by the group were founded on the premise of 
security and impartial governance by Shariah. It is this narrative which is being re-engaged in the 
propaganda material here: AS rule means economic opportunity (especially in regard to what are 
presented as quintessentially ‗Somali‘ economic activities), ‗dignified‘ and religiously-sanctioned 
charity, and freedom from the abuses committed by SFG-aligned or AMISOM forces.   
      
5.5. Islamist mobilisation and socio-religious change in Somalia 
In order to understand the form and potential appeal of AS conflict-narratives it is necessary to 
examine the history of political Islamist mobilisation in Somalia and processes of socio-cultural or 
religious change which have characterised the post-1991 era. This section draws on the historical 
record as well as current interventions into ‗mainstream‘ public sphere debate on religious change, 
expression and contestation. 
Modern Somali Islamism can primarily be traced to the emergence of groups such as Al 
Ittixaad Al Islaam, mobilised in opposition to the confrontational secularism of Siyaad Barre‘s 
military regime through the 1970s and 1980s. Coinciding with increased global expression of political 
Islamist agency, the growing influence of Salafi or Wahabi inspired Sunni doctrines (Adam 2010; 
Mire Aadam 2013), and Somali economic migration to the Gulf States, the development of anti-
regime Islamist organisation would come to play a political and social role in the aftermath of state 
collapse in 1991.  
Although the fall of Barre‘s regime was brought about by the operations of regional clan-
based militias through the 1980s (including the Somali National Movement in what would become 
Somaliland; the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in what is now Puntland, and the United Somali 
Congress who took Muqdisho from the central regions and swept through the south), Islamist 
mobilisation and rhetoric remained an undercurrent within attempts to pull the country out of the 
conflict that followed state collapse in 1991. The extent to which Islamist organisations such as Al 
Ittixaad were active and internationally-linked during this period is debatable, although modern 
jihadis are often eager to link themselves with this historical context - for example, in regard to the 




murder of the Bishop of Muqdisho, or the infamous Black Hawk Down incident during the United 
States‘ and United Nations‘ early engagement with post-state collapse Somalia
20
.  
Space precludes a full overview of the complex historical development of the regionally 
divided Somali Islamist movements during the chaotic period of 1990s‘ ‗warlord‘ politics. However, 
it is necessary to reference certain important milestones including the confrontation between Al 
Ittixaad and the SSDF in the northeast leading to their expulsion from the strategic port city of 
Bosaaso in 1992, and their subsequent entrenchment in the south in Gedo region, eventually 
prompting Ethiopian military incursions from 1996 (De Waal 2004, 128). Meanwhile, a stateless and 
divided Muqdisho experienced different stages of Islamist judicial development, eventually 
culminating in the emergence of the Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga (Union of Islamic Courts) 
that would expand its authority into larger areas of southern Somalia before its overthrow in the 
Ethiopian invasion of 2006 (Barnes & Hassan 2007, Mwangi 2010). It was from this point that AS, 
hitherto an armed radical faction of the broader Courts movement, asserted itself as the primary 
resistor against what was portrayed as brutal Ethiopian aggression. It would subsequently come to 
establish itself as an administrative body across the majority of the southern Somali regions during 
what Hansen (2013) describes as its ‗Golden Age‘ of governance and territorial control around 
2009/2010.  
These different periods of Islamist mobilisation and administrative development in the post 
1991-era corresponded with, and conditioned, wider trends of socio-religious change visible 
particularly in urban Somalia. Increased emphasis on public piety, orthodox critiques of ‗traditional‘ 
socio-religious practices and a visible trend of cultural orientation towards the Arab world are all 
apparent features of religious expression in modern Somali urban communities (Tiilikainen 2010). 
The popular conception that ‗most Somalis are Sufis‘
21
 and are thus likely to automatically reject or 
resist the governance or judicial practices of a salafi-influenced Sunni administration is an over-
simplification of a socio-religious context which has changed enormously in the decades following 
state-collapse. Insecurity has created conditions where the perceived impartial and firm 
implementation of Shariah has, at times, been welcomed as a remedy by different social groups who 
make careful calculations of the tradeoffs between individual liberty and the security gains of Islamist 
rule.    
This is not to say that religio-political contestation along salafi/sufi lines does not exist. The 
militant ‗sufi‘ agency of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaac against AS in may be expressed in these terms, 
                                                          
20
 Somalimemo.net, 1 June 2015, ‘Sheekh Xasan Turki oo Masuul Ka Ahaa Dilkii Baadri Salvadore Colombo 
Loogu Geystay Magaalada Muqdisho’ [Sheikh Xasan Turki was responsible for the killing of Father Salvador 
Colombo in Muqdisho]: http://somalimemo.net/articles/2931/Sheekh-Xasan-Turki-oo-Masuul-Ka-ahaa-Dilkii-
Baadari-Salvador-Colombo-Loogu-Geystay-Magaalada-Muqdisho  
21
 The Guardian newspaper, 2 April 2015 ‘Al-Shabaab: from al-Qaida rejects to a fighting force of thousands’:    
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/al-shabaab-from-al-qaida-rejects-to-a-fighting-force-of-
thousands 




although the extent to which this constitutes a purely ideological contest as opposed to completing 
clan interests in the Central Regions is beyond the scope of this paper (Hesse 2010). However, in the 
wider discursive battlefield, popular debates seem to have largely shifted beyond what constitute 
‗traditional‘ or ‗Somali‘ forms of Islam. While I highlight below two notable exceptions to (or 
criticisms of) this trend in ‗mainstream‘ Somali media, the AS propaganda I explore makes no 
mention of competing interpretations of Islam (whether ‗traditional‘, ‗Somali‘ or otherwise). It 
focuses instead on clear distinctions between a Sunni Ummadda Soomaaliyeed and those who are 
‗apostate‘ by their association with a government that cooperates with the infidels. This formulation 
by omission is in itself a highly political act - essentially erasing debate on alternative conceptions of 
appropriate religious practice in the Somali context - and yet this type of framing of the 
religious/ideological field is characteristic not just of AS propaganda but also other discussions 
playing out in the Somali public sphere.  
Opportunities for public religious debate have been greatly constricted not only by the threat 
of AS retaliations but also wider patterns of increased doctrinal orthodoxy and social conservatism 
evident in urban centres across Somalia. This was a recurring theme of interviews I conducted with 
Somali professionals (in media, education and humanitarian fields) in Muqdisho. Even in cyberspace, 
where there is potential for anonymity and physical detachment from a conflict environment, direct 
religious debate is often muted. In a (rare) critique in the Somali public sphere of doctrinal orthodoxy 
or the restrictions of religious debate, Muqdisho-based writer Bashir M. Xersi‘s opinion piece 
„Wadaaddadii Soomaaliyeed ma UMAL ayaa ka haray?!‟ (‗Of the Somali clerics is it only Umal who 
is left?!‘) represents direct engagement by a local (named) commentator with a particular religious 
controversy ongoing in 2014
22
.  
Xersi discusses the furore over the publication of Somali Islamic scholar Cabdisaciid Cabdi 
Ismaciil‘s book ‗Xadka Riddadka maxaa ka run ah?‟ (What is true regarding the ruling on apostasy?). 
Here he refers to the accusations by prominent conservative clerics (such as the eponymous Sheekh 
Umal, based, like Ismaciil, in Nairobi) that the text represents a distortion of Islam and a conspiracy 
by those seeking to undermine the faith. This is a religious question of fundamental importance to the 
Somali conflict, where the killing of fellow Muslims is often justified in takfiri doctrine by victims‘ 
alleged ‗apostasy‘, self-defined by actors such as AS in the political terms of an individual‘s 
affiliation with state authorities. 
 Xersi contextualises current controversy in terms of a past, idealised role of clerics (pl. 
Wadaaddo) in Somali society, whose function, he argues, was characterised by service to the 
community and a detachment from politics. He criticises other contemporary Somali religious 
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scholars for their immediate intervention in the debate, and points out that in his first address on the 
subject the Sheekh in question admitted that he had not yet read the entire book. The writer peppers 
his argument with numerous Somali proverbs and lines from the poetic canon, as epitomised by the 
independence-era Abwaan (poet) Cabdullaahi Suldaan Timacadde. In doing so he shifts the debate 
towards the role of religion in (specifically) ‗Somali‘ society. Encouraging Somali-language 
deliberation of Islam, he notes that „Buug walba oo af Soomaali ku qoran, wuxuu kayd u noqon  karaa 
eray lumi lahaa oo afka ka mid ah‟ (‗Every book written in Somali can become a store of words of 
the language that would otherwise be lost‘). For the writer, Islam in Somali culture has been stripped 
of ‗meaning‘ in the sense that debate in people‘s vernacular is so frequently constricted, due both to a 
lack of Somali language materials or through doctrinal intolerance and violence.  
Highlighting the contemporary relevance of the issue, he asserts that the ideology of ‗Al 
Shabaab‘ is shared by many other important and active contemporary religious groups: „AL ITIXAAD 
iyo AL ICTISAAM (WAHAABIYA), walina umadda ayey ka dhex qalaadaan, oo maalin walba war 
saxaafadeed habaabin iyo hilin ka weecin ah u soo saaraan‟. (‗Al Itixaad and Al Ictisaam [Wahaabi], 
who remain in society, every day misleading people through the press releases they give‘[writer‘s 
emphasis]). Here the issue is presented as transcending AS itself, relating instead to a wider ‗cultural‘ 
malaise and the changing forms of ‗Somali‘ Islamic social and political expression. This piece is 
striking for its forthrightness, and whilst rare in terms of its explicit critique, it overlaps with tensions 
expressed elsewhere in public sphere regarding appropriate ‗Somali‘ linguistic and cultural identity in 
the post-state collapse (and state reconstruction) context.  
In terms of the media battlefield in which these debates play out, it is notable that Ismaciil‘s 
controversial book was promoted by a ‗news‘ outlet such as (the now defunct) Sabahi Online, 
operated by the US Department of Defence to counter AS propaganda
23
. Given popular perceptions 
that the site was a mere ‗CIA‘ mouthpiece, it is perhaps unsurprising how conspiracy narratives of 
external threats to Islam can be constructed by public sphere figures such as Sheekh Umal. As for the 
writer of the opinion piece discussed here, while I was in contact with him via email he declined to 
comment further or meet me in person in Muqdisho: a reluctance fully understandable in this public 
sphere environment of violence and suspicion towards foreign motives. 
In another written intervention into public sphere debates over Islam, ‗Somali culture‘ and 
transnational influences, diaspora-based writer Xaashi Yassiin Cismaan‘s online editorial‟Waa 
wareeeey!!‟ (A call for help), points to elements of diaspora life which are feeding back into religious 
conflict in Somalia
24
. Here he argues that such factors even more damaging than clanism (his 
depiction of this latter phenomenon is discussed in the subsequent chapter). In lamenting a new 
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generation‘s loss of ‗Somali‘ cultural values and language, he argues that religion (Islam) should not 
be seen as a form of collective identity but should only be conceived of as personal faith („Diintu 
maahan hayb ee waa caqiido‟). Here he implies that the youth (located in a transnational sense in 
both in the diaspora and in Somalia) may be orientating themselves more towards religion as a marker 
of identity than with ‗Somali culture‘, however that may be defined.  
The writer employs the couplet of ‗isgaalaysiin‟ and ‗isqarxin‟ to describe the acts of losing 
one‘s faith, and suicide bombing as opposite evils. He argues that these both stem from foreign 
ideologies and influences, either secular or religious. This is presented as the dilemma for ‗Somali‘ 
Islam, and he appeals to clerics to transcend disputes between salafi and sufi interpretations of the 
faith and promote tolerance. As noted above, this type of explicit comment on doctrinal divides and 
contestation is uncommon in the Somali public sphere, where religious rhetoric – couched within 
appeals to Somali nationalism - tends to take a less explicit form; usually emphasising a 
straightforward unity of Islam or the pervasiveness of external influence. The writer asserts that these 
twin problems of infidelity or extremism have not simply ‗fallen from the sky‘, but rather work 
alongside the dynamics of clan-ism that he also describes. Delving further into doctrinal divides, he 
draws a historical parallel with the European experience of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and 
violence that unleashed between Protestants and Catholics. Whilst he does not push the comparison 
further he concludes by noting that Europe today is at peace and religious coexistence is the norm.   
  In discussing the complexities of Islam and social change in Somalia one must remember 
that this is a context where various political Islamist factions (themselves often the products of the 
same educational, and socialisation processes which influenced the emergence of AS) are on the 
ascendancy in government and represent the future of Somalia as a Sunni Islamic state. Sharif (2015) 
discusses the understudied role of Sudanese Islamic higher education in training and socialising a 
generation of cadres who played a crucial role in the Union of Islamic Courts project. My own 
professional experiences in Muqdisho confirm the prevalence of such alumni networks in the current 
SFG, particularly in the judicial and security apparatuses of the state.  
 In many respects, the elite political arena of Muqdisho is characterised both by clan/regional 
competition and the factionalism of political Islamists. The latter are organised within semi-
institutionalised cliques such as Dam al Jadiid, the group which is popularly perceived to dominate 
the current presidency and which itself emerged as a splinter group of the Somalia‘s Muslim 
Brotherhood-orientated Al Islaax movement. The lack of a popularly recognisable or institutionalised 
party system provides fertile ground for narratives in the public sphere that foreground various 
shadowy clan or religious clique-based political groupings. Popular resentment against Dam Jadiid, 
does not centre around their ill-defined political Islamist ideology, but rather the nefarious influence 




of unaccountable networks on the office of the Presidency and perceived corruption
25
. While the state 
insists (particularly to its Western backers) that it is waging an ‗ideological‘ battle against AS
26
, there 
is no clear secular/Islamist divide in political discourse; Somalia is being reconstructed as an Islamic 
state whose current power holders condemn AS violence as an affront to the Somali nation and as 
running contrary to Islam.  
Geopolitical factors also impact on the wider ideological character of governmental politics in 
Muqdisho. Somalia is being courted by important regional players, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
in the context of competition for influence vis-á-vis the broader Horn of Africa. Both regimes, 
espousing different brands of political Islam, have invested significantly in the Somali Federal 
Government. Turkey is a highly visible humanitarian, diplomatic and economic actor in Muqdisho 
while Saudi Arabia recently pledged $50 Million in aid in return for the SFG‘s severing of diplomatic 
ties with Iran. De Waal identifies intra-Sunni competition in this diplomatic contest with ‗Turkish and 
Qatar-backed candidates pitted against those funded by the Wahhabi alliance‘. The political effects of 
Somalia‘s increased importance in a Gulf-Horn-Red-Sea nexus are already being felt in domestic 
politics and ‗in the country‘s national elections scheduled for September, Arab- and Wahhabi-
affiliated candidates for parliament could very well sweep the board‘
27
.  
Outside of conflict zones in south-central Somalia (and Puntland), Islamism also plays a role 
in the public sphere of Somaliland. Here, while political discourse often revolves around the partisan 
system and electoral politics and intrigue, similar dynamics of socio-religious change, increased 
expression of public piety and critiques of foreign, ‗un-Islamic‘ influence are frequently visible. High 
profile preachers influence public sentiment around moral controversies (see Chapter 3‘s discussion 
of the Hargeysa International Book Fair) and undercurrents of suspicion against foreign agendas 
periodically manifest themselves in the public sphere. Humanitarian agencies or individual actors may 
come under scrutiny (or be deported) for alleged Christian proselytising
28
, while political 
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attracted the attentions of Somaliland security forces, wary of ‘extremist’ rhetoric. 




interventions from the Beesha Caalamka (the ‗International Community‘) may be interpreted as being 
‗culturally‘ or ‗religiously‘ motivated.  
During my last period of fieldwork in Hargeysa in 2015, local newspapers were full of heated 
commentary on the European Union‘s response to Somaliland‘s apparent reinstitution of the death 
penalty after an unofficial moratorium. Commentators were universally opposed to the EU‘s rebuke 
which was seen as an affront both to Islam and the ‗national‘ integrity of Somaliland. At its most 
extreme, the rhetoric from the Hargeysan Mosques stretched to accusations of Western conspiracy: 
foreign exhortations against the application of Shariah interpreted as a plot to promote insecurity in 
Somaliland, fomenting violence amongst the Ummah, who would kill each other or become refugees, 
going to live in camps from which Western agencies or states would benefit
29
. While such radical 
conspiracy narratives (which echo the AS discourse on western humanitarian agencies discussed 
above) cannot be said to be directly representative of wider public opinion on the streets of Hargeysa, 
that they are expressed at all in a religious and media public sphere is significant, particularly in a 
context where sensitivities towards religious fidelity are of great popular importance.  
This glance at Somaliland highlights the salience of conservative religious discourse and 
periodic manifestations of anti-foreign suspicion, in a Somali public sphere that is not characterised 
by the type of endemic violence experienced in many parts of southern Somalia. In Somaliland, the 
socio-cultural influence of reformist Islam operates alongside relative political stability, partisan 
competition and democratic mechanisms. Somaliland‘s governmental and judicial structures 
incorporate elements of Islamic law and all politicians identify as Muslims (as do virtually the entire 
population). Although certain politicians may have a reputation for a more hardline ‗Islamist‘ stance, 
partisan conventions prevent explicit religiously-orientated campaigning. While AS is seen from 
Hargeysa as a problem of ‗Somalia‘ (indicative of insecurity and political mismanagement), aspects 
of the discourses around Islam, Somali ‗culture‘ and foreign influence engineered or exploited by 
these militants are not absent from the Somaliland public sphere.  
As this discussion illustrates, ‗Islamism‘ in Somalia transcends AS militancy, with the 
disappearance of explicitly secular political discourse being a function of historical experience under 
the Barre regime and socio-religious changes which have characterised Somali society through the 
‗failed‘ state period.  Menkhaus has described ‗Somali‘ Islam as the ‗veil lightly worn‘ (2002, 111) 
and emphasised the continued primacy of xeer (customary law) over Shariah. A decade later, while 
recognizing wider socio-religious changes, Anderson follows this logic to assert that AS‘s temporary 
ascendency would be ‗difficult to sustain [as] previous experience in Somalia indicates that Islamic 
fundamentalism will dissipate again when the threat of foreign invasion subsides‘ (Anderson 2012, 
23). AS‘s period of ‗ascendency‘ is, sure enough, over. However, I argue that critiques and fears of 
persistent (or permanent) foreign occupation or intrigue remain highly salient throughout the public 
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spheres of media debate across Somalia. Critiques of this nature against AMISOM were illustrated in 
the previous chapter with reference to the work of cartoonist Amin Amir, an influential commentator 
occupying a generational ideological standpoint otherwise diametrically opposed to that of AS.  
While such narratives are latent (and only sporadically manifest) in the more stable political 
context of Somaliland, they are acutely relevant in south-central Somalia where foreign occupation 
continues alongside the political reconfiguration of the federalisation of Somalia. Some commentators 
in the public sphere emphasise the role of external actors in the counter-insurgency and federalisation 
processes, noting that future Islamist militants - ‗worse‘ that Al Shabaab, and more akin to the 
‗Islamic State‘ - might be able to reclaim the torch of anti-imperialist jihadi nationalism and claim that 
they are defending Somalia‘s interests
30
. These critical discourses range from conspiracy theories 
emphasising the trans-historical dominance of the Ethiopian state over the Somali territory, the 
current Kenyan agenda in south, or the interests of other AMISOM contingents content to take their 
African Union salaries leaving them no good reason to end the conflict and leave Somali soil. In a 
context of media fragmentation and intense suspicion towards outside agendas, rumours and 
misinformation can hold great currency. This is a fact not lost on propagandists, including those who 
support AS. 
 
5.6. Ethno-nationalism and the global jihad: a contradiction in terms? 
External commentary, both academic and journalistic, continues to attempt to predict the trajectory of 
AS militancy, tracing the group‘s apparent ‗decline‘, ‗return‘
31
 or shifting of their primary battlefield 
towards the wider East Africa region (Agbiboa 2015). While certain high profile or spectacular 
attacks – both by and on the group – may influence such fluid speculation, a more sustained reading 
of AS militancy since 2012 shows a consistency and relative operational coherence in their patterns of 
violence, indicative of the fact that Somalia (as an ethnically defined, trans-border constituency) has 
remained a primary focus for the group‘s political ambitions.  
The deployment of particular tropes of ‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist identity is one part of AS‘s 
broad, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory communications strategy designed to maximise the 
range of potential sympathetic audiences both inside Somalia and abroad. In communications 
regarding their ‗operations‘ in Kenya, their narrative speaks both to a ‗Greater Somalia‘ trans-border 
ethnic Somali community (who are all Muslims) and a wider Islamic constituency of Kenyans, not all 
of whom are necessarily Somali.  
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Ambiguities here allow propagandists to play on the history of colonial division of Somalia 
and grievances of the ethnically Somali population of northeastern Kenya, and at the same time 
position the conflict in religious as opposed to ethnic terms. This then encompasses other non-Somali 
Muslims, particularly along the coast who have similarly rooted complaints about ‗Christian‘ Kenyans 
from the interior and their alleged control of land, resources and state institutions. Transnational in 
message, transnational in means, pro-AS propagandists are not adverse to employing international 
media sources or advocacy group materials (such as Al Jazeera English or International Crisis Group) 
to promote their case in this regard, using such material either to justify their cause or demonstrate 
external perceptions of their strength and resilience in the face of counter insurgency efforts
32
.  
The purported struggle for the ‗Global Caliphate‘ and identification with other militant 
Islamist groups (Al Qaeda, for example) jars both practically and ideologically with the Somali ethno-
nationalist tone of much AS-affiliated communication, and may be indicative of the factional 
‗internationalist/nationalist‘ split noted from the outset of the paper. However, in the same way that 
this divide has not seemed to have seriously compromised the military operational capacity of the 
group (particularly the highly centralised, secretive and elite Amniyat intelligence and special 
operations units), the discursive contradictions of their wider communications strategy have served 
not so much as a limitation but rather an enabler of ideological projection to wider potential 
constituencies in the region.  
In assessing both the potential appeal of (and the apparent paradoxes inherent in) discourses 
of nationalist-inspired jihad, it is useful to examine specific designations of ‗Somali‘ culture in the 
above texts in the context of an Islamist insurgency entwined in local (or clan-based) political 
intrigues. The productive practices presented in the films examined above are related to an economic 
conception of ‗Somali‘ resources and ‗traditional‘ practices of both agro-pastoral and pastoral groups. 
This is important in that it straddles different conceptualisations of Somali identity linked to regional 
diversity and the status of  different clan-constructs associating themselves with particular economic 
activities: pastoralism/agro-pastoralism or ‘caste‘-type associations of particular trades. Significant 
here is the discursive distinction often made between the traditionally pastoral ‗Samaale‘ clan-family 
constructs of the Daarood, Dir/Isaaq and Hawiye, and the (‗Sab‘) agro-pastoralist Raxanweyne of the 
inter-riverine areas of the south, as well as other ethnic groups falling outside of this broader Somali 
lineage system. Not being able to engage fully here with the flexibility, fluidity and complexity on the 
ground of these constructs (this is picked up in the subsequent chapter), I simply point out that the AS 
narrative of the material analysed emphasises the shared ‗Somali-ness‘ of the activities discussed, and 
at the same time implicitly highlights the value of impartial application of the Shariah in contexts 
where clan contestation and marginalisation is particularly acute.   
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This is particularly relevant for so-called ‗minority‘ groups who sit outside of the main four 
Somali lineage constructs (Hill 2010) and who will likely continue to be politically marginalised 
through the institutionalised ‗4.5‘ clan-based allocation of positions in the embryonic federal system. 
Such issues influence possible interpretations of the AS propaganda material focusing on somewhere 
like Baraawe; home to such a ‗minority‘ population which may identify itself, to an extent and in 
varying circumstances, outside of the linguistic, cultural, historical or ethnic conceptions of ‗Somali‘ 
identity
33
. AS recruitment from clan groupings who fall into such a ‗minority‘ category or who are 
dissatisfied with their political share in the regional federalisation process is well established, and 
these videos, whilst not naming any specific groups, could be read to contain implicit appeals to 
particular audiences.  
In other propaganda material the appeals to specific ‗minority‘ clan groupings is more 
explicit. Recordings of meetings of the ‗Islamic Governorate of Lower Shabelle‘ depict 
representatives of the historically marginalised Jareer Weyne (described as ‗one of the Somali 
communities‘) pledging allegiance to the jihad
34
. With a similar motive, the Al Furqaan radio 
documentary „Taariikhda dahabiga ah ee ay Beesha Biyamaal ku leedahay la halganka gumeystihii 
Talyaani‟ (The Golden history of the Biimaal Community in the struggle against Italian colonialism) 
appeals to this specific community, currently embroiled in struggles for land in Lower Shabelle 
against the (perceived) Hawiye-dominated State encroaching from Muqdisho
35
. While this particular 
conflict (and clan argumentation in the public sphere in general) is discussed in greater detail in the 
subsequent chapter, integral to this analysis is the way in which such AS communication links 
contemporary micro-contestation to a historical anti-imperialist narrative, one which associates any 
SFG agency with infidel colonisers.   
That the internal coherence of AS is itself, at times, compromised by clan-related intrigues is 
undoubted (Bryden 2014, 5). However, what is of relevance here is the public presentation of 
narratives of ‗traditional‘ political-social organisation alongside jihadi struggle. It is important to draw 
attention to the ways in which pro-AS media often explicitly portrays the group as a mediator between 
or distinct actor vis-á-vis self-defined clan-groupings, all in the context of the ongoing conflict. This 
may take the form of AS facilitating clan reconciliation in areas which it controls or announcements 
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of  clan ‗representatives‘ support for the jihad
36
.  Crucially, there is an amalgamation here of ‗Somali‘ 
and ‗Islamic‘ signifiers of identity, for example, in the apparent application of xeer-based norms of 
inter-clan relations along with the supposedly impartial application of Shariah. These presentations 
gloss over the details of local conflict, defining a wider struggle in terms of a united and homogenous 
ethno-religious community versus foreign ‗infidels‘ and their apostate ‗stooges‘.  
 
5.7. Conclusion  
The objective of this chapter was ambitious: to frame ‗Islamism‘ in the context of public spheres of 
political commentary and debate across the Somali territories. The analysis of the various texts has 
highlighted the various ways in which different actors employ religious-political argumentation, and 
the ways in which these relate to the modern socio-cultural context of Somali Islam. This chapter has 
avoided dichotomising parochial ‗nationalist‘ and grand ‗internationalist‘ agendas of AS. In the 
context of the wider thesis, it instead argues that the inherent trans-nationalism of the imagined ethno-
religious community of the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed (and the associated public sphere) allows these 
discourses to coexist and be used ambiguously to appeal to multiple potentially sympathetic 
audiences.   
This chapter has not asserted that AS retains significant levels of popular support amongst 
‗ordinary‘ Somalis, not least because this would be impossible to quantifiably verify with any degree 
of accuracy. It has instead demonstrated how its propaganda producers utilise narratives of the 
historical division of Somalia and the current exploitation by ‗neo-colonialists‘ of political and 
societal cleavages: discourses which are all prevalent in the wider Somali public spheres of political 
communication and debate, across the territories. The analysis of specific media texts has illustrated 
how the conflict narrative of AS and its application of motifs of Somali ethno-nationalism ‗work‘ in 
the context of political fragmentation and popular perceptions of the prevalence of external 
interference in modern Somalia. The chapter has also demonstrated how ‗Al Shabaab‘ has been 
‗spectralized‘ within this broader Somali-language public sphere, and the ways in which it‘s very 
existence or agency is deployed as a rhetorical trope by state actors such Somaliland or Puntland 
manoeuvring on the wider discursive battlefield of Somali political reconfiguration.  
Whilst AS‘s moment of legitimacy and the potential for rekindling that early support may 
well have passed, a narrative politics which engages explicitly labelled ‗Somali‘ perceptions of 
history and shared ethno-national identity remains potentially at the disposal of other challengers to 
existing and emerging power-holders within a reconfigured federal Somalia. One should not 
underestimate the obstacles that clan and regional real-politick hold for the emergence of any such 
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new or rebranded ‗nationalist‘ contenders for power, nor assume that AS has itself managed to 
transcend these local dynamics of contestation. Nevertheless, these are narratives which fighters 
willingly kill and die for, and simply attributing militant agency to the combination of 
instrumentalisation by elites and blind allegiance of the ‗brain-washed‘ is analytically unsatisfying in 
the broader socio-political context of modern Somalia. The history of the emergence and development 
of AS itself as a fairly diverse cross-clan and effective administrative entity itself testifies to at least 
the future possibility of this type of mobilisation, and the slick propaganda capabilities of media 
organisations sympathetic to its agenda should not be underestimated.  
Uncertainty surrounding political transition in 2016 and the viability of the federal 
reconfiguration process only adds to the potential for conflict and reversal of political and security 
progress made since 2012. Furthermore, dynamics within AS itself - particularly with regard to 
divisions already manifesting themselves over potential affiliations towards the ‗Islamic State‘ and the 
wider international jihadi context – may produce opportunities for new militant actors to emerge onto 
the narrative battlefield explored above.  
Ultimately, whilst one may abhor the violence against civilians which AS‘s conflict narrative 
attempts to legitimize, its ideological appeals to doctrinal clarity and coherence deserve critical 
attention from scholars, as well as policy and humanitarian practitioners working in Somalia. Such 
analysis must foreground both the broader influence of international jihadi mobilisation, as well as 
local conditions conducive to militant Islamist activism - themselves grounded in wider dynamics of 
socio-religious change, shared conceptualisations of historical ethno-religious identity, and popular 











































6. Federalist papers: polemical prose and the politics of division in the 
Somali public sphere 
 
„Dugsi ma leh qabyaaladii waxay dumiso mooyaane‟ 
(Clanism has no benefit, it is only destruction) 




The third and final type of media text explored here is the written Somali-language opinion piece 
(faallo/fikrado/maqaallo). Like Amin Amir‘s cartoons or the multimedia Jihadi propaganda analysed 
in the previous chapters, written polemic political texts circulate within the wider Somali public 
sphere of news and social media. As emphasised in previous chapters, this public sphere can be seen 
to have a dual character: local media production centred in individual capitals of various political 
administrations coexists and overlaps with a transnational arena of Somali-language broadcasting and 
debate. The opinion pieces analysed by this chapter straddle these different levels of the public sphere. 
They may appear online or in print newspapers that are consumed primarily in particular geographical 
locations, but they may also be reproduced across multiple sites with or without the intent of the 
author to reinforce different political narratives or introduce topics deemed by editors and site 
managers to be of interest to wider, often transnational, Somali audiences. The writers of the pieces 
analysed below vary in terms of their background and location: some are young journalists, ‗activists‘ 
and aspiring leaders; others are sitting politicians in Somalia or presidential candidates; others are of 
an older generation and primarily based in diaspora. They are all men, representative of the fact that 
male voices dominate this type of political communication in the public sphere.   
 This chapter analyses a sample of written opinion pieces selected on the basis of the following 
criteria: firstly, each of the texts presented and analysed date from the post-2012 installation of the 
Somali Federal Government in Muqdisho. This period marked a substantive (if highly conflicted) 
shift in the political and military dynamics of state reconstruction and witnessed the constitutional 
emergence of a ‗Federal‘ road map for the reconfiguration of the Somali state. As such, the second 
criteria for selection was a piece‘s explicit discussion of the ‗division‘ of Somalia in clan and/or 
geographical terms. Thirdly, the texts presented here deal with regional politics encompassing each of 
my three fieldwork sites (Somaliland, Puntland, or Muqdisho-centred media) and the relations 
between these entities. Fourthly, they have also each been reproduced across multiple online or print 
formats.  
 One purpose of this sampling is to comparatively explore the ways in which content is 
transmitted and reproduced across a transnational Somali-language public sphere. These texts directly 




engage with how Somali political identities or nationalisms are articulated in relation to factors 
understood to divide the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. Often this division (qaybyaalad) is either 
implicitly or explicitly associated with the genealogical concept of ‗clan‘. The objective of this 
chapter is not to point out the biases or contradictions of rhetorical constructions of ‗clan-speak‘ in 
media texts, but instead examine the the changing relationships that exist between discursive patterns 
visible in media and ongoing political processes. For example, this approach engages the increased 
‗territorialisation‘ of lineage-based politics identified by scholars such as Barnes (2006), Cassanelli 
(2015) and Hoehne (2016) in the post state-collapse era, or institutionalisations of clan-identification 
in modern Somali politics - most notably in the aforementioned, oft-condemned, but persistent ‗4.5‘ 
system of power allocation, a mechanism which remains (for now) fixed at the centre of the political, 
electoral and federal reconfiguration of Somalia.  
 This chapter does not assert that ‗clan‘ is the primary discursive feature of political 
contestation in Somali public spheres. To do so would be to fall into a reductive logic that links all 
drivers of conflict across the Somali territories to supposedly primordial attachments to lineage 
networks of identity, and social organisation. Nonetheless, ideas of ‗clan‘ (qabiil) and (clan) 
‗division‘ (qabyaalad) exist in the public spheres of media and political commentary across and 
beyond the political centres that are the focus of this thesis. If these concepts‘ analytical utility and 
historical-intellectual lineage are hotly debated in Somali studies, then it remains important to 
consider their dynamic and changing positions within the discourses of political actors and 
commentators who live the modern politics of state reconfiguration across Southern Somalia, 
Puntland and Somaliland. People in these political environments make arguments about ‗clan‘ or 
‗clanism‘: they write books and editorials, make films or draw cartoons in which these concepts are 
presented as nouns, adjectives, even verbs; they form organisations to combat the very existence of 
‗tribalism‘. The previous chapters have already introduced tropes of ‗division‘ in these specific 
discursive contexts and have positioned these ideas alongside other narrative tropes of cultural or 
religious ethno-nationalism.  
Whilst there is literature that deals with partisan political communication in the Somali media 
(often with a focus on the diaspora), there is relatively little discursive analysis of how narratives 
based around ‗division‘ are actually constructed. Osman (2015), for example, uses a primarily 
quantitative approach in recording the type or frequency of specific arguments, in terms of 
‗mobilisation‘, ‗solidarity‘ or ‗recognition‘. Whilst recognising their value, I avoid such typologies, 
sacrificing breadth for more in-depth critical discourse analysis of specific texts. This analysis looks at 
how vocabularies of clan are used in political commentary and news media: what can be named, how, 
when, to which ends, what has changed? Following earlier reflections on the inherently transnational 
character of Somali news media, the chapter again problematises the straightforward distinction 
between diasporic and ‗local‘ media production. The commentators discussed below come from 
different geographical and generational backgrounds and maintain different types of links with the 




diaspora: some are local journalists and activists, others are firmly situated abroad, others straddle 
these worlds and move back and forth for different commercial, personal, educational or ‗civil 
society‘ purposes. 
This chapter argues that there exists a dynamic and dialectical relationship - visible in the 
public sphere - between one perceived element of Somali political culture (clan), and notions of 
Somali cultural homogeneity. ‗Clanism‘ in the texts explored here is usually conceptualised as a 
primary factor explaining conflict and the political fragmentation of Somalia. This is accompanied by 
implicit assertions of the socio-cultural ubiquity of lineage identifications, thus contributing to the 
maintenance of particular presentations of Somali identity that emphasise cultural homogeneity. The 
Somali ‗nation‘ is at once destroyed and remade in narratives of ‗clanism‘. As clan or clanism is 
conceptualized as a feature of ‗Somali‘ identity it enters into a wider discursive environment 
preoccupied with the division of the ethnically-defined Somali population over multiple political 
boundaries. Here discourses of ‗division‘ interact with narratives of ethno-nationalism and Islamism 
as purported remedies to what is presented as a political-cultural malaise - a concept ubiquitous, even 
institutionalised, yet also constantly lamented over and critiqued.  
  The chapter proceeds with an overview of scholarly debates in Somali studies on the nature of 
‗clan‘ division and its utility as a frame of analysis for modern politics. This discussion positions and 
justifies the discursive and regional comparative approach adopted by this chapter. This is followed 
by an examination of the genre of polemic prose in the modern Somali public sphere, situated within a 
wider history of Somali literary culture and political communication. Many of these forms of 
production have been introduced by previous chapters and have played a role in longstanding debates 
over the tension between ‗clan‘ and ‗nationalist‘ identity. Analysis is offered of the changing ways in 
which texts circulate through different layers of the Somali public sphere and how this ‗public‘ itself 
is constructed. Several texts are then presented and analysed which speak to (or engage with) 
audiences in Southern Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. Aside from discourse analysis of content, 
the discussion highlights the different identities of the writers and – in Barber‘s terms – what these 
texts say, do and are (2007, 200). 
 
6.2. Conceptualising ‘Qaybyaalad’ in Somali studies 
Recognition of the sensitivities which surround the controversial topics or clan or clanism is vital, 
particularly given the unreconciled legacy of the types of violence (outlined in Chapter one) that 
precipitated and followed the collapse of the Somali state. Kapteijns recounts how a non-Somali 
scholar greatly angered a Somali audience at an academic conference in 1993 by citing poetry 
mentioning particular clan identities. Participants became furious and ‗indignantly pointed out that 
they considered neither his speech nor that of the poets he quoted legitimate in the context of 
simultaneously shared public Somali space‘ (Kapteijns 2012, 54). The writings or arguments 
presented in this chapter have been produced for what is - theoretically, at least – a shared public 




Somali space: either in online news media accessible to anyone with an internet connection and 
knowledge of the language, or in print media in socially diverse urban centres. The arguments 
advanced in these texts may be primarily intended for certain audiences, and their provocative 
sensationalism may in part be influenced by the aforementioned commercial logics of tabloid-style 
‗clickbait‘ production. Nevertheless, their existence in a wider and truly public sphere influences the 
rhetorical strategies used, and their appeals for (logical or emotive) legitimacy are usually pitched to a 
broader audience often defined in the terms of Soomaalinimo or Ummadda Soomaaliyeed.  
 Conceptualising tropes of division in ‗macro‘ and ‗micro‘ terms can, at times, be helpful for 
understanding their existence in the wider Somali media ecology.  ‗Macro‘ level narratives of clan-
political contestation revolve around the conceptualisation of political identities based on the broadest 
level of the segmentary patrilineal genealogical system of abtirso/abtirsiino (the counting of one‘s 
forefathers back to a common ancestor). This encompasses the idea that there exist four major Somali 
‗clan families‘ spread out across the Somali Horn of Africa. These ‗clan-families‘, which are divided 
down into the myriad clan and sub-clan groupings, are characterised at this ‗top‘ level as being of the 
Daarood, the Dir (which may or may not include the Isaaq, itself a politically charged question in 
relation to the identity of an entity such as Somaliland, see Elmi 2010, 29), the Hawiye, and the 
Raxanweyne (otherwise known by its two constituent segments, the Digil & Mirifle).  
 As noted in previous chapters, the Daarood, Dir/Isaaq and the Hawiye have been traditionally 
referred to as the ‗Samaale‘ clan families, conceived of as being characterised by their historic 
association with nomadic pastoralism. This is in contrast to the ‗Sab‘ categorisation of the 
Raxanweyne
1
 (and other so-called minority ethnic or caste-based groups falling outside of the main 
Somali lineages) who are predominantly sedentary agro-pastoralists and concentrated in the inter-
riverine areas of southern Somalia. Samatar alludes to the prestige of the former identity construct in 
stating that ‗even those clan families, such as the Digil and Rahanweyne in Southern Somalia, many 
members of whom do not trace their genealogy directly to Samaale, readily identify themselves as 
Somalis, thereby accepting, at least in a symbolic sense, the primacy of Samaale, as the forebear of 
the Somali people‘ (1991, 13).  This reinforces the discourse that the very word ‗Soomaali‘ derives 
from one side of this imprecise and pejorative binary categorisation, thus placing a predominantly 
pastoralist culture at the centre of many people‘s imaginations of Somali identity. Colonial structures 
and advancements of suffrage in the process of decolonisation historically privileged the 
predominantly ‗northern‘ pastoralist clans at the expense of southern agriculturalists (Laitin & 
Samatar 1987, 65), while Ahad‘s (2015) recent analysis of the Deelley poetic debate in the context of 
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 For a discussion of the difference in clanship conceptions and structure amongst the Raxanweyne (Reewin) in 
contrast to ‘“standard Somali” notions of descent’ see Helander 1997 (132). Whilst the validity of the claims 
(or generalisations) may be interrogated further, this serves an example of the discursive definition of this 
group outside of the predominantly ‘pastoral’ framework of the other historically dominant clan families.    




the Barre‘s revolutionary, nationalist state demonstrates the discursive reification of pastoralist 
heritage (and conceptions of kinship) at the heart of this project.  
 This basic discursive division of peoples also has an important linguistic component which 
has been noted in previous chapters. The ‗Samaale‘ clans predominantly speak different dialects of Af 
Maxaa Tiri, the ‗Somali‘ that became standardized by Barre‘s military regime, whereas Af Maay is 
the mother tongue of many of the Raxanweyne, particularly in the agricultural inter-riverine areas of 
the south. The question of whether or not Af Maay and Af Maxaa Tiri are different Somali ‗dialects‘ 
or, in fact, should be considered different languages, is one that continues to bedevil both linguists and 
activists. The debate carries great emotive weight for those who emphasise the marginalisation of 
Maay speaking communities in the wider political history of Somalia (Kusow, 1995). That there 
remains a debate as to the proper classification of the tongues is indicative of the fact that they are 
significantly different from each other and are largely mutually unintelligible. The historical 
formalisation of Af Maxaa Tiri and the development of literature in this script (as we have seen, at the 
heart of the Somali nation state project) has both furthered the cultural dominance of discourses of 
pastoral cultural heritage and has created the ‗Somali-language‘ public sphere that this thesis engages 
with. Given constraints on research and a far more limited range of written material in this language, 
the current status of Af Maay is in need of detailed research (beyond the scope of this study). Of 
particular interest would be the relationship between a Maxaa Tiri lingua franca, and everday 
experiences of political administration and the development of new regional state strcutures
2
. The 
consolidation of the Southwest State (where the majority of Maay speakers reside) and improved 
security conditions may make such research (which has recently only been possible in refugee camps 
across the border in Ethiopia) possible in the coming years (Yetbarek 2017).  
 This brief overview belies a wealth of diversity and contestation over categorisations which 
will be addressed as I review the relevant debates in the literature below. Nevertheless, the texts that I 
examine emanate from administrative centres that are all dominated by the so-called ‗Samaale‘ clan 
families, and thus, in general, narratives from ‗minorities‘ or predominantly agro-pastoralist 
populations are not directly engaged with in the analysis. The historical influence of the dominance of 
the pastoral cultural heritage within the Somali nation-state project thus remains in the background of 
this analysis of modern political discourse, and, as we shall see, the ‗Samaale‘/‘Sab‘ distinction does 
not operate as explicit mobilising political identity. What is of interest to this chapter is the extent to 
which other ‗macro‘ distinctions made between the dominant Somali clan-families find direct 
expression in media texts in the public spheres of different political centres. Polemics based, for 
example, on the historical agency of the beelaha Hawiye (the Hawiye clans, indicating their 
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 In my own professional experiences working in prisons in Baydhabo (capital of the new Southwest state), I 
was able to use Maxaa Tiri as a working language for basic communication with authorities and detainees for 
whom the majority had Maay as a mother tongue. This is indicative of the continued dissemination and 
dominance of Maxaa Tiri in media and politics, even in the context of prolonged state collapse.  




subdivision down through the genealogical system), or the disputed conceptualisation of a supposed 
Daaroodnimo (the clan identity fixed as a noun in the discourse, analogous to constructions of 
Soomaalinimo as an expression of shared ethno-cultural heritage and solidarity) can be found in 
written political commentary or analysis. Although the legitimacy of invoking such labels in shared 
Somali space may be disputed, it is clear they exist as operationalise-able categories in the rhetoric of 
some actors, particularly in polemic discussions of the political history of modern Somalia and 
geographical dispersals of power. Even more concretely, these ‗macro‘ labels of clan families are 
institutionalised in the reconfiguration of an emerging federal Somalia through the continuing use of 
the ‗4.5‘ system of representative quotas in indirect elections. As noted in previous chapters, the 
media plays an important role here in reproducing these ambiguous and semi-official categories, for 
example, in the listing of clan details of politicians appointed in Muqdisho or the southern Federal 
regions through such mechanisms.   
 Alongside these grand portrayals of clan-family agency, regional dominance or political 
strategising can be found ‗micro‘ articulations of clan interests at a local or sub-clan (and so on) level. 
These may constitute intra clan-family tensions (for example, the presentations of competing clan 
identities amongst the Isaaq who are the largest clan constituency in Somaliland) or be seen at the 
level of neighbourhood politics in Muqdisho where different power-holders (for instance competing 
Habir Gedir, Abgaal or Murusade lineages of the Hawiye) manoeuvre amongst re-emerging state 
structures.  The same multiplicity, fluidity, and contingency of potential clan conflict or alliance 
emphasised in academic literature (Luling 2006, 474) is found in the types of contestation that are 
presented and commented on in the media.  As the texts below demonstrate, these narratives of intra-
clan contestation often overlap with presentations of the bigger regional picture and overly rigid 
distinctions between these ‗macro‘ and ‗mirco‘ narratives can prove analytically problematic. For this 
reason, I highlight the co-existence of grand narratives that involve wider definitions of clan-family 
agency, alongside local contestation which may be placed in this wider political context.  
 Luling emphasises the fluidity of the clan ‗system‘ in terms of alignments of actors and 
argues that whilst an abstract notion of ‗clanship‘ cannot explain conflict in Somalia or the line-ups of 
contesting actors it can, however, ‗define the possibilities for lining up‘ (2006, 472). She uses a 
Geertzian conception of primordialism and stresses the perceived naturalness in society of this system 
of genealogical identification. This echoes Lewis‘ description of ‗invisible differences‘ contrasted 
with ‗visible differences‘ of ethnicity, culture, language and religion which Western observers expect 
to be decisive (Lewis, 2004). Such ‗primordial‘ conceptions, according to Lewis, actually emphasise 
the rationality of the social system that encompasses mechanisms of war and peace-making, social 
identity and welfare. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this type of analysis challenges accounts of the 
primordial which assume an inevitability of thoughtless or irrational violence as the basis of identity 
formation and collective agency. 




 Luling asserts that the primary dynamics of ‗most Somali conflicts‘ have revolved around 
these genealogical ‗invisible differences‘ between clans within the Somali lineage structure. Whilst 
such conflicts are differentiated from those involving those groups such as the Bantu/Jareer or the 
various Benadiri communities whose genealogies are imagined to be outside of this system, she 
acknowledges that it has often been these groups which have suffered disproportionately in ensuing 
phases of violence and land-grabbing (2006, 472). These latter groups are themselves highly diverse 
and often identified by misleading or pejorative labels. What is most instructive for this chapter‘s 
analysis of political communication is Luling‘s commentary on the appropriation by these groups of 
the vocabularies of clan representation. Luling highlights the linguistic logic of the self description of 
the Bantu, for instance, as a beel or qowmiyad (clan/ethnicity) for the purpose of securing 
representation within the then Transitional Federal Government (Ibid 481). Chapter four noted the 
designation of Beesha Shanaad (the 5th clan/community) to denote all ‗minority‘ groups in receipt of 
their half share of representation (compared to the main clan families) in the ‗4.5‘ system and this 
naming highlights conventions by which groups in Somalia are co-opted into a governmental system 
defined by the genealogical constructs most characteristic of the pastoral, ‗northern‘ clan families. 
 The concept of primordialism generated scholarly controversy in the immediate post-1991 
period as scholars scrambled to explain the explosion of societal violence that followed the fall of the 
military regime. These debates were epitomised by the heated confrontation between Lewis and 
Besteman, clashing over interpretations of clan-identity and mobilisations of violence. Lewis 
described Besteman‘s account - of how conflict in Somalia was ‗othered‘ as primordial savagery in 
contemporary US media coverage - as ‗doing violence to ethnography‘ and asserted that she had 
misunderstood the fundamental and yet fluid historical-social structures of lineage networks in the 
context (Lewis 1998). Lewis attempted to flip the terms of the debate on ‗primordialism‘ by accusing 
Besteman herself of an evolutionist perspective which (in her emphasis on class and race) painted clan 
identity in terms of pre-civilized irrationality. Lewis argued that one can conceive of clan both as 
holding a ‗supreme moral force‘ for people who view it as a ‗natural fact‘, without it standing inimical 
to a political ‗modernity‘ of contingent alignments and material interests (1998, 105). Besteman‘s 
reply focused on Lewis‘s ‗primordialist blinders‘ which precluded adequate focus on the particular 
dynamics of colonial-driven social change and the development of 20th Century state structures as 
factors which influenced post-state collapse violence – a period historically distinct from the 
centuries-old examples cited in his initial critique (Besteman 1998, 109).  
 Barnes contextualises the Lewis/Besteman exchange in his exploration of the concept of u 
dhashay/ku dhashay: the notions of being born ‗to‘ a place or being born ‗in‘ a place which have 
changed over time in meaning and significance for clan and territoriality (2006, 496). He notes that 
the application of the u dhashay/ku dhashay shorthand on contemporary (southern) clan-conflicts 
constitutes a historicity that is ―neither ‗invented tradition‖ nor the wilful imposition of ―primordialist 
blinders‖‘ (2006, 496). Instead, Barnes highlights how these two foreign scholars‘ positions actually 




epitomised the wider generational, geographical and theoretical rifts which were opening up within 
Somali studies. Lewis, whose career stretched back to the British colonial administration for which he 
worked, was long the doyen of the field and represented a largely northern-centric lens of ‗Somali‘ 
studies (Kapteijns 2004). These perspectives traditionally privileged the cultural heritage of nomadic 
pastoralism (including, as it does, the classic segmentary lineage system of the so called ‗Samaale‘ 
clan families) and its influence on the political-sociology of a wider Somalia. In anti and post-colonial 
struggles this focus was itself of political utility in its emphasis on nationalist homogeneity and the 
legitimisation of the pan/Greater Somali project – the ‗invention‘ of Somalia, as Ahmed et al. would 
have it (1995). Kapteijns argues that the colonial understanding of clanship (that Lewis exemplified), 
far from being vindicated by the seemingly primordial clan dynamics of the civil war, was itself 
responsible for influencing the ‗self-views‘ of many Somalis to the extent that this made possible such 
forms of violence (2004, 1).  
 Besteman, according to Barnes, represented a younger generation of scholars whose 
fieldwork sites were concentrated in the south with groups outside of the major pastoralist lineages. 
Their work, informed by the disproportionate suffering and victimisation of these groups in the 
maelstrom of post-1991 violence, emphasised instead the social, linguistic, economic, ethnic and 
racial heterogeneity of the Somali territories. This approach often revisits the inherent divisions 
dismissed, ignored or suppressed by the post-colonial Somali nationalist project in an attempt to 
explain the prolonged nature of state-collapse, seemingly intractable conflict and the difficulties 
apparent in the reconstruction of a unitary Somali nation-state (Luling 1997; Kusow 2004; Hesse 
2010; Eno et al 2010, Balthasar 2014). The modern salience of these post-independence discourses 
has been highlighted in Chapter 2‘s discussion of the rebooting of potentially contested motifs (such 
as the pastoral Maandeeq idyll) by #Cadaanstudies academic activists.   
 Barnes‘ argument emphasises heterogeneity and he issues a ‗call to take back the dominant 
framework of genealogy studies to local contexts‘ (2006, 487). Although I agree that a more localised 
focus can yield valuable results, I instead position this contribution on discourses of division in the 
wider comparative frame. As Kapteijns (2004) emphasises, discourses of clan are never fixed or 
static, and they constantly engage with the broader history of Somali nationalist identity formation 
examined in previous chapters. To comparatively analyse modern discourses of ethno-nationalism 
(and associated critiques of ‗clanism‘) does not equate to accepting any narrative of Somali 
homogeneity or the ubiquity and timelessness of a northern or pastoralist-centric paradigm of lineage 
relations. Instead, the objective here is to explore what is ‗rolled into‘ narratives of division in this 
particular (and distinctive) post-2012 period of tangible political reconfiguration (Ibid, 4). The 
ongoing reconstruction of the Somali Federal Government thus gives warrant to research the ways in 
which nationalist discourses - in new forms of media - are being revived, utilised or altered from past 
configurations.  
 




6.3. Genre and the media ecology 
As its primary source base this chapter examines written print and digital polemical prose that 
circulates in the wider Somali public sphere of news media. As emphasised in first two chapters, the 
historical predominance of oral forms of literature and argumentation in Somali culture has long 
meant that written texts have been viewed as a less prestigious, less developed, and less widely 
disseminated mode of cultural production (Afrax 1987, 272). Samatar emphasises the pastoralist‘s 
traditional distain for the written language and the importance placed in Somali poetry on effective 
memorisation and live performance: ‗[the pastoralist] is aware of his superiority to his urbanized 
countrymen in this respect [and] tends to ridicule literate people for being too dependent on written 
symbols as aids for remembering. They maintain, perhaps not without justice, that writing has a 
dulling effect on the mind‘ (1982, 32). The relatively recent formalisation of the Somali orthography, 
traditionally low literacy rates and the limited distribution of newspapers or books has historically 
limited the social penetration of written texts and maintained the prestige of oral poetic discourse.  
 Nevertheless, concerns over the preservation and continued vitality of the Somali language 
have long provoked intellectuals to advocate for the development and expansion of written literary 
and journalistic production. Such efforts can be traced back to figures such as Maxamed Daahir Afrax 
pioneering new forms of novelised fiction (1981) and written literary criticism in Barre-era 
newspapers (1987, 272), and are ongoing in the post-1991 context where political collapse and 
fragmentation has degraded the capacity of the state to promote and preserve the Somali language in 
education systems or national archives. Chapter three‘s discussion of the recent phenomenon of 
‗international book fairs‘ - led by Hargeysa and recently being adopted in Garoowe and Muqdisho -
highlights the energies of both civil society and state-like administrations in the promotion of the 
written Somali language. Although these events serve as showcase for a much broader canon of oral 
literary culture, their emphasis on books illustrates the role that the preservation and development of 
written texts is imagined to play in the preservation of the Somali language itself.  
 Although vibrant print media exists or is emerging in the three research sites (as outlined in 
Chapter three) it is, arguably, the emergence of Somali cyberspace that has had the greatest impact on 
the modern use of written Somali political communication (Isse-Salwe 2008). Significant numbers of 
people are engaged in producing written content – often the type of opinion pieces or editorials 
discussed here – that discuss political developments across the Somali territories. The sheer number of 
websites that exist, and the frequent reproduction of content across multiple sites (and into print) 
indicates a popular demand for this type of writing. As elsewhere, profit margins for commercial 
journalism are slim, and this explains the circulation of content (with or without the permission of 
authors) and a frequent preference for sensationalist headlines – or ‗clickbait‘ – to attract the online 
traffic that will generate advertising revenues. With this in mind, it has been noted that online 
platforms tend to facilitate the proliferation of ‗diasporated‘ hate-speech and clan-based polemic 
(Osman 2015) that might offend significant segments of audiences in the wider Somali language 




public sphere. Whilst this may at times be true, there remains a great diversity in the tone and intent of 
the texts explored in this chapter, as well as in the background and location of the writers. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that the canon of poetic political discourse also includes 
‗non-prestigious‘ forms of oratory that Samatar characterises as ‗diatribe‘, ‗provocation‘ and ‗curse‘ 
(1982, 74). It is not the purpose of this chapter to designate certain pieces as examples of ‗hate-
speech‘ or otherwise, but rather reflect on the ways in which the modern media environment 
facilitates different forms of political communication and the interplay of different types of texts. The 
pieces discussed here themselves draw on a much broader literary heritage of poetry and proverbs. 
These texts circulate alongside images, videos and advertisements which also play a role in 
structuring the media environment of which they are a part.  
The intersection of multiple forms of content in the modern Somali written media ecology can 
be seen in different uses of the proverb quoted at the beginning of the chapter decrying the destructive 
nature of (clan) division.  The renowned nationalist poet Abwaan Cabdilaahi Suldaan Maxamed 
Timacadde provided a distinctive contemporary commentary on the local and international context of 
colonial rule in Africa as well as the euphoria and difficulties of the post-independence era. Aside 
from introducing the vivid idiom of Maandeeq, the she-camel embodying national liberation and 
sustenance, the poet continuously tied the Somali struggle for independence into the wider world of 
colonial geopolitics
3
. Similar interplay between the local and global is evident in many of the texts 
explored below, and I have seen this particular proverb reproduced in written forms in the public 
sphere that range from polemical prose and civil society publications, to cartoons and university toilet 
cubicle graffiti. Recently, the line appeared on my Twitter news-feed, quoted by the Anti-Tribalism 
Movement, a Somali civil society organisation based in Somalia and in the diaspora, committed to 
‗educating and raising awareness about the effects of tribalism [clanism] within communities‘
4
. When 
I subsequently met ATM activists in London, they were busy preparing the distribution of prints of 
Amin Amir‘s cartoons across different locations in Somalia as part of an ‗awareness raising‘ initiative 
on the dangers of ‗tribalism‘ in politics and society
5
. Once again, this illustrates the complex 
circulation and interplay of different texts in the Somali public sphere and their deployment by third 
parties for particular agendas.  
Many of the writers of the texts explored below may consider themselves to be part of this 
wider Somali ‗civil society‘, and similarly, many are located in the diaspora. However, instead of 
using this amorphous and contested notion of civil society sphere of organisation between the state 
and the family (Kasfir 1998; Lewis 2002) to conceptualise where these writings are coming from in 
the transnational Somali context, this analysis attempts to understand the position of these writers as 
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individuals contributing content into a vast and largely unregulated space of public sphere debate. 
Barber‘s approach to the analysis of ‗tin-trunk‘ writings in African history – everyday texts, produced 
by ‗ordinary‘ but often prolific individuals for public consumption and private archiving – is useful 
here in conceptualising what writings in the wider Somali public sphere ‗do‘ (Barber 1997). Here one 
must consider not only the rhetorical point of the text itself, but the function the act of writing and 
disseminating serves for the author. In some instances the stereotype of the embittered man in the 
diaspora shouting into the online vacuum to vicariously ‗recreate conflict‘ (Osman 2015) may well be 
accurate. In a different diasporic context, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie provides a stinging but 
poignant caricature of this type of character in her novel Americannah. She describes ‗Nigerians in 
bleak houses in America‘ who despite their yearly ego-burnishing trips back to Africa ‗fight on the 
internet over their mythologies of home, because home was now a blurred place between here and 
there, and at least online they could ignore the awareness of how inconsequential they had become‘ 
(2014, 117).  Nonetheless, the diversity of backgrounds of the writers explored below should caution 
against sweeping generalisations. It should also invite greater attention to be paid to how and why 
texts circulate in the ways that they do, the particular ways and circumstances in which certain 
rhetorical tropes (clan, division, the Somali ‗nation‘) are used, and the impact this has a on a wider 
discursive environment and media ecology. In the rough ‗Southern Somalia/Puntland/Somaliland‘ 
territorial categorisations of the texts (problematised and justified in Chapter two) many perspectives 
are left out. This chapter offers an overview of certain predominant and interacting discourses and – 
given the historical and contemporary sensitivity of many of these topics - it should go without saying 
that the inclusion of any argument does not equate to an endorsement or validation of any truth claim 
made within.    
 
6.4. Lament in the capital: critiques of division from Muqdisho 
Axmed Cabdihaaddi‘s article in Muqdisho‘s Xaqiiqa Times newspaper, entitled „Maxaa dhacaya 
haddii lafeydo cowrada qabiilka?‟ (What happens if clan is uncovered?)
6
, constitutes a cultural auto-
critique of the conventions of clan discourse that are the subject of this chapter, and highlights the 
aura of taboo around mention of clan identities in the public sphere. This piece, from a young 
freelance journalist in Muqdisho (who also works in public relations for the Somali International 
University), is different from the other texts explored below in that it is a direct comment on the 
conventions of communication (or silence) around clan issues. Presented in a satirical fashion and 
adopting the analogy of the body politic, the writer describes clan as the ‗genitals‘ of the Somali 
Ummah (‗cowrada qabiilka‟): a source of shame requiring concealment. He elucidates these tensions 
by arguing that whilst Somalis are careful not to mention clan directly in their speech, when conflict 
arises (or peacemaking, or distribution of resources) it becomes a primary point of reference to fall 
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back to. Evocative of the metaphorical language of the Deelley poetic debates of 1979-1980 (Ahad 
2015, 133) clan is described the burden camel that has escaped with its load and is in need of training 
(„si awrkan buubaalka ah „qabiilka‟ loo leyliyo‟). He describes this as a process which can only start 
with open debate about how people can live together. As it is the concealed nature of the discourse 
that ‗makes sparks fly‘, he makes facetious calls for various steps to be taken: making one day of the 
year the ‗day of the clan‘, where Somalis all over the Horn of Africa can recite literature, jokes and 
engage in open debate about clan; making it normal for clan to be read/spoken about in media and in 
education curricula; including clan in personal ID documents; and establishing a museum to store all 
of the customs of the Somali clans!  The writer here uses humour to speak the tension that exists in 
social and political communication between the perceived ubiquity of clan identities and the 
parameters of debate which render so much unspoken.  
 In fact, and as the subsequent texts illustrate, much is in fact said in the public spheres of 
political communication. As such and in contrast to the above piece, it is rare to find contemporary 
political commentary as explicit in specific group identity presentation as the opinion piece ‗Somali 
national identity and the problem suffered by the Hawiye!‘ by Caballah Salaad ‗Kuugey‘, published 
on Keydmedia (a Muqdisho and diaspora-based website)
7
. The writer - based in the UK diaspora and 
founder of a cookie-cutter style Somali news website (Coomaad online) - begins his lament at the 
current state of Somali affairs (as so many others do) by recounting the fall of the military government 
of Siyaad Barre. He asserts that the various Jadhadadii freedom fighter groups (including the SSDF, 
SNM and USC) shared the same grievances against the regime, which fought back bringing suffering 
to innocent civilians. The polemic is premised on the idea that the ‗Hawiye‘ (nominally embodied by 
the USC, and not internally differentiated) held fast to the idea of Soomaalinimo in the aftermath of 
state collapse, in contrast to the ‗Isaaq‘ (SNM) and the ‗Daarood‘ (specifically the Majeerteen-
dominated SSDF) who pursued their own clan-region interests and cooperated with the Ethiopians to 
fulfil their goals. The writer asserts that the Hawiye were stuck in a situation of ‗laba daran mid 
dooro‟, having to choose between two bad options: abandonment either of clan or national interest. 
The writer argues that the ensuing conflict has led the Ummad Soomaaliyeed to believe that the 
Hawiye do not want governance, ‗however, today it is as clear as daylight that it is them who do not 
want government, unity or Somali nationalism‘ ( i.e. those accusers from other clans who make-up the 
Somali Ummah). 
The piece specifically attacks the SSDF which it accuses not of affiliation to a shared 
Daarood identity, but rather a specific Majeerteen sub-clan solidarity (‗Majeerteenimo‟) as shown by 
their alleged abandonment of their Daarood (Ogadeen) kinsmen fighting for freedom in ‗Western 
Somalia‘ (Soomaaliya Galbeed, Zone 5 of Ethiopia, AKA the ‗Ogaden‘ region). The writer draws a 
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direct link between the SSDF and the formation of the state of Puntland which he describes as being 
led solely by the Maajeerteen to the exclusion of other groups. The SSDF interests were, he argues, 
literally ‗clanic‘ (danaha...beelaysan ah) and the writer cites historical examples, clearly conflating 
SSDF identity with the Majeerteen: ‗they [the SSDF] were the first clan to kill a Somali president and 
the first to raise a foreign flag‘
8
. This piece presents a seemingly monolithic Hawiye identity 
construct, while at the same time both disaggregating the agency of the Maajeerteen within the wider 
Daarood clan family, and playing a nationalist card attributing problems of political/clan division to 
the role of foreign interests. The tension between such an explicitly clan family construct-based 
narrative and the nationalist appeal on which it bases its legitimacy is particularly striking, however 
this is a characteristic of numerous other examples of rhetoric which single out particular groups for 
criticism of their allegedly divisive clan-inspired political manoeuvring.    
The deployment of similar historical arguments in the context of current political intrigue can 
be seen in the reporting by the same website of a speech by Somali/Canadian peace activist and poet 
Maxamuud Siyaad Togane, quoted as stating that ‗it was the Daarood clan which destroyed the 
Somali‘
9
. Togane is a controversial figure whose poetry has been criticised in the past for a 
confrontational and provocative style. Kapteijns (2012) asserts that this simply reflects his 
acknowledgement of the continued salience of clan-narratives of conflict
10
. Here, however, it is the 
mode of reporting of Togane‘s speech, rather than that individual himself, that is the focus of analysis. 
The news story contains no details of the location or date of the speech, and the picture used of the 
speaker is not likely to have been taken from the event (it shows Togane apparently in Puntland, 
standing in front of a banner showing former Puntland President Faroole and the administration‘s 
emblem).  
Familiar historical events - such as the 1969 assassination of President Sharmaarke and the 
bombardment of Hargeysa - are attributed to (undifferentiated) Daarood protagonists and these are 
linked to the current political machinations of a clique known as the ‗Cakaara Action Group‘ (English 
phrase used) who are described as ‗extremists who believe in clan ideology‘ (‗Koox xagjireen ah oo 
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rumeysana mabda‟ qabiil ah‟). The speaker names allegedly prominent members of this group 
(‗Daarood villains‘) and accuses them of gathering funds to bribe Members of Parliament in favour of 
the then embattled Prime Minister Cabdiweli Sheikh Axmed
11
. In relation to the dispute between the 
President and this former PM in question (Cabdiweli Sheikh), other commentators reported the 
secretive financial role of this ‗Cakaara‘ group in allegedly changing character of the contestation 
from ‗political‘ to ‗clan-based‘. In this account the clan concept becomes a verb (‗to clan-ify‘) 
illustrating not some primordial logic of clan-identification in political institutions, but rather the 
influence of money in creating a clan-based dynamic of contestation
12
. 
  Although the accuracy of the reporting can easily be challenged - based as it is on 
anonymous sources (‗People who know information‘) – this style of writing is illustrative of a public 
sphere in which conspiracy theories surrounding clan-cliques and factional intrigue are rife and find 
fertile ground for reproduction. Numerous interview respondents in Muqdisho (and elsewhere) 
demonstrated popular perceptions of political corruption at the centre of government, and with the 
absence of a tangible party system many are left to speculate on the role of various factional (clan-
based or Islamist) associations who operate in the highly securitised corridors of power. The 
assassination of MPs has been a frequent occurrence in Muqdisho
13
 and whilst responsibility for such 
killings is usually claimed by AS, the wider Somali rumour mill is constantly alive with conspiracy 
theories of political intrigue and corruption.  
Surveying broader perspectives on the political reconfiguration of Somalia, the points raised 
in another diaspora-based writer‘s opinion piece are characteristic of many of the arguments decrying 
the Federalisation project led from Muqdisho with the support of international backers
14
. Xaashi 
Yassiin Cismaan‘s lament of „war wareeey!!‟ amalgamates the vocabularies of clan, religion and 
cultural contestation in a call to action against foreign intervention and the division of Somalia, the 
image of which is presented with a metaphor of the human body and spirit. This body politic device is 
here initiated with the graphic description of a physical illness which is then linked to the fate of 
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Somalia: he asks „ma keligay baa ka haray bukaankii caalamka?‟ (‗Is it just me who has been left as 
the patient of the world?‘).  
In describing the collapse of the Somali state, Cismaan employs the commonly heard 
description of the Somali nation of ‗opening up‘ (or being taken apart - „Markii Soomaalidu kala 
furfurantay...‟). Not only does this image fit with the earlier surgical metaphors but it captures the 
sense of vulnerability of Ummadda Soomaaliyeed to external manipulation or defilement that is 
emphasised in so many of the texts explored here. After this ‗opening up‘ the writer asserts that 
everyone has reverted to the territory of their clan („degaanka rooxaantiisa (qabiilkiisa)‟). The use of 
rooxaan in this context is telling: its literal meaning is ‗spirit‘ and this imbues the concept of clan 
genealogies with a metaphysical significance (for the body politic) which the writer returns to as he 
proceeds. The failure of the ubiquitous ‗4.5‘ system to facilitate agreement or reconciliation is 
described as inevitable, and the writer argues that if this status quo persists then the Somali nation will 
come to be known as the ‗Somali countries‘, in same way that the ‗Arab countries‘ are referred to 
collectively today. The use of global geopolitical comparisons is a common feature of many of these 
examples of political commentary. Accounts might reference, for instance, the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, the dispersal of the Kurdish population or the impact of the colonial Sykes-Picot 
agreement on the contemporary Middle East, consistently situating the Somali predicament in terms 
of external influence over a divided Somali ethno-nation
15
. 
The homogeneity of this imagined community is set out in no uncertain terms in the writer‘s 
polemic: „Soomaalidu waa ummad isku isir ah oo wadaagta taariikh, dhaqan, hidde, af iyo diin ba‟ 
(‗The Somalis are an Ummah of the same ancestry who share a history, culture, heritage, language 
and religion‘). With Ummadda Soomaaliyeed so defined, the writer argues that it is this community 
that must build the nation and he re-invokes the body metaphor to argue that what is required is a 
‗central‘ nervous system to ensure state functionality, as opposed to a ‗federal nervous system‘. The 
writer specifically addresses religious scholars – clearly indicative of the importance he places on 
their role – and speaks to them about their shared experience (as Somalis) of clan. He attempts to 
explain the way in which different people orientate themselves towards or mobilise around clan: 
„Waad og tihiin, inaan kulligeen, haddaan Soomaali nahay, aan Rooxaan wada qabno. Laakiinse isku 
si nooma wada hayso‟ (‗You know that all of us, if we are Somali, engage with clan together. 
However, we do so in different ways‘). He asserts that for 50% of people, their ‗clanism‘ is 
accompanied by a lack of knowledge; 30% are bound by stubbornness; 15% are motivated by cruelty 
and only 5% of people are said to possess a ‗pure‘ orientation to clan - without that malicious intent, 
intractability, or Jahli, the Arabic derived notion a pre-Islamic state of  ignorance.  
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Elsewhere, the writer develops the body-politic analogy further in describing the brain of the 
body as the government and nationalism, and the organs as what is traced from the ancestors (i.e. 
clan)
 16
. The ‗cells‘ of these organs represent individuals, and the ‗spirit of clan‘ (Rooxaan) is 
described as the force which allows individuals to know which organ they form part of. ‗Charisma‘ 
(‗burji‟) in turn comes from the brain (the state) which allows each organ or cell to see each other. 
Clanism (‗qaybyaalad‟) is the ‗virus‘. In his allusion to the organs as genealogical constructs the 
writer employs a phrase derived from ‗knees and elbows‘ (‗sida jilibyahan iyo suxulyahan‟) which - 
lest the body metaphor become confused - refers not to body parts themselves but rather the semantic 
convention used to describe different levels of the genealogical system itself (see also laf [bone] as 
another sub-level in determining lineage). Physical imagery is pre-inscribed into the language of clan, 
a point I make not to emphasise any apparent primordialism of identification, but rather the 
possibilities existing for rhetorical devices to construct the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed as a tangible, 
quasi-biological whole in which clan is an integral social feature
17
.  
The writer describes Puntland and Somaliland as bodily ‗organs‘ which have broken away, 
albeit recognising their different positions vis-á-vis the reconstruction of the unitary state. Recalling 
how ‗organs‘ represent clans in his schema, it is clear how the writer conceives of these political 
structures as simply clan-based projects. He argues that the recourse to historical borders (particularly, 
one assumes, by Somaliland) constitutes a revoking of the Somali body-polity and an embrace of the 
scars left by the ropes of the British and Italian colonialists („...waxaa xad inoo ah haartii uu reebay 
xarigga gumaystayaashu(Ingiriis & Talyaani) ay xubnaha jirka Soomaaliga ku kala guntadeen‟). The 
writer criticises the naming of the Republic of Somaliland, rhetorically asking whether this ‗land‘ 
really belongs to all Somalis regardless of lineage. This type of critique, where the language and 
vocabularies of the political spectrum are deconstructed, is common in these types of commentary and 
this reflects the discursive dynamism of the Somali political environment where every label and term 
is up for (re)definition and debate.  
Cismaan‘s polemics diagnose the malady of the Somali nation (patient) in terms of the ‗spirit‘ 
of clan - presented as both at the root of the problem of institution building whilst at the same time an 
integral feature of the body polity. Certain aspects of identity of Ummadda Soomaaliyeed - anti-
colonial history, culture, religion, language - are taken to be clear, self-evident and unproblematic. 
This effectively neutralises the dissent of those who might question this homogenous portrayal of 
nationalist lore and the construct of this ‗Somalia‘ which is, the writer argues, to be saved by those 
righteous patriots not corrupted by the ignorance or malign intent of clan bias.  
                                                          
16
 Xaashi Yassin Cismaan, Somalitalk, September 2007, ‘War niman yohow Raggii meeye?’ [Hey, where are the 
Men amongst you?] http://www.somalitalk.com/2007/sept/20sep107.html  
17
 Lewis (1994) certainly plays on this ‘primordialist’ imagery in his discussion of ‘Blood and bone: the call of 
kinship in Somali society’.  




His discussion also addresses (linguistically, no less) certain minority groups defined by 
profession (caste) as opposed to race or ethnicity. He points out that the names of the major clan 
families are proper nouns and so cannot be pluralised: „Niman Daarood ah [ma jiraan Daroodyo ama 
Daaroodyaal]‟ (for example, ‗the Darood Men, never ‗Daroods‘ or the ‗Darood‘s‘), whereas for those 
groups defined by caste (he mentions the ‗Midgaan‘
18
, Tumaal and Yibir) their names are pluralised 
e.g. „Niman Midgo ah‟, as one would do for any modern profession. Cismaan goes on to argue that 
this stems from the (‗brave, long-lineaged and un-skilled‘) pastoralists‘ distain for craftsmen. Whilst 
this is but a side note to his argument, it illustrates the dominance of the (pastoral) lineage discourse 
both in the socio-political reality he alludes to, as well as in his own writing around the topic which 
itself designates ‗clan‘ as an inalienable part of the ‗Somali‘ body-politic.  
Moving from the intangible to the nitty-gritty of state reconfiguration, it is a sign of the 
dominance of the federal project as a possibility for a Muqdisho-centred Somali government, that the 
very idea of federalism is conceptualised by other writers as a distinct form of political ideology in 
itself. Young diaspora returnee Adam Hajji Hussein (‗Damase‘)‘s October 2014 piece „Qabyaalad 
Federaaleedka Soomaaliya‟, explores the familiar trope of the clanic-divisiveness of federalism, but 
situates it within a historical lineage of other ideological experiments – colonialism, post-colonial 
procedural democracy, scientific socialism – which have ‗scarred‘ Ummadda Soomaaliyeed
19
. 
Employing examples from around the world, the writer differentiates between different models or 
degrees of federalism and argues that whilst a variant of the system might be beneficial for some 
places, cultural context (here defined by ‗clan‘) makes it ill-suited to Somalia and open to abuse. He 
notes that those countries in which federalism might be successful are different to a Somalia, defined 
as it is by (implied) homogeneity of ‗a country, a religion and a people‘.  The writer asserts that many 
things, such as ‗clan, the internet and religion‘, have advantages and disadvantages, and can be used 
by different people for positive and malign ends. This selection of examples is telling. In describing 
factors influencing the Somali political environment, it presents the complexly intertwined social 
forces of clan-identification and Islam at a similar level of significance to the technological basis of 
the modern electronic public sphere.  
 Central to the political worldview of many critics of the state reconfiguration project is the 
notion that a federalised Somalia will, effectively, be absorbed into the federal system of an ‗imperial‘ 
Ethiopia, ruled by a Tigray elite in power in Addis Ababa. Opinion pieces by such self-professed 
nationalists often emphasise the political identity of the ‗regional‘ administrations and the motivations 
of ‗shameless‘ politicians (‗Siyaasiyiin aan waxba ka xishooneynin‟), as opposed to referencing the 
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clan identity of these administrations directly
20
. In Cabdullaahi Ibraahim (‗Gumeysi-Diid‘)‘s account, 
Somaliland is denigrated to the same status as Puntland and other more recently emergent political 
entities - itself a pervasive rhetorical tool used by commentators to challenge Somaliland‘s legitimacy. 
The writer focuses on political protocol to make his argument and notes with distain the endless series 
of visits by ‗presidents‘ of various administrations (‗maamul hebel‟) to Addis Ababa to meet the 
Ethiopian leadership and ‗take their orders‘. The Puntland president, the writer states, has been to 
Muqdisho only once in an official capacity. Elsewhere the same writer specifically describes regional 
political structures as clan-based administrations (‗maamul beeleed‟) and describes the state of 
relations with Ethiopia as an embarrassment even for those who are professed supporters of the 
Somali Federal Government. That this particular piece was republished by various sites, including 
those which usually take a pro-AS line, is indicative of the wide-ranging appeal of this type of 
rhetoric
21
. The whereabouts of this commentator – whose nickname means ‗one who refuses 
colonialism‘ are unclear - although other pieces of his writing have appeared on the websites of 
Somaliland based newspapers, discussing specifically the question of Somaliland‘s recognition and 
the predicament of Somali ‗unity‘. In that case, the piece reproduced is likely to have been chosen for 
its controversial appeal to Somaliland-based (or aligned) readers and demonstrates the occasional 
ability of writers to publish anti-secessionist opinion pieces in Somaliland-orientated media
22
.  
 Other commentators describe the federalisation process as legalised clanism („waa 
qabyaaladii oo sharci loo helay‟) whereby certain groups attempt to take advantage of the ambiguous 
Provisional Constitution (adopted in 2012) in order to establish an administration which benefits them 
whilst other clans ‗sleep‘
 23
. The writer, Hassan A. Shire, notes that some of these groups are 
themselves ‗waking up from this slumber‘ as the conflict over the creation of Jubaland and the 
Southwest administrations has illustrated. In this formulation, the federal project creates a regional 
zero-sum game, setting foundations for future conflict between 9 such entities and opening the 
country for exploitation of natural resources by foreigners. Here, colonial strategies of ‗divide and 
rule‘ are referenced and place a broadly homogenous Ummadda Soomaaliyeed within a broader 
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imperial history of the carve-up of Somalia. Interestingly, although Shire‘s work appears on Southern-
focused websites (and on a personal blog that prominently features the Timacadde proverb quoted 
above) this commentator is actually based in Somaliland and has worked for various civil society and 
humanitarian organisations, as well as a Hargeysa-based ministry. A very similar article – under a 
slightly different heading – was also reproduced in Somaliland-based media outlets, again 
demonstrating an overlap of content between different parts of the fragmented territory
24
. Although 
this piece does not look favourably on ‗regional administrations‘ anything that emphasises the 
continued instability of the south could be read with interest by Somaliland-based readers. The fact 
that Somaliland is not mentioned directly here is an ambiguity that could be read to strengthen the 
secessionist administration‘s case for pragmatic external recognition.  
Another example of how cross-regional political commentary operates can be seen in 
Southern-focused media‘s quoting of well-known politicians from other political centres, particularly 
when the points made correspond with what may appear to be the editorial orientation of the 
commentator. Take, for example, Keydmedia‘s quoting of Faysal Cali Waraabe (leader of the third 
opposition party in the Republic of Somaliland) on his view that Nicholas Kay (UN Special 
Representative for Somalia) intended for the country to be administered from Garoowe
25
. This 
illustrates not only this politician‘s high profile across the Somali political spectrum, but also the 
manner in which Somaliland is perceived by Muqdisho media as merely constituting another regional 
administration, also playing the game of state reconfiguration. Waraabe, well-known for his 
outspoken and often controversial opinions, is quoted here provocatively criticising the alleged 
impartiality of the UN and its support for the formation of Axmed Madoobe‘s Jubaland – a bias, he 
alleges, which serves the interests of the Puntland administration. These comments come from an 
observer who is himself hardly impartial (given the poor state of Somaliland‘s relations and 
occasional confrontations with Puntland) and feed into perceptions that there exists a national 
‗Daarood‘ political agenda, allegedly evidenced by the close relationship between the Puntland and 
Jubaland administrations, and their attempts to constrain (Hawiye) power in Muqdisho.  
Puntland‘s playing of the federalisation game is discussed in more detail and with more 
explicit reference to clan identifications in Cabdiqaadir Maxamed Cismaan‘s piece entitled 
„Puntland‘s divorce comes before the marriage!‘
26
. This writer, who works for a university in 
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Malaysia and is active in diaspora politics, has published articles in a wide range of southern focused 
news websites. He addresses Puntland here with the suffix one would use to call a female 
acquaintance, and describes the administration as having broken off relations with the Somali Federal 
Government that didn‘t exist in the first place. The writer is referring to Puntland President Gaas‘s 
‗official‘ suspension of links with the Muqdisho SFG in July 2014 after the latter‘s signing of an 
agreement on the establishment of the Galmudug state (Puntland controls the northern half of Mudug 
region and rejects its integration into a separate Galmudug regional state). The writer here mocks the 
Gaas administration‘s stance by claiming that the previous Puntland President (Faroole) had broken 
off relations the previous year which had not since been reinstated. This type of parody of the external 
relations of the various regional administrations (or ‗clan administrations‘ – „maamul beeleed‟ as the 
writer puts it here) is common in a context where multiple political authorities at different stages of 
administrative development are attempting to assert themselves through the trappings, iconography 
and conventions of legitimate ‗state‘ power.  
A highly euphemistic portrayal of political-clan power projection across different regions is 
also at work here. The writer talks about former President Faroole‘s various trips around and beyond 
Somalia (to Kismaayo or Zone 5 in Ethiopia) in order to stir conflict or build clan-based coalitions. 
The attention paid to movements of ‗regional presidents‘ is noted above, and it is popular knowledge 
that political elites are very frequently in air transit between the various islands of administrative 
control around southern Somalia. Often the airports in question are secured by AMISOM forces and 
they serve as important and visible sites of political performance, frequently featured in news media 
covering the welcoming ceremonies and pageantry that accompanies such visits. As road travel is 
usually unfeasible for politicians, regional airports have become important strategic and politically 
resonant locations where interface occurs between various power holders in each context: politicians, 
loyal local security forces, UN functionaries and offices, AMISOM troops etc. Like hotels, airports 
are prominent in popular imaginations of the securitised loci of power and authority across Somalia.   
Whilst the writer makes reference to geographically defined communities, his liberal use of 
inverted commas suggest that these simply serve as euphemisms for clan affiliations. He discusses the 
reaction of politicians of ‗Beesha Garoowe‘ (The Garoowe clan/community, i.e. Puntland) to the 
SFG‘s appointment of a previous „Reer Gedo‟ (‗Gedo region people‘) Prime Minister (Cabdiweli 
Sheikh Axmed), and makes reference to the clan militia of Raskaami [sic], who have taken control of 
Kismaayo and have become the basis of the Jubaland project. Although the writer is explicitly dealing 
with clan-politics, he avoids clan names altogether and instead relies on territorial definitions for the 
different Daarood groupings: whether the Majeerteen sub-clans represented by the Garoowe 
politicians, a Marexaan Prime Minister or the Ogadeen Ras Kaambooni militia. Clearly, this rhetorical 
strategy (which allows the writer to be both rather specific in his condemnations without having to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 




break taboos of naming specific sub-groups in the public sphere) assumes and depends on the 
audience‘s geographical conceptualisation of clan territoriality. Such arguments could be seen to be 
both reflecting and further reinforcing the wider shift towards territorial focus in clan-based claim 
making discussed by Cassanelli (2015) and Hoehne (2015, 2016). As this type of commentary in the 
public sphere uses presentations of territory as shorthand for clan (avoiding the taboo of clan-naming), 
this reaffirms the importance of geographical-historical arguments for legitimising settlement, conflict 
or power relations. With legacies of civil war violence left disputed and unresolved, and the 
boundaries of modern Somalia still very much up for debate, the further ‗fixing‘ of particular groups 
in particular places is both problematic and politically contentious.  
This discursive process can likewise be identified in the final piece I examine in this selection 
of ‗southern‘ arguments. This article, entitled ‗Who is instigating the fighting in the Shabelle 
[regions]‘
27
, discusses conflict between the Habir Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye and the Biimaal (Dir). 
Although it employs far more direct clan language than the previous piece, it also taps into similar 
rhetorical themes surrounding historical and contemporary genealogical identification with territory. 
Although the writer of the piece, Axmed Sheekh Maxamed is listed as Suldaan (clan leader) of the 
Habir Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans in Merka, he does not have a particularly high profile and his actual 
position to speak on behalf of any group is questionable. He is not one of the 135 elders chosen in 
2016 to undertake the selection of electors for the new Parliament and was not part of the Merka 
committee of elders which emerged the previous year.  This is indicative of frequent controversy over 
the profusion of competing elders and ‗traditional‘ leaders, often emerging in the context of seat 
allocation and political representation.  
Nevertheless, considered as an individual commentator, the writer describes the immediate 
parties to the conflict as two ‗brotherly‘ clans, and makes an appeal to objective truth telling. His list 
of purported facts concerns the historical presence of the Habir Gedir in the region as pastoralists, 
farmers and political functionaries for over 15 generations, and he rhetorically asks as to how a people 
with history in the town (Merka) and the region can be said to be migrants who have not been born in 
that area. This claim to autochthony is intended to refute the notion that the Shabelle regions faced an 
influx of Habir Gedir migrants following the fall of Barre‘s regime in Muqdisho and the subsequent 
move of Hawiye militias through the south, displacing ‗traditional‘ inhabitants. The article goes so far 
as to portray the Habir Gedir as the victims of a history of ‗hunting‘ perpetrated by other external 
figures including warlords such as Axmed Madoobe (now in control of Kismaayo and the Jubaland 
administration), those from Bari region (meaning Puntland) and those penetrating the country from 
Ethiopia. The writer emphasises the importance of media broadcasting and alleges that ‗11 websites‘ 
have been set up which, although claiming to be located in the Shabelles, are actually based in Bari 
(Puntland) and are committed to spread lies and propaganda. In essence, the piece represents an 
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attempt to draw focus away from the localised conflict to a broader conspiracy of geographically 
removed actors who have an (alleged) interest in stoking up conflict near to Muqdisho. The writer 
attacks the Daarood clan in the broadest terms. This condemnation includes those (like Axmed 
Madoobe‘s Ogadeen sub-clan) who ‗illegally/improperly‘ control Kismaayo (xaaraan ku haysta), and 
the Majeerteen in Bari (Puntland), whose involvement in sowing ‗provocation and disorder‘ (faduul 
iyo fidno), he argues, is ‗surprising‘ given their lack of ‗territory or people‘ in the Shabelle regions.  
The writer seeks to undermine the same Daarood solidarity he describes, by remarking on the 
Maajeerteen‘s betrayal of their Ogadeen cousins to the Ethiopians (see also Caballah Salaad‘s piece 
quoted above). He then goes on to question the actual genealogical construction of the conflict in 
challenging the notion that the Biimaal are actually part of the Dir clan-family. This assertion plays 
into the writer‘s wider perception of clan conspiracy involving the Isaaq, associated with Somaliland. 
The writer presents this group as being in league with the Dir (The Isaaq are often categorised as 
forming part of the broad Dir ‗clan-family‘) and alleges their involvement in the Shabelle conflict, 
and wider Muqdisho politics as a means to prevent state building in the south and advance the 
interests of „Isaaqland‟ (Somaliland).  The writer employs the colourful description of Isaaq MP‘s 
(for him ‗secret agents‘ of Somaliland) sitting around in hotels in Muqdisho plotting against Somali 
unity. He also describes the other external actors involved in the conspiracy, all of whom are 
benefiting in one way or another from the conflict: AS which takes advantage of clan tensions, 
Ethiopia which has historically brought problems for the Qowmiyad Hawiye (Hawiye 
‗nation/ethnicity‘); Kenya which relishes conflict in the Shabelles to draw attention away from their 
client/proxy state in the Jubas, and finally the SFG itself, embodied by the former PM Abdiweli who 
is biased against one of the parties (the Hawiye/Habir Gedir).  
Although this piece constitutes an extreme and convoluted form of clan-conspiracy based 
argumentation in a southern-focused public sphere, it nonetheless shares many rhetorical features with 
the other texts cited above. Different vocabularies, idioms or euphemisms of clan interplay with 
nationalist tropes of Somali cultural, religious or linguistic homogeneity in the face of externally 
manipulated political fragmentation. In order to examine how similar vocabularies are used for 
different political objectives, the analysis now turns to critical narratives emanating from Puntland 
around federalism and the wider Somali political environment. 
 
6.5. Puntland: arguing an ambiguous autonomy  
Perspectives from Garoowe on the reconfiguration of a federal Somalia are presented quite differently 
to those articulated in the Muqdisho public sphere. Garoowe represents a more homogenous political 
space than the sprawling and conflicted capital, and Puntland itself is administered by state structures 
and institutions which, for all their limitations, exert a degree of coherent authority across the major 
towns of the region that would be the envy of power-holders in Muqdisho. These different 
political/security contexts are evident in material being produced in the Puntland public sphere and in 




presentations of its position vis-á-vis the embryonic federal Somalia and various other contesting 
actors, notably Somaliland. 
Cabdiqaadir Muuse Yuusuf‘s commentary in the Ilays newspaper ‗The future of Puntland 
after 2016: ongoing change and effects‘ situates the administration in the context of federalisation and 
the ‗Vision 2016‘ roadmap
28
. This schema of the SFG and its international backers aimed to manage 
the end of President Xassan‘s term and facilitate a transition of power via a national selection process 
through the new regional states. Regarding the redrawing of the political map of Somalia, the writer 
(himself a former Puntland deputy minister) describes the ‗most recent‘ formulation of federal 
regions, which he claims are based on the ‗natural distribution of the population of Somalia‘ (‗sida 
dabiiciga ah ee ay bulshada u kala degto deegaanka dhulka Soomaaliya‟). This federal Somalia 
would thus be constituted of the following territories (quoted here with my emphasis on those 
territories that would be disputed by Somaliland [points 1,2] or a Galmudug administration [point 3]): 
 
1. The administration of western Somaliland (Awdal, Waqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, western 
Sanaag) 
2. Puntland Administration (Bari, Nugaal, Sool, north Nudug, east Sanaag and district of 
Buhoodle) 
3. Central Administration (Shabelle Dhexe, Hiiraan, Galgaduud, south Mudug) 
4. Southwest Administration (Bay, Bakool, Shabelle Hoose) 
5. The Jubas and Gedo  
 
This configuration of regions represents the optimal result for Puntland and it is clear that the 
‗natural‘ order of population distribution referred to by the writer is based on the clan make-up of 
these territories, as opposed to any other geographic or economic consideration, or earlier colonial 
boundary. North Mudug is dominated by the Cumar Maxamuud sub-clan of the Majeerteen (Daarood) 
whilst southern Mudug is home primarily, but not exclusively, to Habir Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans. 
Neither population (according to politicians) would be willing to be governed by an administration 
perceived to be dominated by the other. Thus, a quandary exists given that the ambiguously worded 
Provisional Constitution, does not allow for the splitting of existing administrative regions, regardless 
of the actual political reality on the ground - quite clear in the town of Gaalkacyo, on this border and 
split between two administrations. The writer suggests that the regional configuration he claims was 
already laid out has been ‗altered‘. He argues that the objective of a Central (Galmudug) 
Administration (backed by the President but not the former PM Cabdiweli who ‗lawfully showed the 
borders of Puntland‘ and was thus removed from office) would require both military and financial 
force, bringing with it the risk of civil war.  
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Looking west, the writer discusses political developments and potential changes of regime in 
Somaliland in the wider context of federalisation, and notes (albeit in vague terms) the destabilizing 
influence that Somaliland will have over this national process. He echoes a fear of Puntland‘s 
marginalization often heard in popular discussion of negotiations between Somaliland and the SFG. 
As a non-secessionist but functional federal state, Puntland finds itself in a dilemma over its position 
towards such negotiations. It has strained relations with both sides that can manifest in military 
posturing and open conflict with Somaliland and a relatively frequent severing of ties with the SFG. 
However,it has no seat at the table where the relations between ‗The Federal Government of Somalia‘ 
and ‗The Republic of Somaliland (or, from the SFG side, the prospects of reintegration) are discussed. 
For this reason commentators in Puntland remain wary of any concessions that the SFG might be 
prepared to make to Somaliland at its expense, but at the same time are bound to a position that 
supports Somali ‗unity‘.  
Consequently, the Puntland press is often inclined to side with the SFG position, as 
demonstrated in an anonymous March 2015 piece in the Kaaha Bari newspaper condemning a 
Somaliland delegation‘s walkout of talks held in Turkey (after their objection to the inclusion of 
certain Isaaq politicians on the SFG side)
 29
. The article reflects the diplomatic discourse of the 
protagonists themselves and does not mention the shared clan-family backgrounds of the four 
individuals named as being objected to by the Somaliland delegation. They are referred to instead as 
being ‗from Somaliland‘ and the words of the Somaliland foreign minister used in rejecting these 
individuals‘ participation epitomise Somaliland‘s portrayal of itself in clear nationalist as opposed to 
clan-based terms. The article asserts that the ‗obstruction‘ of talks represents the continuation of 
Somaliland‘s policy of „Soomaalidiidnimo‟: the ‗rejection of Somali [unity]‘, given noun status here in 
the same way that its more common antonym (Soomaalinimo) is.  
 Commentary in Puntland on the reconfiguration of the Somali state is also often focused on 
events further beyond its borders, particularly the goings-on of power holders in Muqdisho. One 
narrative in Puntland surrounding political violence in the capital – particularly the assassination of 
MPs – holds that the Daarood have been disproportionately affected. Commentators have argued that 
this is indicative of a conspiracy by Hawiye political elites (the former President of the SFG and his 
string-pullers in the Dam Al Jadiid clique) to use the deterioration of security conditions for their own 
political ends, for example, to facilitate the extension of the President‘s term or change the relative 
balance of power in Muqdisho itself. The killing in July 2014 of MP Saado Cali Warsame, a former 
singer famous for the role her work came to play in opposition to Barre‘s military regime, sparked a 
national outcry but also was taken as evidence form some commentators, particularly in Puntland, of a 
conspiracy against Daarood politicians in Muqdisho.  
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Pieces such as Muuse Xaji Abees‘s ‗Strong warning to Daarood MPs‘ were addressed 
primarily to a clan-defined audience but also to ‗all those who love Somali unity‘, clearly framing the 
presentation of a sectional issue in the wider terms of Somali nationalism
30
. This writer played a role 
in the formation of Puntland in 1998 and subsequently spent several years in the diaspora before 
returning to Somalia in 2014. The article called on Daarood MPs to leave Muqdisho (as there was ‗no 
doubt‘ that Saado had been killed by forces loyal to the President Xasan ‗Culusow‘
31
) and flee to areas 
of peace and companionship in Puntland and Jubaland - the clan-based nature of this welcome being 
fully conveyed by the title and the blanket address to the whole Daarood clan-family.  
A reassertion of conspiracy narratives followed attacks on the Central and Makka Al 
Mukarama hotels in Muqdisho in February and March 2015 in which up to 35 people were killed, 
including, it was argued by some commentators, a high number of Daarood political figures (such as 
the ambassador to Switzerland Yuusuf Maxamed ‗BariBari‘). A piece such as „Muuq-disho‟ by the 
prolific and diaspora based writer Ahmed Yusuf Ahmed on Dunida Online, plays on the name of the 
city in question as an ‗image of killing‘, and uses various other puns and wordplay to portray a 
collusion between AS (‗Al Habaab‟/‘the lost‘) and the Dam Al Jadiid faction (here ‗Dulmi Jadiid‟ or 
the ‗new oppression‘) to advance the political agenda of the President
32
. Whilst the polemic is high on 
emotive rhetoric and low on evidence to substantiate the claims made, it does epitomise the discourse 
around the distinction between ‗home‘ territory for politicians coming to Muqdisho (also seen above 
in Abees‘s piece), and the role of ‗guests‘, who, as the latter writer alleges, may show more inclination 
for ‗cannibalism‘ than hospitality.  
Given what Kapteijns describes as the early 1990s ‗clan-cleansing‘ (2012) of the Daarood 
from Muqdisho, it is perhaps unsurprising to see certain Puntland narratives on modern violence in the 
capital framed in terms of clannic conspiracy. Territorial considerations around security and the 
theories of unseen agency that they engender can proliferate amongst a wider public with a heightened 
sense of where they may or may not feel safe in Somalia. Such personal considerations were noted by 
many different informants across the different territories especially when recounting their expectations 
or experiences when travelling, usually in a professional capacity or ‗returning‘ from the diaspora. The 
sharp divides of political space observable in these public sphere texts from Puntland can also be 
discerned from news media and commentary in the Republic of Somaliland, which is where the 
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6.6. Somaliland: claim-making and the ‘other’ country 
Journalism in Hargeysa reflects the distinct political environment of the Republic of Somaliland and 
also plays a significant role in the production narratives of independence. If one was to rely solely on 
Hargeysa‘s ten plus newspapers for news of Somalia it would be difficult to discern any substantive 
federal reconfiguration taking place as it is a subject rarely covered in any specific detail. Although 
the daily happenings of Somaliland‘s vibrant political scene provide more than enough copy for 
Hargeysa‘s journalists to fill their pages, the amount and scope of news covered from Somalia – that 
‗other‘ country – plays an important role in the self-definition of Somaliland as an entirely separate 
political space. The notion that Somalia remains mired in endemic bloodshed is a part of the political 
imagination of many Somalilanders. This is true for writers who cover events from the south with 
particular focuses: namely political violence, the continued role of AS, or SFG statements, 
negotiations or ceremonies which question the sovereign integrity of Somaliland. In this context, 
detailed discussion of federalisation is undesirable, in that its mere mention could be taken to suggest 
that it is a process in which Somaliland has a stake, thus raising the possibility of its integration into 
this framework. The ‗official‘ slogan of Somaliland‘s 2015 May 18
th
 Celebrations (Somaliland‘s 
anniversary of its 1991 declaration of independence) demonstrates the importance of policing 
narratives around secession and vigilance against discursive openings for counter-claims: „Dalkayga 
doodi kama furna‟ (‗My country is not open for debate‘)
 33
.   
Where events in Somalia are covered, they are often portrayed through a long historical lens 
emphasising past conflict (with allusions of continuity in the present day) and downplaying significant 
political change in Muqdisho. A piece in the Ogaal newspaper (also widely circulated online) entitled 
‗The Muqdisho Government: follow the bravery of the Somaliland heroes?‘ epitomises this type of 
historical contextualisation of contemporary events
34
. Writing under the pen-name ‗Weli Cabsiiye‘, 
the commentator breathlessly addresses the prospect of AMISOM tanks lining up on Somaliland‘s 
border, following discussion that month about the possibility of a contingent being transferred north to 
Puntland to assist in the fight against AS there. The piece makes clear the ferocity of military 
resistance that would be faced by such a move, and notes the history of the SNM‘s struggle against 
the Barre regime.Leaving aside the fact that this AMISOM deployment was unlikely to occur due to 
intense opposition from the Puntland government itself, it is instructive that the African Union Forces 
are portrayed as proxies for the SFG. This stands in contrast to the conception commonly put forth by 
southern commentators that they are the agents of foreign interference or ‗colonialism‘. Here the 
writer compares the current situation of Somaliland (possessing a government, flag and population not 
prepared to allow for a deterioration of the security situation in the Horn) with that of Muqdisho: 
„Xamar hadii maanta ay gubanyaso Somaliland hore ayey u soo gubatey‟ (‗If Muqdisho burns today, 
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[remember] that Somaliland was on fire before‘). Although the situations facing modern Muqdisho 
and Hargeysa in the late 1980s are incomparable (in terms of the nature or scope of the political 
violence unleashed), the writer‘s nationalistic fervour is characteristic of many such discussions which 
repeatedly link all contemporary developments with Somaliland‘s struggle for independence and 
troubled historical relationship with the south. In this mode of argumentation, the political entity of 
Somalia lies firmly in the past, and in defining its territory mention is often made to the regions that 
were once referred to as part of Somalia („gobollada dalkii Soomaaliya la isku odhan jiray‟
35
). 
Compared to Muqdisho or Garoowe, it is much less common in the Hargeysa public sphere to 
see rhetorical strategies that reference ‗macro‘ narratives of clan-family political agency, or – that flip 
side of the same coin – appeals to political Soomaalinimo nationalism. The absence of the latter is 
hardly surprising for a polity which defines itself as a ‗Somali‘ political entity, but is positioned in 
terms of regional independence from multiple other ‗Somali‘ spaces of governance. Indeed, the very 
existence of Somaliland demonstrates the failure of the historical project of pan-Somali nationhood 
(or irredentism) often embodied in the deployment of the Soomaalinimo discourse
36
.Conversely, with 
regard to ‗macro‘ narratives of clan, it is important to consider the ways in which the Somaliland 
political project has (and has not) attempted to legitimise itself and the effect that this has had on 
discourses in the public sphere. Although the SNM movement and nucleus of post 1991 state-building 
was predominantly driven by Isaaq sub-clans, the Somaliland state has consistently attempted to 
portray itself (in self presentation, and, to an extent, in practice) as a multi-clan polity that makes no 
distinction based on the clan identity of its citizens. Somaliland is home to sizeable Dir and Darood 
populations (to the west and east of the Isaaq heartlands respectively) and political development has 
led to many non-Isaaq sub-clans being co-opted into elite politics
37
. An appreciation of the importance 
of the multi-clan identity and rhetoric for the Somaliland project helps explain the symbolic (as well 
as real-politick or resource-linked) importance of the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag. Were these 
territories ever to be lost either to a local political challenger or a Puntland administration (which 
imagines its territorial scope as corresponding with the ‗natural‘ distribution of the Harti Daarood sub-
clans) then this would undermine the identity of Somaliland as a multi-clan polity and allow external 
critics to advances the claims (that they already make) of Isaaq hegemony in a clan-state project.  
In early public expressions of Somaliland nationalism, visual appeals were made to colonial 
history - including even the use of British insignia and the Protectorate flag itself - presumably as a 
                                                          
35
 Himilo newspaper, Hargeysa, March 25,2015, ‘Interview with Head of Somalia Immigration’. 
36
  The very naming of Somaliland is itself an appeal to an ethno-nationalist legitimacy (just one that rejects the 
possibility of a wider political organisation for Somalis). It is also important to recall here the naming of 
Puntland - chosen over ‘Harti-land’ – as a non-clan-based label appealing for credibility within the context of 
contemporary peace negotiations, one which also conjured up a historical image of territorial-political 
coherence (which, in fact, had not previously existed). See Hoehne 2009, Marchal 2010).  
37
 Somaliland’s second president, Daahir Riyaale Kaahin, for example, hailed from the Gadabuursi community 
(Dir). 




means to express the idea of a legitimate territorially-defined polity populated by multiple clans
38
. 
During my time in Hargeysa since 2009 I have not witnessed the use of such direct imagery relating 
to the colonial power, indicative no doubt of a reconsideration by actors of the desirability of 
employing such foreign iconography, or following the realisation that the former colonial power was 
not going to lead any efforts to push for Somaliland‘s international recognition. Nevertheless, the 
historical juridical existence of Somaliland‘s independent borders at the moment of decolonisation 
remains a key factor in the discourse surrounding recognition. This forms part of a wider legalist and 
normative-democratic narrative that frames legitimate statehood both for citizens and a watching 
‗international community‘. Within the public sphere there is little perceived legitimate space for 
arguments referencing (directly, at least) ‗macro‘-conceptions of clan-family contestation across the 
former territories of Somalia. This is not to say that the events that brought about the emergence of the 
Somaliland state (i.e. the marginalisation and suppression of the north by the Barre regime) are never 
framed in the context of clanism, but rather that this idea is presented in contrast to the political 
modernity that Somaliland is imagined to represent in the Somali Horn of Africa.    
 If Somaliland is presented by its supporters as an escape from a past characterised by 
centralised (southern) control and an institutionalised and authoritarian clanism, then the spectre of 
this ‗clanism‘ exists within public sphere discourses inside the Somaliland political project as a 
prevalent and powerful rhetorical tool with which to contest political developments or critique the 
action of power-holders. Charges of clanism are common in political commentary and frequently find 
voice around contentious issues, such as the dispute in 2015 which embroiled the three political 
parties, the Guurti (upper house of legislature, made up of ‗traditional‘ elders) and the National 
Electoral Commission, over the proposed extension of President‘s Siilaanyo‘s mandate and the setting 
of a new election date.  
Writing by individuals such as Maxamed Sadiiq (Youth wing spokesman of the opposition 
Wadani party) was characteristic of many of the rhetorical blows traded by commentators in the 
Hargeysa political milieu
39
. Sadiiq‘s piece addresses the leader of the Guurti (Saleban Gaal) directly 
and questions material reward and the ‗curse‘ of clan in his position taken to authorize the delaying of 
the Presidential election. The writer, taking a highly lyrical style, is strong on rhetorical flourishes 
painting the Guurti leader‘s decisions as being tainted by clan-bias, whilst at the same time staying 
well clear of any specific charges or naming of particular (clan) groups. The writer relies here on his 
audience‘s popular understanding of the various clan-loyalties that can be ascribed to various named 
actors, thus creating the space in which the simple and generalised charge of pandering to clan or 
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‗particular‘ interests can gain rhetorical traction (The President and Guurti leader are from the same 
Maxamed Abokor lineage of the Habar Jeclo sub-clan of the Isaaq)
40
. 
Couched amongst the nationalist rhetoric of fidelity to the wishes of the Somaliland 
population and the oblique accusations of sectional interest, lies a criticism of the Guurti for their 
failing to give a specific reason for its authorization of the postponement of the election, beyond the 
fact that the previous government had been granted one. Aside from the abstract rhetoric of clanism, 
what comes through clearly in this piece is an idealised conception of the ‗spirit‘ of the institution in 
question. Embodied in the writer‘s use of the term Guurtinimada (again, so concrete it is made a 
noun), is the notion that this ‗house of traditional elders‘ has in the past fulfilled the function of 
moderating political competition, exemplifying neutrality and the importance of the ‗middle ground‘. 
This institution, based as it is on a logic of ‗traditional‘ (i.e. clan) representation, is simultaneously 
imagined to have the potential (and proven track record) of ameliorating clan-based conflict or special 
interests in the name of the Somaliland Ummah.  
Given the attention that has been given to the institution by scholars of ‗hybrid‘ political 
orders (Renders 2012, Hoehne 2013) it is useful to consider the way in which the very aura, 
uniqueness and perceived past successes of this institution play into Somaliland‘s own nationalist and 
state-making mythology.  It demonstrates how popular conceptualisations of clan-based order, and 
‗traditional‘ mechanisms of socio-political representation are not seen to contradict that other 
potentially negative side of the equation: the logics of clan affiliation and bias. Although this does not 
inoculate the institution against criticism - as Sadiiq‘s attack and other commentary in the public 
sphere highlight - the example does illustrate the way in which the hybridity emphasised in the 
political science literature on such legislative bodies is also discernable in imaginations of its political 
legitimacy in the Hargeysa public sphere of political argumentation. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
Returning to Barber‘s (2007) conceptualisation of texts, the analysis above has highlighted some 
aspects of what opinion pieces say, do and are in the wider Somali media ecology. Discourses around 
clan or clanism in written polemics across the public sphere are characterised by a dialectical 
construction of clan logic as both constitutive of and detrimental to ‗Somali‘ political culture. These 
texts often say that clanism is primary driver of political fragmentation through key points of 
historical reference - the archetype being state collapse itself. At the same time, certain conceptions of 
clan-affiliation are presented as being fundamental to a broadly homogenised cultural identity of 
Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. In this construction, clan becomes the foil off which play the competing yet 
also ‗culturally‘-grounded tropes of nationalism and Islam. These are presented as remedies to 
seemingly inevitable political malaise, creating malleable space for multiple discourses of ‗Somali‘ 
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political organisation or critique of existing power-holders, conceptualised across administrative 
boundaries of a supra-national community.  
As for what these texts ‗do‘, the analysis above provides examples of how certain ‗macro‘ 
narratives of clan contestation may be used to deflect focus away from local dynamics of conflict onto 
broader political conspiracies and a wide range of geographically dispersed but interested actors. 
Alternatively, we see how various rhetorical strategies of non-naming or geographical euphemism 
allow commentators to make clan-based arguments. These rely on readers‘ assumed fluency in such 
coding, and level the generalised charge of ‗clanism‘ in what are, essentially, themselves clan-based 
polemics. Here the cyclical nature of the rhetoric is obvious: the logic of clan is reaffirmed in the very 
argumentation that decries its influence on politics.  Often narratives of clan affiliation are presumed 
in such arguments at the expense of more in-depth discussion of alternative (or complementary) 
motivations for political agency, whether these include capture of state resources or other private 
economic interests.  
These texts also constitute part of a modern Somali media ecology that is often dominated by 
transnational (though not necessarily solely diasporic) producers, and characterised by the circulation 
and reproduction of written content across multiple different forums. The analysis has highlighted 
some of the ways in which texts and narratives ‗travel‘ across and between media platforms focused 
on the different territories. This is a process that itself contributes to the maintenance of an 
overarching and global Somali public sphere of political debate. Furthermore, the sheer amount of 
polemic prose across print and online news media indicates that producers and consumers view 
written forms of the language as being important, and such writings frequently draw on a wider 
literary canon of more ‗prestigious‘ texts including poetry and proverbs. This speaks to Chapter 
three‘s observations on the role that journalists are imagined to play in processes of linguistic, cultural 
and social development, and is also evident in the efforts of ‗civil society‘ and public intellectuals 
(categories that some of the writers discussed above might fit into) in promoting the written language 
through initiatives such as the ‗international book fairs‘ phenomenon. Politically, it is no coincidence 
that these events have emerged in the three administrative centres focused on in this thesis, and 
elements of competition over the apparent guardianship of the Somali literary tradition are apparent 
and deserve more attention in the context of state legitimisation strategies.  
Kapteijns‘ argument that scholarly paradigms of clan division can have a significant real-
world impact on self-views and patterns of conflict should be returned to here (2011, 1). There 
remains scope to explore further the particular mechanisms through which such narratives exert their 
influence within particular settings, and the overview of the technological context of a trans-regional 
and transnational public sphere presented here attempts to go some way in explaining how ideas 
travel, circulate and are deployed by different actors. A concept like ‗clan‘, argues Kapteijns, ‗derives 
[its] ever changing meanings from the historical context in which people, through their purposeful or 
non purposeful action and understanding give it meaning‘ (2004, 15). This and previous chapters‘ 




examination of the structure of the modern Somali media ecology and the interplay of multiple 
producers, texts and formats across a divided political space has attempted to demonstrate how, 
almost paradoxically, the trope of ‗division‘ can in itself help construct particular imaginations of 
‗Somali‘ identity. It has also shown how terminologies change  and adapt to new technological and 
political contexts. This theme is developed in the concluding chapter, tying together the analyses of 
different types of text in the public sphere and reflecting on the tangible political impact of this 


















































7.1. Transnational media and ‘post post-colonial’ state-building  
This thesis has demonstrated that the Somali media ecology is inherently ‗transnational‘. This holds 
true for every level of production and consumption: ranging from the ‗local‘ newspapers of Hargeysa 
speaking to an internationalised audience of diaspora returnees and those connected to financial 
remittances from abroad; or to a ‗nationalist‘-orientated press in Muqdisho addressing media 
consumers identifying with the global Somali Ummah in terms of their own mobility and connections 
to the homeland. The existence of foreign-based Somali-language broadcasters with the capacity to 
reach audiences across the myriad ‗state‘ boundaries that divide Somalia and Somalis presents a novel 
challenge for political authorities attempting to reconstruct ‗post post-colonial‘ state structures.  
This ‗post post-colonial‘ discursive context is tangible in the media texts which have been 
analysed in previous chapters. In each political centre, histories of Somali statehood are 
conceptualised as experiments of governance - their failures culminating in the pivotal temporal 
reference point of the burburkii (destruction) of the state in 1991. Subsequent articulations of Somali 
sovereignty make reference to anti-colonial resistance and re-energise these tropes in various ways: 
from a militant Islamist or nationalist critique of ‗neo-imperialism‘, to Somaliland‘s portrayal of a 
post-union colonisation by ‗the south‘. Modern political rhetoric thus engages with a contested 
‗colonial‘ history in multiple ways, formulating new conceptions of national sovereignty in a media 
environment characterised both by political fragmentation and the constant reproductions of a broadly 
homogenised ‗Somali‘ cultural identity.  
There is a direct relationship between this persistence of political fragmentation and the 
continued reproduction of the global Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. Multiple political actors are required 
to couch claims to legitimacy in terms of this imagined community: a state in Muqdisho presents itself 
as the representative of all Somalis, while various nationalist critiques of foreign intervention speak, 
necessarily, to a consciously defined ‗Somali‘ polity. Even Somaliland must ground its secessionist 
claims not in some separate ‗northern‘ cultural identity (which would energise clan-based critiques 
against its separatist political project) but rather in its self-presentation as one sovereign ‗Somali‘ state 
amongst others. Even discourses of the most divisive kind - those based on clan or critiques of ‗clan-
ism‘ - reproduce a fundamental ‗cultural‘ unity of a body politic. This is the notion that the imagined 
community is defined by the influence of a genealogical structure and that this constitutes one 
component of what it means to be a ‗Somali‘.  
These arguments are based on analysis of the media texts featured through the thesis. In this 
concluding chapter I reflect on the concrete political implications of this technological and discursive 
media ecology on conflict and state reconfiguration across and between the territories in question. To 





of sovereignty, which inform expressions of legitimacy for modern Somali political structures. I 
critique popular, policy and scholarly interpretations of ideology and ‗radicalisation‘, and re-examine 
recent trajectories of public sphere theorisation, drawing parallels and distinctions between these 
observations and the particularities of Somali cases. Finally, I argue that the increasing prevalence of 
protracted state-contestation in certain parts of the broader Islamic world (Libya, Syria, for instance) 
means that the Somali experience, for all its historical specificity, may come to be an important 
comparative reference point in terms of the impact of changing public sphere technologies on the 
dynamics of conflict and expressions of political legitimacy.  
 
7.2. ‘Cultural’ contestation and Somali statehoods  
The thesis has asserted that ‗cultural‘ contestation is an important component of the reconfiguration of 
Somali statehood across the political territories examined. Commentators and political actors in each 
of the territories attempt to legitimise political experimentation and change through appeals to an 
‗authentic‘ Somali cultural identity, engaging with linguistic, religious and generational tensions over 
the contours of Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. It is hard to overstate the significance of the status of the 
Somali language as a popularly perceived measure of state collapse. Laitin (1977) demonstrated the 
importance of linguistic formalisation for the development of the post-colonial authoritarian state‘s 
agenda. The educational outreach programs of literacy promotion that this formalisation facilitated in 
the 1970s are perhaps the achievement of the Barre regime that is remembered most appreciatively by 
the widest range of communities across Somalia today. Few other initiatives taken by the ‗scientific 
socialist‘ military state are remembered by so many as having had such a broad and positive impact 
across the Somali regions, or remaining largely untainted by the ‗clanism‘ which came to characterise 
the state. Modern efforts (or declarations) aimed at the preservation of the Somali language and 
literature by re-emerging political authorities and civil society in Hargeysa, Garoowe and Muqdisho 
are one aspect of the ‗cultural‘ compenent of state reconstruction highlighted by this thesis. The 
relationship between such initiatives and the emergence of a transnational Somali media has also been 
highlighted and both serve to maintain the linguistic hegemony of a mutually intelligble written 
‗standard‘ Somali (Af Maxaa Tiri).  
 Concerns about the status of the Af Maay dialects spoken primarily in the inter-riverine areas 
of southern Somalia continue to intersect with denunciations of ethno-political marginalisation of the 
predominantly agro-pastoral groups living there. This debate exists as one of the primary fault-lines of 
debates over presentations of ‗Somali‘ identity and whilst not focusing specifically on linguistic or 
ethnic ‗minorities‘, various chapters of the thesis have analysed the continued presentation of a 
dominant pastoralist identity within discourses of Soomaalinimo and institutions of clan-power 
allocation. Nonetheless, and as the thesis has also demonstrated, conceptions of ‗tradition‘ (for 





scholars (for instance, the increased territorialisation of claims) are visible in some of the media texts 
analysed. 
Relative ethnic and linguistic homogeneity across Somalia must be viewed comparatively in 
the wider African context for its political significance to be appreciated. The contested history of the 
Af Maxaa Tiri ascendancy as ‗standard‘ Somali aside, the importance of the mutual intelligibility of 
this lingua franca, across all of the political territories discussed is distinct in continental perspective. 
Where else, one could reasonably ask, does a single African language exist as mother tongue for a 
majority of the population and operate as lingua franca across so many political boundaries? It is this 
linguistic linkage that underpins and facilitates the transnational Somali public sphere.  
The significance of an apparent communicative homogeneity should not mask the degradation 
and contestation that are popularly perceived to have characterised linguistic change in the post state-
collapse era. These discourses echo some of the debates which accompanied the formalisation of the 
orthography in the early 1970s, particularly with regard to the eventual choice of a Latin alphabet for 
the script. The accusatory wordplay of Latin as „La‟diin‟ (lacking in religion) was used in 
contemporary debates by those who advocated for the use of Arabic script. Today, whilst there are 
few calls for Somali orthography to be altered, the increasing prevalence of Arabic (and other foreign 
languages, particularly English) in educational institutions has made promotion and preservation of 
written Somali a political issue linked to expressions of statehood in each of the capitals analysed. 
Examples discussed in previous chapters have highlighted state actors‘ initiatives for promoting 
written Somali as a language of governance, national ‗heritage‘, and business. In Somaliland, the most 
consolidated and stable Somali state apparatus examined here, the greatest efforts have been taken by 
governmental authorities and public intellectuals to establish institutions and events for the promotion 
of literary cultural expression. Chapter three‘s discussion of the Hargeysa International Book Fair has 
highlighted the internationally recognised political prestige associated with such efforts, and the more 
recent holding of similarly branded events in Muqdisho and Garoowe illustrates these cities‘ desire to 
assert themselves as centres of cultural production.  
These book fair vignettes also illustrated undercurrents of religiously-articulated cultural 
contestation concerning international patronage, ‗liberal‘ agendas and foreign influence. The 
following chapters subsequently demonstrated that whilst such debates may take different forms in 
different security contexts, many of the key critical discourses of foreign intrigue and cultural-
religious conspiracy remain salient across the media environment. That reformist Islamist critiques of 
aid dependence and alleged conspiracies against a religiously-defined Ummadda Soomaaliyeed find 
expression amongst the seemingly endemic political violence in Muqdisho, in the political spaces of a 
wider south-central and north eastern insurgency, and in the relative democratic stability of urban 
Hargeysa, is illustrative of the socio-cultural context of political debates across these territories.  
Chapter five argues that the religious ‗radicalism‘ of militant groups such as AS cannot be 





discourses which emphasise the intervention of numerous external actors on internal Somali political 
processes. These critiques of the ‗foreign‘ and what I describe as the ‗spectralization‘ of AS 
mobilisation and violence, are expressed both locally (in relation to particular political projects) and 
trans-nationally via a deterritorialized Somali public sphere. Like narratives of ‗division‘, discussed in 
Chapter six, AS violence is conceived of as a problem for the wider Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. State 
language in the public sphere reflects this, for example, in Muqdisho, where the government 
announces the commencement of a ‗campaign of inoculation‘ against AS („Ololaha talaalka ka 




Chapter three emphasised the war of words conducted between the state and the armed 
insurgency as well as the difficulties faced by the former in controlling the narrative - such as in their 
attempted labelling of AS with the acronym UGUS, ‗the organisation for the destruction of the Somali 
Ummah‘. Such a struggle is no mere sideshow to the conventional warfare or counter-insurgency 
waged alongside it, but rather cuts to the heart of linguistic and cultural contestation over the identity 
of the re-emerging (Muqdisho-based) Somali state. Here the politics of Somali-usage versus or 
alongside Arabic echoes debates in the 1970s and illustrates the fluid linguistic context with which 
emerging state structures engage. Political claims to authentic ‗Somali‘ cultural preservation are, 
however, multiple and Chapter five has demonstrated that even ostensibly internationalist Islamists 
cast their governance and militancy in these terms. AS‘s narratives of economic ethno-nationalism 
portray a ‗traditional‘ Somali rural idyll, and propaganda around their dealings with clan 
representatives demonstrates a sensitivity to Xeer (customary law) based norms of inter-clan 
reconciliation, as well as strict adherence to Shariah. 
 Further research could fruitfully explore the use of the gabay poetic form by AS 
propagandists and supporters - a mode of cultural expression quintessentially ‗Somali‘ and 
consciously linked to the wider canon of oral Somali literature and political communication
2
. While 
modern appeals are not made directly to the early 20
th
 century anti-colonial leader ‗Sayyid‘ Maxamed 
Cabdullah Xasan (perhaps given his contentious legacy amongst certain clans, particularly in the 
north) it is important to recall his superlative deployment of poetic rhetoric as an almost visceral 
weapon of war (Samatar 1982). Literary analysis of the production of other Islamist militants in 
different contexts has emphasised cultural nationalism as a facet of modern jihadi  mobilisation (see 
Van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012 on the Taliban) and whilst this thesis has limited its scope to news 
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against UGUS was commenced this afternoon] http://www.radiomuqdisho.net/ololaha-talaalka-ka-hortaga-
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media and the ‗modern‘ language of political debate, I note the use of poetry by AS to illustrate 
explicit appeals to ‗Somali‘ cultural legitimacy. Here, as with much of their propaganda, religious and 
ethnic identities are fused and homogenised. In this formulation the Somali religious tradition is 
entirely Islamic, and a binary is created between those who oppose their agenda (they are thus neither 
Muslims nor good ‗Somalis‘) and Ummadda Soomaaliyeed, implicitly orthodox and Sunni, with 
increasingly little direct reference made to religious contestation on Salafi/Sufi lines
3
. Although this 
has not always been the case – AS made the iconoclasm of Sufi sites a common feature of their public 
presentation up until around 2010 – recent propaganda of the type explored in Chapter five has 
emphasised an unproblematic and seemingly monolithic Islam which characterises the areas under 
their control.  
The generational and transnational dynamics of this cultural contestation should be 
identifiable in this analysis, although the multiplicity of influences and the decentralized nature of the 
broader public sphere belie any binary-type categorisations of ideological orientation. In one sense, 
the development of Islamism in modern Somalia can be attributed to the religio-political agency of an 
emerging generation of activists, clerics and militants who have had no prior experience of a unified 
Somali state (and its largely secular orientations). The eponymous ‗youth‘ of AS are commonly 
understood as making up the bulk of its fighters: uneducated, indoctrinated and willing to die for a 
poorly understood religious calling. Whilst there may be elements of truth to this characterisation, the 
‗Shabaab‘ could also describe a generation of cadres and militant leaders who have come to political 
maturity in the post 1991-context, a cohort of Islamist activists who cut their teeth in the development 
of the judicial-political structures of the short-lived Union of Islamic Courts or networks of salafi-
orientated businessmen who have prospered in various sectors of a largely stateless economy. Some 
of these figures are, or have been, members of AS, others have followed trajectories which have taken 
them into positions of power within the Transitional or Federal Somali Governments.  
As a political discourse, secularism is practically nonexistent. Contestation in Muqdisho, in 
the absence of recognisable political parties, can often be characterised in terms of factional Islamism, 
underpinned by commercial interests and a semi-institutionalised clan-arithmetic of appointments and 
perceived allegiances. The Somali Federal Government, beholden to multiple sources of foreign 
patronage is obligated to defer to some of the normative preferences of the ‗international community‘ 
in terms of support for human rights and democratisation. At the same time, the increasing role of 
newly assertive and (financially) persuasive players from the Islamic world (particularly Turkey, 
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 Al Jazeera International broadcast, July 2012 ‘Imposing Islamic Law: Somalia’s Al Shabaab accept nothing 
else’ available on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZJjN91idBM ; Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada report: ‘Somalia: Situation of practitioners of Sufism in Mogadishu; incidents of violence 
involving al Shabaab [Al-Shabaab] and practitioners of Sufism; security situation and availability of state 
protection in Mogadishu’ *SOM104995.E+, 24 November 2014 
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/299654/422239_en.html ; BBC Somali, March 25, 2010 ‘Shabaab oo 






Saudi Arabia, Qatar, sensitive, like the West, to Somalia‘s continued geopolitical importance in the 
Horn) sets an ideological context which further promotes various strands of political Islamist political 
thought, increased Sunni orthodoxy and a continued shift in popular cultural orientation towards the 
Arab/Islamic world.  
These broad ideological trends should not be imagined as standing opposed to the 
democratisation of political processes in south-central Somalia. The main impediment here is not 
political Islam, but rather continued instability, AS resilience and an inability of the SFG to channel 
resources to ‗liberated‘ regions or extend of meaningful control and public services. Looking north, 
the discussion of Somaliland highlights the development of doctrinal Islamist reformism, assertive 
discourses of social conservatism and critiques of ‗Western‘ interference within the context of a 
vibrant democratic process, itself framed by a nationalist mythology of historical struggle and 
legitimate sovereignty.  
Such dynamics are influenced by the mobility of segments of the populations in Somalia and 
Somaliland, and the international orientations of communities affected in various ways by migration 
has been highlighted in previous chapters‘ analyses of media production. Here, the ‗transnational‘ or 
the ‗diasporic‘ is often integrated into ‗local‘ media production and consumption. The popularity of 
the geographically detached cartoonist Amin Amir‘s critiques of politics on the ground in Somalia, is 
an example of these collapsed spatial distinctions, as is the prevalence of Somali-language media 
broadcast into and across the political territories of the Horn from the diaspora. The impact of this 
mobility on shifting popular cultural and the ideological orientations is multifaceted and complicates 
problematic binary distinctions between the ‗local‘, ‗African‘, ‗religious‘ or ‗traditional‘, and the 
‗diasporic‘, ‗Western‘, ‗secular‘ or ‗modern‘. This is best understood, I argue, through analysis of 
different debates over ‗foreign‘ influence that find expression in the public sphere and may overlap 
with the generational dynamics of political imagination highlighted above. For different 
commentators of contrasting ideological or generational identities negative transnational influences on 
‗good‘ or ‗authentic‘ Somali culture are characterised by their apparent foreignness. Moral panic over 
religiously or culturally inappropriate behaviour often points to diaspora returnees. These critiques 
often overlap with political tensions surrounding the apparent capture of re-emerging state structures 
by these returnees perceived as swooping in from abroad, armed with the skills, capital and 
connections to take advantage of economic opportunities generated by these processes. Although 
militant actors such as AS may attempt to take advantage of these types of cleavages, such discourses 
are not limited to their propaganda and find expression in the broader public spheres of these re-
emerging political centres. 
From a contrasting ideological perspective, it is AS militancy, social and political Salafi-ism 
or growing doctrinal Sunni orthodoxy that are regarded by some as the foreign imports - 
quintessentially ‗un-Somali‘ in their restrictive and intolerant attitudes to cultural and religious 





young people from the diaspora who join AS‘s jihad in Somalia, or that of groups such the ‗Islamic 
State‘ in the Syria and Iraq. They may also, in less explicitly political terms, advocate a nostalgic 
imagining of a pre-state collapse cultural idyll based on ‗traditional‘ Somali Islam, pastoral customs 
and literature. It is important to note, however, that such discourses rarely entertain – in public, at 
least – a nostalgia for the secular state itself or its social liberalism. This is a function of a broad 
imagination of the ‗failure‘ of ‗Somali/scientific socialism‘ as a past political experiment for 
Ummadda Soomaaliyeed, and sensitivity to popular orientations towards increased public piety and 
doctrinal orthodoxy, visible on the streets of modern Somalia or Somaliland.  
I do not intend here to present a typology of commentators in terms of generational or 
ideological affiliation. These are simply observations of the discursive tenor of multiple texts that I 
have encountered in Somali public spheres of political debate, a sample of which has been analysed in 
depth in previous chapters. The purpose of this sketching is instead to emphasise the multiplicity of 
media or ‗cyber‘-subjectivities enabled and conditioned by an inherently transnational public sphere. 
Furthermore, the examples used highlight the tendency for a range of contrasting ideological 
positions - in their critique of the ‗foreign‘ - to reproduce similar discourses of Soomaalinimo: that 
imagined ethno-religious community existing beyond current state structures. As Chapter five points 
out this holds true even for pro-jihadi propaganda, the political-ideological orientation that could be 
conceived as being most potentially hostile to the reification of an ethnic solidarity as a basis for 
political organisation. Here the ethnic and religious are simply presented as being inseparable – a 
discursive tactic in itself that neutralizes any notion of a diversity of Islamic religious practice in 
Somalia in favour of the jihadists‘ own salafi/takfiri/wahhabi orthodoxy.     
 
7.3. Ideology, ‘radicalisation’ and the religious public sphere   
Amidst the real-politick of contestation for land, the material benefits of international patronage for 
those who capture the re-emerging Somali state, or the class-like dynamics of ethnic-economic 
marginalisation suffered by ‗minority‘ peoples, it can be easy to dismiss the ideological drivers of 
conflict in modern Somalia. Having employed a primarily constructivist epistemology from the 
outset, this thesis has emphasised the complex intertwining of material and ideological influences 
which structure the agency and worldviews of political actors in a context of extreme power 
fragmentation. A purely instrumentalist account of elites (for example, AS ideologues) manipulating 
and brainwashing a generation of uneducated and marginalised youth into suicide operations for a 
religiously misguided jihad is inadequate in that it overlooks the potentially ‗elite‘ backgrounds of 
some of those fighters who themselves willingly give up their lives in military or terrorist attacks, and 
the risks faced by a insurgent leadership in confronting US power in the Horn of Africa
4
. This 
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recognition is not intended to romanticise their struggle but rather put into context the agency and 
motivations of ‗radical‘ ideologues, military planners and would-be Islamist governors who operate 
under the constant threat of death by Reaper drone and Hellfire missile.  
Such an observation also speaks to a pervasive ‗liberal‘ discourse in the West which 
continually marginalises the ideological underpinnings of terrorism in favour of explanations which 
emphasise social marginalisation, alienation, and a lack of education. These factors are not irrelevant, 
however such narratives may ignore the explicitly ideological rationales deployed by educated, 
politically-aware young people to explain their militant or ‗radical‘ agency. The military rationality of 
such actions – fomenting chaos in the West and drawing it further into an unwinnable conflict in the 
Middle East – should be evident, for all its moral repugnance in its disregard for civilian lives. The 
impulse to attribute terrorism to misguided and misled individuals stems in part from a somewhat 
admirable intention to draw the focus away from Islam itself, denying right-wing and xenophobic 
Western nationalists an explanation that singles out Muslims as a homogenous group sharing a 
singularly and inherently violent religion. Critically engaging, however, with the stated political-
ideological argumentation of militants should not necessarily entail the construction of a monolithic 
conception of Islam, nor lend legitimacy-by-acknowledgement to any particular worldview or 
justification for violence.  
In the case of AS, this thesis has attempted to illustrate how the discursive foundations of 
their military struggle in fact overlap with multiple ‗nationalist‘ narratives in a wider Somali public 
sphere concerning alleged neo-colonialism, the division of Ummadda Soomaaliyeed and the nefarious 
influence of ‗Christian‘, foreign powers. Ignoring this wider discursive context, many accounts 
attempt to explain ‗radicalisation‘ (to inoculate against it) by distinguishing this type of agency or 
thought from that of ‗moderate‘ Muslims, or present a religious/secular political dichotomy which is 
very hard to actually identify in modern Somali politics. Ignoring the wider discursive or socio-
religious context means that studies of militancy can make such supposedly explanatory statements 
as: 
‗it is significant that all the interviewees [demobilised AS recruits] grew up in areas where 
Muslims were in the majority and that they had a very negative perception of religious diversity 
and acceptance of other religions‘ (Botha & Abdile 2014, 6) 
 
This leads one to ask: where exactly in Somalia is this not the case? Where in Somalia (or 
Somaliland) does public religious diversity (particularly in terms of other faiths) actually exist? It is 
perhaps somewhat facetious to pick on this particular comment in isolation, however I would argue 
that it is emblematic of many external analyses of militancy which dichotomise ‗radical‘ and 
legitimate political agency at the expense of accurate presentations of discursive and socio-religious 
complexity and a blurring of these problematically pejorative categorisations. This thesis has argued 
                                                                                                                                                                                    






that ‗radical‘ narratives must be understood within the context of wider (ethno-nationalist) public 
spheres, and not as a separate strand of politico-religious thought.  
De Waal‘s conceptualisation of the Horn of Africa‘s ‗market-place‘ politics, introduced in 
Chapter one, sidelines ideological appeals to nationalism, arguing that such rhetorical strategies only 
avail themselves to ‗particularist‘ insurgencies, led by actors who will be required to conform to 
material political bargaining when or if they obtain power (2015, 210). As previous chapters of this 
thesis have demonstrated, it is difficult to conceive of political Islam in the Somali context as such a 
niche pursuit, or as a rhetorical appeal available only to a small ‗radicalised‘ cohort of cadres and 
militants. Indeed, I would argue that the modern discursive battlefield in Somalia – combined with the 
wider socio-cultural influence of an increasingly orthodox Sunni Islam - leaves considerable scope for 
actors to apply a professed agenda of anti-‗foreign‘ religious nationalism while remaining sensitive to 
the material realities of fragmented power politics and diverse economic interests. Recall how the 
judicial advance of the Islamic Courts Union was only stemmed by (US-backed) Ethiopian military 
action, an invasion which subsequently empowered AS as a radical fringe to consolidate yet more 
territory under a cross-clan administration. Once again, this experiment did not collapse under the 
weight of its internal contradictions (religious nationalism versus clan real-politick, for instance) but 
rather through the conventional advance of African Union military assets funded and supported by the 
wider ‗International Community‘. The point here is not to dispute the pervasiveness of securitised 
transnational security patronage as outlined by De Waal, but instead emphasise the potential resilience 
of forms of religious ethno-nationalism which can draw selectively from a global vocabulary of 
East/West, Muslim/unbeliever confrontation.  
De Waal‘s point that intellectual energies in the Horn are no longer concentrated in post-
independence national universities is accurate and deserves further reflection here (Ibid, 202). The 
technological development of the Somali public sphere, the growth of the private tertiary education 
sector and continued political fragmentation have created a context which promotes the diffusion of 
such (potentially ideological) energies through multiple channels and towards different political-
regional projects. The complex interconnectedness of these forums – particularly in regards to the 
prevalence of over-arching transnational Somali media networks – ensures, however, that a wider 
Somali public sphere is maintained. Multiple voices are thus required to speak to Ummadda 
Soomaaliyeed defined in either political or cultural terms, to legitimate various projects and 
discourses of authority and development.  
This thesis has employed an explicitly non-normative conceptualisation of the Somali public 
sphere (in terms of the Habermasian democratic potential for rational-critical debate), and one which 
emphasises the interplay of local and trans-nationalised circuits of media production. The term ‗public 
sphere‘ has been employed in preference to a broader and more amorphous notion of ‗popular culture‘ 
for the simple reason that producers within this information context understand themselves to be, and 





news media) are perceived as contributing to public debate. News media is conceptualised by 
numerous actors as playing specific roles within state reconstruction processes, and even some of the 
most seemingly identity-bound rhetoric (found for instance in jihadi propaganda) is often presented in 
the didactic and ration-critical formulations of modern multi-media ‗news‘ formats.  
Understanding ‗modernity‘ in the discursive environment of political argumentation in 
Somalia has been an important component of the thesis‘s methodological approach. This can be 
considered here in comparison to the orientation of recent public sphere literature towards religious 
civil-society and the notion of ‗counter-publics‘. Meyer and Moors conceptualise a religiously-
orientated public sphere as an oppositional space to the state. Aside from calling into question the 
necessarily secular foundations of the classical concept, a religious public sphere, in this sense, creates 
possibilities for the imagination of collective identity (á la Anderson) beyond the nation-state (2006, 
4), a theme returned to numerous times in this thesis. They argue that ‗with the diminishing capacity 
of the nation-state for constructing communities of belonging, sub publics and transnational publics 
that are grounded in religious convictions, imaginaries, and networks have become increasingly 
important‘ (Ibid, 12). Similarly, Hirschkind‘s exploration of the ‗cassette ethics‘ of Islamic sermon 
distribution in Egypt grapples with the limited scope of Habermas‘ emphasis on ration-critical 
discourse as constitutive of the public sphere. He argues that in contrast to the ‗formation of political 
opinion through intersubjective reason, the discursive arena wherein cassette sermons circulate is 
geared to the deployment of the disciplining power of ethical speech, a goal, however, that takes 
public deliberation as one of its modalities‘ (2006, 30). His account does not establish a tradition 
(Islam) versus modernity (state) dichotomy, but does emphasise the existence of a potentially 
omnipresent counter-public of religious identification, facilitated by the cheap reproduction and 
dissemination of religious material.  
The notion of religious counter-publics is problematic for the Somalia case studies given the 
absence of a clearly defined and oppositional secular state. Although it is true that militant Islamists 
such as AS attempt to develop counter-narratives in diverse forms of media production against a state 
that is defined in terms of ‗apostasy‘ and the alleged renouncement of Islam, a broader overview of 
the discursive battlegrounds of Somali politics has revealed the multiple ways in which Islam is 
appropriated by different politics actors, alongside and often inseparable from (and not in opposition 
to) ethno-nationalist rhetorical devices. Whilst the actually existing secularism of different state 
projects across Somalia can be compared from a political-juridical perspective, in the self-definition 
of these entities the language of secularism is almost entirely absent.   
Schultz‘s discussion of ‗publicness‘ in the context of popular debate in Mali employs 
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh‘s observation that ‗culture‘ in many settings can ‗no longer serve as a 
register to appeal to a common national identity and political agenda; [and instead] becomes an idiom 
through which claims to local particularity in a multicultural nation-state are justified‘ (2000, cited in 





Islam‘s expansion into the public sphere is the state‘s reduced capacity (in ‗cultural‘ terms) to gain 
popular emotive allegiance. The peculiar nature of prolonged state collapse in Somalia has produced a 
discursive environment in which dominant narratives of state-reconstruction fuse an apparently 
homogenous conception of ‗Somali‘ culture with appeals to shared Islamic faith, rendering almost 
meaningless this notion of separation between different types of emotive appeal. This is not to say that 
cultural contestation does not exist in the context (and the very fact of homogeneity is frequently 
challenged) however the terms of the debate all engage Islam as a potentially unifying trope of 
political identity.  
This thesis‘ use of these concepts of religious public-sphere production has highlighted 
repeated overlaps in the Somali cases between discourses of political, cultural and religious 
sovereignty. At the same time, the deployment of this terminology recognizes the potential for the 
emrgence of new types of ‗critical‘ subjectivity embedded within public sphere producers and 
consumers‘ ideas of their own ‗publicness‘ and their relation to political authority (Schulz, 2006, 
145). This has a technological aspect in the sense that actors are willing and able to speak within a 
trans-border, global and explicitly ‗Somali‘ public sphere. Political authorities and separatist 
nationalists may attempt (with varying levels of success) to construct more localised public spheres 
around particular political institutions or processes, however they remain bound to communicate 
within the wider Somali-language networks of international broadcasters in order to make claims to 
legitimacy and engage in rhetorical contestation over Somali statehoods. It is telling that the most 
frequent and highly-publicised confrontations between the media and state authorities occur over the 
reportage of these international Somali broadcasters such as Voice of America or Universal TV. This 
is not to suggest that state authorities do not engage with or attempt to regulate more ‗localised‘ 
media, but it is understandable that there is greater scrutiny of the production of these larger 
transnational networks particularly in the context of macro-contestations of legitimate sovereignty 
across the territories.  
 
7.4. Implications for state-formation: the public sphere and monopolies of violence  
The influence of the Somali media ecology on state-building and political violence has been touched 
upon in the preceding section and in previous chapters. This conclusion now advances some more 
concrete findings on the potential trajectories of political consolidation across the Somali case studies, 
drawing on recent comparative literature on communications technology and state contestation. 
Although a wealth of scholarly and journalistic attention has been paid to the role of social media in 
the Arab Spring, the focus on the emancipatory potential of decentralized electronic networks of 
communication and mobilisation against coherent authoritarian states often leads accounts in an 
overly normative direction, limiting the potential for analysis of the practical ramifications of 





states to harness the power of such social media networks in innovative and pervasive ways, 
neutralizing any comparative advantage of anti-state activists (Morozov 2012).  
As has been noted above, the Somali context differs from these Middle Eastern examples in 
that there exist multiple state entities, none which have the capacity to act as coherent authoritarians 
against which popular struggles are mobilised. What then can be gained here from the burgeoning 
literature on Arab communications revolutions? Firstly, comparisons can be made between the growth 
of pan-Arab satellite news media in the early 2000s (exemplified by Al Jazeera, see Sakr 2007 and 
Hafez 2008) and the development of similar trans-state Somali-language news networks. In the 
former context, the development of a truly pan-Arab public sphere did not so much undermine the 
hegemony of the nation state form, but rather facilitated the spread of the anti-regime zeitgeist which 
engulfed the region in the development of the Tunisian uprising, eventually helping to unseat or 
seriously challenge numerous governments in the region.  
In the Somali case, I have not argued that the growth of such satellite or online media sets the 
stage for a practical reawakening of pan-Somali statehood, but rather contributes to the construction 
and reproduction of the ‗Ummadda Soomaaliyeed‟ imagined community across the various centres of 
power. Although the realities of state contestation and conflict currently override any politically 
unifying capacity of this public sphere, the fact that such affective cultural discourses seem to thrive 
in the context may itself be a function of the flux and uncertainties of political developments on the 
ground across Somalia. 
In analysing the resilience of this imagined ethno-community alongside the technological 
advances in media production it is also necessary to consider the commercial logics of the information 
economy and the role of advertising across the public sphere. Touched upon in previous chapters, 
examples have been provided of commercial content marketed through local and transnational Somali 
media to consumers across the world. In fact, the inherent trans-nationalism which I argue 
characterises ‗local‘ media in Somalia is often most visibly evidenced by the fact that airwaves and 
web-pages are full of advertisements for services and commodities located in virtually every world 
city where Somali populations reside. Reflecting the potential mobility of (elite) consumers as well as 
the financial connections linking the wider urban population with kin in the diaspora, such advertising 
not only reaffirms to audiences the globalised nature of Ummadda Soomaaliyeed, but the content 
itself often reproduces certain tropes of ‗Somali‘ identity, most obviously the imagery of the pastoral 
idyll and wealth in livestock. Usually steering clear of overt political bias – and with an eye on 
expanding access to new markets - such commercial content serves to reproduce the imagined ethnic 
community across multiple political boundaries. This in turn conditions the wider discursive 
environment within which political authorities communicate and legitimise their state projects.    
 Looking at social media engagement, Lynch (2011) notes that the qualities making tools such 
as Twitter or Facebook useful for evading authoritarian repression (anonymity, spontaneity, lack of 





democracy. Social media here may be a force for ‗permanent revolution,‘ and while this may help 
undermine autocracy, it may be less helpful in building the institutional foundations of democracy (or 
new state structures). The technological foundations of Somali public spheres allow for the production 
and consumption of multiple narratives of political struggle and legitimacy. The inability of the state 
to project its voice as the dominant narrative, combined with the increased potential for individualised 
media consumption via devices such as internet-connected smart-phones, further facilitates discursive 
fragmentation. In the Somali case, distinctions between social and ‗official‘ media are blurred with 
multiple political actors and media broadcasters employing a variety of different platforms to promote 
or directly disseminate content. This is, again, a result of the contemporaneous development of new 
media technologies and state structures, as opposed to the classic image of an authoritarian state 
attempting to come to grips with the new communicative possibilities available to its citizens.  
The ways in which a re-emerging state, for example in Muqdisho, attempts to utilise social or 
popular media have implications for the extent to which it is able to consolidate a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence. State authorities here recognise the value of winning hearts and minds in 
an ideological struggle with a militant Islamist movement which has demonstrated previous capacity 
for state, administrative and judicial development. However, as was discussed in Chapter three, the 
broadcasting of detailed information relating to investigations, counter-intelligence, counter-
insurgency and judicial process, may in itself undermine these efforts against a foe which is able to 
penetrate into state institutions by way of a network of agents and informants.  
Another highly pertinent example of this dynamic emerged during the writing of this 
concluding chapter, illustrating state media agency and the role of journalists not only as 
communicators but combatants.  Xasan Xanafi, a journalist affiliated with AS‘s Radio Andalus, was 
extradited to Somali from Kenya to face trial for his involvement of the killing of several other media 
workers in Muqdisho between 2007 and 2011. Prior to him being sentenced to death by a Military 
Court, Somali National Television (in collaboration with the National Intelligence and Security 
Agency) released an almost two hour long documentary entitled ‗Dilaaga Wariyaha – waa kuma 
Xasan Xanafi?‟ (‗The journalist killer – who is Xasan Xanafi?‘) featuring an extended confession 
from the accused in custody
5
. Two months later Xanafi was executed by firing squad. This was a 
public execution: pictures in the Somali media appeared in my Twitter newsfeed moments after it 
occurred. Unlike other state execution footage taken from this same site at Muqdisho‘s General 
Kahiye Police Academy which I have been (regrettably) exposed to, here the condemned man‘s face 
was initially pictured without a hood. It is conceivable that this was part of the state‘s performance of 
justice for this highly publicised and case in regards to a very recognizable individual.  
Considerations of adequate judicial process (or affronts to basic human dignity) aside, this 
case is related here to demonstrate both the capacity and challenges faced by the state in waging a 
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public discursive battle against AS in ‗state‘ and ‗social‘ media. The very broadcasting of Xanafi‘s 
confession enabled the construction of a counter-narrative by (presumably) pro-AS propagandists 
who supposedly obtained a voice recording of Xanafi in custody distancing himself from what he 
alleged was a forced confession at the hands of local and Western intelligence operatives
6
. Released 
as another video documentary on Youtube, the film was less concerned with Xanafi‘s alleged guilt or 
innocence but rather the role of foreign security agencies
7
. Characteristic of other highly 
internationalist and externally-connected propaganda material, the film featured reportage from the 
UK‘s Channel Four News: a piece by British-Somali journalist Jamal Osman on foreign detention and 
interrogation in Muqdisho. The film was promoted via pro-AS websites, although it was claimed to be 
the work of an organisation named ‗Justice 4 Journalists‘. This organisation – distinct from an 
organisation of the same name in Kenya – has little else in the way of an online footprint and is likely 
a mere front for jihadi sympathisers. It is notable that the film is bilingual (Somali voiceover or 
interview, English subtitles) and the organisation supposedly behind its production is branded almost 
as a Western-style human-rights advocacy group. Aside from demonstrating the range of formats 
employed by anti-state elements in their propaganda this example highlights the constant discursive 
interaction, via ‗social‘ and ‗official‘ media, between the state and the armed opposition, or their 
supporters. Such counter-narratives feed into a public sphere highly responsive to conspiracy theories 
and the constant invocation of external agendas and motivations.  
I understand conspiracy here in Wolfe‘s formulation as ‗less a particular narrative than a 
particular way of assembling narratives that performs the function of not only supplying a moral map 
to the political landscape but, more profoundly, of rescuing truth by rediscovering it in a particular 
discursive technique‘ (1997, 70 my emphasis). I highlight this productive process to reflect on the 
way in which the technologies of the modern Somali public sphere facilitate such complex and 
transnational assemblage of narratives. Consider the example above of the Somali-language pro-jihadi 
website, using also Arabic, Swahili and English, promoting, mediating and commenting on an 
English-language propaganda film on Youtube that is masquerading as reportage from a ‗civil 
society‘ human-rights advocacy group. The linguistic, stylistic, thematic and discursive diversity of 
this propaganda production calls into question any simple narrative dichotomies framed between 
local/international, religious/secular, western/Islamist public sphere production. Appeals to rational-
critical argumentation here speak not to the ‗killer‘s‘ guilt or innocence, but rather external power 
projection into conflict in Muqdisho - Somalia situated in the global context of the War on Terror and 
‗neo-imperialism‘. My argument is that the conditions of the Somali public sphere, in the midst of 
ongoing state reconstruction, facilitate a wide range of rational-critical subjectivities; a potential 
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diversity which is seldom captured in the public sphere literature, even when focused on the religious 
contours of ‗non-western‘ deliberative practice.  
Another point to be made here is that in engaging in ‗social‘ media contestation, an 
unconsolidated state positions itself on the same discursive playing field as its competitors, and 
(potentially) at a similar level of popularly imagined authority. Consider the National Intelligence and 
Security Agency in Muqdisho, with its @HSNQ_NISA Twitter feed and 6225 ‗followers‘, operating 
merely as one voice in highly fragmented discursive space
8
. This is a novel challenge to be negotiated 
by re-emerging states in an era of decentralized media and begs the question: do state actors who feel 
the need to legitimize themselves via such networks, necessarily lose an aura of sovereign prestige 
when entering into an arena of narrative-politics where anti-state opposition have the capacity to 
instantaneously challenge every claim made? If this is a pitfall faced by multi-national corporations in 
advanced industrialised economies when social media interaction with consumers opens them up to 
ridicule or critique (Gallaugher and Ransbotham 2010), then what are the consequences for emerging 
state structures in a conflict zone operating in a similarly uncontrollable public sphere? 
This public sphere coexists with a material environment (in Muqdisho, at least) where ‗non-
state security providers‘ (Menkhaus 2016) operate alongside nascent state forces and compromise any 
emerging monopoly of state violence. Again, crucial to this formulation is a blurring of state/non-state 
categorisations in considering neighbourhood, clan-based militias or ‗private security companies‘ and 
a complex political economy of security provision for numerous actors such as state officials, a 
burgeoning business class, and humanitarian agencies (or foreign researchers!). An intriguing overlap 
between this security environment and the role of conspiracy theorisation is touched upon by 
Menkhaus in his recognition that ‗at least some Somali non-state security providers have staged 
insecurity in order to provide protection, and have worked to undermine the revival of an effective 
central government and security sector‘ (2016, 14). Here the role of the public sphere and a narrative 
politics of insecurity/‘stabilisation‘ comes into focus as a potential site of manipulation for material 
gain and the perpetuation of what Keen (2000) describes as conditions of ‗durable disorder‘.    
Before concluding with a discussion of the impact of this communicative context on the 
overaching theme of ‗ethno-nationalism‘, it is first appropriate to survey the ongoing developments in 
media strategy by the current administrations in each of the ‗capitals‘ engaged in the thesis, and 
potential future trajectories of state reconfiguration and contestation. Despite the continued prevalence 
of non-state armed actors and the ability of insurgents to attack state structures in the capital, the 
Somali Federal Government‘s emergence and development since 2012 is reflected in their efforts (and 
modest successes) in establishing a Somali ‗state‘ narrative in the Muqdisho public sphere. The SFG‘s 
propaganda strategy has been critically examined above, however it is necessary to point out the 
significance of the fact that the state is now able to enter into this discursive contestation in the first 
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place, through its utilisation of state media such as Somali National Television, Radio Muqdisho and 
even social media in the form of Twitter communications from security services. Such 
communications (in Somali, English and Arabic) demonstrate state actors‘ desire to link political and 
security consolidation with a wider public sphere narrative that foregrounds ‗Somalia rising‘, 
optimism surrounding development in Muqdisho, a ‗normalisation‘ of daily life, while critiquing of 
external accounts which continue to emphasise violence and disorder. The contours of this discussion 
have been highlighted above with regards to #Cadaanstudies and critical analysis of foreign 
mainstream media, and it bears repeating that the state retains the potential to discursively link itself 
to these types of narrative, taking advantage of genuine nationalist enthusiasm for state reconstruction 
(and cultural renaissance) in the capital.  
State media development in Puntland reflects the administration‘s ambiguous orientation 
towards Somali state reconstruction in Muqdisho. Authorities in Garoowe have developed legal and 
political mechanisms to control (or attempt to control) narratives around Puntland‘s legitimacy: here 
the state‘s Ministry for Information has played an important role in drafting a media law, challenging 
international broadcasters such as VOA, as well as cultivating links with telecommunications 
providers - facilitating periodic control over certain websites. The emergence of ‗PLTV‘ (openly 
‗serving and defending Puntland‘s interests‘
9
) with the support of foreign financing is indicative both 
of the state‘s long-term media sensitivity, and its aspirations to quasi-statehood legitimated by 
external patronage and relations. This state-making, conflict and communications nexus was recently 
epitomised in Puntland‘s expression of a clear media narrative around its forces‘ defeat of AS 
militants moving north into its territory from Galmudug state. Conspiracy theories regarding the role 
that Muqdisho played in this AS movement were voiced by state figures on transnational Somali cable 
TV broadcasters, but perhaps of greater importance was the manner in which images of captured AS 
child-soldiers were disseminated. The Puntland state was eager to portray its role in demobilising and 
re-educating these youngsters whilst attempting to delegitimize the Islamist militants
10
. The subtext to 
all of these reports was that Puntland security forces had demonstrated an operational coherence that 
had not been evident in Muqdisho, thus undermining periodic calls for AMISOM forces to expand 
their theatre of operations into the northeast. That Puntland can broadcast its apparent lack of reliance 
on external military assets (covert security and intelligence support notwithstanding) also serves as 
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propaganda for Garoowe – a fact of no small potential significance given continuing constitutional 
debates over the potential relocation of the Somali capital as part of federalisation process
11
. 
News media in Hargeysa plays an integral role in carving out the discursive space for 
Somaliland‘s political project of secession and independence. Whilst ‗local‘ public spheres of media 
production are discernable across the different Somali urban political case studies, it is for Somaliland 
that this arena of information transmission and debate has its most tangible impact on imaginations of 
statehood. The vocabularies of political institutions are constantly reproduced in the Hargeysa-based 
news media, actively engaged in establishing the city as the capital of an independent Somali state. As 
examples in the previous chapters have demonstrated, these institutions are not merely conceived of 
as static, formal structures of governance, but also as embodiments of nationalist historical narratives 
and repositories of normative political-cultural values. Implicitly and explicitly, appeals to ‗Somali‘ 
cultural heritage speak to wider audiences in a transnational public sphere, attempting to legitimise the 
political secession of Somaliland as a new member of a regional configuration of ‗Somali‘ states or 
administrations.  Employing conventions of ‗foreign‘ and ‗domestic‘ news broadcasting, the 
Somaliland media constantly affirms the spatial coherence of the independent state (not always 
corresponding with a fuzzier reality in the borderlands) standing alongside but separate to, political 
neighbours of Ethiopia and ‗Somalia‘ (or a Puntland ‗administration‘). Selective coverage of 
developments, particularly in these latter two territories, foregrounds the implicit legitimacy of a 
Somaliland project in the face of continued political or military instability elsewhere. On a news 
media stage, Somaliland‘s statehood is performed for an ‗international community‘ (from whom 
formal recognition is demanded) and also the wider Somali-language public sphere, itself structured, 
financed and staffed by a highly mobile diaspora, active politically in various communities inside the 
Horn and in the broader diaspora. The internationalisation of statehood discourses is similarly clear in 
the tone and focus of media production in Hargeysa itself. This not only collapses distinctions 
between ‗local‘ and ‗diasporic‘ production but indicates the influence of mobile elites in the wider 
politics of state reconstruction or reconfiguration across Somalia - a factor also evident in the 
discussions of media output and debate elsewhere in the Somali Horn.  
Although it is difficult to speculate further on the state-making trajectories of the three 
political centres addressed by this thesis, I offer some modest reflections here. At the time of the 
completion of this thesis, the selection of a new Parliament and transfer of executive power to 
Maxamed Cabdulaahi ‗Farmaajo‘ has been successfully undertaken through an indirect regional 
process and the votes of new MPs. Whilst the former administration of Xasan Sheikh Maxamuud 
demonstrated the capacity to communicate relatively coherently around the security-orientated 
struggles against AS, it was unable to control a single narrative around this political transition, 
particularly given the fact that the orginal plan for ‗one person one vote‘ elections has been delayed 
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until at least 2020, due to the wider security situation in the very recently established federal states. 
Gradually improving security and economic conditions in Muqdisho (tied to continued publicity for 
state-security advances) may well allow the ‗Somalia rising‘ narrative to continue gaining traction to 
the potential benefit of new, or reorganised, power holders. This process is intimately tied to the 
consolidation of the nascent federal states and the fight against AS, a foe which has repeated defied 
expectations and remained a credible military (if no longer political) adversary. It is too early, and 
beyond the scope of this thesis, to comment on potential influence of an emerging Somali-franchise 
Islamic State, aside from pointing out that Islamist-framed ethno-nationalism will remain a viable 
rhetorical vehicle for mobilising communities who are marginalised by the ongoing political 
processes
12
. The question remains, however, as to how big and diverse those constituencies will be 
post 2016.  
This thesis has argued that Puntland and Somaliland must be conceptualised as state 
formations centred around politically influential capital cities. External patronage will remain vital for 
power-holders, even if the optimal potential window for Somaliland‘s international recognition may 
well have passed. The actual impact of continued non-recognition on Somaliland‘s political 
development is difficult to assess. Democratic processes are now popularly inscribed in imaginations 
of legitimate state sovereignty, however, the ‗international community‘ may be able to exert less 
leverage over the conduct of elections as prospects for recognition are seen to stagnate, or recede 
further into the distance. Increasingly muscular anti-liberal discourses in the Somaliland public sphere 
can be seen, in part, as a reaction to perceived western influence without the prospect of political 
recognition, as well as the persistent myth that Somaliland has developed (and can continue to 
develop) without any kind of external (and conditional) humanitarian aid. The popular currency of 
Somaliland‘s nationalist imagination may come to be felt by political elites manoeuvring in 
negotiations with authorities in Muqdisho – if/when these restart. In the long term, power holders in 
Hargeysa who attempt to adapt their strategy in the face of diminished hopes of recognition, may find 
that a weight of popular expectation and uncompromising aspirations to secessionism limits room for 
diplomatic compromise or effective bargaining for autonomy with Muqdisho.  One must not overlook 
the mobility of political elites and there are numerous figures in Muqdisho who either hail from 
Somaliland or have served in its government before relocating for new political opportunities in the 
south. The Somaliland government currently strenuously rejects the involvement of such individuals 
in negotiations between Hargeysa and Muqdisho, and the extent of any future roles they may be 
allowed to play will be determined by the level of popular secessionist sentiment as expressed in 
public in Hargeysa.  
Puntland, on the other hand, does not possess such a distinct and clearly articulated historical 
state nationalist narrative vis-á-vis Muqdisho - complicated as this is by the association of the former 
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military regime with the Daarood clan family. This means, however, that it remains less ideologically 
encumbered than the explicitly secessionist Somaliland in its relationship with the Somali Federal 
Government. Whether this will lead to greater concessions of autonomy from Muqdisho or the 
gradual integration of its existing state structures will remain an open question. Needless to say, the 
current status-quo of near total de facto independence is not likely to change soon, and it is 
noteworthy that as a regional administration with neither an independence agenda nor a Somaliland-
style democratic success-story, it has still been able to attract a significant degree of international 
patronage and support. Due to Puntland‘s position as a theatre of operations against both AS and 
maritime pirates, this has particularly focused on the security sector, and the development of various 
paramilitary and intelligence-gathering units will continue to increase the relative influence and 
leverage held by the administration in continuing negotiations towards a workable federalism. The 
sight (relayed frequently in the media) of Puntland officials arriving in Muqdisho with their own 
security-detail of ‗special forces‘ troops, clearly outfitted with externally-sourced equipment, is but 
the most visible indicator of this power dynamic at work. My analysis of popular Puntland 
commentaries on the status of Puntlanders in Muqdisho politics has demonstrated how narratives of 
conspiracy and physical threats in the capital intersect with these expressions of Puntland‘s 
independent security-sector capacity.  
 
7.5. Ethno-nationalism beyond the nation state  
This thesis has explored the concept of ethno-nationalism in the context of public sphere debate over 
the reconfiguration of the Somali state. It has argued that there exists a dialectical relationship 
between realities and narratives of political fragmentation and the increased reproduction of 
discourses engaging an ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally-defined Somali ‗Ummah‘. 
This counter-intuitive process can be seen to work in various ways: political fragmentation requires 
commentators to legitimate a diverse range of political projects to a transnational ‗Somali‘ audience, 
in the context of reconstruction of a ‗post post-colonial‘ Somali state. Across the Somali territories the 
‗state‘ is being re-imagined and politically reconfigured: by Somalilanders who stake juridical 
legitimacy on a British colonial boundary; by Islamists explicitly invoking the notion of ‗Greater 
Somalia‘; or by power-holders in Muqdisho who wish to recreate a unitary Somali state but recognise 
the necessity of re-adjusting mechanisms of representation and regional power distribution to address 
the failures of post-independence statehood. 
Even where political secession is the stated objective this cannot be justified through recourse 
to a more limited and parochial identity in that this would leave the project open to charge that it 
constitutes a mere political vehicle of the dominant clan-family. In this sense Somaliland‘s statehood 
is articulated as just this, a culturally ‗Somali‘ state, existing as a legitimate ‗Somali‘ political entity in 
a Horn populated by other ‗Somali‘ administrations. Islamist mobilisations necessarily invoke ethno-





cultural economic or political practices, or the implicit homogenisation of Somali religious identity. 
Even the most divisive of discourses, that of clan (or critiques of others‘ ‗clanism‘) ultimately tend to 
emphasise a cultural homogeneity in which genealogical identity constitutes an important pillar of 
political culture (and one that often discursively harks back to the pastoral emphasis and dominance of 
the post-colonial state project).  
Wimmer and Schiller remind us that the scholarly ‗shift towards a study of ‗transnational 
communities‘...was more a consequence of an epistemic move away from methodological nationalism 
than of the appearance of new objects of observation‘ and note that the nation-state form, far from 
being fixed and immutable, has always been shaped by cross border movements of people, capital and 
ideas (2002, 301). This thesis has fore-grounded this mobility in the context of a globalised public 
sphere which recreates multiple discourses of ‗ethno-nationalism‘ for various political projects and 
agendas. ‗Ethno-nationalism‘ is an appropriate term here in that all of the discourses of political 
sovereignty (or resistance) discussed in previous chapters ground themselves, in one way or another, 
in terms of specific notions of what it means to be a ‗Somali‘, an ethnic category appended or 
expanded by other religious, linguistic or cultural signifiers of identity. The Somali nation state is 
fundamentally divided and contested, and outside of urban centres it may be largely intangible or be 
of limited impact (except for the effects of ongoing military operations). State-building, nonetheless, 
is being undertaken in these towns and cities and a reconfigured Somalia - hype aside - is emerging 
after more than two decades of political stagnation and intractable conflict, particularly in the south.  
In the northwest and to a lesser extent the northeast, new Somali states have already emerged.  
To what extent can a partially deterritorialized and trans-state public sphere foster different 
forms of ethno-nationalism beyond the nation state? Perhaps ‗trans-state‘ is a more appropriate term 
here, in that this thesis has attempted to demonstrate how an ‗imagined community‘ of the Somali 
ethno-nation does exist regardless of, and alongside, various political experiments and malleable 
interpretations of Somali colonial and post-colonial state history. Put another way, to what extent is 
ethno-nationalism ethno-nationalism without the nation-state? To answer these questions it is 
necessary to, once again, emphasise the distinctiveness of Somali case studies, particularly in regard 
to the status of ethno-nationalism itself. A key aspect of Wimmer and Schiller‘s critique is that 
mainstream political science or history has ignored ethno-nationalism in the context of western state-
building (distinguishing states from nations) whilst projecting it into those ‗troublesome‘ parts of the 
post-colonial or modern world where ‗tribalists‘ undertake ethnocide in the name of the nation (Ibid 
307). This is a valuable insight that warns against the reification of inherent European ‗rationalism‘ 
and overlooking the role of ethno-nationalism (and associated violence) in western state-building 
experiences. 
Reflecting on the Somali cases, it is necessary to point out that debates over of this type of 
brutal, unthinking ‗tribalism‘ are a feature of both the academic literature and modern political and 





the level of the ‗clan‘, within a genealogical construct of a wider Somali ethnicity that virtually all 
members of the main clan families (and especially the traditionally pastoralist Daarood, Dir/Isaaq and 
Hawiye) recognise and reproduce in their political discourses. Ideas of clan do not remain static, and 
can be seen to shift and adapt to changing contexts of communication and debate. As such, analysis of 
polemic prose in the previous chapter has shown that this imprecise and problematic notion of the 
‗Samaale‘ does not exist as an explicit, operationalisable political identity in these debates, perhaps 
given the continued fragmentation of the territories in question between these dominant clan family 
constituencies. On the other hand, that chapter has also demonstrated that in certain circumstances or 
with regard to certain moments in history, broad-brush identifications of ‗clan-family‘ agency, 
organisation or conspiracy do appear in public sphere discourse. Furthermore, implicit within many of 
these discourses remain appeals to a broadly homogenising pastoralist cultural heritage, an echo of the 
cultural-identity that was historcially reinforced at the centre of the Somali nation-state idea by post-
colonial governments.  
Having said this, it should also be pointed out that the types of texts analysed in Chapters four 
and five illustrate the development of potentially broader conceptualisations of Somali ethno-
nationalist identity. The fact that cartoonist Amin Amir hails from a ‗minority‘ group, but is able to 
produce material that finds receptive audiences across all of the political territories in question is 
significant, and this shows the role of a transnational public sphere in facilitating new forms of 
nationalist expression. From a totally different ideological standpoint, the AS propaganda analysed in 
Chapter five incorporates both pastoral and non-pastoral tropes of cultural heritage, and demonstrates 
the Jihadists‘ rhetorical commitment to a broadly conceived but identifiably ‗Somali‘ ethno-nation of 
homogenised religious believers. Of course, the reality of AS‘s engagement with and governance of 
‗minority‘ populations is complicated and the chapter emphaises the fact that such rhetoric does not 
likely correspond with violent and coercive realities on the ground. Nevertheless, the historical 
development of their resilient and cross-clan networks of militancy - combined with the dynamic and 
decentred media ecology - has provided space for new articualations of ‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist 
identity to be expressed.  
Ultimately, as the analysis has examined particular types of text with reference to political 
developments in the three centres of Garoowe, Hargeysa and Muqdisho this has – by and large - 
excluded many other narratives of so-called ‗minority‘ groups (categorisations I have reflected on in 
previous chapters). In justifying this focus, it must be appreciated that the primary political fault-lines 
of modern Somali state-making or breaking exist between the dominant clan families and that the 
primary political dynamic of the violence that characterised the civil war period (contested history 
that continues to structure narratives of state reconfiguration and contestation) was again defined by 
such intra-‗Samaale‘ contestation. This should not be taken as a down-playing of the disproportionate 
levels of suffering which affected (and continues to affect) communities outside of these main 





ongoing processes of marginalisation. However, to understand elite political contestation across 
modern Somalia it is essential to recognise the (popularly perceived) centrality of conflict amongst the 
major Somali lineages, and it is this context, I argue which allows a ‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist 
discourse to exist in various public spheres alongside continued political fragmentation. What is 
rolled into in many of these debates (for instance a continued emphasis on the pastoral aspect of 
Somali cultural heritage) may contribute to the further marginalisation of minority groups who have 
been forced to play the game of state reconfiguration by the rules of ‗4.5‘ allocations of positions at 
regional and national levels of government.  
Although clan names may be referenced in terms of modern political history or ongoing 
contestation, it is nonentheless difficult to speak of distinct identity-projection of the individual clan 
families either in cultural, linguistic or religious terms, at least in the public sphere. In Somaliland, for 
example, there is little overt effort to promote or portray an ‗Isaaq‘ cultural identity distinct from other 
groups in Ummadda Soomaaliyeed. There does, however, remain significant scope for further fine-
grain study of modern poetic literature on this question, and a fruitful study could be undertaken to 
explore the ways in which Raxanweyne (Digil & Mirifle) identities - in terms of agro-pastoralism and 
the use of the Af Maay dialect - are expressed politically in relation to federal state reconstruction, 
particularly the emerging Southwest State centred around Baydhabo. Although that has lain beyond 
the scope of this project, I emphasise here how dominant clan family identities are primarily 
expressed in political terms: either through claims to autochthony or a seemingly increasing 
‗officialisation‘ of clan communications and diplomacy - up to and including written agreements 
made with foreign states such as Kenya
13
. The growing prevalence of claims to clan-based territorial 
‗ownership‘ is visible in contemporary debates between political actors who identify the long-term 
ramifications of the federal reconfiguration of Somalia.  
Such claim-making corresponds to Dunn‘s observation ‗that the [increased] employment of 
autochthony discourses is an attractive response (one of several possible) to the ontological 
uncertainty of the postmodern/postcolonial condition‘ (2009, 113), while Meyer and Geschiere assert 
that ‗people‘s awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger a search for 
fixed orientation points and action frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct 
new boundaries‘ (1999, 2). Such conditions of uncertainty, flux and mobility have been implicit in 
each of the political contexts of Somali statehood discussed above. If clanic territorial claim-making 
constitutes one response to political uncertainty, then other discourses in the public sphere 
(particularly around a universalising or homogenising construction of ‗Somali‘ identity) may also be 
interpreted as popular responses to continued state fragmentation and a distrust of political elites. 
Whilst it may be tempting to conceive of this solely in terms of civic agency, this formulation may, 
however, overlook the blurred distinctions between ‗official‘ and ‗informal‘ state communication in 
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the complex and splintered Somali political environment, where multiple actors lay claim to state 
vocabularies and discourses of political legitimisation. To focus here in the conclusion on the divisive 
politics of clan is not to emphasise ‗primordialist‘ agency but rather to acknowledge and problematise 
institutionalisation along the lines of the reductionist ‗4.5‘ electoral mechanism that has been 
deployed once again (perhaps for the last time) in the 2017 selection of the new SFG. The above 
chapters have explored perceptions of (and discursive contestation over) division, and have 
emphasised their political expressions through various rhetorical strategies, increasingly territorial-
type coding and their interface with radical oppositional narratives of Islamist authority.  
Although the distinctiveness of the Somali case has been emphasised above, it is possible to 
point to potentially useful comparative examples to explore the relationships between political 
‗tribalism‘, grand discourses of regional ethno-solidarity, and appeals to political Islam. Libya, for 
example, is often now labelled the ‗new Somalia‘ of North Africa, in reference to state collapse and 
extreme political fragmentation. In this regard, the insights of this thesis may well prove relevant for 
what is becoming an increasingly prolonged conflict. The ‗tribal‘ characteristics of ongoing 
contestation in the Libyan case are frequently emphasised, and a comparison can be drawn with 
Somalia in regard to the implicit manipulation of tribal loyalties by Qadhdhafi‘s ostensibly socialist 
and nationalist regime (Anderson 1990) and the unravelling of conflict along these lines in the 
aftermath of revolution (Hweio 2012). A crucial difference with the Somali case however, was the 
role of wider pan-Arab nationalist mobilisation - in the context of which Qadhdhafi‘s Libya 
represented but one (distinctive) state project. Post-colonial Somalia, however, was the single state 
vehicle of pan-Somali nationalism, and failed ethnic irredentism into its neighbouring states set the 
scene for eventual regime collapse. ‗Somalia‘ - as a concept and despite its deeply contested state-
history - still exists as the primary affective focus for imaginations of pan-Somali mobilisation, 
invoked by various political actors.  
Despite this important difference there are academic debates already playing out around 
political and ‗tribal‘ fragmentation in Libya relevant for this conclusion on Somali nationalist 
ideologies. Cherstich (2014) for example, argues that ‗tribalism‘ in the current Libyan context can be 
conceptualised as an ideology in itself, albeit one that belies conventional distinctions between urban 
‗nationalist‘ or ‗Islamist‘ emotive mobilisation, and ‗conservative‘ social forces of rural hinterlands. 
He argues, in contrast to such reductionist dichotomisations, ‗that Libyan tribesmen have ‗national‘ 
and ‗tribal‘ as two available narratives (together with others like ‗Islam‘ or ‗the revolution‘), and that 
they combine them in complex ways in order to describe, navigate, and affect social reality‘ (2014, 
407). 
To conclude, I note that this description of complex political identity formation in Libya 
corresponds closely to one of the the central arguments of this thesis: namely, that the coexistence of 
of Somali ethno-nationalist imaginaries alongside social and political fragmentation represents not so 





sphere of identity projection within and across multiple (Somali) political boundaries. The different 
types of text analysed in my sample have demonstrated how narratives of ethno-nationalism are 
deployed alongside and may be informed by discourses of religious solidarity, appeals to clan as an 
implicit facet of ‗Somali‘ political organisation, or rhetorical critiques of ‗tribalism‘ itself. To argue 
that ‗Somalia‘ (and, by extension Somali ethno-nationalism) is but a ‗myth‘ (Hesse 2010) with no 
affective or practical political value in an apparently materialist battleground of elite contestation over 
the spoils of conflict or state reconstruction, is to ignore the complex interplay between multiple 
nodes of discursive political argumentation and expressions of identity. Purely instrumentalist 
accounts of political agency fail to capture the ideological complexity of political contestation in 
Somalia - narrative battles which individuals, both elites and foot-soldiers, are willing to die for. This 
thesis has thus attempted to analyse the political significance of such popular discursive contestation 
within a public sphere which itself impacts on the material reconstruction or reconfiguration of 
monopolies of violence and state-building. The struggle for the reconfiguration of the Somali state 
will continue and a primary battlefield will remain the public sphere. Such is the current technological 
context of affective state re-making, and such are the multiple possibilities for reproducing imagined 
communities of trans-state nations in the 21
st
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Somalia Turkiga kula yeelan laheyd‟ [Somaliland obstructs talks with Government of Somaliland 
which were to take place in Turkey] 
Saalax Cali Waaberi, Puntland Today, September 21, 2015, „Somaliland oo dadaal ugu jirta in ay 
qorshe gurracan ku hanato Sanaag‟ [Somaliland strives for wicked plan over Sanaag] 
Ogaal newspaper, Hargeysa, April 30, 2015, „Hal ku dhigga sanadkan‟ [This year‘s slogan] 
Weli Cabsiiye, Ogaal newspaper, Hargeysa, May 5, 2015, „Dawlada Xamar: Dib u raac taarikhda 
geesiyada Somaliland?‘ [The Muqdisho Government: follow the bravery of the Somaliland heroes?] 
Himilo newspaper, Hargeysa, March 25,2015, ‗Interview with Head of Somalia Immigration‘. 
Maxamed Sadiiq, Ogaal newspaper, April 30, 2015, „Saleebaanoow ama Soomaalilaand baad abaal 





Jamal Madaar, Geeska Afrika newspaper, Hargeysa May 10, 2015 „Fitnada ka soo foolle mashruuca 

























































Appendix 3. List of interviews 
 
Included here are formal, extended and semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The list excludes 
numerous shorter unsolicited interactions with media consumers in cafes, hotels and universities in 




Cumar Shidle, independent media consultant, Rugsan Hotel, Garoowe, 27 February 2015 
Mukhtar Xersi Maxamed, head of Audio/Visual unit, Puntland Development Research Centre, 
Garoowe, 28 February 2015 
Cabdiweli Xirsi Cabdule ‗Indhaguran‘, Puntland Minister of Information, Communication, Culture 
and Heritage, Ministry Office, Garoowe, February 28 2015 
Cabdiraxman Warsame Jama, Chair of Puntland Chamber of Commerce, Rugsan Hotel, Garoowe, 3 
March 2015 
Cabdifatah Askar, Director of Puntland Television, Garoowe PLTV Headquarters, 3 March 2015 (also 
via email correspondence) 
Maxamuud Siciid Xuseen, Former Deputy Puntland Justice Minister, Rugsan Hotel, Garoowe, 4 
March 2015 
Maxamed Yusuf Jama ‗Tigey‘, Governor of Mudug Region, Rugsan Hotel, 4 March 2015 
Focus group 1 (5 male, 1 female university students, anonymous), Puntland State University, 
Garoowe, 7 March 2015 
Focus group 2 (8 male, 1 female university students – anonymous), Puntland State University, 
Garoowe, 7 March 2015 
Focus group 3 (8 male university students – anonymous), Puntland State University, Garoowe, 8 
March 2015 
Focus group 4 (8 male students – anonymous), Puntland State University, Garoowe, 8 March 2015 
Xuseen Yassin ‗Gorogoro‘, Owner/operator of Shacab Media (online news), Rugsan Hotel, Garoowe, 
9 March 2015 
Dr Nuur Axmed, Puntland Vice Minister of Information, Communication, Culture and Heritage, 
Ministry Office, Garoowe, March 9 2015 
Keyse Yusuf Aden, Secretary, Puntland Ministry of Information, Communication, Culture and 
Heritage, Ministry Office, Garoowe, March 9 2015 
Faisal Khalif Barre, Chairman, Media Association of Puntland (via Skype) 25 and 26 April 2015 
Hargeysa 
Maxamed Jaamac ‗Dhage‘, Novelist, Mansoor Hotel, Hargeysa, 28 April, 2015 
Abdikaar (only first name given), Newspaper-vendor, Safari Hotel, Hargeysa, 28 April 2015 
Cabdilaahi Maxamed Dahir, Minister of Information, Culture and National Guidance, Ministerial 
Office, Hargeysa, 30 April 2015 
Mubaarak Ibrahim, Director, Beder International University, Safari Hotel, 30 April, 2015 
Zakariye Axmed Maxamed, Journalist, Radio Hargeysa, Main office, Idaacad Neighbourhood, 
Hargeysa, 30 April 2015 
Dr. Cabdiraxman Xuseen Axmed, Writer/Academic Development Director, Gollis University, 





Boobe Yusuf Ducaale, Writer/Secretary of Media and Communications of Wadani Party, Safari 
Hotel, Hargeysa, 4 May 2015 
Maxamuud Cabdi Jaamac, Chairman, Somaliland Journalists‘ Association (SOLJA), office, Hargeysa, 
4 and 6 May 2015 
Cabdiraxman ‗Guri Barwaaqo‘, Head of Gaariye School for Somali language and culture, University 
of Hargeysa, 5 May 2015 
Cabdirisaaq Axmed, Head of Administration, Jamhuuriya Newspaper, office, Hargeysa, 6 May 2015 
Yoonis Cali Nuur, Journalist (retired, ex-BBC Somali service), SOLJA office, Hargeysa, 7 May 2015 
Focus group 1 (3 female, 3 male university students, anonymous), Gollis University, 7 May 2015 
Focus group 2 (6 male university students, anonymous), Gollis University, 9 May 2015 
Focus group 3 (5 male university students, anonymous), Gollis University, 10 May 2015 
Xamda Xuseen Maxamed Cigaal, Journalist/columnist, Email correspondence, May 2015 
Muqdisho 
Hotel owner (anonymous), hotel, Muqdisho, 8 February 2015 
Communications Officer (anonymous), International humanitarian organisation, Muqdisho office, 12 
February 2015 
Male ex international humanitarian organisation Muqdisho head of office (anonymous), hotel, 
Muqdisho, 29 January 2015 
Hotel domestic staff (1 male, 2 female – anonymous) hotel, Muqdisho, 31 January 2015 
Male journalists (x3, anonyomous), Goobjoog Media, hotel, Muqdisho, 2 February 2015 
Driver (x1), private security guards (x2) (anonymous), hotel, Muqdisho, 11 February 2015 
Cabdiqaadir Sheekh Shakuna, Minister of Ports, Interim Southwest Administration, hotel, Muqdisho, 
11 February and 12 April, 2015 
Editor of Muqdisho print newspaper (anonymous), email correspondence, February-March 2015 
Axmed Cali, Member of Board of Directors, Hormuud Telecom, hotel, Muqdisho, 8 April 2015 
Yuusuf Xasan, editor, Xaqiiqa Times newspaper, hotel, Muqdisho, 9 April 2015 
Female head of Muqdisho office (anonymous), International Humanitarian Organisation, Office, 
Muqdisho, 11 April 2015 
Focus group (10 male, 4 female university students, anonymous), University of Muqdisho, Faculty of 
Journalism, Muqdisho, 13 April 2015 
Male Journalist (anonymous), Shabelle Media, hotel, Muqdisho, 13 April 2015 
Dr Ibrahim Maxamed Mursal, Head of Administration, University of Muqdisho, 13 April 2015 
Nairobi 
Cabdiladiif Dahir, journalist, Nairobi, May 13 2015 
Fowziyo Omar, Producer, Radio Ergo Office, FAO Somalia Compound, Nairobi, May 13, 2015 
London 
Cali Saciid, Owner Keyd Media, café, Stockwell, London, May 27, 2015 
Adam Matan and Sagal Bafo, Anti-Tribalism Movement, ATM Office, Shepherd‘s Bush, London, 






Appendix 4. Questionnaire sample (Somali with English Translation) 
 
Question designed and translated into Somali by the author and distributed amongst undergraduate 
in Muqdisho (University of Mogadishu); Garoowe (Puntland State University), and Hargeysa (Gollis 




Daraasad ku saabsan isticmaalka tignoolojiyada warbaahinta Af Soomaaliga 
(Study on use of Somali media technology) 
 
Aniga magacaygu waa Peter Chonka, waxaan diyaarinayaa daraasad PhD ee Jaamacadda Edinburgh (Dalka Ingiriiska). 
Maalmahan waxaan soo ururinayaa macluumaad la xidhiidhaa isticmaalka tignoolojiyo kala duwan ee warbaahinta Af 
Soomaaliga (tusaale ahaan raadiyow, internet, wargeys IWM). Halkan waxaan rabaa in aan ku weydiyo dhowr su’aal ku 
saabsan isticmaalkaaga tignoologiyo warbaahineed. Haddii aad su’aalo qabtid ku saabsan daraasaddayda fadlan ii soo 
xidhiidh: p.j.chonka@sms.ed.ac.uk  
[My name is Peter Chonka and I am preparing a PhD at the University of Edinburgh (UK). At the moment I am collecting 
data related tot he use of different Somali language media technologies (for example radio, intent, newspapers etc.) Here I 
would like to ask you several questions concerning your use of media technology. If you have any questions about my 
research then please contact me at: p.j.chonka@sms.ed.ac.uk]  
 
Haddii aad rabtaa in aan ku soo diro warbixinta ee daraasaddaas markuu la dhammeyey (waxaan rajaynayaa in aan 
2016ka dhammeyn karta, insh’allah) fadlan halkaan ku qor email-kaaga:    
[If you would like me to send you the outcome of this research when it is completed (I hope to finish in 2016 inshallah) then 
please write your email address here:]                    
 
Wax jawaab ah oo aad ii siiso waa mid astuuran ah: micnaha waxay tahay in macluumaadkaas ayaan isticmaali doona si 
magac la’aan ah markaan diyaarinayaa warbixinta ugu dambeynta.  
[All answers given are anonymous: this means that I will use data without names in the final report] 
 
Macluumaadka jawaabaha:  [Respondent information] 
 
Da’daada:...............Jinsigaaga(lab/dheddig)............Magalaadaada/Xaafaddaada..........*Age, Gender, Town/neighbourhood] 
Su’aalooyinka  [the questions] 
1) Sida caadiga ama qiyaas ahaan, toddobaad kasta imisa jeer ayaad isticmaashaa qaababkaas warbaahineed? 
(fadlan  ku qor saf kasta) [Usually, or approximately, how many times per week do you use these forms of 
media – please put a tick on each line] 











Barnaamij warar ee TV       
Barnaamij warar ee Radiyow       
Wargeys/Joornal       
Bog war ah ee internetka       
 
[Televison news Every day              3 times p/w         2 times p/w     once p/w            less then once     never 




2) Haddaad daawataa barnaamij warar ee TV-ga (Af Soomaaliga), muxuu yahay channel-ka oo aad daawataa inta 
ugu badan? [If you watch TV news (Somali language), which channel do you watch most?] 
                      ....................................................................................................................................... 
3) Maxay tahay sababta ugu weyn in aad daawataa channel-kaas? (fadlan 1 sanduuq ku qor ) [What is the most 
important reason that you watch that channel?] 





b) ‘waan aamminaa wixii ay faafiyaan’  *‘I trust what they broadcast’+ 
c) ‘waan is garanaynaa dadka soo saarayaan barnaamijkaas’  *‘I know the people who make that program’+ 
d) ‘waan raacsanaa ra’igooda (tusaale ahaan xagga siyaasadda, diinta IWM)  *‘I agree with their opinions’ 
(e.g. regards to politics, religion, etc.] 
e) ‘Qoyskayga/Ehelkayga way jecelyihiin baraamijkaas ama channel-kaas’  *‘My family like that program or 
channel’+ 
f) Sabab kale (fadlan halkan ku qor): [Other reason: please write] 
 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
4) Haddaad dhageysataa wararka raadiyow-ga, maxay tahay idaacadda oo aad dhageysataa inta ugu badan? 
[If you listen to radio news, which channel do you listen to most?] 
 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
5) Maxay tahay sababta ugu weyn in aad dhageysataa idaacaddaas (fadlan 1 sanduuq ku qor ) [See Q3 options] 
a) ‘waxay bixiyaan warar ku saabsan meesha aan ku joogaa’  
b) ‘waan aamminaa wixii ay faafiyaan’  
c) ‘waan is garanaynaa dadka soo saarayaan barnaamijkaas’  
d) ‘waan raacsanaa ra’igooda (tusaale ahaan xagga siyaasadda, diinta IWM)  
e) ‘Qoyskayga/Ehelkayga way jecelyihiin baraamijkaas ama idaacaddaas’  
f) Sabab kale (fadlan halkan ku qor):  
............................................................................................................................................................ 
6) Haddaad akhrisaa wararka internetka ee Afka Soomaaliga, muxuu yahay website-ka oo aad isticmaashaa inta ugu 




7) Maxay tahay sababta ugu weyn in aad isticmaashaa website-kaas (fadlan 1 sanduuq ku qor ) [See Q3 options] 
a) ‘waxay bixiyaan warar ku saabsan meesha aan ku joogaa’  
b) ‘waan aamminaa wixii ay faafiyaan’  
c) ‘waan is garanaynaa dadka soo saarayaan website-kaas’  
d) ‘waan raacsanaa ra’igooda (tusaale ahaan xagga siyaasadda, diinta IWM)  
e) ‘Qoyskayga/Ehelkayga way jecelyihiin website-kaas’  
f) Sabab kale (fadlan halkan ku qor):  
............................................................................................................................................................ 
8) Haddaad akhrisaa wargeys ama journal Afka Soomaaliga, muxuu yahay wargeyska oo aad akhrisaa inta ugu 




9) Maxay tahay sababta ugu muhiimsan in aad akrisaa wargeyskaas (fadlan 1 sanduuq ku qor ) [See Q3. Options] 
a) ‘waxay bixiyaan warar ku saabsan meesha aan ku joogaa’  
b) ‘waan aamminaa wixii ay faafiyaan’  
c) ‘waan is garanaynaa dadka soo saarayaan wargeyskaas’  
d) ‘waan raacsanaa ra’igooda (tusaale ahaan xagga siyaasadda, diinta IWM)  
e) ‘QoyskaygaEhelkayga way jecelyihiin wargeyskaas’  
f) Sabab kale (fadlan halkan ku qor):  
............................................................................................................................................................ 
10) Inta badan, xaggeed ku daawataa wararka TVga? (tusaale: Gurigaaga? Makhaayad? Cafe?...) ................................. 
[Mostly, where do you watch TV news? (e.g. in your home? At a resatuarant? In a cafe?] 
 
11) Inta badan, xaggeed dhegeysataa wararka Raadiyowga? ............................................................[...listen to Radio?] 
 






13) Inta badan, xaggeed ku akhrisaa joornaal/wargeys? ..................................................................[....read newspaper] 
 
14) Miyaad isticmaalaysaa ‘mobile-internet’ ee telefoonkaaga si aad u hesho warar?      Haa  Maya  
 
[Do you use mobile internet to find news? – Y/N] 
 
15) Ma is taqaan qof oo ka shaqayaa/shaqaysaa shirkad warbaahineed?      Haa      Maya  
 
[Do you personally know anyone who works for a media company? – Y/N] 
 
16) Xagga shacabka guud ee xafaaddaada oo aad ku deggentahay, muxuu yahay qaabka/tignoolojiyga warbaahineed 
oo ay isticmaalaan inta ugu badan? 
[In terms of the general population in your neighbourhood, what form of media technology do people use most? 
TV/radio/internet/Newspapers) 
 
TV       Raadiyow      Internet       Wargeys  
 
17) Miyaad akhrisaa/dhegaystaa/daawataa warbaahin ee luuqad kale?      Haa         Maya  
 
[Do you use read/listen/watch media in other languages? Y/N] 
 
a) Haddii jawaabtaadii tahay ‘haa’, maxaad isticmaashaa? (Fadlan halkan ku qor magac 
website/barnaamij/Idaacad iyo luuqadiis) 
*If you answered ‘Yes’,what do you use – please write the name of the website/program/station and the 
language] 
..........................................................................................................................................................................     
Aad baad u mahadsantahay wakhtigaaga iyo caawintaada! 
































Appendix 5. Selected questionnaire results 
 
Individual locations and aggregated results (325 respondents). Data included here pertains most 
directly to thesis chapters‟ analyses. Full data-set retained by author.  
 
Question: ‘Usually, or approximately, how many times per week do you use these forms of media?‘ 
Aggregated percentages (no significant difference between 3 locations) Radio highlighted as most 





p/w twice once 
Less than 
once never   
TV 58.3 13.5 5.9 8.0 6.3 8.0 100.0 
Radio 59.9 10.0 5.6 7.8 6.3 10.4 100.0 
Newspaper 24.1 9.2 7.2 17.7 17.3 24.5 100.0 
Website 57.9 9.5 8.4 8.4 6.6 9.2 100.0 
 
















































Question: ‗If you listen to radio news, which channel do you listen to most?‘ 
 
         































































Question: ‘If you read online Somali language news, which website do you use most often?‘ This 
generated 64 different answers, with no single dominant website being identifiable across the 
research sites. Data from question 8 on newspaper consumption is not included here as there are no 
„national‟ print newspapers consumed across the three territories.  
 
Question: ‗Do you use mobile internet to find news?‘ Yes 77%; No 23% (Aggregate: no noticeable 
different across 3 sites) 
 
Question: ‗Do you personally know anyone who works for a media company?‘ Yes 63%; No 37% 
(Aggregate: no noticeable different across 3 sites) 
 
Question: In terms of the general population in your neighbourhood, what form of media technology 






Question: ‗Do you use read/listen/watch media in other languages?‘  Yes: 77%; No 23% (Aggregate: 
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